Orissa High Court
Subrajit Das vs The Chief Divisional Retail Sales ... on 10 May, 2017
Equivalent citations: AIR 2017 (NOC) 936 (ORI.)
Author: A.K. Rath
Bench: A.K. Rath
HIGH COURT OF ORISSA: CUTTACK
C.M.P. No.144 of 2015
In the matter of an application under Article 227 of the Constitution
of India.
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Subrajit Das ................ Petitioner
---versus--
The Chief Divisional Retail Sales Manager,
Indian Oil Corporation Limited,
Bhubaneswar ................ Opp. Party
For Petitioner : Mr. Samir Kumar Mishra, Advocate
For Opp. Party : Mr. Debaraj Mohanty, Advocate
JUDGMENT
P R E S E N T:
THE HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE A.K. RATH
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Date of Hearing: 02.05.2017 │ Date of Judgment: 10.05.2017
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Dr. A.K. Rath, J.By this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, challenge is made to the order dated 06.01.2015 passed by the learned Addl. District Judge, Mayurbhanj, Baripada in I.A. No.13 of 2014 arising out of F.A.O. No.56 of 2014. By the said order, learned appellate court rejected the application of the petitioner under Sec.151 C.P.C. for a direction to the respondent-opposite party for supply of High Speed Diesel (HSD) and Motor Spirit (MS) and not to take over the equipments by use of force.
02. The petitioner is the owner of a petrol pump in the name and style of M/s. Tarini Kisan Seva Kendra, At/P.O.-Badasahi, 2 Dist.Mayurbhanj. He was appointed as a dealer by the Indian Oil Corporation Limited (for short, "IOCL") for retail sale of High Speed Diesel (HSD) and Motor Spirit (MS). The dealership agreement was entered into between the parties on 19.11.2007 with certain terms and conditions. While the matter stood thus, the defendant no.2 lodged a complaint before the IOCL with regard to the forgery of the signature of the petitioner in the consent memo said to have been given by the defendant no.2. The IOCL send the same for Forensic Test to the CFSL, Kolkata on 18.04.2014. A notice to show cause was issued to the petitioner for termination of dealership as the signature found in the consent memo on 14.10.2006 of defendant no.2 is a forged one and the same violates the terms and conditions embodied in clause no.45(i) of the dealership agreement. Thereafter the petitioner as plaintiff instituted C.S. No.351 of 2014 in the court of the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Divn.), Baripada for declaration that the registered lease deed no.846 dated 28.03.2007 executed by defendant nos.3, 4 and 5 in favour of the plaintiff over 'A' schedule land is valid document, permanent injunction not to terminate the dealership agreement and certain other ancillary reliefs. He had also filed an application under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 C.P.C. for temporary injunction, which was registered as I.A. No.13 of 2014. The interim application was dismissed on 12.12.2014. Assailing the same, the petitioner filed F.A.O. No.56 of 2014 in the court of the learned Additional District Judge, Baripada. During pendency of the appeal, he filed an application under Sec.151 C.P.C. for a direction to the opposite party for supply of High Speed Diesel (HSD) and Motor Spirit (MS) and not to take over the equipments by use of force till finalization of F.A.O. No.56 of 2014. The said application having been rejected, the instant petition has been filed.
303. Mr. Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the plaintiff is the owner of a petrol pump. The dealership agreement was executed between the parties on 19.11.2007 with certain terms and conditions for retail sale of High Speed Diesel (HSD) and Motor Spirit (MS). The defendant no.2 lodged a complaint before the IOCL with regard to the forgery of the signature of the plaintiff in the consent memo said to have been given by the defendant no.2. The IOCL send the same for Forensic Test to the CFSL, Kolkata on 18.04.2014. The allegation made by the defendant no.2 is baseless. Since there is no allegation with regard to the sale of petrol, the plaintiff filed an application for temporary injunction. Learned appellate court is in seisin of the matter. In the event supply of High Speed Diesel (HSD) and Motor Spirit (MS) is stopped by IOCL and the equipments are taken away, the plaintiff shall suffer irreparable injury. He submitted that the plaintiff has a prima facie chance of success in the suit. The balance of convenience tilts in his favour and moreover he shall suffer irreparable loss and injury.
04. Per contra, Mr. Mohanty, learned counsel for the opposite party submitted that the plaintiff had forged the signature of the defendant no.2. The defendant no.2 filed complaints before various authorities including Vigilance Department of IOCL regarding forgery of the signature. Thereafter the IOCL sent the same to the CFSL, Kolkata. The CFSL had furnished its opinion that the signature appearing as defendant no.2 on consent memo is not his signature. Thus the plaintiff on the basis of forged documents got the dealership. He further submitted that clause no.45(i) of the dealership agreement deals with any information given by the dealer in his application for appointment as a dealer or in any documents supplied therewith or filed in support thereof. Clause no.45(j) 4 provides that if the dealer concealed any information, he shall be disentitled for being appointed as dealer. Show cause notice was issued to the petitioner for violation of clause no.45(i) of the dealership agreement. The plaintiff was asked to show cause. Instead of filing of show cause, he filed the suit and sought for an interim injunction. The same was refused. Thereafter he filed F.A.O. No.56 of 2014 before the Additional District Judge, Baripada. While the matter stood thus, on 24.12.2014 the IOCL terminated the dealership agreement and communicated the same to the plaintiff. The interim order of status quo passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Baripada in F.A.O. No.56 of 2014 was communicated to the IOCL on 29.12.2014. By the time the order of status quo was communicated, the dealership agreement was terminated and the order had been communicated; thus the application under Sec.151 C.P.C. is not maintainable. The plaintiff has no prima facie chance of success in the suit. The balance of convenience does not tilt in favour of the plaintiff and he will suffer irreparable loss and injury. He submitted that mandatory injunction is granted in rarest of rare cases. Learned trial court has rightly rejected the same. He relied upon the decisions of the apex Court in the case of Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. vs. Sri Sriman Narayan and another, AIR 2002 SC 2598 and this Court in the case of Maa Sarala Distributor vs. Hindustan Cocacola Beverages Pvt. Ltd., CLT (2008) Suppl.832.
05. In Dorab Cawasji Warden vs. Coomi Sorab Warden and others, (1990) 2 SCC 117, the apex Court discussed the principles to be kept in mind in considering the prayer for interlocutory injunction and held:
"16. The relief of interlocutory mandatory injunctions are thus granted generally to preserve or restore the status quo of the last non-contested status which preceded the pending controversy until the final hearing when full relief may be 5 granted or to compel the undoing of those acts that have been illegally done or the restoration of that which was wrongfully taken from the party complaining. But since the granting of such an injunction to a party who fails or would fail to establish his right at the trial may cause great injustice or irreparable harm to the party against whom it was granted or alternatively not granting of it to a party who succeeds or would succeed may equally cause great injustice or irreparable harm, courts have evolved certain guidelines. Generally stated these guidelines are:
(1) The plaintiff has a strong case for trial. That is, it shall be of a higher standard than a prima facie case that is normally required for a prohibitory injunction.
(2) It is necessary to prevent irreparable or serious injury which normally cannot be compensated in terms of money.
(3) The balance of convenience is in favour of the one seeking such relief.
17. Being essentially an equitable relief the grant or refusal of an interlocutory mandatory injunction shall ultimately rest in the sound judicial discretion of the court to be exercised in the light of the facts and circumstances in each case. Though the above guidelines are neither exhaustive nor complete or absolute rules, and there may be exceptional circumstances needing action, applying them as prerequisite for the grant or refusal of such injunctions would be a sound exercise of a judicial discretion."
06. The apex Court in the case of Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (supra) held:
"10. In the case of Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. Amritsar Gas Service & others, (1991) 1 SCC 533, a Bench of three learned Judges of this Court considered the appropriate relief to be granted in a case arising from revocation of the distributorship agreement for sale of LPG by the Indian Oil Corporation under different clauses of the agreement. In that connection, this Court made the following observations:-
"The question now is of the relief which could be granted by the arbitrator on its finding that termination of the distributorship was not validly made under clause 27 of the agreement. No doubt, the notice of termination of distributorship dated March 11, 1983 specified the several acts of the distributor on which the termination was based and there were complaints to that effect made against the distributor which had 6 the effect of prejudicing the reputation of the appellant-Corporation; and such acts would permit exercise of the right of termination of distributorship under clause 27. However, the arbitrator having held that clause 27 was not available to the appellant-Corporation, the question of grant of relief on that finding has to proceed on that basis. In such a situation, the agreement being revocable by either party in accordance with clause 28 by giving 30 days' notice, the only relief which could be granted was the award of compensation for the period of notice, that is, 30 days. The plaintiff-respondent 1 is, therefore, entitled to compensation being the loss of earnings for the notice period of 30 days instead of restoration of the distributorship. The award has, therefore, to be modified accordingly. The compensation for 30 days notice period from March 11, 1983 is to be calculated on the basis of earnings during that period disclosed from the records of the Indian Oil Corporation Ltd."
11. Coming to the case on hand it is to be kept in mind that the controversy raised in the case relates to a commercial contract entered between the appellant and respondent no.1 for sale of petroleum products manufactured by the appellant Corporation. Permission for sale of such products was granted by the appellant on the terms and conditions set out in the agreement. In the said agreement it was clearly stipulated that the respondent no.1 shall not change the structure of the firm without the permission of the appellant. Concededly the respondent no.1 had changed the structure of the firm from a proprietary firm to a partnership firm. The consequence of violation of any condition of the agreement by the respondent no.1 was provided under clause 45 in which it was stated that the grantor/licensor will be entitled to revoke the agreement on the happening of such event. Therefore, prima facie the appellant was entitled to take action for revoking the agreement entered with the respondent no.1. Validity or otherwise of the order of revocation can be considered at the stage of interim injunction only for the limited purpose of ascertaining whether there is prima facie case in favour of the plaintiff/petitioner and not for determination of the question finally. From the discussions in the impugned order it appears that the High Court has dealt with the matter as if it was deciding the suit.
12. The questions whether, if the respondent no.1 had violated the condition stipulated in the agreement by changing the structure of the firm without taking prior permission from the appellant, still the latter was bound to give to the former an opportunity for rectifying the defect;
7and whether passing the order revoking the agreement without affording such opportunity will render the revocation order invalid, are matters which are to be considered when the suit is taken up for hearing. These are not matters to be considered in detail for considering the prayer for interlocutory order of injunction. Regarding the question of status quo on the date of the order of injunction there was serious dispute whether the appellant had taken over possession of the property after notice of revocation of the agreement was served on the manager of respondent no.1 and had made over possession of the suit property to respondent no.2 for the purpose of running the petrol pump. The High Court has tried to get over this question by recording a finding that there were some materials on record to show that the respondent no.1 was transacting business of sale of petroleum products on the date of filing of the suit. This finding has been arrived at by the High Court without considering the reasons given by the Trial Court which had recorded a finding to the contrary in its order. The High Court has not at all discussed the considerations which weighed and the reasons which persuaded the Trial Court in rejecting the prayer for interim mandatory injunction as prayed for by respondent no.1. Most importantly, the High Court has not considered the question whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, if the prayer for interim injunction is refused the plaintiff/petitioner will suffer irreparable loss which cannot be adequately compensated by damages. As has been held by this Court in Dorab Cawasji Warden case (supra), ordinarily the relief to be granted to a plaintiff in such a matter is awarding of damages and interim injunction of a mandatory nature is not to be granted."
07. In Maa Sarala Distributor (supra), a Division Bench of this Court after survey of decisions of the apex Court held that mandatory injunction should be granted in rarest of the rare cases as it amounts to granting the final relief.
08. Keeping in view the enunciation of law laid down in Dorab Cawasji Warden (supra), Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (supra) and Maa Sarala Distributor (supra), this Court has examined the case. For violation of terms and conditions of the dealership agreement, the opposite party issued show cause notice to the plaintiff. Thereafter the plaintiff instituted the suit seeking the reliefs mentioned supra. The application filed by the plaintiff under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 was dismissed. Assailing the said order, he 8 filed F.A.O. No.56 of 2014 before the learned District Judge, Mayurbhanj, Baripada. The same is sub-judice. The dealership agreement dated 19.11.2014 was terminated on 24.12.2014 and the same was communicated. The plaintiff received the letter on 29.12.2014 on which date the learned appellate court granted status quo. Thus by the time of order of status quo was passed, the dealership agreement was terminated and the same was communicated to the plaintiff. The application filed under Sec.151 C.P.C. by the plaintiff is a ruse. In the event the application under Sec.151 C.P.C. is allowed, the same will have effect of granting mandatory injunction and tentamount to grant of final relief. As held by the apex Court in the case of Dorab Cawasji Warden (supra), ordinarily the relief to be granted to a plaintiff in such a matter is awarding of damages and interim injunction of a mandatory nature is not to be granted.
09. The order passed by the learned appellate court cannot be said to be perfunctory or flawed warranting interference of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. Accordingly, the petition is dismissed. Learned trial court shall do well to dispose of the suit by end of December, 2017.
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Dr. A.K. Rath,J.
Orissa High Court, Cuttack The 10th May, 2017/Basanta