Central Administrative Tribunal - Lucknow
Parmanand Prasad Misra vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Ors. on 28 May, 2003
Equivalent citations: 2004(2)SLJ358(CAT)
ORDER A.K. Misra, Member (A)
1. The applicant of this O. A. has prayed for quashing the disciplinary proceedings against him on the ground that initiation of such proceedings was arbitrary and in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India because of the delay in the initiation of such proceedings and non-conclusion of the proceedings within a reasonable time frame.
2. Pleadings on record have been perused and learned Counsel for the parties have been heard.
3. The brief facts of the case are that the applicant was issued a charge sheet by memorandum dated 27.2.2001 which was served upon him on 12.6.2001 i.e., after a lapse of about three and half months from the date of issue of charge sheet. The charge sheet contains only one charge relating to the year 1992-1993 when the applicant was functioning as SDO (P) (North) under the Divisional Engineer Telephones, Kaisarbagh. The only charge was failure to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty and acting in a manner unbecoming of a Government servant. The charge in brief was that while working as SDO, a telephone No, 231969 was opened in the name of one Sri S.P. Agrawal on 19.12.1992 in Diamond Dairy Colony and the said telephone connection had STD and ISD facility. The telephone was opened at the residence of Sri A.M. Khan. According to the charge sheet the JTO (NE) informed the applicant by his letter dated 3rd March, 1993 that the telephone No. 231969 was being misused but the applicant did not take any action on the report of the JTO Sri S.K. Mishra dated 3rd March, 1993. Instead the applicant informed the DE (Phones) of the misuse of the telephone only on 7th April, 1993 after a lapse of a little more than one month. The telephone connection as a result could be disconnected only after 7.4.1993 as a result of which the Department suffered a loss of Rs. 238612/-. There is no other charge against the applicant. It may also be stated here that the JTO Sri S. K. Mishra was also issued a charge sheet dated 24.4.97 under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. The charge against the JTO is closely related to the charge against the applicant. The charge sheet issued to the JTO Sri S.K. Mishra also contains one charge according to which the JTO during his posting as JTO (NE) under SDO Phones (North), Kaisarbagh during the period 1992-93 without verifying the bonafides of the subscriber Sri S.P. Agrawal installed a new telephone connection No. 231969 on 19.12.1992 at the residence of Sri A.M. Khan at Diamond Dairy Colony, Lucknow and also failed to verify the bonafides of the subscriber within a week fortnight after installation of the telephone. Since Sri S.P. Agrawal did not reside at Diamond Dairy Colony and Sri A.M. Khan was already having another telephone connection at his residence, the new telephone No. 239169 installed at the residence of Sri A.M. Khan was misused by him resulting in a loss to the Department of the order of Rs. 968289 between the period 15.1.93 and 2.3.93. There is no other charge against the JTO also. Both the charge sheets one to the JTO and other to the applicant were issued under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules 1965. It is to be noted that whereas the charge sheet was issued to the JTO on 24.4.97, the charge sheet was issued to the applicant on 27.2.2001 i.e., almost after four years from the date of issue of charge sheet to the JTO. Misuse of same telephone number has been alleged in both the charge sheets one issued to the JTO and other to the applicant with the difference that the JTO has been charged for the loss caused between the period 15.1.93 to 2.3.93 and the applicant has been charged in respect of the loss caused between the period 3.3.1993 to 7.4.1993. 4. The case of the applicant is that he has been charge sheeted along with JTO without any reason because he did not commit any misconduct under the CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964. The applicant has submitted that since the JTO was issued a charge sheet and he happened to be the immediate controlling officer of the JTO, he was also charge sheeted along with JTO, though the charge sheet was issued to him after a lapse of four years from the date on which the charge sheet was issued to the JTO. Apart from the fact that the charge sheet issued to him was wholly unwarranted, the applicant has also submitted that the charge sheet issued to him was highly belated as much as for the misconduct, if any, committed in the year 1993, he has been charged sheeted only in the year 2001 after a lapse of eight and half years. It was argued that the charge sheet issued after a lapse of eight and a half years deserves to be quashed on this ground alone. Besides it was submitted that the charge sheet dated 27.2.2001 was served on him only on 12.6.2001 and the Government had not taken any expeditious steps for appointment of the Inquiry Officer and Presenting Officer (in short I.O. and P.O.) who were appointed only on 23.7.2002 i.e., after a lapse of one year and five months from the date of issue of the charge sheet and after a lapse of more than one year from the date on which the charge sheet was served to him. It was also brought to our notice that the appointment of I.O. and P.O. on 23.7.2002 was not made by the Govt. on its own volition but in pursuance of the order dated 10.7.2002 passed by this Tribunal whereby the respondents were directed to finally conclude the disciplinary proceedings pending against the applicant by 31st December, 2002. It was stated in this regard that the time frame fixed by this Tribunal for conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings has not been adhered to by the Government and extension of time was requested by M.P. No. 3687/ 2002 filed on 20.12.2002 prior to expiry of the time allowed by this Tribunal by order dated 10.7.2002. On this application this Tribunal by order dated 3.2.2003 allowed extension of time for finalising the disciplinary proceedings upto 31st March, 2003. Another M.P. No. 763/2003 was filed by the respondents on 7.4.2003 seeking two months further time for finally concluding the disciplinary proceedings pending against the applicant. No orders were passed on M.P. No. 763/2003 seeking two months further extension of time beyond 31st March, 2003 and the M.P. was again listed for orders on 19.5.2003. On this date the case could not be taken up and finally the case was taken up on 21.5.03. Till this date also, the compliance of the order of this Tribunal for finally concluding the disciplinary proceedings had not been made. In the light of these facts it was argued on behalf of the applicant that the charge sheet deserves to be quashed on the ground that the order passed by this Tribunal had not been complied with by the respondents. Reliance was placed in this regard on behalf of the applicant on the followng case law :
1. P.N. Srivastava v. State of U.P. and Ors., (1999) 1 UPLBEC 672 (LKO Bench - Alld.)
2. Anil Kumar Srivastava v. State of U.P., 1993 LAB IC 64.
3. State of M.P. v. Bani Singh, 1990 LAB IC 1488.
4. K.S. Vohra v. D.G., BSF, 1991 LAB IC 70.
5. On behalf of the respondents it has been submitted in the counter affidavit that there was no delay in the issue of charge sheet to the applicant and further that the disciplinary proceedings could not be finalised within the time frame fixed by the Tribunal by orders dated 10.7.2002, 3.2.2002 and 7.4.2003 because the finalisation of the disciplinary proceedings in cases where the charge sheet is issued for major punishment takes a lot of time since the case has to be sent to the CVC for advice at two stages and further the case has also to be sent to the UPSC if a major penalty is to be levied. For this reason it was submitted that proceedings for levy of major penalty take considerable time before they are finalised. In this regard our attention was also invited to a letter dated 20.5.2003 from the Department of Telecommunication, the operative portion of which is reproduced below :
"The Competent Authority has taken a decision on the findings given by the Inquiring Authority in accordance with Sub-rule 2 of Rule 15 of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. Sri P.P. Mishra is being given an opportunity to make a representation against the finding of the Inquiring Authority. Further action in the case will be possible after receipt of his reply."
6. On the basis of this letter of 20.3.2003 it was submitted on behalf of the respondents that the disciplinary proceedings against the applicant stand finally concluded.
7. As regards the delay in the issue of charge sheet it was submitted on behalf of the respondents that there was no delay in issue of charge sheet and in this regard our attention was invited to Para 4 of the counter in which a chronology has been given to show how the matter was investigated by the CBI and how the matter was being considered by the CVC and by the Department before a charge sheet could be issued to the applicant. In the light of the chronology of events given in Para 4 of the counter, it has been stated that it cannot be said that any delay had taken place in the issue of charge sheet to the applicant. It was also argued on behalf of the respondents that the O.A. on this basis is pre-mature because the cause of action would arise to the applicant only after the disciplinary proceedings are finally concluded by levy of penalty or alternatively by exonerating the applicant from the charges. It was also argued on behalf of the respondents that the inquiry and final action on the inquiry report also takes a lot of time because the disciplinary proceedings reach the stage of finalisation only after preliminary hearing, appointment of I.O. and P.O., appointment of defence assistant, examiantion of defence witnesses, examination of the charged official and finalisation of the inquiry report. Thus it was submitted that neither any delay can be said to have taken place in the issue of charge sheet dated 27.2.2002 nor any delay can be said to have taken place in completing the inquiry. Reference in this regard was made on behalf of the respondents to the following case law :
1. B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India and Anr., 1996(1) LBESR 424 (SC)
2. State of Punjab and Ors. v. Chaman Lal Goyal, 1995(1) LBESR 534= 1995(2) SLJ 126 (SC).
3. DIG of Police v. K.S. Swaminathan, 1997(1) LBESR 697.
4. Munni Lal Tripathi v. Principal Secretary, Satarkta Anubhag, U.P. 2002(2) LBESR 273.
5. S.S. Budan, IAS v. Chief Secretary, Central Administration, Govt. of A.P., 1993(1) ATJ 336.
6. Umapada Babu v. UOI and Ors., 1993(2) ATJ 492.
8. We have considered the facts of the case and submissions made on behalf of the applicant and on behalf of the respondents. The fact that the alleged misconduct which was subject of the charge sheet issued to the applicant was committed in January, 1993 is not in dispute. It is also not in dispute that the charge sheet was issued only on 27.2.2001 after a lapse of more than eight years and was served on 12th June, 2001 after three and half months is also not in dispute. Thus prima facie it is obvious that the charge sheet which was served on the applicant on 12.6.2001 related to a misconduct alleged to have been committed eight and half years ago. The chronology of events relating to the issue of charge sheet from the stage of investigation by the CBI to the stage of the first and second advice by the CVC does not explain the delay of eight and half years in the issue of charge sheet. The matter was taken up for the first time by the CBI for investigation only on 27th October, 1995 i.e., after about 3 years from the date of alleged misconduct. Thereafter the first stage advice was given by the CVC only on 12th July, 1996 after a lapse of almost 10 months. Thereafter after a lapse of four years, the first stage advice of the CVC was accepted and a charge sheet was served on the applicant in June, 2001. It is stated in Paragraph 4(g) of the counter that on 18th November, 1997, the CVC requested to wait for the out come of the enquiry instituted against the JTO who was a co-accused and to revert back after the enquiry against the JTO is completed. Thereafter, although as stated in Para 4(h) of the counter, the inquiry against the JTO was completed on 21st July, 1999, the charge sheet was issued only on 22.2.2001 after a lapse of more than one and half years. From these details given in the counter, it can not be said that there was no delay in issue of charge sheet. The delay which is wholly explained in our opinion, is of taking cognizance of an event in October, 1995 which had occured in January, 1993. We also do not understand why the CVC on 18.11.1997 advised to wait for the out-come of the inquiry instituted against the JTO who was the co-accused before proceeding further to issue a charge sheet to the applicant. This itself caused a delay of about three and half years. Besides although the inquiry was completed against the JTO in July, 1999, the charge sheet was served on the applicant only in June, 2001 after a lapse of two years.
8A. Further even after the charge sheet was served on the applicant on 12.6.2001, no action was taken for the appointment of P.O. and I.O. till an order was passed by this Tribunal on 10th July, 2002 directing that the disciplinary proceedings be finally concluded by 31st December, 2002. As already stated the I.O. and P.O. were appointed on 23.7.2002 after a lapse of more than one year from the date of service of the charge sheet. This date also was wholly unjustified specially in the light of the fact that the respondents were very well aware that the applicant is to supperannuate on 31st May 2003. Further the order passed by this Tribunal on 10.7.2002 directing the respondents to finally conclude the disciplinary proceedings by 31st December, 2002 was not complied with. However, on M.P. No. 3687/2002 was filed on 20.12.2002 along with counter seeking further extension of time for eight months. Since the applicant was to supperannuate on 31.5.2003, extension was granted only for three months upto 31st March, 2003 for finalising the disciplinary proceedings. Even this time frame fixed by this Tribunal by order dated 3.2.2003 was not adhered to and on 7.4.2003 when the case was listed, another M.P. No. 763/2003 dated 7.4.2003 was filed seeking further extension of time upto 30th April, 2003. By this date also the disciplinary proceedings were not finalised and hence no orders were passed on M.P. No. 763/2003 whereby the extension of time was sought upto 30.4.2003. The case was finally listed on 21.5.2003 and on this date a letter dated 20.5.2003 was filed from the Department of Telecommunication extracts of which have been reproduced above in Paragraph No. 5 from which it would be obvious that the disciplinary proceedings could not be concluded even upto 21st May, 2003. It is also not worthy that when extension of time was sought upto 31st March, 2003 by M.P. No. 3687/2002, during the course of hearing of this M.P. on 3.2.2003, Ld. Counsel for the respondents stated at the Bar that he will not take any further extension of time beyond 31st March, 2003 for finalising the proceedings. Despite this express undertaking another M.P. No. 763/2003 was again filed on 7.4.2003 by respondents after the expiry of the date fixed for finalising the proceedings (31.3.2003) and it was stated again by Ld. Counsel for the respondents on 7.4.2003 when the case was listed that the disciplinary proceedings will be finalisd before the end of April 2003. As already stated above, proceedings have not been finalised till date and the order dated 20.5.2003 passed by the Department, extracts of which have been reproduced above in Paragraph No. 5 does not even remotely suggest that the proceedings have been finalised.
8B. The proceedings could not be finalised by the respondents in spite of four opportunities given to the respondents and in spite of express undertaking given by the Ld. Counsel for the respondents at the Bar that he will not take any further extension of time beyond 31st March, 2003 for finalising the disciplinary proceedings, as also the submission made on 7.4.2003 at the Bar that the disciplinary proceedings will be finalised by the end of April, 2003. In the light of these facts, M.P. No. 763/2003 is rejected more so because this M.P. was filed on 7.4.2003 after the expiry of the undertaking given by the Ld. Counsel for the respondents at the Bar that no further time for finalising the proceedings shall be taken beyond 31st March, 2003. The judgment of the Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench in the case of P.N. Srivastava v. State of U.P. (supra) relied upon on behalf of the applicant is squarely applicable to the facts of this case. In this case the Hon'ble High Court held that since the directions for completing the inquiry within a given time frame allowed were not complied with and no application for extension of time was filed, inquiry stood vitiated. In the case of the present O. A. second extension of time for finalising the proceedings was sought by application dated 7.4.2003 after the expiry of the time allowed upto 31st March, 2003 on the express undertaking given that no further time will be sought beyond 31st March, 2003. Since disciplinary proceedings in the case of the applicant of the present O.A. could not be completed by 31 st March, 2003 and the application for further extension (M.P. No. 763/ 2003) was belated having been filed on 7.4.2003 and the failure to honour the undertaking given on behalf of the respondents on 3.2.2003 that no further extension of time beyond 31st March, 2003 will be taken, the disciplinary proceedings initiated by issue of charge sheet dated 27.2.2001 deserve to be quashed. Reliance for this purpose is also placed on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of All India Reporter Kurmchari Sangh and Anr. v. All India Reporter Ltd., 1998 (Supplement) SCC 477=1989(1) SLJ 208 (SC), the decision in the case of M.L. Sachdeva v. Union of India, (1991) 1 SCC 605 and the decision in the case of State of Bihar and Ors. v. Subhash Singh, (1997) 4 SCC 430. In all these decisions the Apex Court held that judgments of the Supreme Court and High Courts are almost as important as statutes, rules and regulations passed by the competent legislatures and other bodies since they affect the public generally.
8 C. In the case of M.L. Sachdeva v. Union of India (supra) the Apex Court held that it was the obligation of the Govt. to comply with the directions on or before the expiry of the time allowed. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that where it was found that prior to the extended date, the directions could not be complied with, it was the obligation of the respondent contemner to approach the Court for further extension of time. Similarly in the case of State of Bihar v. Subhash Singh (supra), the Apex Court held that if there was any unavoidable delay in complying with the directions given by the Court, further time for compliance should be sought. In the light of these judgments the charge sheet dated 27.2.2001 deserves to be quashed for the reason that there was no compliance of the directions given by this Tribunal by order dated 3.2.2003 for finalising the disciplinary proceedings by 31st March, 2003.
9. Further as already observed above in Paragraph Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 6, the charge sheet issued to the applicant is also very much belated having been issued on 27.2.2001 in relation to a misconduct alleged to have been committed in February, March, 1993. Besides the Inquiry Officer and Presenting Officer were appointed on 23.7.2002, one and half years after issue of the charge sheet and that too only after an order for finalising the disciplinary proceedings by 31st December, 2003 was passed by this Tribunal on 10.7.2002. Reference in this regard may be made to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of State of M.P. v. Bani Singh and Anr. (supra). In this case it was held by the Apex Court that where the Department was aware of the involvement of an officer alleged irregularities and no satisfactory explanation was given by the Department for the inordinate delay in issuing the charge sheet after a lapse of 12 years, the charge sheet was liable to be quashed. In the case of the applicant of the present O. A. also there was a delay of more than 8 years in the issue of charge sheet from the date on which the alleged misconduct is stated to have been committed and hence the ratio of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of State of M.P. v. Bani Singh (supra), will squarely be applicable.
10. In the case of State of Punjab and Ors. v. Chaman Lal Goyal (supra), relied upon by the respondents it was observed as under by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India :
"Disciplinary proceedings must be conducted soon after the irregularities are committed or soon after discovering the irregularities. They cannot be initiated after lapse of considerable time as it would not be fair to the delinquent officer. Delayed initiation of the proceedings is bound to give room for allegations of bias, malafides and misuse of power. If the delay is too long and is unexplained, the Court may well interfere and quash the charges. Moreover, if such delay is likely to cause prejudice to the delinquent officer in defending himself, the enquiry has to be interdicted (Para 9)."
11. In the case of Chaman Lal Goyal (supra) the Apex Court allowed the enquiry which had proceeded to a large extent to be completed and directed that the respondents in that case should be considered forthwith for promotion without taking into consideration the pendency of the enquiry and should be promoted immediately if found fit. The Apex Court also provided that the promotion so made of the respondents shall be subject to review after the conclusion of the inquiry and in the light of the findings in the inquiry. In the case of Chaman Lal Goyal (supra) the Apex Court also observed in Para 13 that the inquiry shall be concluded within eight months and if the inquiry is not concluded and final orders are not passed within the aforesaid period of eight months, the Apex Court directed that the inquiry shall be deemed to have been dropped. Thus the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Chaman Lal Goyal relied upon on behalf of the respondents favours the applicant more than it furthers the case of the respondents because in the case of the applicant also the time frame for finalising the disciplinary proceedings given on more than one occasion had not been adhered to by the respondents. This apart from the fact that the charge sheet was issued after eight and half years from the date of the alleged misconduct as also the fact that the Inquiry Officer and Presenting Officer were appointed after about one and half years from the date of issue of the charge sheet and that too after an order dated 10.7.2002 was passed by this Tribunal directing to finalise the disciplinary proceedings by 31st December. 2002.
12. The direction in the case of Chaman Lal Goyal for allowing promotion to the applicant forthwith without taking into consideration the pendency of the enquiry and for reviewing the promotion in case it becomes necessary on the basis of findings recorded by the I.O. on conclusion of the inquiry was given in the special circumstances in that case.
13. On behalf of the respondents reliance was placed on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of B.C. Chaturvedi v.. U.O.I, (supra). The decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of B. C. Chaturvedi (supra), to our mind is not applicable to the facts as obtaining in the case of the applicant. The case of B.C. Chaturvedi (supra), was a case of disproportionate assets and in that context it was held by the Apex Court that the Courts in exercise of powers of judicial review should not modify the punishment unless it is grossly disproportionate to the charges. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further observed that the technical rules of evidence do not apply to the disciplinary proceedings and the Tribunal should not examine the adequacy of facts relied upon for which the Disciplinary Authority is the sole Judge. The Apex Court observed that it should however be seen by the Court that the principles of natural justice were observed, statutory rules were not violated and the conclusion arrived at was not perverse.
14. Reliance placed on behalf of the applicant in the cases of DIG Police v. K. Swaminathan (supra), Muni Lal Tripathi v. Principal Secretary, Satarkta Anubhag of U.P. (supra) and Umapada Babu v. Union of India and Ors. (supra) is wholly misconceived in as much as none of these decisions are even remotely related to the issue under consideration in the case of the applicant of the present O.A. In the case of DIG Police v. K. Swaminathan (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that Tribunals/ Courts would not be justified to examine whether the charges are true because that would be a matter for consideration by the I.O. during the course of the inquiry. Accordingly the Apex Court held that the Tribunal was not justified in quashing the charges at the initial stage. In the case of Munni Lal Tripathi v. Principal Secretary, Satarkta Anubhag (supra), the Hon'ble High Court of Allahabad held that even after retirement, disciplinary proceedings could be initiated and in that context it was held that if the assets owned by a public servant are disproportionate to his known sources of income, a criminal prosecution can always be launched even after retirement. Similarly in the case of Umapada Babu v. Union of India (supra), the Apex Court held that the disciplinary proceedings can be continued even after the retirement of a public servant regardless of the fact whether he was placed under suspension or not during his service tenure. In the case of S.S. Sudan, IAS v. Chief Secretary, General Administration, Govt. of A.P. (supra), it was held by the Hyderabad Bench of this Tribunal that whereon the disciplinary proceedings against a member of the IAS initiated only in 1983 could not be concluded till 1986, the same cannot be quashed on the ground of delay. The finding in this regard was given by the Hyderabad Bench of this Tribunal in the context of grant of selection grade during pendency of the disciplinary proceedings.
15. The Apex Court in the case of State of Punjab v. Chainan Lal Goyal referred to the decision of the Constitution Bench in the case of A.R. Antuley v. R.S. Nayak and Ors., 1992(1) SCC 225. In the case of A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, the Apex Court came to the conclusion that ultimately the Court has to balance and weigh several relevant factors and determine whether the right, to speedy trial has been denied in a given case. The Constitution Bench of the Apex Court observed that ordinarily speaking, where the Court comes to the conclusion that right to speedy trial of the accused has been infringed, the charges or the conviction as the case may be will be quashed but observed that this was not the only course open to the Courts and that in a given case the nature of offence and other circumstances may not justify quashing of the proceedings. In the case of the present applicant we have seen that the nature of the charge cannot be said to be so grave as to allow the disciplinary proceedings to prolong even after superannuation of the applicant regardless of the fact that the disciplinary proceedings were not completed within the time frame given by this Tribunal and regardless of the fact that the charge sheet was issued after a lapse of eight and half years from the date of alleged misconduct, although the only charge against the applicant was that he kept the letter dated 3.3.93 of the JTO pending, for a little over a month upto 7th April, 1993 and during this period the telephone No. 231969 was misused causing a loss of Rs. 238612/- to the Department. The defence of the applicant in this regard has been that the said letter was never received by him on 3.3.1993 and was infact received by him only on 7.4.1993 and his report was sent immediately on the same date to the G.M. (TD) and a copy thereof was endorsed to the DE (Phones) also. The applicant's defence in this regard was that the letter was ante-dated by the JTO and in support of this contention the written statement of Sri Babu Lal the Billing TOC had been relied upon by the applicant in which Sri Babu Lal had stated that the said letter of the JTO was delivered to the applicant only on 7.4.93 and was personally handover to him by the JTO on the same date i.e., on 7.4.93. As already stated above disciplinary proceedings were independently initiated by issue of a charge sheet against the JTO also. Though we refrain ourselves from giving any finding on the nature of charge against the applicant, since the matter is already under consideration of the Departmental authorities, we feel that prima facie charge against the applicant does not warrant that the proceedings against the applicant should be prolonged even after his superannuation specially in the light of the factual position discussed in Paragraph Nos. 3 to 7.
16. Reference in this regard may also be made to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh v. N. Radhakrishnan, AIR 1998 SC 1833=1998(3) SLJ 162 (SC). The observations of the Apex Court made in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh v. N. Radhakrishnan are reproduced below :
"The delinquent employee has a right that disciplinary proceedings against him are concluded expeditiously and he is not made to undergo mental agony and also monetary loss when these are unnecessarily prolonged without any fault on his part in delying the proceedings. In considering whether delay has vitiated the disciplinary proceedings the Court has to consider the nature of charge, its complexity and on what account the delay has occurred. If the delay is unexplained prejudice to the delinquent employee is writ large on the face of it."
17. The observations of the Apex Court and the ratio laid down in the case of N. Rudhakrishnun (supra) is fully applicable to the facts as obtaining in the case of the applicant of the present O.A.
18. In the light of the factual position discussed in Paragraph Nos. 3 to 8C and the case law discussed, we are of the opinion that the chargesheet dated 27.2.2001 which was served on the applicant on 12th June, 2001 deserves to be quashed. This is in view of the fact, that there was unexplained delay of eight and half years in issuing the charge sheet. Further there was unexplained delay of about three and a half month in serving the charge sheet dated 27.2.2001 on the applicant. Besides the time frame fixed by this Tribunal for finalising the disciplinarly proceedings on as many as four dates i.e., on 10.7.2002, 3.2.2003, 7.4.2003 and on 30.4.2003 was not adhered to by the respondents. Besides the undertaking given by the Ld. Counsel at the bar on 3.2.2003 that he will not request for any further extension of time for finalising the disciplinary proceedings was also not honoured and thereafter adjournment was sought on behalf of the respondents on two dates on 7.4.2003 and 30.4.2003 on the ground that the disciplinary proceedings arc about to reach finality. We would also mention here that the Enquiry Officer and Presenting Officer had not been appointed even after one and a half years after the issue of the charge sheet and they were finally appointed on 23.7.2002 after an order was passed by this Tribunal on 10.7.2002, directing the respondents to finalise the disciplinary proceedings by 31st December, 2002.
18 A. In view of the foregoing discussion the charge sheet dated 27.2.2001 which was served on the applicant on 12.6.2001 is quashed and the applicant will accordingly be entitled to the usual retirement benefits immediately on his superannuation.
19. In the light of the above discussion the O.A. is allowed without any order as to costs. O.A. allowed.