Gujarat High Court
Karimaben K. Bagad vs State Of Gujarat on 27 February, 1997
Equivalent citations: (1997)2GLR1595
Author: N.N. Mathur
Bench: N.N. Mathur
JUDGMENT N.N. Mathur, J.
1. In this group of Special Civil Applications under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners are either detenus or their family members and associates. They have challenged the original order of detention passed during Emergency under Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as "COFEPOSA") as well as the proceedings instituted against them under Smuggling and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as "SAFEMA") Prefectory Note:
A proclamation of Emergency dated 3-12-1971 came to be issued under Article 352(1) of the Constitution of India on the ground that "Security of India is threatened by external aggression". With a view to deal effectively with threats to the defence of India and to the security of India, the Maintenance of Internal Security Ordinance was promulgated which was replaced by the Act known as Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 (hereinafter called as "MISA") on 2-7-1971. Realising smuggling, foreign exchange racketeering and such related activities having deleterious effect on the national economy and thereby a serious adverse effect on the security of the State, Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Act, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as "COFEPOSA") was enacted to immobilise by detaining the persons engaged in the operations and to disturb the machineries established furthering of smuggling and foreign exchange manipulations with all their ramifications. COFEPOSA Act came into force with effect from 19-12-1974 by virtue of Notification under Section 1(3) of the Act. On the same day, by virtue of Section 14 of the Act, MISA Amendment Ordinance Act, 1974 and MISA Act, 1971 stood repealed.
2. On 25-6-1975, the President of India proclaimed Emergency under Article 352(1) of the Constitution of India on the ground that "security of India is threatened by internal disturbances". The declaration had the effect of suspending fundamental rights under Article 19 as provided under Article 358 of the Constitution. On 27-6-1975, the President of India made an order under Article 359(1) of the Constitution declaring "the right of any person (including a foreigner) to move any Court for the enforcement of the rights conferred by Article 14, Article 21 and Article 22 of the Constitution and all proceedings pending in any Court for the enforcement of the above-mentioned rights shall remain suspended for the period during which the proclamation of emergency made under Clause (1) of Article 352 of the Constitution on 3-12-1971 and on 25-6-1975 are both in force". The effects of administration and realisation of the purpose of COFEPOSA having been rendered defective by reason of clandestine manner in which the persons engaged in this operation carried on their activities and the consequent defects of securing sufficient evidence to comply with the standards insisted upon by the Courts and further that some of the persons engaged in smuggling and foreign exchange racketeering have been facing a serious threat to the economy and to the security of the nation, owing to their large resources and influences, it was conceded that during the Emergency, disclosure of grounds of detention to such persons and compliance with the usual procedure of rules and regulations of the Advisory Board would not be in the larger interest of the nation. Thus, the President promulgated on 1-7-1975, the COFEPOSA (Amendment) Ordinance, 1975 to remove the said defects and to provide a special provision introducing Section 12-A making special provisions in respect of persons whose detention is necessary for dealing effectively with the Emergency. On 5-11-1975, with an object to provide for forfeiture of illegally acquired properties of the offenders, Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Ordinance, 1976 was enacted which became an Act in January 1976. This Act applies to persons convicted under the Sea Customs Act, 1878, Customs Act, 1962, FERA, 1947 and to those detained under the COFEPOSA, whose detention order was neither set aside nor revoked in the circumstances mentioned therein. Besides, the persons so convicted/detained, the Act applies to their relatives and associates as well. The main purpose of the Act is to forfeit the illegally acquired properties of such smugglers and foreign exchange manipulators in whosoever's name they may have been kept.
3. COFEPOSA, by the 39th Constitution (Amendment) Act, 1975, was placed in the IXth Schedule. SAFEMA and COFEPOSA Amendment Acts were placed in the IXth Schedule by the Constitution 40th (Amendment) Act, 1976.
4. The Constitutional Bench of the Apex Court in the case of A.D.M. Jubalpur v. S. Shukla, by majority held that in view of the Presidential Order dated 27-6-1975, no person has any locus to move any writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution before, the Court for, habeas corpus or any other writ or direction to challenge the legality of the order of detention on the ground that the same is not in order or not in compliance with the Act or is illegal or is vitiated by mala fides factually or is based on extraneous consideration. The Court also upheld the validity of Section 16-A (9) of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act.
5. The Emergency was revoked on March 21, 1977 and many detenus were released. Subsequently, notices were issued under Section 6 of the SAFEMA to the said detenus, their relatives and associates calling upon them to show cause why the properties mentioned in the notice be not declared as illegally acquired properties and forfeited. SAFEMA was being invoked against them because of the orders of detention made against the detenus under the COFEPOSA during the period of Emergency. The said orders of detention were the communicating link, foundation for action being taken against the detenus, their friends and relatives under SAFEMA. Thus, several writ petitions were filed in this High Court and in other High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for quashing the said notices.
6. One of the petitions, by way of appeal first time came up before the Supreme Court in Haji Mastan v. Union of India . Haji Mastan filed a petition before the Bombay High Court challenging the order of detention as well as the notice issued under SAFEMA. Haji Mastan was first detained under the MISA under order dated September 17, 1974. On December 19, 1974, the said order was revoked but simultaneously an order of detention was made under Section 3(i) of COFEPOSA. The grounds of detention were served on him on December 23, 1974. On June 25, 1975, Emergency was proclaimed under Article 352(1) on the ground of internal disturbances, which continued in force up to March 21, 1977. The detenu was released on March 23,1977. Notice under Section 6(i) of the SAFEMA was issued to him, his relatives and associates and as such he challenged the order of detention and the notice under SAFEMA on the ground that he was not supplied with the documents clearly and unmistakably relied upon for arriving at the requisite satisfaction and a large number of documents were also referred to in the grounds of detention served upon him. The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition and quashed the order of detention and the notice under SAFEMA. On appeal by the Union of India, the Court held that the proceeding under Sections 6 and 7 of the SAFEMA pre-supposes the valid order of detention under COFEPOSA and thus it was open for the detenu to question the validity of the order of detention. In view of the decision in Haji Mastan's case (supra), as well as in some other cases, this Court also found that the petitions filed under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the order of detention under SAFEMA is maintainable. Reference may be made to a decision in the case of N.D. Choksi v. Union of India, reported in 1992(2) GLR 981. It appears from para 14 of the said judgment that various petitions which came to be filed in this Court under Article 226 challenging the order of detention under COFEPOSA and initiation of proceedings under SAFEMA were stayed by the order of the Supreme Court dated 25-10-1989. But later on the Supreme Court, by order dated 19-12-1991, directed that eight petitions as mentioned in the order be heard by the High Court, as the Constitutional validity of COFEPOSA and SAFEMA were not challenged in those petitions. It further appears that subsequently the Attorney General of India applied for transfer of the writ petitions pending in various High Courts to the Apex Court to be heard along with the petition preferred directly to that Court in view of the important Constitutional questions raised therein. The prayer for transfer was granted in all the petitions and the matters were heard and decided by a Special Bench of 9 Judges of the Supreme Court in Attorney General of India v. Amrutlal Pranjivandas and Ors., as reported in. In Attorney General's Case (supra), the Supreme Court in Para 47 dealing with Haji Mastan's case (supra) expressed "it is not possible to agree with the reasoning of the decision ".
7. In Attorney General's case (supra), the Apex Court noticed that after the judgment in Makhansingh v. State of Punjab, , by way of Constitution 38th (Amendment) Act, 1975, Clause I(A) in Article 359 was introduced. The clause was introduced with retrospective effect from the date of the Constitution. Considering the provisions, the Court held that the validity of law made or needs to be done or omitted to be done by virtue of the said Article during the period of Emergency cannot be questioned either during or after the Emergency on the ground of inconsistencies of Article 19. The Court further held that neither the law nor the executive action (to the extent of its inconsistencies with Article 19) can continue even for a day before (sic.) the cessation of Emergency. Therefore, the validity and/or competence of the State to make or to take them during the period of Emergency was, however, placed beyond question. The Court held thus:
(1) The order of detention to which Section 12-A of COFEPOSA applied can yet be examined even during the Emergency on the touch-stone of law as it obtained during the operation of Presidential Order under Article 359(1) say on the ground that provision 12-A were not complied with or other grounds as may not have bar during the said period.
(2) But a person so could have challenged the order of detention and yet not choose to do, cannot be allowed to do so when such order of detention is made on the basis of applying SAFEMA to him.
(3) If he is allowed to challenge the said order when he is served with notice under Section 6 of the SAFEMA the challenge has to be examined with respect to the position of law as was obtaining at the time when the said order was made and the law in force during the period when the said order of detention was in operation.
(4) The same would be in a position in case of a person who challenge the order but failed in his challenge.
(5) A person who did not challenge either by him or through his best friends the order of detention, challenged but failed, cannot be allowed to challenge the order of detention when action is taken against him under SAFEMA.
8. The Court held that the detenu or his relatives and associates cannot attack or question their validity of the order when it is made on the basis for applying SAFEMA to him or his relatives or associates. Dealing with the contentions of the petitioners that the relatives and associates may have acquired properties of their own and there is no reason why their properties should be forfeited under SAFEMA simply because they are related to or associated with the detenu or convict, the Court held that their cases will require to be dealt with on a separate footing, and if such person proves that he is a transferee in good faith for consideration, his property, even though purchased from the convict-detenu, is not liable to be forfeited. Such a person will only be required to establish that the said property has not been acquired with the monies or assets provided by the detenu/convict or that they in fact did not or do not belong to such detenu/convict. The Court further held thus: "There ought to be a connecting link between those properties and the convict/detenu. The burden of disapproving each, as mentioned is upon the relatives/associates. In this view of the matter, the apprehension and contention of the petitioners in this behalf must be held to be based on the mistaken premises".
9. The Special Bench of 9 Judges of the Supreme Court disposed of all the writ petitions and transferred cases. A direction was given that the Court in authority before whom the proceedings are pending under SAFEMA shall proceed to dispose them of in accordance with law in the light of the judgment. The Court also expressed that the proceedings to be concluded with all deliberate speed.
10. After the petitions and transferred cases were disposed of, a number of petitions were disposed of by the Division Bench of this Court by the following common order:
In view of the decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of Attorney General of India v. Amrutlal Pranjivandas and Ors., reported in JT 1994(3) SC 583, this petition is dismissed.
11. In some of the petitions as the learned Advocates for the petitioner prayed for withdrawal of the petitions, the following order was passed:
The challenge to the Constitutional validity of SAFEMA and COFEPOSA no longer survives, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Attorney General of India v. Amratlal Prajivandas and Ors.,. Counsel for the petitioner, however, wishes to withdraw the writ petition as he wishes to file a fresh petition in the light of the aforesaid judgment, raising such contentions as may be open to the petitioner in accordance with law. Mr. Jayant Patel, Addl. Central Government Standing Counsel for the respondent states that all questions had been answered by the Supreme Court and nothing survives. As the petitioner is wanting to withdraw this writ petition with a view to file a fresh petition, we express no opinion on any of the questions on merit. Permission to withdraw the petition is granted. Petition stands disposed of as withdrawn. Interim order stands vacated.
12. For the sake of convenience, the first order shall be referred to as order "A" and the second order shall be referred to as order "B". After the petitions were disposed of by order "A" or order "B", the present group of Special Civil Applications has been filed challenging the order of detention as well as the notice under SAFEMA. Mr. J.N. Patel, learned Addl. Standing Counsel for the Union of India has raised preliminary objection that the petitions cannot be entertained in view of the principles of constructive res judicata, as the controversy raised in the present group of Special Civil Applications has been decided by the order "A" or order "B". He further submits that this controversy has been concluded by a judgment rendered in Special Civil Application No. 6897 of 1996 dated 4-10-1996 (Coram: M.R. Calla, J.). Mr. R.S. Sanjanwala, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that by order dated 9-8-1994, the Division Bench of this Court, by a common order, has disposed of a number of petitions on the basis of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Attorney General of India (supra) and that the arguments were only on the question of validity of provisions of COFEPOSA. and SAFEMA and in fact, the prayers against the forfeiture of the property in the proceedings under SAFEMA had not been addressed. He further submits that so far as the present group of applications is concerned, the applications were withdrawn and liberty was granted to file fresh petition. In view of this, the principles of constructive res judicata is not attracted in the present case.
13. So far as the order "A" is concerned, the learned single Judge, in the unreported judgment referred to above, relying on the decisions of the Apex Court in the case of Forward Construction Co. v. Prabhat Mandal (Regd), Andheri and Ors., , in the case of Direct Recruit Class II Engg. Officers' Asson. v. State of Maharashtra, and a Full Bench decision of this Court in Bhanubhai Nagjibhai Patel v. State of Gujarat and Ors., reported in 1996(2) GLR 803 (FB) has held thus:
From the decisions, which have been considered, the principle is clearly discernible that for the same cause of action a party cannot be allowed to litigate the same issue or same prayer time and again so as to make it an endless process giving rise to multitude of litigation. Once a question has been raised and the matter has been decided, the same issue or the same prayer cannot be agitated and re-agitated again and again with regard to the same cause of action. At the time when the Division Bench passed earlier orders in the petitions filed by the present petitioners, the prayers, as pointed out hereinabove in para 21(E) and para 21(G) of the respective petitions were there and it was also known to the petitioners as to what had been held by the Supreme Court in the case of Attorney General of India v. Amratlal Pranjivandas (supra) and in the light of that judgment if the petitioners had any cause to show that their properties, which were in question, even if acquired in the year 1971 and even if they had shown it to be their legal income before the Taxation Department and that it had nothing to do with any contribution made by respective detenu. It was open for them to have argued the same and shown and proved their case to this effect before the Division Bench. The Division Bench has clearly observed that in view of the Supreme Court decision the Special Civil Applications are being dismissed. Therefore, the facts were there, grounds were there, the prayers were there and still the petitioners did not choose to argue these points before the Division Bench and the Division Bench had clearly observed that the petitions are being dismissed in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court, the petitioners now cannot take a somersault and say that they did not argue the matters at that time and now they seek the same relief. Thus, the writ jurisdiction of this Court cannot be allowed to be invoked by way of this second petition filed by the petitioners.
I am in complete agreement with the view expressed by Brother M.R. Calla, J. Thus, the present group of Special Civil Applications which has been filed after obtaining order "A" is clearly barred by the principles of constructive res judicata and the same deserves to be rejected on that ground alone.
14. So far as the group of Special Civil Applications which has been disposed of earlier by order "B" is concerned, in my view, the petitions cannot be rejected on the ground that it is barred by principles of constructive res judicata. A reading of the order "B" clearly shows that the learned Advocate for the petitioner clearly expressed that he was withdrawing the petition with a view to file fresh petition in the light of the judgment in the case of Attorney General of India (supra). It is true that this prayer was opposed by the Addl. Central Government Standing Counsel on the ground that all the questions have been answered by the Supreme Court and nothing survives. Further, it is also true that there is no express permission granting liberty to file fresh petition, but on a comprehensive reading of the order, more particularly, when the Division Bench has used the expression "as the petitioner is wanting to withdraw this petition with a view to file fresh petition we express no opinion on the question on merit", that there is no decision on merits.
15. This Court, in the case of Bhagwandas D. Tandel v. S.N. Sinha, reported in 1996(1) GLH 433: 1996(1) GLR 782, has expressed the view that when the petition was withdrawn, it cannot be said that the matter was heard and finally decided as contemplated under Section 11 of the Cr. P.C. nor the said decision is said to have been given on merit. This Court relied on a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Daryo v. State of U.P., reported in . In view of this, in this group of Special Civil Applications wh is preceded by order "B", the doctrine of constructive res judicata cannot be applied.
16. In some of the Special Civil Applications, the contention which goes to the root of the case has been raised to the effect that as the order of detention was revoked on lifting of Emergency, the provisions of SAFEMA cease to apply and as such the impugned notice itself is wholly without jurisdiction. In reply, Mr. J.N. Patel, learned Add). Central Government Standing Counsel submits that unless the detention order is revoked or set aside, under the circumstances covered by provisos (i) to (iv) to Section 2(2)(b) of the SAFEMA, the provisions of SAFEMA will apply. He further submits that in the present case, the revocation is under Section 11 of the COFEPOSA, 1974 and not under the contingencies provided under the provisos (i) to (iv). Before reading the relevant provisions of law, it would be convenient to refer to order of the Division Bench of this Court dated 12-4-1978 as referred in Special Civil Application No. 3717 of 1995 as Annexure "C" (Coram: B.J. Divan, C.J. & D.P. Desai, J.) in Special Criminal Application No. 43 of 1978 which is reproduced as under:
Mr. G. T Nanavaty says that the order of detention has now been revoked. Dismissed as infructuous. Rule discharged. No order as to costs.
In order to appreciate the controversy, it will be convenient to refer Section 2 of the SAFEMA. The relevant portion of Section 2 is extracted as under:
(2) The persons referred to in Sub-section (1) are the following:
(a) Every person:
(i) who has been convicted under the Sea Customs Act, 1878 (8 of 1878), or the Customs Act, 1962 (52 of 1962), of an offence in relation to goods of a value exceeding one lakh of rupees; or
(ii) who has been convicted under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 (7 of 1947), or the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (46 of 1973), of an offence, the amount or value involved in which exceeds one lakh of rupees; or
(iii) who having been convicted under the Sea Customs Act, 1878 (8 of 1878), or the Customs Act, 1962 (52 of 1962), has been convicted subsequently under either of those Acts; or
(iv) who having been convicted under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 (7 of 1947), or the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (46 of 1973), has been convicted subsequently under either of those Acts;
(b) every person in respect of whom an order of detention has been made under the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (52 of 1974):
Provided that:
(i) Such order of detention, being an order to which the provision of Section 9 or Section 12-A of the said Act do not apply, has not been revoked on the report of the Advisory Board under Section 9 of the said Act or before the receipt of the report of the Advisory Board or before making reference to the Advisory Board; or
(ii) such order of detention, being an order to which the provisions of Section 9 of the said Act apply, has not been revoked before the expiry of the time for, or on the basis of, the review under Sub-section (3) of Section 9, or on the report of the Advisory Board under Section 8, read with Sub-section (2) of Section 9, of the said Act; or
(iii) such order of detention, being an order to which the provision of Section 12-A of the said Act apply, has not been revoked before the expiry of the time for, or on the basis of, the first review under Sub-section (3) of that section, or on the basis of the report of the Advisory Board under Section 8, read with Sub-section (6) of Section 12-A, of that Act; or
(iv) such order of detention has not been set aside by a Court of competent jurisdiction;
(c) every person who is a relative of a person referred to in Clause (a) or Clause (b);
(d) every associate of a person referred to in Clause (a) or Clause (b);
(e) any holder (hereinafter in this clause referred to as the present holder) of any property which was at any time previously held by a person referred to in Clause (a) or Clause (b) unless the present holder or, as the case may be, any time who held such property after such person and before the present holder, is or was a transferee in good faith for consideration.
It would also be convenient to read Section 11 of the COFEPOSA which is as under:
11. Revocation of detention orders: (i) Without prejudice to the provisions of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897), a detention order may, at any time, be revoked or modified -
(a) Notwithstanding that the order has been made by an officer of a State Government, by that State Government or by the Central Government;
(b) Notwithstanding that the order has been made by an officer of the Central Government or by a State Government, by the Central Government;
(2) The revocation of a detention order shall not bar the making of another detention under Section 3 against the same person.
A reading of Section 2 of the SAFEMA clearly shows that only contingencies which would take away the jurisdiction of the authorities under the Act against the persons are those as contemplated by the provisos (i) to (iv) of Section 2(2)(b) of the SAFEMA. Clause (a)(i) refers to revocation on the report of Advisory Board under Section 8 or before the receipt of the report of the Advisory Board or before making a reference to the Advisory Board. In case where Section 9 applies, it has not been revoked before expiry of the time or on the basis of review under Sub-section (2) of Section 9 or on the report on the Advisory Board under Section 8 read with Sub-section (2) of Section 9. The third is, detention before expiry of time or on the basis of, the first review under Sub-section (3) or on the basis of the report of the Advisory Board under Section 8 read with Sub-section (6) of Section 12-A and the fourth is that the order of detention has not been set aside by the Court of competent jurisdiction. It is not the case of the petitioner that his case falls in any of the categories mentioned above. Thus, the revocation of detention is only under Section 11 of the COFEPOSA. It has to be borne in mind that all the four situations have been recognised in the statute where the act (sic. Act) would not or cease to apply in the event of detention or (sic. order) being revoked or set aside, revocation under Section 11(i) of the COFEPOSA is not one of those contingencies as contemplated by law. This Act is a special piece of legislation dealing with specified situation and as such it is not possible to go beyond the scope of exceptions created by the provisos (i) to (iv) to Section 2(2)(b) of SAFEMA and take note of the revocation orders which are of the general nature passed under Section 1 ](i) of the COFEPOSA to hold that jurisdiction of that competent authority to proceed on the basis of the said detention order ceases to exist because to do so would be to contribute something to the intention of the legislature which was not there, because had it been so, there was nothing to prevent reference in the Act itself by adding revocation of detention under Section 11(i) of the COFEPOSA also to be drawn by way of additional proviso to Section 2(2)(b) of SAFEMA. Thus, the mere fact of revocation of detention order which generally, falls outside the ambit of the proviso and Section 4 of the Act would be inconsequential so far as the proceedings under the Act are concerned.
17. Now, 1 shall deal with each Special Civil Application bearing in mind the law referred to above.
Special Civil Application No. 3716 of 1995:
This Special Civil Application has been filed by Bipinchandra G. Choksi - detenu as petitioner No. 1, Smt. Jayashree Bipinchandra Choksi, wife of petitioner No. 1 and Bipinchandra Ramanlal Choksi, H.U.F. as petitioner No. 3. The petitioners have challenged the order of detention dated 11-6-1976 and declaration under Section 12-A of the COFEPOSA dated 11-6-1976 and the notice issued under Section 6(1) of SAFEMA - Annexure "D". This petition was initially registered as Special Criminal Application No. 1499 of 1994. It was subsequently, on conversion, registered as Special Civil Application No. 3716 of 1995. The petition appears to have been not affirmed. A non-affirmed affidavit filed is dated 24-8-1993. However, it is signed by the learned Advocate on 7-10-1994. The petition appears to have been filed on 10-10-1994. The necessary facts are that the petitioner No. 1 was detained under the provisions of COFEPOSA by the order of detention dated 11-6-1976. Simultaneously, a declaration under Section 12-A was issued on the same day declaring that it was necessary to detain the detenu for dealing effectively with the Emergency which was then proclaimed. Upon the Emergency being lifted, the order of detention was revoked by the State Government under a wireless message dated 21-3-1977. The notices under Section 6(1) of SAFEMA dated 28-4-1977 were issued. The petitioners have challenged the order of detention as well as the SAFEMA notices by way of filing Special Criminal Application No. 1276 of 1977. However, the said writ petition was dismissed as withdrawn by the order of the Division Bench of this Court on 9-8-1994. The order reads as follows:
The challenge to the Constitutional validity of SAFEMA and COFEPOSA no longer survives, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Attorney General of India v. Pranjivandas and Ors., reported in JT 1994(3) SC 583. The learned Advocate for the petitioner, however, wishes to withdraw the writ petition. He wishes to file fresh petition in the light of the said judgment raising such contention, as may be open to the petitioner in accordance with law. Mr. J.N. Patel, learned Addl. Central Government Standing Counsel appearing for the respondent states that all the questions had been answered by the Supreme Court and nothing survives. As the petitioner is wanting to withdraw this writ petition with a view to file fresh petition, we express no opinion on any of the questions on merit. Permission to withdraw the petition is granted. The petition stands disposed of as withdrawn. The interim relief order stands vacated.
Mr. J.N. Patel, learned Addl. Central Government Standing Counsel has raised two preliminary objections - firstly that since the petitioner did not challenge the order of detention during the subsistence of Emergency in view of the judgment of the Apex Court in Attorney General of India's case (supra), he cannot be permitted to challenge the order of detention. Secondly, that the present Special Civil Application is barred by the principles of res judicata, inasmuch as that in his earlier petition being Special Civil Application No. 1276 of 1977, he had challenged the order of detention as well as the notice under SAFEMA and the same has been disposed of by the order of the Division Bench of this Court dated 9-8-1994.
18. Mr. R.S. Sanjanwala, learned Advocate for the petitioners submits that the 9 - Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in Attorney General of India's case (supra) has been explained in subsequent judgment in the case of Smt. Gangadevi v. Union of India and Ors., . It is held in Gangadevi's case (supra) that where there has been no pronouncement by any Court upon the validity of the order of detention, the detenu is entitled to challenge the validity of the detention order as the same is being made foundation for forfeiting the properties under SAFEMA. The learned Advocate has placed reliance on the observations of the Supreme Court in para 12 which reads as follows:
There has been no pronouncement by any Court upon the validity of the detention order dated 12-9-1975. The petitioner is entitled to challenge the validity of the aforesaid order because it is now being made foundation for forfeiting her properties under SAFEMA.
I cannot agree with the submissions made by Mr. Sanjanwala, learned Advocate for the petitioner. Smt. Gangadevi's case (supra) does not advance the case of the petitioner. The observations quoted above by the Apex Court cannot be read in isolation. In the said case, the order of detention was challenged by the detenu Sreekrishna Gopilal Solanki. The writ petition was admitted and notices were issued to the State. On 11-3-1976, notices under Section 6 of the SAFEMA were issued. On May 1,1976, the said detenu-Sreekrishna Gopilal Solanki died while under detention. Another notice under Section 6 of the SAFEMA was issued to the widow of the detenu, i.e., Gangadevi on April 17, 1977. The writ petition filed by detenu Sreekrishna Solanki was dismissed as infructuous on a representation made by the Public Prosecutor appearing for the State that the detenu has been released. The Apex Court found that it was an incorrect representation as the detenu expired while he was in detention. In that context, the Apex Court said that the order of detention was challenged by detenu Sreekrishna Solanki himself and unless the challenge is repealed, it cannot be made basis of the proceedings under SAFEMA against the wife of the detenu.
19. In the present case, it is not in dispute that the order of detention was never challenged during the subsistence of Emergency. In Attorney General of India's case (supra), it is held that the person who could have challenged the order of detention yet does not choose to do so, cannot be allowed to do so when such order of detention is made the basis of applying SAFEMA to him. In view of this clear position of law, the petitioner cannot be permitted now to challenge the order of detention. It is next contended by Mr. Sanjanwala that since the order of detention has been made foundation for SAFEMA proceedings, it is open for the relatives and friends of the detenu to challenge the order of detention. This question has also been decided by the Apex Court in Attorney General's case (supra). It is held that a person who do not challenge either by himself or through his best friends, the order of detention challenged but failed, cannot be allowed to challenge the order of detention, when action is taken against him under SAFEMA. Thus, this contention also fails. It is lastly contended by Mr. Sanjanwala that the order of detention has been revoked by the wireless message dated 21-3-1977 - Annexure "C" and as such the very foundation of SAFEMA notices disappears. This aspect I have dealt with in my earlier part of the judgment and in view of that this contention also does not survive and it is accordingly rejected.
Special Civil Application No. 3714 of 1995:
In this Special Civil Application, the petitioner No. 1, is late Ambalal H. Gandhi, and petitioner Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 are the legal heirs of late Ambalal. Petitioner No. 7 is Babulal A. Gandhi, who was detained under COFEPOSA by the order of detention dated 19-12-1974. Petitioner No. 10 is the wife of Babulal Gandhi. Petitioner No. 9 to 13 are the other family members. The writ petition was initially registered as Special Criminal Application No. 1578 of 1994, which on conversion, was later on registered as Special Civil Application No. 3714 of 1995. By way of this writ petition, the petitioners have sought direction to quash the order of detention of Babulal Gandhi alias Namdar dated 19-12-1974 and also the notices issued under SAFEMA under Section 6(1).
20. The say of the petitioners is that the order of detention dated 19-12-1974 was previously challenged before this Court by way of filing Special Criminal Application No. 15 of 1975. The said petition was not proceeded with since the constitutional questions were suspended during Emergency. The Division Bench of this Court dismissed the writ petition on 4-2-1977. The order reads as follows:
(Coram: S. Obul Reddy, C.J. & M.C. Trivedi, J.) We are dismissing this application as the enforcement of the fundamental rights conferred by and under Articles 14, 19, 21 and 22 of the Constitution have been suspended. It would, however, be open to the petitioner to make fresh application after the ban imposed on the enforcement of the abovesaid right is lifted. Subject to the above observations, this application is dismissed. Rule discharged.
After the Emergency was lifted, the petitioners filed writ petition which was registered as Special Civil Application No. 3635 of 1979 challenging the validity of the provisions of COFEPOSA as well as SAFEMA. The petitioners also sought direction to quash the order of detention Annexures "A-l" and "A-2" and the notices issued under SAFEMA. However, this writ petition was dismissed by the order of the Division Bench of this Court dated 9-8-1994 which reads as follows:
In view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Attorney General of India v. Amrutlal Pranjivandas and Ors., reported in JT 1994(3) SC 538, this petition is dismissed.
As I have already stated in earlier part of the judgment, the aforesaid order being in the category of order "A" is barred by the principles of res judicata. The petition deserves to be rejected on this ground alone. It is further significant to notice that the petitioners in para 7.2 have stated that the notices were challenged by way of Special Civil Application No. 3625 of 1979, but the same was withdrawn since the question raised in the said petition was regarding vires of SAFEMA and COFEPOSA, which was covered by the decision of the Supreme Court and a statement was made by the petitioners to the effect that the petitioners would challenge the order of detention in separate petition. The writ petition is affirmed by Chandrakant Ambalal Gandhi, petitioner No. 5. It is stated in the affidavit that what is stated in para 1 to 11 and 13 contain factual part and legal submissions. Paragraph 12 contains prayers. The contents of the paragraphs are true to his information and belief. This statement made is apparently false as is evident frorri the order of this Court reproduced above. The writ petition has not been dismissed as withdrawn. No liberty was granted. The petitioner has referred to Special Civil Application No. 3635 of 1979 without giving date of its disposal and further details. Copy of the order has also not been placed on record. Thus, the petitioner is guilty of deliberately making false statement.
21. In para 11 of the petition it is stated that except Special Civil Application No. 2524 of 1980 which was withdrawn to enable the petitioners to file this petition, no other petition against the order of detention and the SAFEMA notices before this Court or before any other Court. The petitioner has not given any detail with respect to the said petition. Neither the date of the order has been given, nor copy of the order has been produced. Judgment of the Apex Court in Attorney General's case (supra), it clearly appears that the said petition was decided along with a number of writ petitions and transfer petitions. It is stated in para 6 that the Attorney General of India applied for transfer of writ petitions pending in various High Courts to the Apex Court to be heard along the petitions preferred directly in this Court in view of the important constitutional questions raised therein. After stating the said fact, it is stated that the prayer for transfer is granted in all the transfer petitions. Leave granted in the S.L.P. It appears that the transfer petition (C) Nos. 457-489 of 1989 were also decided in the said group of petitions. Mr. J.N. Patel, learned Addl. Central Government Standing Counsel has produced before me a copy of the show-cause notice which shows that the number of petitions pending before this Court including S.C.A. 2524 of 1980 were transferred to the Supreme Court and the same were decided in the group of petitions. The relevant paragraph of the notice reads as follows:
In The Supreme Court of India Civil Original Jurisdiction Transfer Petition (Civil) Nos. 457-489 of 1989 (Petitions under Article 139(A)(1) of the Constitution of India) with Interlocutory Application (Cicil) Nos. 1-33 (In Transfer Petition Nos. 457-489 of 1989:
Applications for stay.
Whereas the petitions under Article 139-A(1) of the Constitution above-mentioned along with applications for ex-parte stay (copies enclosed) for withdrawal of Civil Writ Petition Nos. 2812 of 1979,1768 of 1977, 1169 of 1977, 570 of 1979, 68 of 1978, 59 of 1977, 86 of 1979, 2810 of 1979, 953 of 1981, 679 of 1980, 2384 of 1980, 672 of 1979, 110 of !979, 98 of 1979, 2507 of 1978, 257 of 1979, 2590 of 1981,2524 of 1980. 167 of 1979, 3146 of 1981, 2404 of 1978, 1307 of 1979, 1919 of 1978, 2300 of 1981, 5684 of 1985, 2652 of 1986, 2653 of 1986, 1878 of 1987, 6784 of 1986, 463 of 1978, 1088 of 1978, 1709 of 1979, 1981 of 1979, entitled Jayantilal RatilalJariwala, etc. etc. v Union of India and Ors. pending before the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad to this Hon'ble Court was filed in this Registry on 19th September, 1989 by Mr. P.H. Parekh, Advocate on behalf of the above named petitioners.
22. When Mr. Sanjanwala, learned Advocate was confronted with this situation, he submits that though the notice was issued and the clients received the same, in fact, no final order with respect to transferring the matter to the Supreme Court was ever passed. The learned Advocate also expressed to file affidavit in this regard. However, I have declined the request of filing the affidavit as it would be preposterous for this Court to enter into this sort of controversy which pertains to the proceedings of the Apex Court. However, it clearly appears from the facts as stated above that the said writ petition stood transferred to the Supreme Court of India. The Apex Court disposed of the writ petitions and transferred cases which is evident from para 64 as under:
64. All the Writ Petitions, Transferred Cases and Appeals are disposed of accordingly. The Court and authorities before whom proceedings are pending under SAFEMA shall proceed to dispose them of in accordance with law and in the light of all concerned that the proceedings are concluded with all deliberate speed.
From the facts stated above, it is abundantly clear that by way of filing this petition, the petitioners have abused the process of the Court. They are also guilty of concealment of material facts. In fact, the earlier petition which stood transferred to Supreme Court and was decided under the title Attorney General v. Amratlal Pranjivandas, got disposed of from the Division Bench of this Court without informing this fact and the same issue has been raised by filing the present Special Civil Application. Thus, the Special Civil Application deserves to be rejected for more than one reasons.
Special Civil Application No. 3717 of 1995:
This Special Civil Application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed by Kalanbhai Morarbhai Tandel as petitioner No. 1, Ukkadbhai Morarbhai Tandel as petitioner No. 2, and Manojkumar Naranbhai Tandel as petitioner No. 3. The application was initially registered as Special Criminal Application No. 303 of 1995. By way of this Special Civil Application, the petitioners have challenged the notice dated 21-11-1979 issued by the competent authority at Ahmedabad under the provisions of SAFEMA. The identical notice dated 27-11-1979 issued to Kalanbhai Tandel, petitioner No. 1 and notice dated 15-4-1988 issued to Manojbhai Tandel, petitioner No. 3 have been challenged. It is significant to notice that the order of detention has not been challenged in this Special Civil Application which is the foundation of the notice under SAFEMA. Be that as it may, petitioner No. 1 Kalanbhai Tandel was detained under the provisions of COFEPOSA by the detention order dated 21-8-1976. After the Emergency was lifted, a writ petition was filed by Ukkadbhai Tandel, petitioner No. 2 as is evident from Annexure "C-2" challenging the order of detention. This was registered as Special Criminal Application No. 43 of 1978. The said writ petition was dismissed as infructuous on a statement made by the learned Advocate that the order of detention has been revoked. The order dated 12-4-1978 reads as follows:
Mr. G.T. Nanavati states that the order of detention has now been revoked. Dismissed as infructuous. Rule discharged. No order as to costs.
24. It further appears that after the dismissal of the writ petition, the impugned notices under SAFEMA were issued, and therefore, the petitioners challenged the same by way of filing Special Civil Application which was registered as Special Civil Application No. 679 of 1980. The say of the petitioners is that in view of the decision of the Apex Court in Attorney General's case (supra), the said petition was withdrawn with a view to file fresh petition in the light of the judgment of the Apex Court raising such contentions as liberty open to the petitioners in accordance with law. Along with the petition, a copy of the said order dated 9-8-1994 has been annexed and marked as Annexure "C".
25. Mr. Sreedharan, Inspecting Officer and competent authority under SAFEMA has filed an affidavit. It is stated that the petition is not maintainable as the petitioners have not challenged the order of detention which is the foundation for notices under SAFEMA. It is further stated that the controversy raised in the present Special Civil Application was raised by the petitioners by way of filing Special Civil Application which was registered as Special Civil Application No. 679 of 1980. The reference of which has been made by the petitioner in the petition under para 3. It is contended that S.C.A. No. 679 of 1980 was transferred to the Apex Court and the same has been decided by the Apex Court with the Attorney General's case (supra). It is also pointed out that the basis of SAFEMA notices dated 22-11-1979, 27-11-1979 and 15-4-1988 under SAFEMA are on the basis of detention order dated 21-8-1976 detaining the petitioner No. 1, namely, Kalanbhai Tandel. This has nothing to do with the detention of Ukkadbhai Tandel, present petitioner No. 2. It is also pointed out that Ukkadbhai is convicted under the Customs Act as per the order dated 16-6-1979 of the Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Valsad and on the basis of his conviction, the revised show-cause notice dated 22-9-1988 was issued to him under SAFEMA.
26. This petition deserves to be rejected and can be placed in the category of cases where the process of this Court has been grossly abused for more than one reasons. The petitioners have stated that the petition has been filed before this Court which was registered as S.C.A. No. 679 of 1980 and the same was dismissed as withdrawn in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Attorney General's case (supra). The petitioner has produced the order dated 9-8-1994 and marked as Annexure "C". Annexure "C" is an order of the Division Bench of this Court dated 9-8-1994 passed in S.C.A. 2384 of 1980 and not in S.C.A. No. 679 of 1980 as stated by the petitioner in para 3 of the petition. The petitioner has made false assertion in para 4.2. As stated earlier, the transfer applications before the Supreme Court were registered as transfer petition No. 457-489 of 1989. S.C.A. No. 679 of 1980 finds place in the notice of transfer issued by the Supreme Court. The relevant para of the notice is extracted in earlier part of the judgment. Reference may also be made to para 6 of the judgment of the Apex Court in Attorney General's case (supra), which clearly says that the prayer for transfer was granted. It is evident from para 64 of the judgment that the transfer petitions were disposed of by the Supreme Court. I have summoned S.C.A. No. 679 of 1980 from the Registry. There is no order of withdrawal of the petitions with liberty to file fresh as asserted in para 3 of the petition. Thus, I have no hesitation in saying that the petitioner has deliberately made a false statement on oath with a calculated move to mislead this Court. Secondly, as ] have held that the principles of res judicata will be applicable in case of order under category "A" and the same applies to the present Special Civil Application as well. In the present case, there is neither order under category "A" nor under category "B". In any case, the petitioner has failed to produce any order under the category "B". Thirdly, the order of detention has not been challenged in the present Special Civil Application. Otherwise also the petitioners cannot challenge for the reason that the order of detention was not challenged during the subsistence of Emergency. The petitioner has referred to S.C.A. No. 43 of 1978. This petition was filed by Ukkadbhai Tandel. The Emergency was lifted in March, 1977. The petition was filed in 1978. This clearly shows that the petition was filed after the Emergency was lifted. It may further be noticed that the foundation for the SAFEMA notices are the detention of Kalanbhai Tandel. The petitioners are silent with respect to challenge or order of detention of Kalanbhai Tandel.
The petitioners have raised contention that as the order of detention has been revoked, the very foundation of SAFEMA notices have disappeared, and therefore, they do not survive. The contention deserves to be rejected. As I have taken the view that the revocation of detention order falling outside the ambit of proviso under Section 2(2)(4) of the SAFEMA Act would be inconsequential so far as the proceedings under the SAFEMA is concerned. In view of the aforesaid, there is no merit in this Special Civil Application and the same deserves to be rejected with costs.
Special Civil Application No. 3436 of 1996:
This Special Civil Application has been filed by Smt. Karimabai K. Bagad. By way of this Special Civil Application, the petitioner seeks direction to quash and set aside the impugned order under Sections 7 and 19 of the SAFEMA passed by respondent No. 4, namely, the competent authority under SAFEMA. From reading the entire body of the petition, it is not clear which are the impugned orders. This sort of casual drafting is not new. In alternative, it is also prayed that in Special Criminal Application No. 101 of 1977 challenging the order of detention to be revived and quashed and set aside, the order of detention passed against the detenu and hold that since the order of detention is invalid, SAFEMA proceedings are not valid.
27. The say of the petitioner is that her husband-Karimbhai Bachubhai was detained by order of detention dated 25-2-1977 under the provisions of COFEPOSA. Her late husband-Karimbhai challenged the order of detention by way of filing petition which was registered as Special Criminal Application No. 101 of 1977. The said petition came up for hearing before this Court on 3-8-1977. The Court, after hearing the parties, indicated its mind to quash and set aside the said order. However, the order of detention was revoked on 4-8-1977 in view of the letter of the Public Prosecutor. The Court passed the following order dated 8-8-1977:
"As the detention is revoked, the petition does not survive. Hence Rule discharged with no order as to costs."
28. After the detention was revoked, on the basis of the order of detention, notice dated 6-10-1980 under SAFEMA was issued. The petitioner's husband died in the year 1988. Respondent No. 4 by order dated 23-3-1993, held that the petitioner is a person who falls within the ambit mischief of Section (2) of the SAFEMA and accordingly directed action under Section 7 of SAFEMA. The material for passing the order under Section 7 was the Settlement of Commission's order dated 31-3-1986. The matter was taken in Appeal before the Appellate Tribunal constituted under SAFEMA. It was contended before the Appellate Authority that the respondent No. 4 ought not to have initiated proceedings under SAFEMA against her as there was no valid and existing order of detention which is condition precedent. It was also submitted that the revocation amounts to nullifying the order of detention ab initio and giving a restricted meaning to the word revocation would defeat the purpose of the said Act. However, the Tribunal, by its judgment dated 7-12-1995, rejected the appeal.
29. The only contention raised in this Special Civil Application is with respect to the effect of the order of revocation. I have rejected this contention in the earlier part of my judgment. So far as the prayer with respect to the revival of S.C.A. No. 101 of 1977 is concerned, the same cannot be granted firstly for the reason that it was open for the petitioner in that S.C.A. to urge the Court to decide the petition on merit. Secondly, the petition was dismissed as infructuous in the year 1977 and the cannot be revived after a period of about 20 years.
30. In view of this, there is no merit in this Special Civil Application and the same is accordingly rejected.
Special Civil Application No. 7725 of 1996 :
This Special Civil Application has been filed by the legal heirs of deceased Narsihbhai Tandel. By way of this application, the petitioners seek direction to quash and set aside the order of detention passed against the deceased Narsihbhai Tandel and also the notices issued under Section 6(1) of the SAFEMA, as well as the order of the Appellate Tribunal dated 7-7-1981 and the notice dated 19-8-1996.
31. The say of the petitioners is that the deceased Narsihbhai was detained under COFEPOSA by the order of the Government of Goa dated 16-1-1975. Section 12 of the COFEPOSA was made applicable in his case. However, after the lifting of the Emergency, the order of detention was revoked and he was released. The deceased Narsihbhai was served with notice dated 23-1-1979 under Section 6 of the SAFEMA. A reply to the notice was given. However, by the order dated 20-8-1980, the order under Section 7 of the SAFEMA was passed declaring the disputed property as illegally acquired property of the deceased Narsihbhai. Consequently, order under Section 19 of the SAFEMA was passed forfeiting the said property by the order of the competent authority dated 20-8-1980. Deceased Narsihbhai preferred an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal. The said appeal was withdrawn by the petitioners therein pointing out to the Tribunal that the property in dispute does not belong to Narsihbhai, and therefore, he does not want to prosecute the appeal. It was, therefore, open for the competent authority to initiate proceedings against the real owner. The further say of the petitioners is that repeatedly it has been pointed out to the competent authority that the property does not belong to the deceased. Without serving notice to the petitioner No. 2, the competent authority is insisting that the legal heirs of Narsihbhai to hand over possession and/or pay rent of Rs. 1,128/- p.m. failing which it has been mentioned that the legal heirs of the deceased Narsihbhai should be evicted. It appears that at this stage, the petitioner filed Special Civil Application before this Court which was registered as S.C.A. No. 2652 of 1986. This application was dismissed as withdrawn in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Attorney General's case (supra). The order dated 9th August, 1994 produced an Annexure "C" falls under the category order "B" as referred in the earlier part of the judgment. The say of the petitioner is that he came to know about the disposal of the Special Civil Application only when he received notice in May 1996, and therefore, the present Special Civil Application has been filed in October, 1996. Mr. C.B. Nair, Inspecting Officer, under SAFEMA has filed affidavit. It is stated that after giving proper opportunities to the detenu for providing his legal source of income which was invested in the properties mentioned in the notice and considering the reply, only one property bearing survey No. 2096 situated at Master Sheri, Nani Daman was forfeited under Section 7 of the SAFEMA as per order dated 20-8-1980. The order under Section 19(1) of the SAFEMA was also passed on 20-8-1980. Late Shri Narsihbhai Tandel preferred an appeal against the said order before the Appellate Tribunal which was dismissed on 7-7-1981. Thus, the order of the competent authority has become final. Thereafter, the Collector, Daman has taken over possession of the said house from deceased Narsihbhai Tandel through Mamlatdar, Daman on 27-7-1984 by drawing a panchnama for the same. However, Narsihbhai Tandel was allowed to stay in the said property as a lessee, tenant of the Central Government and for that purpose, rent of the said house property was fixed at Rs. 1,128/- per month. The rent was payable w.e.f. 20-8-1980. Thereafter, Special Civil Application No. 2652 of 1982 was filed by detenu Narsihbhai Tandel before this Court challenging the constitutional validity of SAFEMA and COFEPOSA. The ad-interim relief was granted by this Court restraining respondent No. 2 from implementing the order passed under Section 19(1) of SAFEMA on filing undertaking by the detenu that he will not dispose or otherwise alienate the property in question till final disposal of the petition. The said Special Civil Application was withdrawn on 9-8-1994 and the stay was vacated, and therefore, the legal heirs of the detenu were asked to pay the arrears and also to vacate the property in question. On 24-9-1996, when the officers working under respondent No. 2 went to take final possession of the said property in question, the petitioner No. 2 Kanjibhai M. Tandel, brother of the detenu filed Civil Suit in the Court of Civil Judge (S.D.), Daman and obtained order to maintain status quo. The said application for stay was subsequently rejected. Thereafter, the suit has also been withdrawn. A detailed reply has been filed with respect to holding of enquiry under the provisions of SAFEMA. 32. In view of the reply, the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioners has not raised any contention with respect to the merit of the case. He has, however, raised his contention as has been raised in other petitions with respect to the effect of revocation of order of detention. The contention is rejected for the reasons stated in earlier part of the judgment.
33. It may further be noticed that Special Civil Application No. 2652 of 1986 was also disposed of by the Supreme Court along with the Attorney General's case (supra) as the number of the said Special Civil Application finds place in the transferred cases which is evident from the relevant extracts reproduced in the earlier part of the judgment. Thus, on this ground also this Special Civil Application is not maintainable. In view of the aforesaid, there is no merit in this Special Civil Application and the same is accordingly rejected.
Special Civil Application No. 7970 of 1996:
34. Petitioner No. l(a) is the heir of deceased Bhaniben M. Tandel who died on 15-1-1990. Petitioners No. 2(a) to (d) are the heirs of deceased Narsihbhai Tandel who died on 23-11-1994. In this petition, the same questions have been raised as have been raised in S.C.A. No. 7725 of 1996 filed by the relatives of the petitioner No. 2(a) to (d) in which the same order of detention is challenged against the deceased Narsihbhai Tandel. The petitioners as heirs of deceased Bhaniben Tandel and Narsihbhai Tandel have filed this petition since pursuant to the order passed under SAFEMA against the deceased Bhaniben, the possession of the land is being disturbed. For the reasons stated in the earlier part of the judgment dealing with S.C.A. No. 7725 of 1996, this Special Civil Application also deserves to be rejected. In view of the aforesaid, Special Civil Application Nos. 3714 of 1995, 3716 of 1995,3717 of 1995,3436 of 1996, 7725 of 1996 and 7970 of 1996 are dismissed. Rule discharged. Interim relief in each application stands vacated.
FURTHER ORDER
35. Mr. R.S. Sanjanwala, learned Advocate for the petitioners submits that the interim relief granted by this Court earlier may further be continued for a period of four weeks. As the controversy involved has been concluded by the Special Bench constituting nine Judges of the Supreme Court and as such there is no scope for granting further relief. The prayer is accordingly rejected.