Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati
T.Muthyala Reddy vs The State Of Andhra Pradesh, on 10 March, 2023
Author: U.Durga Prasad Rao
Bench: U. Durga Prasad Rao
HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE U. DURGA PRASAD RAO
Writ Petition Nos.350 and 390 of 2020
COMMON ORDER:
Petitioners pray for Writ of Mandamus declaring the award No.1 of 1998, dt.12.03.1998 in respect of their lands situated in Vedanthapuram Village, Tirupathi Mandal, Chittoor District is arbitrary, illegal, contrary and violation of articles 14, 21 and 300- A of Constitution of India and contrary to Section 24(2) of Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (for short „the REFCTLARR Act, 2013‟) as the said award was lapsed and consequently declare earlier acquisition proceedings as lapsed and direct the respondents not to interfere with the possession of petitioners lands.
2. Writ Petition No.350 of 2020 filed by the petitioner seeking the above prayer in respect of his land in extent of Ac.0-67 cents in Sy.No.204/7 situated in Vedanthapuram Village, whereas Writ Petition No.390 of 2020 is filed by three petitioners in respect of their lands in an extent of Ac.0-50 cents in Sy.No.203-3N; Ac.0-90 2 cents in Sy.No.203-30; Ac.0-51 cents in Sy.No.203-3P; Ac.0-43 cents in Sy.No.203-3Q; Ac.0-44 cents in Sy.No.203-3R are totaling Ac.2-78 cents also situated in Vedanthapuram Village, Tirupathi Mandal, Chittoor District.
3. The case of the petitioners is thus:
(a) The petitioners are owners of their respective lands. The 2nd respondent vide proceedings Roc.No.D6/17412/92, dated 09.11.1992 approved the acquisition of Ac.25-22 cents in Sy.Nos.196, 202, 203 and 204 of Vedanthapuram Village, on the request of 3rd respondent for acquisition of the land for the purpose of "Sites and Services". After issuing notification under Section 4(1) and Section 6, the 4th respondent passed award No.1/98, dated 12.03.1998. The respondent authorities assured to provide house plots to the petitioners but the same was not complied.
(b) Since the petitioners and some others did not agree for the compensation as provided by the Land Acquisition Officer, he referred the matter under Section 18 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short "the Act, 1894) and same was numbered as L.A.O.P.No.341 of 1998 and the said O.P was disposed on 3 28.08.2012 confirming the value fixed by the Land Acquisition Officer (LAO). However all these years no compensation was paid to the petitioners and in spite of the award being passed in 1998, all the land owners including petitioners have been in continuous possession of their respective lands and the respondents have never taken possession of the lands. Thus, the purpose of acquisition was not fulfilled.
(c) Subsequently, in the year 2007 when the respondents issued similar notification vide Roc.No.G3/8810/2007, dated 24.07.2007 for acquiring neighbouring lands in Sy.No.202/3B of Vedanthapuram Village for an extent of Ac.2-52 cents for the similar purpose of "Sites and Services", the said notification was challenged by the respective owners by filing writ petition before High Court of Andhra Pradesh on the ground that the purpose for which the lands was sought to be acquired i.e., "Sites and Services"
is vague. The said writ petition was allowed by order dated 14.07.2016 which became final as the same was not challenged by the respondents therein.4
(d) While so, in the instant case also the purpose i.e., "Sites and Services" mentioned in the notification issued by the 2 nd respondent is vague since it is not clarified as to what is meant by "Sites and Services" and for whose benefit the said "Sites and Services" was proposed. The State cannot acquire land of a citizen except in the public interest and for public benefit. In the absence of details as to the alleged public purpose for which the land is sought to be acquired, no one can comprehend as to why the land is being acquired.
(e) In the instant case, as stated supra the purpose is too vague and though respondents claim that they took symbolic possession of the land, in fact the petitioners and other owners have been in continuous possession of the land. In view of the facts that the possession has not been taken and the compensation has not been paid to the petitioners, Section 24 of the REFCTLARR Act, 2013 will apply and thereby the earlier Land Acquisition Proceedings will be lapsed automatically by virtue of the Section 24(2) of the said Act.5
(f) The petitioners and other owners who are affected by the above Land Acquisition Proceedings, submitted representations dated 19.04.2018 and 17.05.2019 to the 1st respondent requesting to drop the proceedings as the same are hit by Section 24 of REFCTLARR Act, 2013 as stated supra. However, there is no response from the respondents, on the other hand after the lapse of more than 20 years, respondents are now trying to interfere with the possession of the petitioners in respect of their lands and trying to evict them. Earlier in the year 2017, when the respondents similarly tried to dispossess some of the land owners, they filed Writ Petition No.70 of 2018 and the High Court of Andhra Pradesh directed the respondents not to interfere with the possession of petitioners therein pending writ petition. The said writ petition is pending adjudication before this High Court. Again the respondents are now trying to meddle with the lands of the petitioners.
Hence the writ petition.
6
4. Respondents 2 and 4 filed counter opposing the two writ petitions contending as follows:
(a) In 1992 after obtaining orders from Government vide letter No.460/I2/92-2 MA, dated 15.07.1992 the 3rd respondent placed requisition before the 4th respondent and accordingly the 4th respondent initiated proceedings for acquisition of Ac.25-22 cents of patta land in Vedantapuram Village under the provisions of the Act, 1894 under „Sites and Services‟ programme. A notification under Section 4(1) was issued and declaration under Section 6 of the Act, 1894 was published for the following lands:
Sy.No. Extent
196/2A 0.40
196/2B 0.53
196/2C 1.41
196/2D 0.94
196/2E 1.10
202/1A 0.09
202/1B 0.05
202/2 0.22
202/3A 10.32
203/3A 0.10
203/3B 0.08
203/3C 0.03
203/3D 0.10
203/3E 0.35
203/3F 0.12
203/3G 0.71
203/3H 0.61
7
203/3I 0.34
203/3J 0.34
203/3K 0.34
203/3L 0.34
203/3M 0.44
203/3N 0.50
203/3‟O‟ 0.90
203/3P 0.51
203/3Q 0.43
203/3R 0.44
204/3A 0.02
204/3B 0.04
204/3C 0.05
204/3D 0.05
204/3E 0.05
204/3F 0.05
204/4 0.68
204/5 0.33
204/6 0.66
204/7 0.57
204/8 0.02
204/9 0.72
204/10 0.10
TOTAL 25.22
(b) Award No.1/1993, dated 16.06.1993 was passed initially for Ac.13.26 cents only out of total extent by excluding an extent of Ac.11.96 cents for the reason that the interested persons including the mother of the petitioner in W.P.No.350/2020 filed writ petitiones questioning the notification and obtained stay orders. After dismissal of the writ petitions and writ appeals, 8 Award No.1/1998 was passed on 12.03.1998 for the remaining extent of land. Both the awards were passed by strictly following due process of the Act, 1894. It is false to contend that the respondents promised to allot house plots to the owners of the acquired lands.
(c) It is also false to contend that compensation was not paid.
In fact after passing of the award No.1/1993, dated 16.06.1993 compensation was paid to the awardees and possession of the entire land of Ac.13.26 cents was taken and handed over to 3 rd respondent vide acknowledgment dated 21.06.1993.
(d) So far as land owners covered by award No.1/1998, dated 12.03.1998 are concerned, they filed W.P.Nos.5320/93, 5327/93, 5367/93, 5539/93, 5540/93, 5569/93, 5282/93, 8226/93, 9298/93 and 11236/93 challenging the validity of 4(1) notification on the ground that the acquisition for „Sites and Services" is vague and ambiguous. Those writ petitions were dismissed by a common order dated 13.06.1994. The writ appeal No.1071/1994 which was fled assailing the common order was also dismissed by the order dated 25.03.1996. After exhausting all the legal impediments, the 9 4th respondent passed the award No.1/1998 in respect of remaining Ac.11.94 cents and after passing of the award, the petitioners and some others started second round of litigation by filing W.P.No.3131/2012 challenging the award No.1/1998 on the same ground that the purpose of notification namely "Sites and Services"
is ambiguous. The said petition was also dismissed by order dated 15.02.2012. Ergo, the petitioner now cannot question the said issue once again at this length of time, as the previous orders in W.P.s, W.A.s will operate as res judicata.
(e) Other contention of the petitioners that in respect of neighbouring Sy.No.202/3B for an extent of Ac.2.52 cents a notification was issued and same was challenged and the writ petition was allowed by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh is concerned, the said issue is irrelevant in the present case as both the notifications are separate. The neighbouring lands are concerned, a separate notification under Section 4(1) of the Act, 1894 was issued in the year 2007 which was challenged by the land owners and notification was quashed. The said order was passed without taking into consideration the earlier orders dated 10 30.06.1994, 25.03.1996 and 15.02.2012 wherein the similar contention raised by the petitioners was negatived by this High Court.
(f) It is further stated that challenging the award No.1/1998, dated 12.03.1998, the mother of the petitioner in W.P.No.350/2020 and some others filed W.P.Nos.17076, 17077, 17078, 17108, 17109 and 17110 of 2000 and those writ petitions and their corresponding writ appeals i.e., W.A.Nos.317, 320, 321, 322, 323 and 325 of 2003 and even SLP No.3972/2007 filed before Hon‟ble Supreme Court were all dismissed on 21.01.2003, 22.12.2006 and 09.03.2007 respectively.
(g) It is further contended that the contention of the petitioners that after passing of the award in the year 1998 no compensation was paid to the petitioner and others and they are in continuous possession is not true and correct. In fact the total award amount of Rs.19,01,607/- under award No.1/1998, dated 12.03.1998 was deposited in the Court of III Additional District Judge, Tirupathi vide bankers cheque No.264237, dated 13.07.1998 and referred the matter under Section 30 and 31 of the 11 Act, 1894 since the interested persons including mother of the petitioner did not attend for enquiry and produce documentary evidence to prove title before the LAO in respect of the acquired lands though statutory notices were served on them. Learned III Additional District Judge conducted enquiry in L.A.O.P.No. 341 of 1998 and disposed the case by order dated 28.08.2012 holding that the claimants failed to establish their respective claims over the acquired lands in respect of which the reference was made and therefore till the claimants establish their claims in a civil Court, they cannot be declared as persons entitled to receive compensation. It is further stated that on the request of some of the owners, the LAO referred the matter U/s 18 of the Act and learned III Additional District Judge, Tirupathi registered the case as LAOP No.44/1999 and after enquiry disposed of the said LAOP by confirming the award No.1 of 1998.
(h) The entire extent under award No.1/1998 was taken physical possession under the cover of "panchanama" dated 15.03.1998 by LAO and handed over to 3rd respondent. The lands were mutated in favour of the Vice-Chairman, Tirupathi Urban 12 Development Authority (TUDA), Tirupathi in the revenue records of Vedanthapuram Village. The lands were reclaimed, layout was approved for an extent of Ac.25-22 cents and house plots were sold to the general public by way of public auction and the plots covered under remaining extent were kept pending in view of the Court litigation. The said extent was fenced with barbed wire and name plate was also erected indicating that the land belongs to TUDA. Hence the contention of the petitioners that they are still in possession and compensation was not paid is not correct. As such the question of lapse of earlier acquisition proceedings in terms of Section 24(2) of REFCTLARR Act, 2013 does not arise. The writ petitions are not maintainable and they may be dismissed.
5. The 3rd respondent also filed separate counter in both the writ petitions with averments similar to the counter filed by respondents 2 and 4.
6. Petitioners in W.P.No.390/2020 filed additional affidavit with the following main averments.
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(a) Section 4(1) notification was issued by the Special Deputy Collector, (Land Acquisition) in the name of dead persons (i.e., pattadar and enjoyer). However, in the noties U/s 5(A) of the Act, 1894 calling for objections, surprisingly the signatures of the dead persons were mentioned. Except C. Shankar Reddy, no one was alive as on the date of 4(1) notification or at the stage of notices U/s 5(A). Hence the acquisition proceedings are vitiated.
(b) It is submitted that at the request of aggrieved parties, the Government stayed the land acquisition proceedings. Upon the representation of small farmers, Hon‟ble Minister took up the matter on 19.11.1997 in proceedings No.1819/M/MA&UD/97 and thereafter respondent Principal Secretary stayed the proceedings in question on 25.11.1997 pending further orders vide letter No.27263/12/97-IMA. The said stay order is in operation till 10.03.1998. Hence as per Section 11(A) of the Act, 1894, the entire land acquisition proceedings were lapsed on 25.03.1998. These facts were suppressed by the respondents.
(c) Land acquisition proceedings were contrary to G.O.Ms.No.911 MA issued by the Housing, Municipal 14 Administration and Urban Development (I-2) Department, dated 09.11.1987 and on that ground the writ petitions deserve to be allowed.
(d) In Roc.No.307/G/92 it is evident that till 19.03.1998 the draft letter to the LAO was not approved and the said letter reached the LAO on 20.03.1998. Further on 15.03.1998 (Sunday) panchanama was conducted which shows that the panchanama was prepared later.
(e) According to respondents 11-A proceedings were issued on 12.03.1998. However letter in Roc.No.307/G/92, dated 19.03.1998 the draft award was not finalized and hence issuance of notice dated 12.03.1998 would not arise. The said notice was received by C. Shankar Reddy on 25.03.1998 and hence it is clear that the respondents put an anti date in the said notice. The signatures of the individuals were forged. Hence the acquisition proceedings may be quashed.
7. Heard Sri K. A. Narasimham, learned counsel representing Sri V. Sai Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioners and learned Government Pleader for Revenue representing respondents 1 & 2 15 and Sri I. Koti Reddy, counsel representing Sri P.Muni Reddy, Standing Counsel for TUDA.
8. Severely fulminating the award No.1/1998 dated 12.03.1998 learned counsel for the petitioner Sri K.A. Narasimham would strenuously argue that the said award, since inception was fraught with many incorrigible procedural violations and therefore the same is liable to be set aside. He would expatiate that there was no involvement of public purpose whatsoever in the instant acquisition proceedings which should be the corner stone for land acquisition proceedings. Referring to the Notification dated 09.11.1992 issued U/s Section 4(1) of the Act, 1894 he would argue that the notification does not depict that proposal or request for acquisition was mooted by 3rd respondent. Further, the alleged public purpose mentioned therein as "for sites and services programmes" is as dubious and indiscernible as it could be. Neither the above patent and cryptic phraseology nor the latent intendment of the authorities spelled out that the acquisition was for a true public purpose, because the so-called sites and services were not even insinuatingly meant for poor and homeless weaker 16 sections of the society but the acquisition like any other private commercial venture, was intended to provide housing sites to the rich and opulent section. Hence the acquisition did not pass the test of „public purpose‟ U/s 3(f) of the Act, 1894. When the very object of the acquisition is divested of the spirit of public purpose, he would argue, the notification should fall to ground at the inception itself. He placed reliance on
(i) Srinivasa Cooperative House Building Society Ltd.
v. Madam Gurumurthy Sastry1
(ii) Madhya Pradesh Housing Board v. Mohd. Shafi2
(iii) Radhy Shyam (Dead) through LRs v. State of Uttar Pradesh3
(iv) Gajjela Narasimha Reddy v. Collector, Ranga Reddy District4
(v) Common Order dated 14.07.2016 in W.P.Nos.24580 & 24756 of 2007 passed by Hon'ble Sri Justice M. S. Ramachandra Rao
(a) Nextly, learned counsel would argue that Section 4(1) Notification was vitiated also for the reason that in the said notification the names of some of the deceased owners were 1 1994 (4) SCC 675 2 (1992) 2 SCC 168 = MANU/SC/0484/1992 3 2011 (5) SCC 553 4 2008 (5) ALT 233 = 2008(5) Andh LD 302 17 shown. However, curiously, the signatures of such deceased persons were found in the objections statements, recorded U/s 5(a) of the Act, 1894. Therefore, both Section 4(1) Notification as well as the meaningful enquiry contemplated U/s 5(a) lost their significance. He relied on Ramji Veerji Patel v. Revenue Divisional Officer5 to project the avowed object of Section 5(a).
(b) Nextly learned counsel argued that as per Section 11(A) of the Land Acquisition Act, the award should be passed within a period of two years from the date of publication of declaration, failing which the entire acquisition proceedings shall lapse. In the instant case declaration U/s 6 of the Act, 1894 was made on 20.04.1993. However, award was passed only on 12.03.1998. In the interregnum except the stay granted by the Government vide the letter No.27263/12/1997-1MA, dated 25.11.1997 issued by the Principal Secretary, no Court stay was in vogue. Therefore, the entire acquisition proceedings including the award are hit by Section 11(A).
(c) Finally learned counsel argued that on the representation of the writ petitioners and some others, stay of acquisition was 5 MANU/SC/1288/2011 18 granted by the Government and thereafter, though stay was said to be vacated as alleged by the respondents, no vacate order copy was served on the petitioners and the petitioners and others are still in effective possession of the subject lands and further, compensation has not been paid to the petitioners and in that view, the award No.1/1998 dated 12.03.1998 is hit by Section 24 of the REFCTLARR Act, 2013 and the acquisition is unsustainable in the eye of law. Therefore, if the respondents want, they have to initiate land acquisition proceedings afresh in accordance with the provisions of the REFCTLARR Act, 2013. He relied upon D.Mahesh Kumar v. State of Telangana, Department of Revenue, rep. by its Principal Secretary, Hyderabad6.
Thus he prayed to allow the writ petitions.
9. Per contra, Sri I. Koti Reddy, learned Standing Counsel for 3rd respondent and Sri Muni Reddy, learned Standing Counsel for 4th respondent vehemently argued that the writ petitions are liable to be dismissed in limini for the reason that on the same grounds now raised by the petitioners, their predecessors have filed writ 6 2017 (1) ALT 400 (D.B) 19 petitions in the earlier round of litigation by challenging Section 4(1) notification dated 09.11.1992 and those batch of writ petitions after thorough hearing were dismissed by the Common High Court of Andhra Pradesh and the resultant appeals were also dismissed holding that there was no vagueness or ambiguity in the terminology „sites and services‟ employed in Section 4(1) notification and the same is meant for public purpose.
(a) After dismissal of the appeals, the 4th respondent passed Award No.1/1998 in respect of litigated lands in an extent of Ac.11.96 cents and when the predecessors in title of the present writ petitioners and some others did not attend enquiry, referred the award to learned III Additional District Judge, Tirupathi U/s 30 and 31 of the Act, 1894 and deposited the award amount in the Court. They would further argue that learned III Additional District Judge, Tirupathi conducted enquiry in L.A.O.P.No.341 of 1998 and disposed of the case vide order dated 28.08.2012 holding that the claimants before him could not establish their respective claims. Similarly, on the request of some of the claimants who challenged quantum of compensation, Land Acquisition Officer (LAO) 20 referred the matter U/s 18 of the Act, 1894 to III Additional District Judge, Tirupathi and learned Judge disposed of the LAOP No.44/1999 by confirming the award No.1 of 1998. Learned counsel would strenuously argue that the present writ petitions are not maintainable in view of the earlier round of litigation which was decided against their predecessors and also for the reason that their predecessors failed to succeed in the corresponding LAOPs referred U/s 18 and 30 of the Act, 1894. Learned counsel would thus contend that the writ petitions are hit by the principle of res judicata.
(b) Learned counsel nextly argued that writ petitions shall fail also due to the enormous indolence of the petitioners who woke up from slumber and re-agitated the cause already decided more than 20 years ago. No plausible explanation for delay was offered by the petitioners. Therefore, for the inexplicable and inordinate delay the writ petitions deserve dismissal. They placed reliance on Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal7.
(c) Thirdly, they argued that the common order dated 14.07.2016 in W.P.Nos.24580 and 24756 of 2007 passed by 7 (2020) 8 SCC 129 21 learned single judge of Common High Court of Andhra Pradesh has no relevancy with the notification under issue in the instant case. But for the fact that the lands in both the set of matters situate in Vedanthapuram, the acquisition proceedings are quite different. The judgments in the writ petitions filed by the predecessors of the petitioners were not placed before learned single judge in W.P.No.24580/2007 and batch. In that view probably learned judge came to conclusion that the wording „sites and services‟ in the notification under challenge was vague and accordingly allowed the batch of writ petitions. However, the said judgment will not have any bearing on the present writ petitions.
(d) Nextly while refuting the contentions of the petitioners that they are still in possession of the subject lands, learned counsel for respondents argued that soon after passing the award, the LAO took possession of the lands and handed over to TUDA wherein the development activities have been conducted and some plots were also sold. Learned counsel thus vehemently argued that since possession was taken and compensation was deposited in the Court by following due process of law, the question of award No.1/1998 22 hit by Section 24 of the REFCTLARR Act, 2013 does not arise. Thus they prayed to dismiss the writ petitions.
10. As a reply, Sri K.A.Narasimham argued that the Act 1894 being an expropriatory legislation, the LAO shall meticulously follow the procedure contemplated under the law. However, in the instant case, as there were numerous violations, such as vagueness in the purpose; non-disclosure of proposal by the 3rd respondent; non-holding of meaningful enquiry under Section 5A; non-passing of the award within the time stipulated under Section 11A of the Act, 1894; non-payment of compensation to the petitioners and not taking of possession, the award is vitiated and the previous orders which dealt with only some of the procedural violations will not operate as res judicata as the present writ petitions are filed projecting all the lapses in acquisition. He relied upon Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal v. Dossibai N.B.Jeejeebhoy8
11. The points for consideration are:
(i) Whether the writ petitions are hit by principles of res judicata?
8
MANU/SC/0420/1970 = AIR 1971 SC 2355 23
(ii) Whether objections-enquiry under Section 5A of the Act 1894 was hit by fraud?
(iii) Whether the award 1/1998 was not passed within the time stipulated U/s 11(A) of the Act, 1894 and thereby it was lapsed?
(iv) Whether award No.1/1998 is hit by Sec. 24 of the REFCTLARR Act, 2013?
12. Point No.1 : The petitioners are questioning the award No.1/1998 on the following main contentions:
(i) In Section 4(1) notification, there was no mention about the proposal initiated by 3rd respondent requiring the land for TUDA. Hence acquisition was sought to be made without any requisition by a particular agency.
(ii) The requirement for sites and services programme by TUDA is vague and misleading and does not disclose any public purpose, de horse of which, acquisition cannot be undertaken.
(iii) No meaningful enquiry as contemplated under Section 5A of the Act 1894 was conducted as some of the owners of the lands died long prior to Section 4(1) notification, but curiously their signatures were found on the statement of objections recorded during the enquiry. Hence, the acquisition is hit by fraud.
13. In the light of above contentions, I perused the record produced by the respondents 3 and 4 in two volumes. The volume 24 with the name "D-DIS-G1/307/92", contains at page 15 the letter in D.O.ROC.No.307/G1/92, dated 12.02.1992 addressed by the 3rd respondent to the 1st respondent wherein he clearly mentioned the need for acquisition of the lands, He stated that to promote land growth centres around the town, the TUDA has identified Ac.25.22 cents of land in Vedanthapuram village. He further mentioned that vide G.O.Ms.No.25 MA, dt;21.01.1987 the Government have permitted to initiate land acquisition proposals in the larger interest of planned and integrated development of urban areas. As there is demand for plots on the southern side of the town and as it was economically viable project, he requested the 1st respondent to forward his requisition to screening committee for approval.
(a) Then the letter No.460/12/92-2, MA, dated 15.07.1992 addressed by the Joint Secretary, MA & UD Department to the 3 rd respondent shows that the screening committee in its meeting held on 04.05.1992 cleared the above acquisition proposal of the 3rd respondent.
(b) Thereafter, U/s 3(c) of the Act, 1894, the Governor of A.P. appointed Special Deputy Collector (LA) (TUDA), Tirupathi 25 to perform the functions of Collector U/s 5(a) of the Act, 1894 and the said officer submitted draft notification U/s 4(1) of the Act, 1894 to the 2nd respondent for approval and vide proceedings No. B6/17412/92, dt: 09.11.1992, the 2nd respondent while approving the draft notification sent it for publication in the A.P. Gazette - issue No.CTR 192, dated 10.11.1992.
(c) Thereafter, the Special Deputy Collector issued Section 4(1) notification. Then Section 5(A) enquiry was conducted on 09.03.1993 by serving notices on the interested persons and giving them opportunity to put forth their objections. Thereafter, the draft declaration proposal u/s 6 of the LA Act was submitted to the District Collector, Chittoor by LAO, TUDA on 31.03.1993 and same was approved by the Collector vide proceedings No.B10/17412/92, dated 15.04.1993 and was published in the A.P. Gazette Extraordinary, Issue No.217, dated 20.04.1993 and also published in local papers.
14. While so, out of the proposed extent of Ac.25.22 cents, since there was no dispute with regard to Ac.13.26 cents, the LAO 26 passed award No.1/1993, dated 16.06.1993 (vide page No.217 of the file) and allowed the compensation of Rs.19,14,779/-.
15. So far as remaining extent of Ac.11.96 cents is concerned, challenging the Section 4(1) notification some of the land owners filed batch of writ petitions before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh. Thota Subbamma, the mother of the petitioner in W.P.No.350/2020 filed W.P.No.5539/1993. Whereas C. Shankar Reddy, the 1st petitioner in W.P.No.390/2020 and E. Pulla Reddy, the husband of 3rd petitioner in W.P.No.390/2020 filed W.P.No.6653/1993. Inter alia, the contention of the petitioners was that the purpose of acquisition mentioned as „sites and services programme‟ was very vague and there was no public purpose involved. After hearing, the writ petitions were dismissed by a learned single Judge vide common order dated 13.06.1994 with the following observations:
"Public purpose is defined under Section 3(f) of the Act 1894. The land required under any scheme of development by any local authorities with the approval of appropriate Government is also for public purpose. Under Section 18 of the Andhra Pradesh Urban Areas (Development) Act, 1975, it is open to the Government to acquire any land required for the purpose of 27 development or for any other purpose under this Act and the Government can acquire such land under the provisions of the Act 1894. This is exactly what is done in this case." (emphasis supplied).
(a) Disagreeing with the argument of the petitioners that the expression "sites and services programme" was vague and the persons interested cannot understand the purpose for which it was sought to be acquired and that the TUDA was aiming at deriving profit by dividing the land into sites and distributing the same to the public at higher costs which cannot be said to be for a public purpose, learned Judge observed thus:
"I cannot accept this contention. The expression "sites and services programme" is clear enough to indicate division of land into sites and service by sale. I am of the view that it is not fatal in view of the authority of the Supreme Court cited in H.D.Vora v. State of Maharashtra [AIR 1984 SC 866 = MANU/SC/0309/1984], wherein it was held:
"It is not necessary that the order of requisition must explicitly set out the public purpose for which it is made. The only requirement of the law is that the requisitioning must be made for a public purpose and so long as there is a public purpose for which an order of requisition is made, it would be valid irrespective of whether such public purpose is recited in the order of requisition or not"
(b) Aggrieved, one of the petitioners filed Writ Appeal No.1071/1994. The said writ appeal and the remaining writ 28 petitions were heard and dismissed by a Division Bench of the High Court of A.P. vide order dated 25.03.1996 with the following observations:
7. The learned counsel for the appellants sought to rely on a decision of the Supreme Court in MADHYA PRADESH HOUSING BOARD v. MOHD. SHAFI [1992 (2) SCC 168] for the proposition that the expression used in the notification should not be vague. The facts of the said case are different from the facts of the present case. In the present case Section 5-A enquiry was conducted and all the persons concerned including the appellants and petitioners herein, filed their objections and the same were considered and disposed of.
None of the appellants / petitioners raised the objection that the purpose mentioned in the notification (ie) „Sites and Services Programme‟ is vague. Only for the first time in the writ petitions that they raised such an objection. It is manifest that under the scheme, the TUDA has to prepare a master plan and the lands shown in the master plan should be acquired after identifying the rightful owners. Therefore, it cannot be said that the notification is vague or untenable (emphasis supplied). It is well settled principle of law that in the Section 4(1) notification the entire purpose for which the land has to be acquired need not be mentioned. It is sufficient if the purpose for which the land is to be acquired is mentioned and it cannot be said that the same is vague or untenable".
16. While so, the petitioner in W.P.No.350/2020 and some other land owners submitted a representation to the Government to 29 delink their lands from acquisition (vide page No.285 of the file). In that view, the Principal Secretary MA & UD Department vide his letter No.27263/MA, dated 25.11.1997 called for the report of the 3rd respondent while staying the acquisition of the lands pending further orders. Accordingly, the 3rd respondent submitted his report vide D.O. ROC No.307/G1, dated 16.12.1997 and requested to vacate the stay granted to complete the land acquisition process. Thereupon, the Principal Secretary, vide his letter No.27263/12/1997/2/MA, dt: 10.03.1998 communicated to the 3rd respondent that the stay order issued was vacated and the request of the small farmers of Vedanthapuram village was rejected. Consequently, Award No.1/1998 came to be passed by the LAO on 12.03.1998.
17. After passing of the award also, some writ petitions were filed. For instance, the petitioners in present writ petition Nos.350/2020 and 390/2020 and some others filed W.P.No.3131/2012 seeking a writ of mandamus declaring the action of the Government in not considering their representation for deletion of their lands from acquisition as illegal and to direct 30 the respondents to delete their lands. In the said writ petition also they questioned the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act as vague and ambiguous. A learned single Judge of the common High Court of A.P. considering the submission of learned Standing Counsel for TUDA that the award was already passed and the land was divided into plots and substantial number of plots were already sold, dismissed the writ petition on 15.02.2012.
18. Be that as it may, challenging the award No.1/1998, batch of writ petition Nos.17076, 17077, 17078, 17108, 17109 & 17110 of 2000 were filed. Thota Subbamma, mother of the petitioner in W.P.No.350/2020 filed W.P.No.17077/2000, whereas the 1st petitioner and husband of 3rd petitioner in W.P.No.390/2020 have filed WP No.17110/2000. In those writ petitions, the petitioners mainly contended that award No.1/1998 dated 12.03.1998 was passed after expiry of a period of two years from the date of publication of declaration under Section 6 of the Act, 1894 and hence, the award was violative of Section 11(A) of the said Act. The said W.P.Nos.17076/2000 & batch (C.Munikrishnaiah v. 31 District Collector9) was dismissed by a learned single Judge with the following observation:
"18. It is no doubt true that the lands belonging to all the petitioners herein were proposed for acquisition under the same notification and the same declaration was given. The petitioners individually challenged the proceedings in various writ petitions as noticed hereinabove. E. Pulla Reddy and others, the petitioners in W.P. No.17110 of 2000 filed W.P. No. 6653 of 1993 and obtained interim order on 19-5-1993. The interim order was in force till 26-3-1996 and, therefore, no award should have been passed in respect of the lands of those persons. Similar is the case in respect of other writ petitioners. The award passed on 12-3-1998 insofar as the same extent is concerned, cannot be said to be beyond two years. Further, as rightly contended, in relation to Acs.13.26 cents, an award being Award No.1 of 1993 was already passed on 16-6-1993 and the same, in my considered opinion, does not render the award dated 12-3-1998 passed in relation to other lands illegal."
(a) Aggrieved by the above order, the petitioner filed the batch of writ appeal Nos.317, 320, 321, 322, 323 and 325 of 2023 and those writ appeals were also dismissed by the Division Bench by its order dated 22.12.2006 while observing thus:
"The aforementioned two judgments substantially support the view we have taken that the orders of status quo passed in different writ petitions and writ appeals filed by the appellants, which remained effective till 25.3.1996 i.e., the date on which Writ Petition No.6653 of 1993 was dismissed, effectively prevented respondent No.2 from passing award in respect of land measuring Ac.11-96 cts. and, therefore, the 9 MANU/AP/0060/2003 32 award passed on 12-3-1998 was within the period of two years specified in Section 11A."
(b) Aggrieved, the petitioners filed Special Leave Petition No.3972/2007 which was dismissed in limini by the Hon‟ble Apex Court vide its order dated 09.03.2007.
19. After passing award No.1/1998, the LAO referred the award to the Court of learned III Additional District Judge, Tirupati under Section 30 of the Act 1894 since some of the owners of the acquired lands did not appear for conducting enquiry to establish their title to be eligible for compensation. T.Subbamma, the mother of petitioner in WP No.350/2020 and the 1 st petitioner in WP No.390/2020 were shown as respondents therein. Learned III Additional District Judge, Tirupati conducted enquiry in LAOP 340/1998. Except filing counters, the respondents did not place any evidence to establish their case. Hence, learned III ADJ observed that till the claimants establish their claims in a Civil Court, they cannot be declared as persons entitled to receive compensation in respect of their respective lands and answered the reference accordingly vide order dated 28.08.2012. 33
(a) Be that it may, on the representation of the petitioners in WP No.390/2020 and some others, the LAO also made a reference of award No.1/1998 under Section 18 of the Act 1894 to the III ADJ, Tirupati. Learned Judge after conducting enquiry dismissed the LAOP No.44/1999 by confirming the award on the ground that the claimants have not produced any evidence to seek enhanced compensation for the acquired lands.
20. The above is the past history of long drawn legal battle against award No.1/1998 as is depicted by the record produced by the respondents 3 & 4 and the relevant judgments. In the above backdrop, the contentions now raised by the present petitioners once again against award No.1/1998 have to be scrutinized.
21. The first contention raised by the petitioners is that Section 4(1) notification is vague, ambiguous and indiscernible by the owners of the respective lands to put forth their objections and there is no public purpose involved in the "sites and services programme" projected in the notification. I find absolutely no teeth or venom in this contention, for, the said contention was 34 already raised in W.P.No.5539/1993 & batch by the present petitioners and learned single Judge in his common order dated 13.06.1994 has rejected the said claim and his observation was noted in Para 15 of my judgment. So also, in the resultant appeal No.1071/1994 and other batch of writ petitions, the Division Bench in its order dated 25.03.1996 while confirming the order of learned single Judge, dismissed the aforesaid writ appeal and other writ petitions, categorically observed that it cannot be said that the notification is vague or untenable. Its observations are extracted in Para 15(b) of my judgment. Again in W.P.No.3131/2012, the present writ petitioners raised the issue of vagueness in Section 4(1) notification, but the said contention was negative by the learned single Judge. Thus, at the outset, the challenge made against section 4(1) notification on the ground of the alleged dubiousness or nebulousness was rejected by the Courts in successive cases. Hence, said contention is of no avail once again to the petitioners now.
22. The next contention is that section 4(1) notification does not reflect any proposal initiated by 3rd respondent requiring the land 35 for TUDA and hence, there is no requisition for acquisition. This argument in my view does not hold water in the light of my succintive narration of the background history commencing from the proposal made by the 3rd respondent to the 1st respondent vide his letter in D.O.ROC.No.307/G1/92 dated 12.02.1992, and requesting him to forward his requisition for Ac.25.22 cents of land in Vedanthapuram Village to the Screening Committee for approval till issuance of Section 4(1) notification by the Special Deputy Collector (LA), TUDA. The aforesaid correspondence would clearly show that the sites and services programme was mooted by the 3rd respondent. Further, a perusal of Section 4(1) notification would depict that Government was satisfied that the lands mentioned in the schedule were needed for public purpose i.e., for sites and services programme to be undertaken by 3rd respondent. The aforesaid aspects were vividly discussed in the orders concerning the earlier round of litigation. Therefore, the repetitive contention of the petitioners can be heard only to be rejected.
36
23. Thus, the writ petitions on the above contentions are not sustainable and hit by doctrine of res juidicata, as those contentions were already heard and decided in earlier writ petitions and writ appeals. Plethora of decisions would demonstrate that the principle of res judicata applies to writ jurisdiction also. In P.Bandopadhya v. Union of India10, the Apex Court observed thus:
"Reference can be made to the decision of the Constitution Bench in Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers' Association v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. [MANU/SC/0291/1990 : (1990) 2 SCC 715 : AIR 1990 SC 1607 wherein Sharma, J., on behalf of the five-judge bench, held:
"35...It is well established that the principles of res judicata are applicable to writ petitions. The relief prayed for on behalf of the petitioner in the present case is the same as he would have, in the event of his success, obtained in the earlier writ petition before the High Court. The petitioner in reply contended that since the special leave petition before this Court was dismissed in limine without giving any reason, the order cannot be relied upon for a plea of res judicata. The answer is that it is not the order of this Court dismissing the special leave petition which is being relied upon; the plea of res judicata has been pressed on the basis of the High Court‟s judgment which became final after the dismissal of the special leave petition. In similar situation a Constitution Bench of this Court in Daryao v. State of UP [MANU/SC/0012/1961 : (1962) 1 SCR 574 : AIR 1961 SC 1457] held that where the High Court dismisses a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution after hearing the matter on the merits, a subsequent petition in the Supreme Court under Article 32 on the same facts and for the same reliefs filed by the same parties will be barred by the general principle of res judicata. The binding character of 10 MANU/SC/0378/2019 = (2019) 13 SCC 42 37 judgments of courts of competent jurisdiction is in essence a part of the Rule of law on which the administration of justice, so much emphasised by the Constitution, is founded and a judgment of the High Court under Article 226 passed after a hearing on the merits must bind the parties till set aside in appeal as provided by the Constitution and cannot be permitted to be circumvented by a petition under Article 32..."
24. Learned counsel for petitioners cited following decision to contend that in the present case the principle of res judicata has no application. It should be noted that the said decision can be distinguished on facts and hence, it will not fortify petitioners‟ case.
In Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal‟s case (8 supra), with regard to the applicability or non-applicability of principles of res judicata, the Apex Court has observed that when the matter in issue between the parties is one purely of fact or a mixed question of law and fact decided in the earlier proceedings by a competent Court, it cannot be reopened and questioned in a subsequent proceedings. However, where the decision is on a question of law i.e., the interpretation of statute it will be res judicata in subsequent proceedings between the same parties, where the cause of action is the same because the expression "the matter in issue in Section 11 CPC means the right litigated i.e., the facts on which right is 38 claimed or denied and the law applicable to it for determination of the issue. However, where the question is one purely of law and it relates to the jurisdiction of a Court or a decision of the Court sanctioning something which is illegal, then resorting to the rule of res judicata is not permissible as the rule of res judicata is a rule of procedure which cannot supersede the law of the land.
In the instant case, in the earlier two rounds of litigation, Section 4(1) notification was challenged on the ground that the terminology "sites and services programme" was vague and dubious and not disclosing any public purpose. The said contention involves mixed question of facts and law because in the earlier writ petitions the common High Court of A.P. considered the law i.e., Section 4(1) and Section 3(f)(vii) on one hand and relevant facts i.e., TUDA has the responsibility to implement its master plan for growth of the town and held there was no ambiguity in the words "sites and services programme" and it was intended for public purpose. The said decision was rendered in all the earlier rounds of litigation. Therefore, the said concluded mixed question of fact and law cannot be resuscitated once again in the present cases. 39
25. That being so, the following decisions relied upon by the petitioners to contend that there was no public purpose involved, in my view, will not advance their cause.
(a) In Srinivasa Cooperative House Building Society Ltd. (1 supra), in the matter of providing house sites to the members of the appellant Cooperative Society, the Government under an agreement contributed nominal amount of Rs.200/-. The appellant argued that since the Government‟s contribution was there from public exchequer, the public purpose envisage under Section 3(f) of the Act 1894 was satisfied and the requirements under chapter VII of the Act need not be followed. The Apex Court held that the act done by the State was a colourable exercise of power and there was no public purpose involved.
However, in the instant case, as already stated supra, in WP No.5320/1993 & batch, a learned single Judge referring to Section 3(f)(vii) of the Act, 1894 held that the land acquired under any scheme of development by any local authority (3rd respondent) with the approval of appropriate Government will amount to public purpose.
40
(b) The Madhya Pradesh Housing Board‟s case (2 supra) is concerned, the said decision was distinguished on facts by the Division Bench of the High Court in W.A.No.1071/1994 & batch.
(c) In Radhy Shyam‟s case (3 supra), the Apex Court on facts of the case held that there was no real or substantive urgency to justify invoking urgency provision under Section 17(1) and to exclude the enquiry under Section 5A. It should be noted that in the present case neither the urgency button under Section 17 was pressed nor the enquiry under Section 5A was dispensed with. On the other hand, in the orders relating to the earlier writ petitions, it was clearly observed that Section 5A enquiry was conducted and the said fact attained finality.
(d) In Gajjela Narasimha Reddy‟s case (4 supra), a learned single Judge of the High Court of A.P. having regard to the fact that the acquisition of land was for a private cooperative housing society for development and allotment of sites to its members who were advocates, chartered accounts and businessmen, held that no public purpose was involved. The instant case is not of that nature. The requisition was made by a statutory Urban Development 41 Authority i.e., TUDA to implement its master plan for providing sites and services to the general public.
(e) The common order in W.P.No.24580 of 2007 & batch dated 14.07.2016 relied upon by the petitioners, wherein a learned single Judge in respect of a different acquisition proceedings held that sites and services programme was vague, cannot be considered since the earlier judgments including the judgment of Division Bench holding that there was no obscurity in the said terminology was not placed before the learned Judge.
Thus, this point is answered in favour of the respondents and against the petitioners.
26. Point No.2: It is argued that some of the land owners died long prior to section 4(1) notification, but their names were mentioned in the notification and their signatures were found in the objection statements recorded under Section 5A enquiry and hence, no meaningful enquiry was conducted and the so-called enquiry was vitiated by fraud.
42
(a) This argument is not tenable for two main reasons. Firstly, while challenging the award No.1/1998 in WP Nos.17076/2000 & batch, the petitioners who had an opportunity to question the validity of Section 5A enquiry did not do so, but for the first time they raised this objection. Hence, the said contention is hit by the principle of constructive res judicata. With regard to the applicability of doctrine of constructive res judicata, the Apex Court has observed thus:
(i) Sharadchandra Ganesh Muley v. State of
Maharashtra11
"5. It is seen that the bar under Section 11A (Land Acquisition Act, 1894) was available to the appellant when the first writ petition was filed, since the Amendment Act 68 of 1984 had come into force on September 24, 1984 during the pendency of the writ petition. He did not raise the point. Therefore, the doctrine of „might and ought‟ engrafted in Explanation IV to Section 11 of the CPC would come into play and the appellant is precluded to raise the controversy once over. Therefore, the doctrine of constructive res judicata puts an embargo on his right to raise the plea of bar of limitation under Section 11A."
(b) Secondly, in the present writ petitions, the petitioners did not take a specific plea that particular persons who were mentioned in Section 4(1) notification expired long back and their signatures were found in the objection statements recorded under Section 5A. No particulars of such persons and the dates of their death are 11 MANU/SC/0004/1996 = AIR 1996 SC 61 43 mentioned in the pleadings. It is trite law that a party who seeks an order to be set aside on the ground of fraud, must specifically plead and prove the details of the fraud perpetrated by the concerned. Lest, the sterile argument dehors of pleadings should be rejected by the Courts.
(i) In A.C.Ananthaswamy v. Boraiah (Dead) by LRs12, the Apex Court emphasized the need for requisite plea and proof of allegation of fraud. It observed thus:
"5. We do not find any merit in this appeal. Firstly, in the present case, Patel Chikkahanumaiah had moved an application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC for setting aside the ex-parte decree on the ground of non service of summons in which fraud was not alleged. As stated above, Patel Chikkahanumaiah had moved R.A. No.54 of 1977 in which there was no such allegation. Secondly, the present suit has been instituted to set aside the ex-parte decree on the ground that the decree was obtained by fraud and misrepresentation. Fraud is to be pleaded and proved. To prove fraud, it must be proved that representation made was false to the knowledge of the party making such representation or that the party could have no reasonable belief that it was true. The level of proof required in such cases is extremely higher. An ambiguous statement cannot per se make the representation guilty of fraud. To prove a case of fraud, it must be proved that the representation made was false to the knowledge of the party making such representation. [See: Pollock & Mulla on Indian Contract & Specific Relief Acts -- (2001) 12th Edition page 489]." (emphasis supplied)
(ii) In Afsar Sheikh v. Soleman Bibi13. the Apex Court observed thus:
12
MANU/SC/0655/2004 = (2004) 8 SCC 588 44 "15. While it is true that `undue influence', `fraud', `misrepresentation' are cognate vices and may, in part, overlap in some cases, they are in law distinct categories, and are in view of Order 6, Rule 4, read with Order 6, Rule 2, of the Code of Civil Procedure, required to be separately pleaded, with specificity, particularity and precision. A general allegation in the plaint, that the plaintiff was a simple old man of ninety who had reposed great confidence in the defendant, was much too insufficient to amount to an averment of undue influence of which the High Court could take notice, particularly when no issue was claimed and no contention was raised on that point at any stage in the trial court, or, in the first round, even before the first appellate court."
(iii) In Gayatri Devi v. Shashi Pal Singh14. the Apex Court observed thus:
"16. In our view these observations aptly apply to the case before us. The learned counsel for the respondent relied upon the judgment of this Court in S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v Jagannath [MANU/SC/0192/1994 : AIR 1994 SC 853] and United India Insurance Co. Ltd. V. Rajendra Singh and others [MANU/SC/0180/2000 : (2000) 2 SCR 264] to contend that there was a fraud played upon the court and the fraud unravels everything. As a general proposition, the proposition is right. But fraud must necessarily be pleaded and proved. In the entire history of litigation nothing was pleaded, much less proved, as fraud. We cannot countenance the plea of fraud without any basis." (emphasis supplied) Accordingly, this point is answered against the petitioners.
27. Point No.3: The question of law raised in this point is no more res integra since a learned single Judge of the High Court of 13 MANU/SC/0001/1975 = AIR 1976 SC 163 14 MANU/SC/0188/2005 = AIR 2005 SC 2342 45 A.P. in W.P.No.17076/2000 & batch has elaborately discussed the said question and held that the award No.1/1998 was passed within the stipulated period of two years. In the corresponding Writ Appeal No.317/2023 & batch, the Division Bench has upheld the common order passed by the learned single Judge. Further, SLP No.3972/2007 filed before the Hon‟ble Supreme Court was dismissed. Therefore, the petitioners cannot re-agitate the same issue now.
This point is accordingly answered against the petitioners.
28. Point No.4: Regarding this point, the contention of the petitioners is that even though award No.1/1998 was passed, physical possession of the property was not taken and compensation was not paid to the petitioners and hence, the award is hit by Section 24(2) of the REFCTLARR Act, 2013. The respondents staunchly denied the said contention. In view of the background history pertaining to this case narrated earlier, I find no force in the contention of the petitioners.
Payment of compensation is concerned, since the petitioners did not turn up for enquiry, the LAO referred the matter to the 46 Court of III ADJ, Tirupati, under Section 30 of the Act 1894 and deposited the award amount of Rs.19,01,607/- vide bankers cheque No.264237, dated 13.07.1998. The 3rd ADJ conducted enquiry in LAOP No.341/1998 and passed orders dated 28.08.2012 and held that till the claimants establish their claims in Civil Court, they cannot be declared as persons entitled to receive compensation.
So far as possession is concerned, the LAO has taken possession of Ac.11.96 cents vide Panchanama dated 15.03.1998 and handed over to the 3rd respondent vide certificate of handing over of possession of lands dated 16.03.1998. It should be noted that on the representation of the Standing Counsel for 3 rd respondent that the possession was taken over and some of the plots were also sold, W.P.No.3131/2012 was dismissed. No appeal seems to be carried and hence, the said order became final. In that view, the petitioners now cannot contend that the award was hit by Section 24(2) of the REFCTLARR Act, 2013.
29. Thus, on a conspectus, the writ petitions are not maintainable either on law or in facts. Further, due to inordinate delay in challenging the award No.1/1998 also, the writ petitions deserve 47 dismissal. In Indore Development Authority‟s case (7 supra), the Apex Court observed thus:
"366.9. Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 does not give rise to new cause of action to question the legality of concluded proceedings of land acquisition. Section 24 applies to a proceeding pending on the date of enforcement of the Act of 2013, i.e., 1.1.2014. It does not revive stale and time-barred claims and does not reopen concluded proceedings nor allow landowners to question the legality of mode of taking possession to reopen proceedings or mode of deposit of compensation in the treasury instead of court to invalidate acquisition."
30. Accordingly, these Writ Petitions are dismissed. No costs.
As a sequel, interlocutory applications pending, if any, shall stand closed.
_________________________ U.DURGA PRASAD RAO, J 10.03.2023 KRK/NNN/MVA