Kerala High Court
R. Raveendran vs Quilon Commercial And Industrial ... on 22 January, 1993
Equivalent citations: (1993)ILLJ990KER
JUDGMENT M.M. Pareed Pillay, J.
1. In both the original petitions, Exhibit P-2 award of the second respondent-Industrial Tribunal, Quilon, is challenged. Petitioners contend that the maistries working in their factories are not regular employees, that they work only during temporary periods and that in an earlier case, viz., I.D. 1 of 1983, their salary was raised while no relief was given to their claim regarding dearness allowance etc., and so the Tribunal was not justified in passing Exhibit P-2 award. It is also contended by the petitioners that at any rate the second respondent was not justified in passing the award with effect from January 30, 1985.
2. On a consideration of the evidence the second respondent held that the maistries are also entitled to get all benefits like other monthly paid staff in the companies, i.e., basic pay, fixed dearness allowance, variable clearness allowance, leave amenities etc., as claimed by the union. This Court cannot re appreciate the evidence and substitute its own finding in a proceeding under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.
3. Contention of the petitioners that the decision in I.D. 1 of 1983 would operate as res judicata in the present proceedings has to be considered. In I.D. 1 of the 1983, the Tribunal held that the maistries are entitled to enhancement of Rs. 65 per month in their basic pay from January 1, 1983. The Tribunal held that it is not in favour of changing the rate of dearness allowance indicated in the minimum wage notification. Petitioners maintain that in view of the award in I.D.1 of 1983, Exhibit P-2 award cannot be sustained as the former award operates as res judicata,
4. Section 19(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, provides that an award shall remain in operation for a period of one year from the date on which the award becomes enforceable under Section 17-A. Of course, it can be terminated by any party to it by giving notice as required under Section 19(6). First proviso is to the effect that the appropriate Government may reduce the period and fix such period as it thinks fit. Second proviso curtails the powers of the Government by making it clear that it cannot extend the period beyond one year at a time. It also specifically says that the total period of operation of any award cannot be extended; beyond three years from the date on which it came into operation. Sub-section (6) states that the award shall continue to be binding on the parties until a period of two months has elapsed from the date on which notice is given by any party bound by the award to the other party or parties intimating its intention to terminate the award. Unlike a decree or order of a civil court the award under the Act cannot be considered to be conclusive between the parties as it is limited I to the duration for which it remains effective and in force as provided under Section 19 of the Act. As Section 19 is categoric that the award is of limited duration, it is futile to contend that findings in an award would operate as res judicata in a subsequent award.
5. The Tribunal held that the maistries are entitled to get the benefits as claimed by the union with effect from January 30, 1985. That finding requires modification as I hold that they are entitled to it only from the date of reference, viz., April 22, 1986.
6. The writ petitions are dismissed subject to 5 the above modification.