Madhya Pradesh High Court
Shravan Kumar Sonkar And Six Ors. vs State Of Madhya Pradesh And Three Ors. on 11 September, 1997
Equivalent citations: II(1997)DMC449
JUDGMENT S.K. Kulshrestha, J.
1. In this petition, the petitioners have prayed that the investigation of offence pertaining to Crime No. 23 of 1996 registered at Mahila Police Station, Jabalpur, be quashed as the F.I.R. in respect of this investigation does not disclose commission of any cognizable offence. The learned Counsel for the petitioners has urged that the marriage between the petitioner No. 1 Shravan Kumar Sonkar and the respondent No. 4 Smt. Saroj Sonkar stood dissolved by a decree of divorce passed on 16.5.1995 and since a bare perusal of the F.I.R. (Annexure R-I) and the return of the respondents 1,2,3 and 4 indicates that the commission of the offence has been alleged between 15.1.1996 and 17.6.1996, this period being subsequent to the decree of divorce, no offence under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code can be said to have been made out, as it requires existence of relationship of husband and wife. The learned Counsel has invited attention to the contents of the F.I.R. (AnnexureR-I) to point out that even though the case has also been registered under Section 406, I.P.C, the ingredients of the said provision are not made out, as there is no allegation of any mis-appropriation of property leading to criminal breach of trust. The learned Counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. B.R. Bajaj, A.I.R. 1994 S.C. 1256, and has particularly invited attention to paragraph No. 7 thereof, in which their Lordships have laid down as to in what circumstances the investigation can be quashed by the High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction or its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Since the argument of the learned Counsel is based on the said observation of the Supreme Court, the relevant paragraph is reproduced herein below :
"7. In State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Suppl. (1) SCC 335:(1992 AIR SCW 237), this Court has exhaustively considered after having referred to a number of decisions, the limitation in exercising the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution or under Section 482, Cr. P.C. to quash the criminal proceedings at the stage of F.I.R. with a view to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It was held thus (para 100 of AIR):
"In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of of decisions relating to the exercise of the extra- ordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent power under Section 482 of the Code which we have extrcted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficietly channelised and inflex- ible-guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the com- plaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other ma- terials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by Police Officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make a case against the accused.
(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute - only a non-cognizable offence, no investi- gation is permitted by a Police Officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceed- ing against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the con- cerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and /or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grude."
To the same effect is the ratio laid down in Janta Dal v. N.S. Chowdhary,(1992) 4 SC 305: (1933) AIR SCW 248. In the above case this Court has exhaustively dealt with the scope of inherent powers conferred by Section 482, Cr. P.C. and it was held thus (para 135 of AIR):
"This inherent power conferred by Section 482 of the Code should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecutiton. The High Court - being the highest Court of a State should normally refrain from giving a premature decision in a case wherein the entire facts are extremely incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved whether factual or legal are of great magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in regard to the cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceedings at any stage. This Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335 : (1992) AIR SCW 237, to which both of us were parties have dealt with this question at length and enunciated the law listing out the circumstances under which the High Court can exercise its jurisdiction in quashing proceedings."
It is also further reiterated that at the stage of the FIR the Courts should refrain from interfering when the FIR discloses the commission of a cognizable offence and statutory power of police to investigate cannot be interfered with in exercise of the inherent power of the Court."
2. While the learned Counsel for the petitioners does not dispute that if the FIR is read, it does disclose commission of a cognizable offence, the ground on which the authority to investigate has been assailed is that there being no relation- ship of husband and wife in existence on the dates between which the offence is said to have been committed, it cannot be said that offence under Section 498A, I.P.C. was made out. Likewise, nothing is there on record to indicate any mis- appropriation leading to criminal breach of trust, which is nothing bar an offence under Section 406, I.P.C.
3. The learned Counsel for the respondent No. 4 has urged that since no reference has been made of any decree of divorce, on which reliance has been placed by the petitioners, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Deepti v. Akhil Rai, (1995) 5S.C.C. 751, the investigation can be continued and it would be open to the petitioners to place entire material before the Court at the time of framing of the charge. The learned Counsel for the said respondent has also placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in M/s. Jayant Vitamins Ltd. v. Chaitanyakumar, AIR 1992 S.C. 1930, holding that the Courts are not justified in quashing the investigation when the entire material can be produced before the Court at the time of framing of the charge.
4. The parties also dispute that any decree of divorce was obtained by respondent No. 4 and the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 4 has also pointed out that steps have been taken for getting the said decree set aside and further steps have been taken to seek injunction to prevent the petitioner No. 1 from contracting marriage.
5. From the facts of the present case, it is clear that from the perusal of the First Information Report and the material placed on record, one cannot come to any conclusion, at this stage that no offence is made out because the allegations in the F.I.R. are to be taken on their face value for arriving at such a conclusion. Since there is no mention of any severence of the relationship of husband and wife between the petitioner No. 1 and the respondent No. 4 in the F.I.R. lodged by her, if the F.I.R. is construed on its own language, it does not disclose commission of that offence, though it would be open to the petitioner No. 1 to prove to the contrary and also to the Investigating Agency to come to its own conclusions if the material on which reliance has been placed in the investigation of the case indicates to the contrary. Since the investigation is in progress, in which the Investigating Agency has yet to come to its own conclusion, the investigation cannot be quashed on the ground that no prima facie case calling for investigation of non-congnizable offence has been made out.
6. Under these circumstances, the petition deserves to be dismissed and is, accordingly, dismissed with no order as to costs.