Himachal Pradesh High Court
Date Of Decision: 19.3.2026 vs State Of Himachal Pradesh And Ors on 19 March, 2026
Author: Sandeep Sharma
Bench: Sandeep Sharma
2026:HHC:7955
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
CrMMO No. 371 of 2025
Date of Decision: 19.3.2026
.
_____________________________________________________________________
Ram Kumar and Anr.
.........Petitioners
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh and Ors.
.......Respondents
Coram
of
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting? Yes
For the Petitioners: Mr. Janak Raj and Mr. Abhinav Mehta,
rt Advocates.
For the Respondents: Mr. Vishal Panwar, Additional Advocates General
and Mr. Ravi Chauhan & Mr. Anish Banshtu,
Deputy Advocates General.
___________________________________________________________________________
Sandeep Sharma, J. (Oral)
By way of instant petition, prayer has been made by the petitioners for quashing of FIR No. 129 of 2020 dated 24.8.2020, under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of IPC, registered with Police Station Jawali, District Kangra, Himachal Pradesh as well as consequent proceedings pending before the learned trial Court below.
2. Precisely, the grouse of the petitioners as has been highlighted in the petition and further canvassed by Mr. Janak Raj and Mr. Abhinav Mehta, Advocates, is that there is no evidence suggestive of the fact that accident occurred on account of rash and negligent driving of the ::: Downloaded on - 23/03/2026 20:30:45 :::CIS 2 2026:HHC:7955 petitioners and as such, there was no occasion, if any, for the investigating agency to lodge FIR against the petitioners under Sections 279, 337 and .
338 of IPC. While making this Court peruse FIR as well as final report filed under 173 CrPC, above named counsel vehemently argued that the alleged incident came to notice of the police on the basis of information furnished by Medical Officer, CHC Nagrota, before whom petitioners were brought for of treatment. They state that at the time of spot inspection, no person came forward to depose that accident occurred on account of rash and negligent rt driving of the petitioners, rather police after having examined motor cycle allegedly lying on the spot, proceeded to conclude that accident occurred on account of negligence of both the petitioners. They stated that since there is no eye witness to the accident and both the petitioners involved in the accident have been made accused on the basis of circumstantial evidence, there is no likelihood of succeeding the trial, rather continuation of criminal proceedings, if any, pursuant to FIR sought to be quashed would be abuse of process of law and as such, this Court while exercising power under Section 528 of BNSS can proceed to quash the FIR.
3. Mr. Anish Banshtu, learned Deputy Advocate General, while fairly admitting that no independent witnesses ever came to be associated by the investigating agency to establish rash and negligent driving of the ::: Downloaded on - 23/03/2026 20:30:45 :::CIS 3 2026:HHC:7955 petitioners, stated that since factum of accident is not in dispute and at the relevant time, motor cycle involved in the accident was being driven by the .
petitioners, no illegality or infirmity can be said to have been committed by the investigating agency while registering case under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of IPC against both the accused. While referring to the evidence adduced on record, learned Deputy Advocate General, stated that there is of overwhelming evidence suggestive of the fact that in the alleged accident, both the petitioners suffered serious injuries, which is sufficient to connect rt them with the alleged offence and as such, they rightly came to be booked under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of IPC.
4. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused material available on record, this Court finds that SHO after having received telephonic call from the Medical Officer CHC Nagrota that two persons have been brought for treatment on account of injuries suffered in the accident, reached the hospital and attempted to record the statement of petitioners, but since they were declared unfit by the doctor, Investigating Officer reached the spot of accident and on the basis of circumstantial evidence proceeded to lodge FIR against both the petitioners under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of IPC.
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5. After completion of investigation, police presented challan in the competent court of law, but before charge, if any could be framed, .
petitioners, who have been made accused in the FIR sought to be quashed, has approached this Court in the instant proceedings for quashing of FIR.
Careful perusal of challan placed on record under Section 173 CrPC, reveals that no independent witness has been associated, rather police of officials who had no occasion to see the accident have been cited as prosecution witnesses.
6. rt Before ascertaining the genuineness and correctness of the submissions and counter submissions having been made by the learned counsel for the parties vis-à-vis prayer made in the instant petition, this Court deems it necessary to discuss/elaborate the scope and competence of this Court to quash the criminal proceedings while exercising power under Section 528 of BNSS (Section 482 of Cr.PC).
7. Hon'ble Apex Court in judgment titled State of Haryana and others vs. Bhajan Lal and others, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 has laid down several principles, which govern the exercise of jurisdiction of High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C/ Section 528 of BNSS. Before pronouncement of aforesaid judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court, a three-Judge Bench of Hon'ble Court in State of Karnataka vs. L. ::: Downloaded on - 23/03/2026 20:30:45 :::CIS 5 2026:HHC:7955 Muniswamy and others, 1977 (2) SCC 699, held that the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding, if it comes to the conclusion that allowing .
the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed.
Relevant para is being reproduced herein below:-
"7....In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is of entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The saving of the High Court's inherent powers, rt both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose which is that a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice. The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice has got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature. The compelling necessity for making these observations is that without a proper realisation of the object and purpose of the provision which seeks to save the 55 inherent powers of the High Court to do justice, between the State and its subjects, it would be impossible to appreciate the width and contours of that salient jurisdiction."
8. Subsequently, Hon'ble Apex Court in Bhajan Lal (supra), has elaborately considered the scope and ambit of Section 482 Cr.P.C.
::: Downloaded on - 23/03/2026 20:30:45 :::CIS6 2026:HHC:7955 Subsequently, Hon'ble Apex Court in Vineet Kumar and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Anr., while considering the scope of interference under Sections .
397 Cr.PC and 482 Cr.PC, by the High Courts, has held that High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding, if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceedings ought to quashed. The of Hon'ble Apex Court has further held that the saving of the High Court's inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a rt salutary public purpose i.e. a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In the aforesaid case, the Hon'ble Apex Court taking note of seven categories, where power can be exercised under Section 482 Cr.PC, as enumerated in Bhajan Lal (supra), i.e. where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with malafides and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge, quashed the proceedings.
9. Hon'ble Apex Court in Prashant Bharti v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2013) 9 SCC 293, while drawing strength from its earlier judgment titled as Rajiv Thapar and Ors v. Madan Lal Kapoor, (2013) 3 SCC 330, has reiterated that High Court has inherent power under Section ::: Downloaded on - 23/03/2026 20:30:45 :::CIS 7 2026:HHC:7955 482 Cr.PC., to quash the initiation of the prosecution against an accused, at the stage of issuing process, or at the stage of committal, or even at the .
stage of framing of charge, but such power must always be used with caution, care and circumspection. While invoking its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., the High Court has to be fully satisfied that the material produced by the accused is such, that would lead to the of conclusion, that his/their defence is based on sound, reasonable, and indubitable facts and the material adduced on record itself overrules the rt veracity of the allegations contained in the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant. The material relied upon by the accused should be such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the actual basis of the accusations as false. In such a situation, the judicial conscience of the High Court would persuade it to exercise its power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. (now Section 528 of BNSS) to quash such criminal proceedings, for that would prevent abuse of process of the court, and secure the ends of justice. In the aforesaid judgment titled Prashant Bharti v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2013) 9 SCC 293, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under:-
"22. The proposition of law, pertaining to quashing of criminal proceedings, initiated against an accused by a High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to ::: Downloaded on - 23/03/2026 20:30:45 :::CIS 8 2026:HHC:7955 as "the Cr.P.C.") has been dealt with by this Court in Rajiv Thapar & Ors. vs. Madan Lal Kapoor wherein this Court inter alia held as under: (2013) 3 SCC 330, paras 29-30) .
29. The issue being examined in the instant case is the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., if it chooses to quash the initiation of the prosecution against an accused, at the stage of issuing process, or at the stage of committal, or even at the stage of framing of charges. These are all stages before the commencement of the actual trial. The same parameters would of naturally be available for later stages as well. The power vested in the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., at the stages referred to hereinabove, would have far reaching consequences, inasmuch as, it rt would negate the prosecution's/complainant's case without allowing the prosecution/complainant to lead evidence. Such a determination must always be rendered with caution, care and circumspection. To invoke its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. the High Court has to be fully satisfied, that the material produced by the accused is such, that would lead to the conclusion, that his/their defence is based on sound, reasonable, and indubitable facts; the material produced is such, as would rule out and displace the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused; and the material produced is such, as would clearly reject and overrule the veracity of the allegations contained in the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant. It should be sufficient to rule out, reject and discard the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant, without the necessity of recording any evidence. For this the material relied upon by the defence should not have been refuted, or alternatively, cannot be justifiably refuted, being material of sterling and impeccable quality. The material relied upon by the accused should be such, as would persuade a ::: Downloaded on - 23/03/2026 20:30:45 :::CIS 9 2026:HHC:7955 reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the actual basis of the accusations as false. In such a situation, the judicial conscience of the High Court would persuade it to exercise its power under Section .
482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash such criminal proceedings, for that would prevent abuse of process of the court, and secure the ends of justice.
30. Based on the factors canvassed in the foregoing paragraphs, we would delineate the following steps to determine the veracity of a prayer for quashing, raised by an accused by invoking the power vested in the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.:-
of 30.1 Step one, whether the material relied upon by the accused is sound, reasonable, and indubitable, i.e., the material is of sterling and impeccable quality?
rt 30.2 Step two, whether the material relied upon by the accused, would rule out the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused, i.e., the material is sufficient to reject and overrule the factual assertions contained in the complaint, i.e., the material is such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of the accusations as false. 30.3 Step three, whether the material relied upon by the accused, has not been refuted by the prosecution/complainant; and/or the material is such, that it cannot be justifiably refuted by the prosecution/complainant?
30.4 Step four, whether proceeding with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the court, and would not serve the ends of justice?
30.5 If the answer to all the steps is in the affirmative, judicial conscience of the High Court should persuade it to quash such criminal - proceedings, in exercise of power vested in it under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. Such exercise of power, besides doing justice to the accused, would save precious court time, which would otherwise ::: Downloaded on - 23/03/2026 20:30:45 :::CIS 10 2026:HHC:7955 be wasted in holding such a trial (as well as, proceedings arising therefrom) specially when, it is clear that the same would not conclude in the conviction of the accused."
.
10. Hon'ble Apex Court in Asmathunnisa v. State of A.P. (2011) 11 SCC 259, has held as under:
"12. This Court, in a number of cases, has laid down the scope and ambit of the High Court's power under section 482 of the Code of of Criminal Procedure. Inherent power under section 482 Cr.P.C. though wide have to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with great caution and only when such exercise is justified 9 by the tests rt specifically laid down in this section itself. Authority of the court exists for the advancement of justice. If any abuse of the process leading to injustice is brought to the notice of the court, then the Court would be justified in preventing injustice by invoking inherent powers in absence of specific provisions in the Statute.
13. The law has been crystallized more than half a century ago in the case of R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab AIR 1960 SC 866 wherein this Court has summarized some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings. This Court summarized the following three broad categories where the High Court would be justified in exercise of its powers under section 482:
(i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the proceedings;
(ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged;::: Downloaded on - 23/03/2026 20:30:45 :::CIS
11 2026:HHC:7955
(iii) where the allegations constitute an offence but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge."
.
14.In Smt. Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi and Others (1976) 3 SCC 736, according to the court, the process against the accused can be quashed or set aside :
"(1) where the allegations made in the complaint or the statements of the witnesses recorded in support of the same taken at their face value make out absolutely no case against of the accused or the complaint does not disclose the essential ingredients of an offence which is alleged against the accused; (2) where the allegations made in the complaint are patently rt absurd and inherently improbable so that no 10 prudent person can ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused;
(3) where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having been based either on no evidence or on materials which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible; and (4) where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal defects, such as, want of sanction, or absence of a complaint by legally competent authority and the like".
15. This court in State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy & Others (1977) 2 SCC 699, observed that the wholesome power under section 482 Cr.P.C. entitles the High Court to quash a proceeding when it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceedings to continue would be an abuse of the process of the court or that the ends of justice requires that the proceedings ought to be quashed. The High Courts have been invested with inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, to achieve a salutary public purpose. A Court ::: Downloaded on - 23/03/2026 20:30:45 :::CIS 12 2026:HHC:7955 proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In this case, the court observed that ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice must .
be administered according to laws made by the Legislature. This case has been followed in a large number of subsequent cases of this court and other courts."
11. Hon'ble Apex Court in Asmathunnisa (supra) has categorically held that where discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing process is of capricious and arbitrary having been based either on no evidence or on materials which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible; and where the rt complaint suffers from fundamental legal defects, such as, want of sanction, or absence of a complaint by legally competent authority and the like, High Court would be justified in exercise of its powers under Section 482 CrPC/ Section 528 of BNSS.
12. From the bare perusal of aforesaid exposition of law, it is quite apparent that while exercising its inherent power under Section 482 Cr.PC.
(now Section 528 of BNSS), High Court can proceed to quash the proceedings, if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceedings to continue would be an abuse of process of the law.
13. Now being guided by the aforesaid law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court, this court would make an endeavour to find out "whether ::: Downloaded on - 23/03/2026 20:30:45 :::CIS 13 2026:HHC:7955 proceedings initiated against the petitioners under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of IPC, can be quashed and set-aside or not?"
.
14. Factum with regard to accident is not in dispute, but question which needs to be determined in the case at hand, is "whether petitioners are liable to be prosecuted under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the IPC for their having driven the motor cycle involved in the accident rashly and of negligently".
15. Having carefully perused final report filed under Section 173 rt CrPC, this Court is persuaded to agree with learned counsel for the petitioners that no evidence has come on record suggestive of the fact that accident occurred on account of rash and negligent driving of the accused i.e. petitioners herein, rather police officials after having received telephonic call from the CHC Nagrota inspected the spot of accident and thereafter on the basis of circumstantial evidence i.e. position and location of motor cycle involved in the accident, registered the case against the petitioners.
16. Conjoint reading of FIR as well as final report filed under Section 173 CrPC, clearly reveals that at the time of spot inspection, no person came to report that accident happened due to rash and negligent driving of the petitioners, who were allegedly driving the motor cycle involved in the accident. Though learned counsel for the petitioners ::: Downloaded on - 23/03/2026 20:30:45 :::CIS 14 2026:HHC:7955 attempted to argue that petitioners herein were never identified, but once it is not in dispute that motor cycle involved in the accident belongs to the .
petitioners, omission, if any, on the part of the prosecution to conduct identification may not be of much relevance, however, there appears to be merit in the contention of learned counsel for the petitioners that to invoke Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the IPC, prosecution is under obligation to of prove that vehicle in question was being driven rashly and negligently so as to endanger the human life. In the case at hand, none of the prosecution rt witnesses, proposed to be examined, had an occasion to see the accident with their own eyes and as such, there was otherwise no occasion for them to depose that vehicle in question was being driven rashly and negligently.
Case of the prosecution is that at the time of spot inspection, motor cycle involved in the accident was found lying on the spot in damaged condition and as such, drivers of both the vehicles are liable to be prosecuted under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the IPC, however this court is not persuaded to accept the afore plea of the prosecution.
17. At this stage, it would be apt to take note of Sections 279, 337 and 338 of IPC, which reads as under:
"279. Rash driving or riding on a public way-Whoever drives any vehicle, or rides, on any public way in a manner so rash or negligent as to endanger human life, or to be likely to cause hurt or injury to ::: Downloaded on - 23/03/2026 20:30:45 :::CIS 15 2026:HHC:7955 any other person, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both."
.
"337. Causing hurt by act endangering life or personal safety of others-Whoever causes hurt to any person by doing any act so rashly or negligently as to endanger human life, or the personal safety of others, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both."
of "338. Causing grievous hurt by act endangering life or personal safety of others-Whoever causes grievous hurt to any person by doing any act so rashly or negligently as to endanger human life, or rt the personal safety of others, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both."
18. As per Section 279 of IPC, whoever drives any vehicle, or rides, on any public way in a manner so rash or negligent as to endanger human life, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both. In the case at hand, there is no evidence adduced on record that vehicle involved in the accident at the time of the accident was being driven on public way and similarly no cogent and convincing evidence has been adduced on record, to prove rash and negligent driving, if any, by the petitioners accused named in the FIR.
Merely having taken note of the position of the motor cycle involved in the ::: Downloaded on - 23/03/2026 20:30:45 :::CIS 16 2026:HHC:7955 incident may not be sufficient to conclude rash and negligent driving , rather for that, a person is required to state on oath that vehicle involved in .
the accident was being driven rashly and negligently so as to endanger the human life.
19. Similarly, Section 337 of IPC provides that whoever causes hurt to any person by doing any act so rashly or negligently as to endanger of human life shall be punished/sentenced for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine. In the case at hand, none of the persons involved in rt the accident stated before the police that they received injuries on account of rash and negligent driving of other persons and as such, it is not understood that how and on what basis, case under Sections 337 and 338 of IPC has been registered against the petitioners. Since accused, who allegedly were driving the motor cycle nowhere deposed that accident occurred on account of rash and negligent driving of any one of them coupled with the fact that no independent witness had an occasion to see the accident with his eyes, there is no probability that prosecution would be able to prove rash and negligent driving of the petitioners.
20. By now, it is well settled that specific evidence is required to be adduced on record by prosecution to prove rash and negligent driving, if any, on the part of the accused. Mere allegations are not sufficient to hold ::: Downloaded on - 23/03/2026 20:30:45 :::CIS 17 2026:HHC:7955 accused guilty of having committed offence punishable under Section 279 IPC. Rash and negligent act may be described as criminal rashness .
negligence, but to prove guilt, if any, under Section 279 IPC, prosecution is required to prove that the act of the accused was more than mere carelessness or error of judgment.
21. At this stage, reliance is placed on judgment rendered by our of own High Court in case titled Akshay Kumar v. State of HP, Latest HP LJ 2009 HP 72, relevant para of which reads as under:-
rt "8. In fact, an injury shall be deemed to be negligently caused whomsoever it is willfully caused, but results from want of reasonable caution, in the undertaking and doing of any act either without such skill, knowledge or ability as is suitable to consequences of such act, or when it results from the not exercising reasonable manner of using them or from the doing of any act without using reasonable caution for the prevention of mischief, of from the omitting to do any act which is hazarding a dangerous or wanton act with the knowledge that it is so and that it may cause injury, but without an intention to cause injury or knowledge that it will be probably caused. The criminality lies in running the risk of doing such an act with recklessness or indifference as to the consequences. Rash and negligent act may be described as criminal rashness negligence. It must be more than mere carelessness or error of judgment."
The courts below did not appreciate the above facts that there was debris on the side of the road on the curve due to the slip, while negotiating the curve, as stated above, some witnesses have admitted ::: Downloaded on - 23/03/2026 20:30:45 :::CIS 18 2026:HHC:7955 that the danga gave way to the bus which caused the accident and the rash and negligent driving by the petitioner is also denied, therefore, it find that the findings of quilt arrived at against the .
petitioner by both the courts below were not based upon legal and proper appreciation of evidence. In the circumstances aforesaid, the petitioner cannot be said to have criminal rashness or negligence, thus he is entitled for the benefit of doubt as two views were deducible from the evidence on record."
22. Reliance is also placed upon judgment of this Court in of Gurcharan Singh versus State of Himachal Pradesh reported in 1990 (2) ACJ 598, relevant paragraphs of which are reproduced here-in-below:-
rt "14. Adverting to the facts of this case, it is in evidence that the truck in question was loaded with fertilizer weighing 90 quintals.
Obviously, it cannot be said that the speed of the vehicle was very fast. Secondly, it is a State Highway and not a National Highway. Therefore, the speed on this account as well cannot be considered to be high.
"15. Coming to the statements of witnesses on this aspect, it has been stated that the truck was moving in high speed but it has not been said as to what that speed actually was. To say that a vehicle was moving in a high speed is neither a proper and legal evidence on high speed nor in any way indicates thereby the rashness on the part of the driver. The prosecution should have been exact on this aspect as speed of the vehicle is an essential point to be seen and proved in a case under Section 304-A of the Indian Penal Code. Further, there are no skid marks which eliminate the evidence of high speed of the vehicle. In addition to this, it has been stated by the witnesses that the vehicle stopped at a distance of 50 feet from the place of accident.::: Downloaded on - 23/03/2026 20:30:45 :::CIS
19 2026:HHC:7955 This appears to be exaggerated. However, it is not a long distance looking to the two points; viz, the first impact of the accident and the last tyres of the vehicle and the total length of the body of the truck .
in question. If seen from these angles, the distance stated by the witnesses cannot be considered to be very long and thus an indication of high speed. The version of the petitioner that he blew the horn near about the place of curve which frightened the child, cannot be considered to be without substance. This can otherwise be reasonably inferred that the petitioner would have blown the horn on of seeing the child on the road as it is in evidence that the child had come on the pucca portion of the road while there is no evidence as to whether the witnesses, more particularly, Ghanshyam, PW7, rt Chander Kanta, PW8, mother, and a few other witnesses were there at that particular time. Rather the depositions of these witnesses indicate that they were coming from some village lane which was joining the main road in question. Children of this age, usually crafty by temperament, move faster than the parents and are in advance of them while walking. This appears to have happened in the present case. Minute examination of the circumstances of this case and the evidence brought on the record, discloses that the deceased had reached the pucca portion of the road much before the arrival of his parents and the witnesses. That is why in their deposition they have said that the child had been run over by the truck. On the other hand, the petitioner has stated that horn by him and started crossing the road which could not be seen by him and the result was the accident and the death of the child. In case some pedestrians suddenly cross a road, the driver of the vehicle cannot save the pedestrian, however slow he may be driving the vehicle. In such a situation he cannot be held negligent; rather it appears that the parents of the child were negligent in not taking proper care of the ::: Downloaded on - 23/03/2026 20:30:45 :::CIS 20 2026:HHC:7955 child and allowed him to come alone to the road while they were somewhere behind and they could have rushed to pull back the child before the approaching vehicle came in contact with him as it is in .
their depositions that the truck driver was at a distance coming at a high speed and in case the child wanted to cross the road, it could do so within the time it reached at the place of the accident. How the accident has actually taken place, has not been clearly and comprehensively stated by any of the witnesses. They appear to have been prejudiced by the act of the driver. Their versions are, of therefore, coloured by the ultimate act of the petitioner and the fact that the child had been finished."
23. rt In the case at hand, there is none to state that at the time of the accident, motorcycle was being driven rashly and negligently, rather very factum of the accident on the date of the alleged incident on the spot given in the final report is doubtful because nobody from that area ever reported the matter with regard to accident. Had petitioners after having suffered injuries, given statement to the police with regard to their having suffered injuries in the accident, things would have been different, but it is admitted case that neither petitioners ever stated that vehicles were being driven rashly and negligently nor any person from the area, where accident took place, lodged complaint. Mere finding of motorcycle at the place of the accident may not be sufficient to conclude the guilt of the petitioners under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of IPC, especially when there is no evidence with ::: Downloaded on - 23/03/2026 20:30:45 :::CIS 21 2026:HHC:7955 regard to rash and negligent driving and injury, if any, caused to the persons walking or standing on the road.
.
24. Needless to say, high court while exercising power under Section 482 Cr.PC can quash the proceedings, which are ultimately likely to be failed on account of lack of evidence. In the case at hand, evidence collected on record, if perused in its entirety, nowhere suggests that of prosecution would be able to prove the act of rash and negligent driving of the petitioners and as such, no fruitful purpose would be served by putting rt the petitioners to the ordeal of the protracted trial, which is otherwise likely fail.
25. In view of the detailed discussion made herein above and law taken into consideration, there appears to be sufficient ground for this Court to exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C, for quashing of FIR and consequent criminal proceedings against the petitioners, to prevent abuse of process of law and to prevent unnecessary harassment to the petitioners, against whom there is no evidence to connect them with the commission of offences as incorporated in the FIR.
Otherwise also, continuance of the criminal proceedings against the petitioners in the present case would be a sheer wastage of time of the learned trial Court and the same would amount to subjecting the ::: Downloaded on - 23/03/2026 20:30:45 :::CIS 22 2026:HHC:7955 petitioners to unnecessary and protracted ordeal of trial, which is bound to culminate in acquittal. If the evidentiary material collected on record to .
prove the guilt of the petitioners is perused in its entirety, there is no material to connect the petitioners with the offence alleged to have been committed by them. To the contrary, if on the basis of material adduced on record by the investigating agency, trial is allowed to continue, great of prejudice would be caused to the petitioners and same would amount to sheer abuse of process of law.
26. rt Consequently, in view of the detailed discussion made herein above as well as law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court, this Court finds merit in the present petition and as such same is allowed and FIR No. 129 of 2020 dated 24.8.2020, under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of IPC, registered with Police Station Jawali, District Kangra, Himachal Pradesh as well as consequent proceedings, are hereby quashed and set-aside and petitioners are acquitted of the charges framed against them in the aforesaid FIR. Accordingly, present petition is disposed of, so also pending applications, if any.
March 19, 2026 (Sandeep Sharma),
(manjit) Judge
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