Jeevarathna Anand vs The State Of Karnataka on 28 October, 2024

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Karnataka High Court

Jeevarathna Anand vs The State Of Karnataka on 28 October, 2024

Bench: M.Nagaprasanna

Reserved on : 21.10.2024
Pronounced on : 28.10.2024

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

DATED THIS THE 28TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA

CRIMINAL PETITION No.13194 OF 2023

BETWEEN:

1 . JEEVARATHNA ANAND
W/O ANAND B.G.,
AGED ABOUT 41 YEARS,
R/AT NO. 23, 4TH MAIN,
NAGARABHAVI CIRCLE,
VIDYAGIRI LAYOUT,
NAGARABHAVI,
BENGALURU NORTH,
BENGALURU - 560 072.

2 . KANNAVARA ONKARAPPA
S/O KANNAVARA SIDDAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 74 YEARS,
R AT NO. 101/5, 16TH MAIN,
25TH A CROSS,
NEAR TEJASWINI ENGLISH SCHOOL,
JAYANAGARA, 3RD BLOCK EAST,
BENGALURU - 560 011.
(NAME AND ADDRESS OF THE
PETITIONERS AS PER AADHAR CARD)
... PETITIONERS

(BY SRI SANDESH J.CHOUTA, SR.ADVOCATE A/W
2

SMT.SHILPA RANI, ADVOCATE)

AND:

1 . THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
BY THILAK NAGAR POLICE STATION,
BENGALURU CITY,
REPRESENTED BY SPP,
HIGH COURT BUILDING,
BENGALURU - 560 001.

2 . N.S.ANANDAPPA,
S/O LATE NAGAPPA,
AGED 75 YEARS, OCC: DOCTOR,
R/O NO. 1594/10, 11TH A MAIN,
JAYANAGAR 4 T BLOCK,
BENGALURU CITY - 560 011.
... RESPONDENTS

(BY SRI B.N.JAGADESSHA, ADDL.SPP FOR R-1;
SMT.THARA R., ADVOCATE FOR R-2)

THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION 482 OF
CR.P.C., PRAYING TO QUASH THE FIR IN CR.NO.299/2023, FOR
THE OFFENCE P/U/S 120B, 406, 420, 469, 470, 471 OF IPC, ON
THE FILE OF THILAK NAGAR POLICE STATION, RESPONDENT NO.1
AND PENDING ON THE FILE OF THE LEARNED 3RD ADDITIONAL
CHIEF METROPOLITAN MAGISTRATE, BANGALORE.

THIS CRIMINAL PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 21.10.2024, COMING ON FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:-
3

CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA

CAV ORDER

The petitioners/accused 1 and 2 are knocking at the doors of

this Court calling in question registration of a crime in Crime No.299

of 2023 registered for offences punishable under Sections 120B,

406, 420, 469, 470 and 471 of the IPC and pending before the III

Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru.

2. Heard Sri Sandesh J. Chouta, learned senior counsel

appearing for the petitioners, Sri B.N.Jagadeesha, learned

Additional State Public Prosecutor appearing for respondent No.1

and Smt. R. Thara, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2.

3. Facts, in brief, germane are as follows:-

One N.Nagappa had two sons - N.S. Anandappa/2nd

respondent and N.T.Ramesh and 3 three daughters. N.Nagappa,

father of the complainant had purchased a property i.e., Site

No.141, 13th Main Road, 3rd Block, Jayanagar, Bengaluru measuring

43'x59' and constructed ground and first floors. The 2nd respondent,
4

son of N.Nagappa institutes a suit for partition and separate

possession in O.S.No.6811 of 1990 against his parents and four

other siblings. The said suit comes to be dismissed on 28-11-2001

on the ground that respondent No.2 failed to prove that he has

1/3rd share in the property and the property was a joint family

property. The 2nd respondent/complainant prefers regular second

appeal before this Court in R.F.A.No.312 of 2002 which comes to be

dismissed on 24-06-2006.

4. The father/N.Nagappa executes a gift deed in favour of his

wife Smt. Pavithramma and delivered possession of the ground

floor of the property on 12-08-2011. A Will is then executed by

N.Nagappa and Smt. Pavithramma bequeathing all the immovable

and movable properties in favour of three children viz.,

Thejeshwari, Nagalakshmi and N.T.Ramesh. Thejeshwari and

N.Nagappa die in the years 2015 and 2017 respectively. After a

long drawn proceedings, the mother/Smt. Pavithramma dies.

Khata of first floor of the property was transferred in the name of

the daughter of the 1st petitioner. It is then the 2nd

respondent/complainant causes a legal notice on the other siblings
5

to part with his share both immovable and movable properties

which were either gifted or subject matter of Will. He later registers

the impugned complaint against these petitioners on the score that

they fraudulently obtained signatures of his parents when they were

alive and he was not allowed to perform the last rites of his father

and hence it was an organized plan against the complainant. The

complaint becomes a crime in Crime No.299 of 2023. The

registration of crime is what has driven the petitioners to this Court

in the subject petition. A co-ordinate Bench of this Court granted

an interim order of stay of further investigation on 14-12-2023. The

same is in subsistence even today.

5. The learned senior counsel representing the petitioners

would vehemently contend that a pure civil dispute is sought to be

given a colour of crime by the family member of the petitioners, all

on the score that he did not get a share in the property. He would

contend that the complainant never took care of his parents.

Therefore, the parents of the complainant had bequeathed all the

self-acquired properties in favour of the petitioners. If the

complainant wanted a share, it was open to him to institute civil
6

proceedings. He could not do so for the reason that he has lost all

civil cases filed against members of the family. Therefore, he

registers the impugned complaint. It is his submission that on

02-11-2023 itself the complainant sought to register a complaint

against these petitioners and the petitioners were called to the

Police Station to tender explanation and the complaint was closed

holding that it is purely civil in nature. Ten days thereafter comes

the 2nd complaint that is the impugned complaint.

6. The learned counsel appearing for the 2nd respondent

would vehemently refute the submissions to contend that the

allegations against these petitioners are writ large. The matter is at

the stage of investigation and this Court should not interdict

investigation when there is prima facie crime established. The

learned counsel would submit that the remedy available to file a

civil case would not mean that criminal law cannot be set into

motion. She seeks dismissal of the petition.
7

7. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions

made by the respective learned counsel and have perused the

material on record.

8. The afore-narrated facts are all a matter of record. A

complaint comes to be registered on 12-11-2023. Since the entire

issue has generated from the complaint, I deem it appropriate to

notice the complaint. It reads as follows:

" ಾಂಕ:12/11/2023

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10

The backdrop of the complaint is necessary to be noticed. The

relationship of persons in the family is as noticed hereinabove. A

Will dated 07-02-2014 comes to be executed. In the Will

observations about the present complainant are necessary to be

noticed, as they assume certain significance. It reads as follows:

".... ..... ....

4. We hereby bequeath any movable or immovable property
or any amount which we may receive from any individual
/ any Department, shall be distributed to our three
children by our Executor.

5. During our life time if we withdraw any amount, the
beneficiaries shall be contended with whatever available
without disputing this Will of ours.

6. The nominees of our accounts shall not be entitled to
draw any amount from our accounts on our demise. Only
the Executor has the power to draw all the balance in our
account or Fixed Deposit and distribute to our three
children according to their service done to us honestly
with love and affection. In case the separated and
deserted son Dr. N.S. Anandappa and eldest daughter
Mrs. Indiraswamy also take part in rendering service by
looking after all our needs like medical etc., as our other
children by appreciation of services of these two, the
Executor Mr. Eshwarappa Naik has got discretion to allot
any share or not to allot any share in our movable and
immovable properties. None of our children shall have
any say against the distribution made by our Executor.

7. We shall not alter or change or cancel this Will of ours
without the written consent from our Advocate and
Executor Mr. Eshwarappa Naik.
11

SCHEDULE

Out of the Four Allotments made in favour of N.Nagappa by
CITB and became the owner of site measuring East to West 60
ft. and North to South 75 ft. consisting of Ground Floor Main
Building bearing Old No.141, New No. 13/1-3, PID No.60-131-
13/1-3 constructed on site bearing No.141, 27th Cross, 13th
Main, 3rd Block East, Jayanagar, Bangalore - 560 011 measuring
East to West 43 ft. North to South 59 ft. with a building
consisting of Ground Floor with open space and First Floor on
the Ground Floor. Out of which Mrs. Pavithramma is the owner
of Ground Floor and open space as per the registered Gift Deed
dated 12th August 2011 and Mr. Nagappa is the owner of the
First Floor on the property of Mrs. Pavithramma bounded on -

East by: Property of Mrs. Indira Swamy bearing
No.141/13/1-2.
West by: Property bearing No.2327.
North by: Building bearing No.141/13/1-4 of Mr.
N.T. Ramesh & Mrs. Nagalakshmi
Shankar.
South by: 27th Cross Road.

Details of Bank Accounts standing in the name of First of
us.

1. Savings Bank Account No.1096010007592/Fixed Deposits
with VijayaBank, Jayanagar Branch, Bangalore.
2. Savings Bank Account No.54019502613/Fixed Deposits
with State Bank of Mysore, Jayanagar Brach, Bangalore.
3. Savings Bank Account No.1315155000039209 with Karur
Vysya Bank, Jayanagar Branch, Bangalore.
4. Any other Bank account/Fixed Deposits which may be
opened/Deposited during our life time.
5. Cash left by us at the time of our death."

N.Nagappa dies. Properties devolve into the hands of Smt.

Pavithramma, the mother. The mother executes a Will. Certain

clauses of the Will are required to be noticed. They read as follows:
12

".... .... ....

WHEREAS Mrs. Tejeshwari Onkarappa W/o Dr.
K.Onkarappa our youngest daughter was taking very good care
of my husband Mr. N.Nagappa and myself. Neither another
daughter Mrs. Nagalakshmi Shankar nor son Mr. N.T.Ramesh
have not taken care of us. Even the funeral rituals of my
husband N.Nagappa were carried out by my son-in-law Dr.
K.Onkarappa.

WHEREAS my daughter Mrs. Tejeshwari Onkarappa who
was the only person taking care of all our needs died on 3rd
October, 2015 and my husband N.Nagappa died on 4th January
2017.

WHEREAS after the demise of my daughter Tejeshwari
Onkarappa, her husband Dr. K. Onkarappa and his daughter
Mrs. Jeevarathna Anand have been supporting me by attending
to all my needs. Though my grand-daughter Mrs. Jeevarathna
Anand stays far away from my residence, constantly in touch
with me and take me to her house often wherein I stay for few
days with my great grand children Kumari. Ruthvika Anand B.G.
and Kumari Boomika Annand B.G. (i.e., daughters of my grand
daughter Mrs. Jeevarathna Anand)....."

Why the properties are bequeathed to other family members and

not to the complainant is clearly indicated. Smt. Pavithramma dies

in the year 2022. Then comes the first complaint of

misappropriation by the present complainant. The Police are said to

have summoned these petitioners and rendered an endorsement

terming the complaint to be a non-cognizable one. Thereafter the

present complaint emerges.
13

9. The 2nd respondent/complainant had instituted a suit in

O.S.No.6811 of 1990 seeking 1/3rd share in the property. That

comes to be dismissed on 28-11-2001. R.F.A.No.312 of 2002 is

preferred by the complainant. That also comes to be dismissed on

24-06-2006, which has become final. The efforts of the 2nd

respondent/complainant to secure the property have failed and now

he projects that the gift initially and the Will later of Nagappa and

Smt. Pavithramma are forged and, therefore, the crime is sought to

be registered. In the considered view of this Court there cannot be

a better illustration of an issue which is purely civil in nature being

rendered a colour of crime and criminal law being set into motion.

If further investigation is permitted in the case at hand, it would run

foul of several judgments of the Apex Court. The Apex Court in the

case of DEEPAK GABA v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH1 has held

as follows:

".... .... ....

11. The private complaint filed by Respondent 2
complainant had invoked Sections 405, 420, 471 and 120-
BIPC. However, by the order dated 19-7-2018, summons
were directed to be issued only under Section 406IPC, and
not under Sections 420, 471 or 120-BIPC. We have quoted
the operative and reasoning portion of the summoning order,

1
(2023) 3 SCC 423
14

that records in brief the assertions in the complaint, to hold
that Respondent 2 complainant had shown that "a forged
demand of Rs 6,37,252.16p had been raised by JIPL, which
demand is not due in terms of the statements made by
Shubhankar P. Tomar and Sakshi Tilak Chand". The order
states that Respondent 2 complainant had filed photocopy of
"one" email as per Documents 1 to 34, but the narration and
the contents of the email is not adverted to and elucidated.
.... .... ....

15. For Section 405IPC to be attracted, the following
have to be established:

(a) the accused was entrusted with
property, or entrusted with dominion over
property;

(b) the accused had dishonestly
misappropriated or converted to their own use
that property, or dishonestly used or disposed of
that property or wilfully suffer any other person
to do so; and

(c) such misappropriation, conversion, use
or disposal should be in violation of any direction
of law prescribing the mode in which such trust
is to be discharged, or of any legal contract
which the person has made, touching the
discharge of such trust.

16. Thus, criminal breach of trust would, inter alia,
mean using or disposing of the property by a person who is
entrusted with or otherwise has dominion. Such an act must
not only be done dishonestly, but also in violation of any
direction of law or any contract express or implied relating to
carrying out the trust. [Sudhir Shantilal Mehta v. CBI, (2009)
8 SCC 1 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 646]

17. However, in the instant case, materials on record
fail to satisfy the ingredients of Section 405IPC. The
complaint does not directly refer to the ingredients of Section
405IPC and does not state how and in what manner, on
facts, the requirements are satisfied. Pre-summoning
15

evidence is also lacking and suffers on this account. On these
aspects, the summoning order is equally quiet, albeit, it
states that "a forged demand of Rs 6,37,252.16p had been
raised by JIPL, which demand is not due in terms of
statements by Shubhankar P. Tomar and Sakshi Tilak
Chand". A mere wrong demand or claim would not meet the
conditions specified by Section 405IPC in the absence of
evidence to establish entrustment, dishonest
misappropriation, conversion, use or disposal, which action
should be in violation of any direction of law, or legal
contract touching the discharge of trust. Hence, even if
Respondent 2 complainant is of the opinion that the
monetary demand or claim is incorrect and not payable,
given the failure to prove the requirements of Section
405IPC, an offence under the same section is not
constituted. In the absence of factual allegations which
satisfy the ingredients of the offence under Section 405IPC, a
mere dispute on monetary demand of Rs 6,37,252.16p, does
not attract criminal prosecution under Section 406IPC.

18. In order to apply Section 420IPC, namely,
cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property, the
ingredients of Section 415IPC have to be satisfied. To
constitute an offence of cheating under Section 415IPC, a
person should be induced, either fraudulently or dishonestly,
to deliver any property to any person, or consent that any
person shall retain any property. The second class of acts set
forth in the section is the intentional inducement of doing or
omitting to do anything which the person deceived would not
do or omit to do, if she were not so deceived. Thus, the sine
qua non of Section 415IPC is "fraudulence", "dishonesty", or
"intentional inducement", and the absence of these elements
would debase the offence of cheating. [Iridium India Telecom
Ltd. v. Motorola Inc., (2011) 1 SCC 74 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri)
1201]

19. Explaining the contours, this Court in Mohd.
Ibrahim v. State of Bihar [Mohd. Ibrahim v. State of Bihar,
(2009) 8 SCC 751 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 929. This Court, in
this case, has cautioned that the ratio should not be
misunderstood, to record the clarification, which in the
present case, in our opinion, is not of any avail and help to
Respondent 2 complainant. We respectfully concur with the
16

clarification as well as the ratio explaining Sections 415, 464,
etc. IPC.] , observed that for the offence of cheating, there
should not only be cheating, but as a consequence of such
cheating, the accused should also have dishonestly adduced
the person deceived to deliver any property to a person; or
to make, alter, or destroy, wholly or in part, a valuable
security, or anything signed or sealed and which is capable
of being converted into a valuable security.

20. In the present case, the ingredients to constitute
an offence under Section 420 read with Section 415IPC are
absent. The pre-summoning evidence does not disclose and
establish the essential ingredients of Section 415IPC. There
is no assertion, much less legal evidence, to submit that JIPL
had engaged in dishonesty, fraud, or intentional inducement
to deliver a property. It is not the case of Respondent 2
complainant that JIPL had tried to deceive them, either by
making a false or misleading representation, or by any other
action or omission; nor is it their case that JIPL had offered
any fraudulent or dishonest inducement to deliver a
property. As such, given that the ingredients of Section
415IPC are not satisfied, the offence under Section 420IPC is
not made out.

21. Section 471IPC ["471. Using as genuine a
forged document or electronic record.--Whoever
fraudulently or dishonestly uses as genuine any document or
electronic record which he knows or has reason to believe to
be a forged document or electronic record, shall be punished
in the same manner as if he had forged such document or
electronic record."] is also not attracted. This Section is
applicable when a person fraudulently or dishonestly uses as
genuine any document or electronic record, which he knows
or has reasons to believe to be a forged document or
electronic record. This Court in Mohd. Ibrahim [Mohd.
Ibrahim v. State of Bihar, (2009) 8 SCC 751: (2009) 3 SCC
(Cri) 929. This Court, in this case, has cautioned that the
ratio should not be misunderstood, to record the clarification,
which in the present case, in our opinion, is not of any avail
and help to Respondent 2 complainant. We respectfully
concur with the clarification as well as the ratio explaining
Sections 415, 464, etc. IPC.] , has elucidated that the
condition precedent of an offence under Section 471IPC is
17

forgery by making a false document or false electronic record
or part thereof. Further, to constitute the offence under
Section 471IPC, it has to be proven that the document was
"forged" in terms of Section 470 ["470. Forged
document.--A false document [or electronic record] made
wholly or in part by forgery is designated "a forged document
or electronic record"."] , and "false" in terms of Section
464IPC [ "464. Making a false document.--A person is
said to make a false document or false electronic record--
First.--Who dishonestly or fraudulently--(a) makes, signs,
seals or executes a document or part of a document;(b)
makes or transmits any electronic record or part of any
electronic record;(c) affixes any electronic signature on any
electronic record;(d) makes any mark denoting the execution
of a document or the authenticity of the electronic
signature,with the intention of causing it to be believed that
such document or part of a document, electronic record
or *[electronic signature] was made, signed, sealed,
executed, transmitted or affixed by or by the authority of a
person by whom or by whose authority he knows that it was
not made, signed, sealed, executed or affixed; or*
Substituted for "digital signature" by Act 10 of 2009, Section
51(e) (w.e.f. 27-10-2009)Secondly.--Who without lawful
authority, dishonestly or fraudulently, by cancellation or
otherwise, alters a document or an electronic record in any
material part thereof, after it has been made, executed or
affixed with electronic signature either by himself or by any
other person, whether such person be living or dead at the
time of such alteration; orThirdly.--Who dishonestly or
fraudulently causes any person to sign, seal, execute or alter
a document or an electronic record or to affix his electronic
signature on any electronic record knowing that such person
by reason of unsoundness of mind or intoxication cannot, or
that by reason of deception practised upon him, he does not
know the contents of the document or electronic record or
the nature of the alteration."] .

22. Section 470 lays down that a document is "forged"
if there is:

(i) fraudulent or dishonest use of a document as
genuine; and
18

(ii) knowledge or reasonable belief on the part
of the person using the document that it is a forged
one.

Section 470 defines a "forged document" as a false
document made by forgery.

23. As per Section 464IPC, a person is said to have
made a "false document":

(i) if he has made or executed a document claiming to be
someone else or authorised by someone else;
(ii) if he has altered or tampered a document; or
(iii) if he has obtained a document by practising deception,
or from a person not in control of his senses.

24. Unless the document is false and forged in terms
of Sections 464 and 470IPC respectively, the requirement of
Section 471IPC would not be met.

25. In the counter-affidavit filed by Respondent 2
complainant, it is submitted that a few bills were
faked/forged, as the goods were not ordered. Reference is
made to balance of Rs 79,752 shown on 30-3-2013, which
was objected to and thereupon as per the complaint itself the
demand/bill was withdrawn. This would not make the bill a
forged document or false document, in terms of Sections 470
and 464IPC. The complaint was made in the year 2017, four
years after the bill/claim had been withdrawn, reflecting no
criminal intent. The bill was not fake or forged, and at best it
could be stated that it was wrongly raised. Moreover, the
pre-summoning evidence is silent with regard to this bill and
mens rea on the part of the accused is not shown and
established. Same would be the position with regard to the
bill/invoice of Rs 53,215 which was as per the complaint,
sent directly to Manav Rachna International at Faridabad.
The bill/invoice is not doubted as "forged" or "false" within
the meaning of Sections 470 and 464IPC. No doubt, Adhunik
Colour Solutions is mentioned as the buyer, and Manav
Rachna International as the consignee, albeit the invoice was
issued by JIPL. Pre-summoning evidence does not help and
make out a case predicated on this bill/invoice. In the
counter-affidavit filed before us, it is alleged that since this
19

bill was sent to Faridabad, JIPL had added the GST in the
invoice. It is argued that had Respondent 2 complainant
supplied the goods, instead of GST, VAT as applicable in
Delhi would have been levied, as Respondent 2 complainant
was based in Delhi. This argument is rather fanciful and does
not impress us to justify summoning for the offence under
Section 471IPC. Besides, the assertion is not to be found in
the complaint, and cannot be predicated on the pre-
summoning evidence.

26. For completeness, we must record that the
appellants have placed on record the dealership agreement
dated 11-4-2012, which, inter alia states that JIPL has a
discretion to establish direct contractual relationship with
specific customers, if JIPL feels they can be served better.
Further, in such a situation, the dealer, if JIPL agrees, can
act as an intermediary. Assuming the bill/invoice had
wrongly recorded Respondent 2 complainant as the buyer, it
is not doubted that Manav Rachna International was the
consignee. At best, Respondent 2 complainant would not be
liable, had Manav Rachna International failed to pay. Non-
payment is also not alleged in the complaint or the pre-
summoning evidence. Reliance on objections vide emails
dated 4-7-2014 and 21-7-2014 are of no avail, as they are
for the period prior to 31-7-2014, when the bill/invoice was
raised.

27. It is evident from the pre-summoning evidence led
and the assertions made in the criminal complaint that the
dispute raised by Respondent 2 complainant primarily
pertains to settlement of accounts. The allegations are:
(i) goods supplied by JIPL were not as per the
requirements and demands of Respondent 2 complainant,
(ii) goods supplied were different from the order
placed, and
(iii) goods lying with, and returned by Respondent 2
complainant have not been accounted for.
These assertions, even if assumed to be correct, would
not fulfil the requirements of Section 405IPC, or for that
20

matter Sections 420 or 471. The material on record does not
reflect and indicate that JIPL indeed had the
dishonest/culpable intention for the commission of the
alleged offences under the IPC. Unless the ingredients of
aforesaid Sections of the IPC are fulfilled, the offence under
Section 120-BIPC, for criminal conspiracy, would not be
made. In fact, a combined reading of the complaint and the
pre-summoning evidence does not disclose any element of
criminal conspiracy as per Section 120-AIPC. The complaint
discloses a civil dispute and grievance relating to the claim
made by JIPL. What is challenged by Respondent 2
complainant is the demand of Rs 6,37,252.16p raised by JIPL
as the amount payable till the year ending 2016. This
assertion made by JIPL is questioned as incorrect. The
demand, even if assumed to be wrong, would not satisfy the
ingredients of Section 405, or Sections 420 or 471IPC, so as
to justify the summoning order. As noted above, JIPL had
filed a criminal case under Section 138 of the NI Act as two
cheques for Rs 1,93,776 and Rs 4,99,610 issued by them, on
presentation, were dishonoured on account of "insufficient
funds".

28. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the
assertions made in the complaint and the pre-summoning
evidence led by Respondent 2 complainant fail to establish
the conditions and incidence of the penal liability set out
under Sections 405, 420 and 471IPC, as the allegations
pertain to alleged breach of contractual obligations.
Pertinently, this Court, in a number of cases, has noticed
attempts made by parties to invoke jurisdiction of criminal
courts, by filing vexatious criminal complaints by
camouflaging allegations which were ex facie outrageous or
pure civil claims. These attempts are not to be entertained
and should be dismissed at the threshold. To avoid prolixity,
we would only like to refer to the judgment of this Court
in Thermax Ltd. v. K.M. Johny [Thermax Ltd. v. K.M. Johny,
(2011) 13 SCC 412 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 650] , as it refers to
earlier case laws in copious detail.
21

29. In Thermax [Thermax Ltd. v. K.M. Johny, (2011)
13 SCC 412: (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 650] , it was pointed out
that the court should be watchful of the difference between
civil and criminal wrongs, though there can be situations
where the allegations may constitute both civil and criminal
wrongs. The court must cautiously examine the facts to
ascertain whether they only constitute a civil wrong, as the
ingredients of criminal wrong are missing. A conscious
application of the said aspects is required by the Magistrate,
as a summoning order has grave consequences of setting
criminal proceedings in motion."

(Emphasis supplied)

The Apex Court, in the subsequent judgment of USHA

CHAKRABORTY v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL2, while considering

the entire spectrum of law on civil cases being dressed with a colour

of crime, has held as follows:

".... .... ....

5. Before adverting to the rival contentions with
reference to application under Section 156(3), Cr. P.C. within
the parameters, we think it only appropriate to refer to the
following decisions of this Court in respect to the scope of
exercise of power under Section 482, Cr. P.C.

6. In Paramjeet Batra v. State of Uttarakhand1, this
Court held:--

"12. While exercising its jurisdiction under Section
482 of the Code of the High Court has to be cautious. This
power is to be used sparingly and only for the purpose of
preventing abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to

2
2023 SCC OnLine SC 90
22

secure ends of justice. Whether a complaint discloses a
criminal offence or not depends upon the nature of the facts
alleged therein. Whether essential ingredients of criminal
offence are present or not has to be judged by the High
Court. A complaint disclosing civil transactions may also
have a criminal texture. But the High Court must see
whether a dispute which is essentially of a civil nature is
given a cloak of criminal offence. In such a situation, if a
civil remedy is available and is, in fact, adopted as has
happened in this case, the High Court should not hesitate to
quash the criminal proceedings to prevent abuse of process
of the court."

7. In Vesa Holdings Private Limited v. State of Kerala2,
it was held that:--

"13. It is true that a given set of facts may make out
a civil wrong as also a criminal offence and only because a
civil remedy may be available to the complainant that itself
cannot be a ground to quash a criminal proceeding. The real
test is whether the allegations in the complaint disclose the
criminal offence of cheating or not. In the present case
there is nothing to show that at the very inception there
was any intention on behalf of the accused persons to cheat
which is a condition precedent for an offence under
Section 420 IPC. In our view the complaint does not
disclose any criminal offence at all. The criminal proceedings
should not be encouraged when it is found to be mala fide
or otherwise an abuse of the process of the court. The
superior courts while exercising this power should also
strive to serve the ends of justice. In our opinion in view of
these facts allowing the police investigation to continue
would amount to an abuse of the process of the court and
the High Court committed an error in refusing to exercise
the power under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure
Code to quash the proceedings."

8. In Kapil Aggarwal v. Sanjay Sharma3, this Court
held that Section 482 is designed to achieve the purpose of
ensuring that criminal proceedings are not permitted to
generate into weapons of harassment.

.... .... ....

12. The basic requirements/ingredients to bring home
the accusations under the alleged offences are hereunder:--
23

Offence punishable under Section 323, IPC.

(i) causation of hurt by another person; (ii) that he
caused such hurt voluntarily; (iii) that such a
case is not covered under Section 334, IPC.

Offence of extortion punishable under
Section 384, IPC.

(i) intentionally putting a person in fear of injury to
himself or another; (ii) dishonestly inducing a
person so put in fear to deliver to any person
any property, or valuable security.

Offence of criminal breach of trust punishable
under Section 406, IPC.

(i) Entrustment of the property or any dominion
over property with accusation; (ii) The person
entrusted dishonestly misappropriating or
converting to his own use that property; or
dishonestly using or disposing that property in
violation of any direction of law prescribing the
mode in which such trust is to be discharged or
of any legal contract, express or implied, which
he has made touching the discharge of such
trust or willfully causing sufferance to any other
person so to do.
Offence punishable under Section 423, IPC.

The essential ingredients to constitute an
offence under Section 423, IPC is that the sale
deed or deed subjecting an immovable property
to a charge was contained a false statement
relating to the consideration or relating to the
persons or whose use or benefit, it was intended
to operate. Thus, it is evident that
Section 423, IPC deals with twin specific frauds
in the matter of execution of deeds or
instruments of transfer or charge, idest, (i) false
recital as to consideration or false recital as to
the name of beneficiary.
24

Offence punishable under Section 467, IPC.

Virtually, the offence under Section 467 is
an aggravated form of the offence under
Section 466, IPC. The essential ingredients to
constitute the offence punishable under this
Section are (i) commission of forgery; (ii) that
such commission of forgery must be in relation
to a document purporting to be (a) a valuable
property; or (b) a will; or (c) an authority to
adopt a son; or (d) which purports to give
authority to any person to make or transfer any
valuable security; or (e) the receive the
principle, interest or dividends thereon; or (f) to
receive or deliver any money, movable property
or valuable security, or any document purporting
to be an acquittance or receipt acknowledging
the payment of money, or (g) an acquittance or
receipt for the delivery of any movable property
or valuable security.

Offence punishable under Section 468, IPC.

(i) Commission of forgery, (ii) that he did so
intending that the document or electronic record
forged shall be used for the purpose of
cheating.

Offence punishable under Section 420, IPC.

To constitute the said offence there must be
deception i.e., the accused must have deceived
someone; that by such deception the accused must
induce a person (i) to deliver any property; or (ii) to
make, alter, destroy a whole or part of the valuable
security or anything which is signed or sealed and
which is capable of being converted into a valuable
property; or (iii) that the accused must have done so
dishonestly. The offence punishable under Section
120B, IPC, to constitute criminal conspiracy, there
must be agreement between two or more persons.
The agreement should be to do or cause to be done
25

some illegal act, or some act which is not illegal, by
illegal means, provided that where the agreement is
other than one to commit an offence, the prosecution
must further prove; or (iv) that some act besides the
agreement was done by or more of the parties in
pursuance of it.

13. Now, the question is whether the allegations in
the aforesaid application are sufficient to constitute the
alleged offences.

14. We have already extracted the said
application filed by the respondent against the
appellants in its entirety. At the outset, it is to be
noted that in the affidavit accompanying the
application, the respondent has stated thus : - "I have
not placed this incident before any Court heretofore".
In the application, obviously, it is stated that he is one
of the trustees of Bagla Sundari Memorial Trust at
Basunagar Madhyagram and under the said trust there
is a high school by name of Rose Bank Educare and he
is the Secretary of the said school. The recital in
paragraph 2 of the application filed by the respondent
would reveal his case that the accused persons kept
him in dark and without giving any information by
strengthening the said trust deed illegally got the
same registered on 12.07.2016 and removed him from
the said post. It is in this context that the aforesaid
statement in the aforesaid affidavit assumes
relevance. It is the case of the appellants that in
regard to his removal from the post of Secretary of the
school, the respondent had instituted title suit No. 363
of 2015, praying therein for a declaration that he is the
Secretary of the school and the said suit is still
pending. Despite the institution of the said suit and its
pendency before the First Court of Civil Judge, Junior
Division, Barasat the respondent made such a
statement in the affidavit. That apart, what is stated in
the application is that he is the Secretary of the
school, run by the trust.

15. The materials on record pertaining to the
said pleadings instituted in the Civil Suit, produced in
26

this proceeding would reveal that the respondent was
in fact ousted from the membership of the trust. In the
counter affidavit filed in this proceeding, the
respondent has virtually admitted the pendency of the
suit filed against his removal from the post of
Secretary and the trusteeship and its pendency. The
factum of passing of adverse orders in the
interlocutory applications in the said Civil Suit as also
the prima facie finding and conclusion arrived at by
the Civil Court that the respondent stands removed
from the post of Secretary and also from the
trusteeship are also not disputed therein. Then, the
question is why would the respondent conceal those
relevant aspects? The indisputable and undisputed
facts (admitted in the counter-affidavit by the
respondent) would reveal the existence of the civil
dispute on removal of the respondent from the post of
Secretary of the school as also from the trusteeship.
Obviously, it can only be taken that since the removal
from the office of the Secretary and the trusteeship
was the causative incident, he concealed the pendency
of the civil suit to cover up the civil nature of the
dispute.

16. By non-disclosure the respondent has, in troth,
concealed the existence of a pending civil suit between him
and the appellants herein before a competent civil court
which obviously is the causative incident for the respondent's
allegation of perpetration of the aforesaid offences against
the appellants. We will deal with it further and also its impact
a little later. There cannot be any doubt with respect to the
position that in order to cause registration of an F.I.R. and
consequential investigation based on the same the petition
filed under Section 156(3), Cr.P.C., must satisfy the
essential ingredients to attract the alleged offences. In other
words, if such allegations in the petition are vague and are
not specific with respect to the alleged offences it cannot
lead to an order for registration of an F.I.R. and investigation
on the accusation of commission of the offences alleged. As
noticed hereinbefore, the respondent alleged commission of
offences under Sections 323, 384, 406, 423, 467, 468,
420 and 120B, IPC against the appellants. A bare perusal of
the said allegation and the ingredients to attract them, as
27

adverted to hereinbefore would reveal that the allegations
are vague and they did not carry the essential ingredients to
constitute the alleged offences. There is absolutely no
allegation in the complaint that the appellants herein had
caused hurt on the respondent so also, they did not reveal a
case that the appellants had intentionally put the respondent
in fear of injury either to himself or another or by putting
him under such fear or injury, dishonestly induced him to
deliver any property or valuable security. The same is the
position with respect to the alleged offences punishable
under Sections 406, 423, 467, 468, 420 and 120 B, IPC.
The ingredients to attract the alleged offence referred to
hereinbefore and the nature of the allegations contained in
the application filed by the respondent would undoubtedly
make it clear that the respondent had failed to make specific
allegation against the appellants herein in respect of the
aforesaid offences. The factual position thus would reveal
that the genesis as also the purpose of criminal proceedings
are nothing but the aforesaid incident and further that the
dispute involved is essentially of civil nature. The appellants
and the respondents have given a cloak of criminal offence in
the issue. In such circumstance when the respondent had
already resorted to the available civil remedy and it is
pending, going by the decision in Paramjit Batra (supra), the
High Court would have quashed the criminal proceedings to
prevent the abuse of the process of the Court but for the
concealment.

17. In the aforesaid circumstances, coupled with
the fact that in respect of the issue involved, which is
of civil nature, the respondent had already approached
the jurisdictional civil court by instituting a civil suit
and it is pending, there can be no doubt with respect
to the fact that the attempt on the part of the
respondent is to use the criminal proceedings as
weapon of harassment against the appellants. The
indisputable facts that the respondent has filed the
pending title suit in the year 2015, he got no case that
he obtained an interim relief against his removal from
the office of Secretary of the School Managing
Committee as also the trusteeship, that he filed the
stated application for an order for investigation only in
April, 2017 together with absence of a case that
28

despite such removal he got a right to get informed of
the affairs of the school and also the trust, would only
support the said conclusion. For all these reasons, we
are of the considered view that this case invites
invocation of the power under Section 482 Cr. P.C. to
quash the FIR registered based on the direction of the
Magistrate Court in the afore-stated application and all
further proceeding in pursuance thereof. Also, we have
no hesitation to hold that permitting continuance of
the criminal proceedings against the appellants in the
aforesaid circumstances would result in abuse of the
process of Court and also in miscarriage of justice."

(Emphasis supplied)

Following the law laid down in all the aforesaid cases, the

Apex Court in the case of NARESH KUMAR v. STATE OF

KARNATAKA3 has held as follows:

".... .... ....

5. Under these circumstances, we are of the
considered view that this is a case where the inherent
powers should have been exercised by the High Court under
Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code as the powers
are there to stop the abuse of the process and to secure the
ends of justice.

6. In the case of Paramjeet Batra v. State of
Uttarakhand, (2013) 11 SCC 673, this Court recognized that
although the inherent powers of a High Court under
Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be
exercised sparingly, yet the High Court must not hesitate in
quashing such criminal proceedings which are essentially of a
civil nature. This is what was held:

3
2024 SCC OnLine SC 268
29

"12. While exercising its jurisdiction under Section
482 of the Code the High Court has to be cautious. This
power is to be used sparingly and only for the purpose of
preventing abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to
secure ends of justice. Whether a complaint discloses a
criminal offence or not depends upon the nature of facts
alleged therein. Whether essential ingredients of criminal
offence are present or not has to be judged by the High
Court. A complaint disclosing civil transactions may
also have a criminal texture. But the High Court must
see whether a dispute which is essentially of a civil
nature is given a cloak of criminal offence. In such a
situation, if a civil remedy is available and is, in fact,
adopted as has happened in this case, the High Court
should not hesitate to quash the criminal proceedings
to prevent abuse of process of the court."
(emphasis supplied)

7. Relying upon the decision in Paramjeet
Batra (supra), this Court in Randheer Singh v. State of
U.P., (2021) 14 SCC 626, observed that criminal proceedings
cannot be taken recourse to as a weapon of harassment.
In Usha Chakraborty v. State of West Bengal, 2023 SCC
OnLine SC 90, relying upon Paramjeet Batra (supra) it was
again held that where a dispute which is essentially of a civil
nature, is given a cloak of a criminal offence, then such
disputes can be quashed, by exercising the inherent powers
under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

8. Essentially, the present dispute between the
parties relates to a breach of contract. A mere breach
of contract, by one of the parties, would not attract
prosecution for criminal offence in every case, as held
by this Court in Sarabjit Kaur v. State of
Punjab, (2023) 5 SCC 360. Similarly, dealing with the
distinction between the offence of cheating and a mere
breach of contractual obligations, this Court, in Vesa
Holdings (P) Ltd. v. State of Kerala, (2015) 8 SCC 293,
has held that every breach of contract would not give
rise to the offence of cheating, and it is required to be
shown that the accused had fraudulent or dishonest
intention at the time of making the promise.
30

9. In the case at hand, the dispute between the
parties was not only essentially of a civil nature but in
this case the dispute itself stood settled later as we
have already discussed above. We see no criminal
element here and consequently the case here is
nothing but an abuse of the process. We therefore
allow the appeal and set aside the order of the High
Court dated 02.12.2020. The criminal proceedings
arising out of FIR No. 113 of 2017 will hereby stand
quashed."

(Emphasis supplied)

The Apex Court, in the afore-quoted judgments, considers all the

issues that are projected in the case at hand and holds that issues

that are civil in nature and are rendered a colour of crime should be

nipped in the bud, when it comes before the Court in exercise of

jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. Therefore, it becomes

a too well settled principle of law that criminal law cannot be

permitted to set into motion on the issues which are purely civil in

nature. Wherefore, permitting further investigation would become

an abuse of the process of law and result in miscarriage of justice.
31

10. For the aforesaid reasons, the following:

ORDER

(i) Criminal petition is allowed.

(ii) FIR in Crime No.299 of 2023 registered at Thilaknagar Police Station and pending before the III Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru stands quashed.

(iii) It is made clear that the observations made in the case at hand are only for the purpose of consideration of the case of the petitioners under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., and the same would not bind or influence any proceedings pending between the parties.

Sd/-

(M. NAGAPRASANNA) JUDGE Bkp CT:MJ

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