Telangana High Court
M/S R.R.M. Educational Society, And 7 ... vs State Of Telangana, And Another on 21 April, 2026
ETD,J
Crl.P.No.2246_2020
1
IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA
AT HYDERABAD
THE HON'BLE SMT. JUSTICE TIRUMALA DEVI EADA
CRIMINAL PETITION No.2246 OF 2020
Date: 21.04.2026
Between:
M/s.R.R.M. Educational Society
Rep. by its President & Secretary,
Mr.Kedari Joseph Sriharsha Shashank
and others ... Petitioners/
Accused
AND
The State of Telangana,
rep. by its Public Prosecutor,
High Court for the State of Telangana
at Hyderabad and another ... Respondents
::ORDER::
This Criminal Petition is filed by the petitioners - accused seeking to quash the proceedings in C.C.No.5247 of 2022 on the file of the learned Special Judicial Magistrate of First Class (Mobile) under PCR Act-cum-II Additional Junior Civil Judge at Hanumakonda, Hanumakonda District, registered for the offences under Section 138 read with Section 142 of Negotiable Instruments Act.
ETD,J Crl.P.No.2246_2020 2
2. The case of the complainant is that accused No.1 is a registered Educational Society represented by its President and Secretary Mr.Kedari Joseph Sriharsha Shashank, who is arrayed as accused No.2, accused No.3 is the Vice President and Treasurer, accused No.4 is the Joint Secretary, accused No.5 is the correspondent, accused Nos.6 to 8 are the members of the accused society. It is submitted that the accused society was not having its own building to run its college, hence, the then management committee during 2008 intended to purchase the property in the name of M/s.R.R.M.Educational Society for the purpose of having its own independent premises. Consequently, the then management committee has purchased a building with a constructed area of 75000 sft over an area of Ac.08-00 at Patancheru by way of registered sale deed from M/s.Trans Asia Overseas Trading Corporation for a total sale consideration of Rs.14,50,00,000/-. M/s.R.R.M.Educational Society was not having its own resources to meet the sale consideration and thus, it decided to raise loans from the complainant society i.e. Aurora Educational Society, Ravi Rishi ETD,J Crl.P.No.2246_2020 3 Educational Society, Karshak Vidya Parishad and from their sponsored colleges and also from one Mrs.Yashoda, W/o.late N.Seethaiah. It is the further case of the complainant that M/s.R.R.M.Educational Society has passed a resolution to raise a loan amount of Rs.15,87,258/- from the complainant society and that M/s.R.R.M.Educational Society also resolved to repay the above said loan amount of Rs.15,87,258/- to the complainant society on interest free basis by October, 2018. Consequently the complainant society has passed a corresponding resolution to accept the repayment of above said loan on interest free basis within the stipulated time. That acknowledging the receipt of loan amount of Rs.15,87,258/- from the complainant society, the M/s.R.R.M.Educational Society represented by it's the then authorized signatory who is accused No.9 has issued a postdated cheque dated 15.10.2018 to the complainant society, drawn on IDBI Bank, Basheerbagh branch for a sum of Rs.15,87,258/-. It is further submitted that in pursuance to an understanding to transfer the management of M/s.R.R.M.Educational Society, accused Nos.2 to 4 were admitted as members of the society with ETD,J Crl.P.No.2246_2020 4 effect from 28.12.2012 and a new managing committee consisting of accused Nos.2 to 4 were elected with effect from 05.09.2013. Consequently, the old committee members of M/s.R.R.M.Educational Society including accused No.9 resigned from the executive committee and from the primary membership of M/s.R.R.M.Educational Society and that accused Nos.2 to 8 formed new managing committee. Further, at the time of handing over of the managing committee of A1 society by A2 to A8, they were well informed about the existing liabilities of A1 towards the complainant society and other educational societies, including the existing outstanding bank loans. When the cheque was presented on 24.12.2018, the banker returned the same with the reason for insufficient funds. Pursuant to the same, a legal notice was issued on 16.01.2019 and inspite of receipt of notice, the respondents i.e. petitioners herein have failed to pay the said amount. Hence, the complaint has been filed vide C.C.No.3395 of 2019.
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3. Heard the submissions of Sri Sricharan Telaprolu, learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri Tarun G.Reddy, learned counsel for respondent No.2.
4. The learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the entire averments in the complaint if examined do not constitute any offence against the petitioners/A1 to A8 to constitute an offence under 138 of NI Act. He further submitted that the loan obtained is in the name of fictitious society and the current account opened with the documents relating to the fictitious society, belongs to A9 and his other family members but not related to A1 to A8. He further submitted that the constitution of new executive committee is with Mr.N.Anudeep as President and also change of registered address of accused No.1, in pursuance to the meeting held on 10.09.2009 was submitted to the Registrar of Societies on 17.09.2009 and the corresponding entries were taken on record by the Registrar of Societies on 16.12.2009, as such the availability of certified copy of those entries can be made only after 16.12.2009, however the fabricated byelaws created ETD,J Crl.P.No.2246_2020 6 for the purpose of claiming the fictitious society through Mr.N.Ramesh Babu as the founder president from 08.09.1999 and submitted to IDBI bank for securing term loan and for opening current account during September, 2009 itself shows that the said account do not pertain to accused No.1 and that they are fictitious accounts being operated by accused No.9 and his other family members, thus, neither A1 nor A2 to A8 have nothing to do with the claim of the complainant. Thus, there is no case at all to be kept pending against the petitioners herein and that continuation of proceedings would be an abuse of process of law. He further submitted that there is no acknowledgment of debt by A2 to A8 on behalf of A1 and that there is no legally enforceable debt to which A2 to A8 can be held liable, therefore in the absence of legally enforceable debt, the ingredients of 138 of NI Act would not get attracted and hence, on that count the proceedings in C.C.No.5247 of 2022 cannot be continued, he therefore, prayed to quash the proceedings against the petitioners.
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5. The learned counsel for respondent No.2 submitted that the present petition itself is not maintainable and that Section 482 of Cr.P.C. cannot be invoked to go into the details of the functioning of the society, the existence of the old body and the taking over of the society by the new management committee so on and so forth. He further submitted that the complaint discloses prima facie case against the society and its management committee and thus, the proceedings are to continue before the trial Court. The fabrication of byelaws and the allegation of fictitious society if any are to be decided during the course of trial. He therefore, prayed to dismiss the petition.
6. In reply to the said arguments, learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that there are legal grounds on which the petition is entitled to be allowed and that the transactions pertain to 2008 when the petitioners were not the directors, hence, on that ground alone the petitioners are to be exempted from any liability, thus, the proceedings cannot be continued.
7. Perused the record.
ETD,J Crl.P.No.2246_2020 8
8. The allegations in the complaint point out a prima facie case under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act. The contention of the petitioners counsel is that the petitioners are not the members of the A1 society as on the date of resolution passed by the earlier members to buy the property by obtaining loan. In pursuance to which, the cheque is issued and that there is no acknowledgment of debt by the current members. Admittedly, the petitioners herein are the existing members of the M/s.R.R.M.Educational Society and the cheque is of the year 2018. Admittedly, the petitioners herein joined the society in 2012 and further, the executive committee on 05.09.2013. As per the written submissions filed by the petitioners counsel, the petitioners also admit that the cheque is a post dated cheque issued by the previous authorized signatory, accused No.9.
9. The only contention of the petitioners counsel is that there is an absence of acknowledgment, i.e., the current members have not acknowledged the debt that was incurred ETD,J Crl.P.No.2246_2020 9 by the earlier management when the management of the society was handed over to the existing members.
10. The learned petitioners counsel submits that the certified copy of certificate of registration submitted by the IDBI bank before DRT discloses that the byelaws of the society annexed to the certificate of registration portray the location of the society as G2, SBI Colony, Bagh Amberpet, Hyderabad and the contention of the petitioner counsel is that they are the fake byelaws. He referred to the declaration submitted by the then members wherein it is mentioned that N.Ramesh Babu is the President, N.Yashoda is the Vice-president, N.Raja Babu is the General Secretary, N.Sulochana is the Joint Secretary and N.Manjusha is the Treasurer, contending that they run contrary to the original bye-laws filed by the petitioner. According to the petitioners counsel, the original bye-laws submitted for registration are handwritten and it discloses that the President is P.Narayan Reddy, vice-president is P.Vinatha Reddy, General Secretary is A.Mahesh Reddy, Joint Secretary is A.Bhupathi and Treasurer is A.Radha. Thus, the counsel ETD,J Crl.P.No.2246_2020 10 contends that since the debt incurred itself is in pursuance of fake bye-laws and the cheque issued in discharge of the same is signed by the then authorized secretary i.e. accused No.9, the petitioners herein who are the existing members who came into the society from 2013 cannot be fastened with any liability under the said cheque. The genuineness of the bye-laws cannot be adjudged by this Court and it is a triable issue.
11. The disputed cheque is issued by M/s.R.R.M.Educational Society signed by authorized signatory and it is dated 15.10.2018. Admittedly, the authorized signatory is accused No.9 who left the society in 2012 and the society was taken over by the new members who are the petitioners herein. Thus, it is a post dated cheque and the signatory would be liable in case of a post dated cheque as it was held in Sunil Todi v. State of Gujarat1.
12. The learned counsel for the petitioners contention is that the ingredients of Section 141 of NI Act have to be fulfilled to 1 (2022) 16 SCC 762 ETD,J Crl.P.No.2246_2020 11 fix up the liability on the existing members of the society for the acts of the prior members.
13. He relied on the decision of the Apex Court in S.M.S.Pharmaceuticals Ltd., v. Neeta Bhalla and another 2, wherein it was held at para No.19 as follows:
"In view of the above discussion, our answers to the questions posed in the reference are as under:
(a) It is necessary to specifically aver in a complaint under Section 141 that at the time the offence was committed, the person accused was in charge of, and responsible for the conduct of business of the company. This averment is an essential requirement of Section 141 and has to be made in a complaint. Without this averment being made in a complaint, the requirements of Section 141 cannot be said to be satisfied.
(b) The answer to question posed in sub-para (b) has to be in the negative. Merely being a director of a company is not sufficient to make the person liable under Section 141 of the Act. A director in a company cannot be deemed to be in charge of and responsible to the company for conduct of its business. The requirement of Section 141 is that the person sought to be made liable should be in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company at the relevant time. This has to be averred as a fact as there is no deemed liability of a director in such cases.
(c) The answer to Question (c ) has to be in affirmative. The question notes that the managing director or joint managing director would be admittedly in charge of the company and responsible to the company for conduct of its business. When that is so, holders of such positions in a company become liable under Section 141 of the Act. By virtue of the office they hold as managing director or joint managing director, these persons are in charge of and responsible for the conduct of business of the company. Therefore, they get covered under Section 141. So far as signatory of a cheque which is dishonoured is concerned, he is clearly responsible for the incriminating act and will be covered under sub- section (2) of Section 141."
2 (2005) 8 Supreme Court Cases 89 ETD,J Crl.P.No.2246_2020 12
14. He further relied on National Small Industries Corporation Limited v. Harmeet Singh Paintal and another 3, wherein it was held at para No.39 as follows:
"39. From the above discussion, the following principles emerge:
(i) The primary responsibility is on the complainant to make specific averments as are required under the law in the complaint so as to make the accused vicariously liable. For fastening the criminal liability, there is no presumption that every Director knows about the transaction.
(ii) Section 141 does not make all the Directors liable for the offence. The criminal liability can be fastened only on those who, at the time of the commission of the offence, were in charge of and were responsible for the conduct of the business of the company.
(iii) Vicarious liability can be inferred against a company registered or incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 only if the requisite statements, which are required to be averred in the complaint/petition, are made so as to make accused therein vicariously liable for offence committed by the company along with averments in the petition containing that the accused were in charge of and responsible for the business of the company and by virtue of their position they are liable to be proceeded with.
(iv) Vicarious liability on the part of a person must be pleaded and proved and not inferred.
(v) If the accused is a Managing Director or Joint Managing Director then it is not necessary to make specific averment in the complaint and by virtue of their position they are liable to be proceeded with.
(vi) If the accused is a Director or an Officer of a company who signed the cheques on behalf of the company then also it is not necessary to make specific averment in the complaint.
(vii) The person sought to be made liable should be in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company at the relevant time. This has to be averred as a fact as there is no deemed liability of a Director in such cases."
15. He also relied on Pooja Ravinder Devidasani v. State of Maharashtra and another 4, wherein it was held at para Nos.17, 18 and 19 as follows:
3
(2010) 3 Supreme Court Cases 330 4 (2014) 16 SCC 1 ETD,J Crl.P.No.2246_2020 13 "17. There is no dispute that the appellant, who was wife of the Managing Director, was appointed as a Director of the Company-M/S Elite International Pvt. Ltd. on 1-7-2004 and had also executed a Letter of Guarantee on 19-1-2005. The cheques in question were issued during April, 2008 to September, 2008. So far as the dishonor of Cheques is concerned, admittedly the cheques were not signed by the appellant. There is also no dispute that the appellant was not the Managing Director but only a non-executive Director of the Company.
Non-executive Director is no doubt a custodian of the governance of the Company but does not involve in the day-to-day affairs of the running of its business and only monitors the executive activity. To fasten vicarious liability under Section 141 of the Act on a person, at the material time that person shall have been at the helm of affairs of the Company, one who actively looks after the day-to-day activities of the Company and particularly responsible for the conduct of its business. Simply because a person is a Director of a Company, does not make him liable under the N.I. Act. Every person connected with the Company will not fall into the ambit of the provision. Time and again, it has been asserted by this Court that only those persons who were in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the Company at the time of commission of an offence will be liable for criminal action. A Director, who was not in charge of and was not responsible for the conduct of the business of the Company at the relevant time, will not be liable for an offence under Section 141 of the N.I. Act. In National Small Industries Corporation (supra) this Court observed:
"Section 141 is a penal provision creating vicarious liability, and which, as per settled law, must be strictly construed. It is therefore, not sufficient to make a bald cursory statement in a complaint that the Director (arrayed as an accused) is in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company without anything more as to the role of the Director. But the complaint should spell out as to how and in what manner Respondent 1 was in charge of or was responsible to the accused Company for the conduct of its business. This is in consonance with strict interpretation of penal statutes, especially, where such statutes create vicarious liability.
A company may have a number of Directors and to make any or all the Directors as accused in a complaint merely on the basis of a statement that they are in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company without anything more is not a sufficient or adequate fulfillment of the requirements under Section 141.
18. In Girdhari Lal Gupta Vs. D.H. Mehta & Anr. (1971) 3 SCC 189, this Court observed that a person 'in charge of a business' means that the person should be in overall control of the day to day business of the Company.
19. A Director of a Company is liable to be convicted for an offence committed by the Company if he/she was in charge of and was responsible to the Company for the conduct of its business or if it is proved that the offence was committed with the consent or connivance of, or was attributable to any negligence on the part of the Director concerned."
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16. He further relied on the decision of the Apex Court in Gunmala Sales Private Limited v. Navkar Promoters Private Limited 5, wherein it was held at para Nos.34.1, 34.2, 34.3 and 34.4 as follows:
"34.1. Once in a complaint filed under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the NI Act the basic averment is made that the Director was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company at the relevant time when the offence was committed, the Magistrate can issue process against such Director;
34.2. If a petition is filed under Section 482 of the Code for quashing of such a complaint by the Director, the High Court may, in the facts of a particular case, on an overall reading of the complaint, refuse to quash the complaint because the complaint contains the basic averment which is sufficient to make out a case against the Director.
34.3. In the facts of a given case, on an overall reading of the complaint, the High Court may, despite the presence of the basic averment, quash the complaint because of the absence of more particulars about the role of the Director in the complaint. It may do so having come across some unimpeachable, uncontrovertible evidence which is beyond suspicion or doubt or totally acceptable circumstances which may clearly indicate that the Director could not have been concerned with the issuance of cheques and asking him to stand the trial would be abuse of process of court. Despite the presence of basic averment, it may come to a conclusion that no case is made out against the Director. Take for the instance a case of a Director suffering from a terminal illness who was bedridden at the relevant time or a Director who had resigned long before issuance of cheques. In such cases, if the High Court is convinced that prosecuting such a Director is merely an arm- twisting tactics, the High Court may quash the proceedings. It bears repetition to state that to establish such case unimpeachable, uncontrovertible evidence which is beyond suspicion or doubt or some totally acceptable circumstances will have to be brought to the notice of the High Court. Such cases may be few and far between but the possibility of such a case being there cannot be ruled out. In the absence of such evidence or circumstances, complaint cannot be quashed;
34.4. No restriction can be placed on the High Court's powers under Section 482 of the Code. The High Court always uses and must use this power sparingly and with great circumspection to prevent inter alia the abuse of the process of the Court. There are no fixed formulae to be followed by the High Court in this regard and the exercise of this power depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The High Court at that stage does not conduct a mini trial or roving inquiry, but nothing prevents it from taking unimpeachable evidence or totally acceptable circumstances into account which may lead it to conclude that no trial is necessary qua a particular Director."5
(2015) 1 SCC ETD,J Crl.P.No.2246_2020 15
17. He also relied on the decision of the Apex Court in Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels and Tours Private Limited6, wherein it was held at para Nos.58 and 59 as follows:
"58. Applying the doctrine of strict construction, we are of the considered opinion that commission of offence by the company is an express condition precedent to attract the vicarious liability of others. Thus, the words "as well as the company" appearing in the section make it absolutely unmistakably clear that when the company can be prosecuted, then only the persons mentioned in the other categories could be vicariously liable for the offence subject to the averments in the petition and proof thereof. One cannot be oblivious of the fact that the company is a juristic person and it has its own respectability. If a finding is recorded against it, it would create a concavity in its reputation. There can be situations when the corporate reputation is affected when a director is indicted.
59. In view of our aforesaid analysis, we arrive at the irresistible conclusion that for maintaining the prosecution under Section 141 of the Act, arraigning of a company as an accused is imperative. The other categories of offenders can only be brought in the drag-net on the touchstone of vicarious liability as the same has been stipulated in the provision itself. We say so on the basis of the ratio laid down in C.V. Parekh [(1970) 3 SCC 491: 1971 SCC (Cri) 97] which is a three-Judge Bench decision. Thus, the view expressed in Sheoratan Agarwal [(1984) 4 SCC 352: 1984 SCC (Cri) 620] does not correctly lay down the law and, accordingly, is hereby overruled. The decision in Anil Hada [(2000) 1 SCC 1 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 174] is overruled with the qualifier as stated in para 51. The decision in Modi Distilleries [(1987) 3 SCC 684: 1987 SCC (Cri) 632] has to be treated to be restricted to its own facts as has been explained by us hereinabove."
18. He also relied on the decision of the Apex Court in Pepsi Foods Ltd., v. Special Judicial Magistrate 7, wherein it was held at para No.28 as follows.
6 (2012) 5 Supreme Court Cases 661 7 (1998) 5 Supreme Court Cases 749 ETD,J Crl.P.No.2246_2020 16 "28. Summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter. Criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of course. It is not that the complainant has to bring only two witnesses to support his allegations in the complaint to have the criminal law set into motion. The order of the Magistrate summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. He has to examine the nature of allegations made in the complaint and the evidence both oral and documentary in support thereof and would that be sufficient for the complainant to succeed in bringing charge home to the accused. It is not that the Magistrate is a silent spectator at the time of recording of preliminary evidence before summoning of the accused. The Magistrate has to carefully scrutinise the evidence brought on record and may even himself put questions to the complainant and his witnesses to elicit answers to find out the truthfulness of the allegations or otherwise and then examine if any offence is prima facie committed by all or any of the accused."
19. He further relied on the decision of the Apex Court in Vineet Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh8, wherein it was held at para No.41 as follows:
"41. Inherent power given to the High Court under Section 482 CrPC is with the purpose and object of advancement of justice. In case solemn process of Court is sought to be abused by a person with some oblique motive, the Court has to thwart the attempt at the very threshold. The Court cannot permit a prosecution to go on if the case falls in one of the categories as illustratively enumerated by this Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426] . Judicial process is a solemn proceeding which cannot be allowed to be converted into an instrument of operation or harassment. When there are materials to indicate that a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive, the High Court will not hesitate in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to quash the proceeding under Category 7 as enumerated in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 :
1992 SCC (Cri) 426] , which is to the following effect : (SCC p. 379, para
102) "102. ... (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge."
Above Category 7 is clearly attracted in the facts of the present case. Although, the High Court has noted the judgment of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426] , but did not advert to the relevant facts of the present case, materials on 8 (2017) 13 Supreme Court cases 369 ETD,J Crl.P.No.2246_2020 17 which final report was submitted by the IO. We, thus, are fully satisfied that the present is a fit case where the High Court ought to have exercised its jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC and quashed the criminal proceedings."
20. A perusal of the resolution dated 25.09.2008 reveals that all the members have resolved to procure the entire land of Ac.8.14 guntas along with buildings of 80,000 to 85,000 Sq.fts at IDA, Patancheru for Rs.14.50 crores towards cost of land and buildings and to incur an amount of RS.1.50 crores towards the repairs and maintenance and for shifting of Vanjari Seethaiah Memorial Engineering College from Bandlaguda to IDA, Patancheru and further resolved to procure the buildings only after the land conversion from industrial zone to institutional zone by the landlord and it was discussed about the finances of the society and it was resolved to take financial help from the sister concerned societies, to approach the Banks to get the financial help for purchase of the above property and it was resolved to authorize Mr.N.Raja Babu, General Secretary to deal with the affairs of the company in this regard. Thus, the contention of the petitioner is that the as ETD,J Crl.P.No.2246_2020 18 on the date of the said resolution, the petitioners were not the members of the society.
21. It is pertinent to extract Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 for the sake of reference:
"141. Offences by companies.--(1) If the person committing an offence under section 138 is a company, every person who, at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to, the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly: Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any person liable to punishment if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge, or that he had exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence:
6 [Provided further that where a person is nominated as a Director of a company by virtue of his holding any office or employment in the Central Government or State Government or a financial corporation owned or controlled by the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be, he shall not be liable for prosecution under this Chapter.] (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where any offence under this Act has been committed by a company and it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to, any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.
Explanation.--For the purposes of this section, --
(a) "company" means any body corporate and includes a firm or other association of individuals; and
(b) "director", in relation to a firm, means a partner in the firm."
22. The petitioners are the members of the M/s.R.R.M. Educational Society, hence, the society and its members are arrayed as parties to the proceedings. The only contention of ETD,J Crl.P.No.2246_2020 19 the petitioners is that they were not the members of the society at the time of issuance of cheque.
23. The liability of the existing members is subject to the conditions laid down in Section 141 of the NI Act. The members of the society would not be automatically liable for the acts of others, but such liability is based on the role and responsibility in the society, as it would be in the case of directors of a company. Mere membership does not create liability.
24. As far as the liability of the present existing members is concerned, the Court has to examine the role played by them in the day to day affairs of the society. It will not be within the knowledge of the de facto complainant to know exactly about the role played by the members, as the same pertains to the internal affairs of the society and would be within the knowledge of the petitioners themselves. Thus, the said point can be raised in their defence before the trial Court, but this Court cannot decide the said issue.
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25. The primary contention of the petitioners counsel is that the existing members have not acknowledged the debt while taking over the management of the society.
26. In N.Rangachari v. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd.,9 the Apex Court held at Para No.27 as follows:
"27. We think that, in the circumstances, the High Court has rightly come to the conclusion that it is not a fit case for exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the complaint. In fact, an advertence to Sections 138 and 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act shows that on the other elements of an offence under Section 138 being satisfied, the burden is on the Board of Directors or the officers in charge of the affairs of the company to show that they are not liable to be convicted. Any restriction on their power or existence of any special circumstance that makes them not liable is something that is peculiarly within their knowledge and it is for them to establish at the trial such a restriction or to show that at the relevant time they were not in charge of the affairs of the Company. Reading the complaint as a whole, we are satisfied that it is a case where the contentions sought to be raised by the appellant can only be dealt with after the conclusion (sic commencement) of the trial".
27. In the present case, the case of the petitioners is that they were not the members of the society at the time of issuance of the cheque. However, it is the contention of the complainant that the cheque was issued by accused No. 9 to discharge the loan that was taken by the society for purchasing the building to run the educational institution. The petitioners herein are the existing members of the society running the 9 (2007) 5 Supreme Court Cases 108 ETD,J Crl.P.No.2246_2020 21 institution. Hence, the internal affairs among the existing members and the erstwhile members, and the fact as to the acknowledgment of debt by the existing members from the erstwhile members, are matters to be adjudicated at the time of trial. The said contention is also a triable issue. Thus, the matter needs adjudication before the trial Court. Hence, it is not just and proper to quash the proceedings. However, it is deemed appropriate to dispense with the attendance of the petitioners before the trial Court.
28. Accordingly, this Criminal Petition is disposed of dispensing with the presence of the petitioners before the trial Court provided that she is represented by a counsel before the trial Court on every date of hearing and shall appear before the trial Court whenever her presence is required during the course of trial.
Miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand closed.
____________________________ JUSTICE TIRUMALA DEVI EADA Date: 21.04.2026 ns