Karnataka High Court
Shri. Rayappa Patil S/O. Ningappa Patil vs The State Of Karnataka on 8 February, 2022
Author: M.Nagaprasanna
Bench: M.Nagaprasanna
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
DHARWAD BENCH
DATED THIS THE 8TH DAY OF FEBRUARY 2022
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
CRIMINAL PETITION NO.100720/2019
C/W.
CRIMINAL PETITION NO.101618/2021
CRIMINAL PETITION NO.101619/2021
IN CRL.P.NO.100720/2019
BETWEEN:
RAYAPPA PATIL @ DHAVANI @ GOTOORA
S/O NINGAPPA PATIL
OCC: JAWAN (MILITARY),
AGED ABOUT: 24 YEARS,
R/AT: GODACHINAMALKI VILLAGE,
TQ: GOKAK, DIST: BELAGAVI-586101.
...PETITIONER.
(BY SHRI AVINASH ANGADI, ADVOCATE.)
AND:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
THROUGH THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE,
GOKAK RURAL POLICE STATION,
GOKAK, REP. BY THE
STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,
HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA,
AT DHARWAD.
2. ISUBU DESAI S/O MODINASAB DESAI
AGED ABOUT: 35 YEARS,
2
R/AT: GODACHINAMALKI VILLAGE,
TQ: GOKAK, DIST: BELAGAVI.
...RESPONDENTS.
(BY SHRI RAMESH CHIGARI, HCGP, FOR R.1;
SHRI PRASHANT MATHAPATI, ADVOCATE, FOR R.2.)
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION 482 OF
THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973, PRAYING TO QUASH THE
COMPLAINT, FIR IN CRIME NO.10/2017 REGISTERED BY GOKAK
RURAL POLICE, GOKAK, CHARGE SHEET DATED 05.07.2018, ORDER
OF TAKING COGNIZANCE DATED 09.08.2018 IN C.C.NO.2009/2018
BY THE II-ADDL. JMFC COURT, GOKAK, FOR THE OFFENCES
PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTION 143, 147, 148, 341,353, 333, 307,
427, 109, 504 READ WITH SECTION 149 OF INDIAN PENAL CODE,
1860 AND ALL FURTHER PROCEEDINGS PURSUANT TO THEREIN IN
RESPECT OF THE PETITIONER HEREIN, ETC.,.
IN CRL.P.NO.101618/2021
BETWEEN:
RAYAPPA PATIL S/O. NINGAPPA PATIL
OCC: JAWAN (CISF)
AGED ABOUT 26 YEARS,
R/AT: GODACHINAMALKI VILLAGE,
TQ: GOKAK, DIST: BELAGAVI-586101
...PETITIONER.
(BY SHRI AVINASH M ANGADI, ADVOCATE.)
AND:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
THROUGH THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE
GOKAK RURAL POLICE STATION,
GOKAK, REP. BY
3
THE STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
AT DHARWAD-580001.
2. G. B. KONGANOLI S/O. B. KONGANOLLI
OCC: GOVT. SERVANT,
AGED ABOUT 36 YEARS,
R/AT PSI, GOKAK RURAL POLICE STATION,
TQ. GOKAK, DIST. BELAGAVI-590001.
...RESPONDENTS.
(BY SHRI RAMESH CHIGARI, HCGP.)
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION 482 OF
THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973, PRAYING TO QUASH THE
COMPLAINT DATED 14.1.2017, FIR IN CRIME NO.11/2017
REGISTERED BY GOKAK RURAL POLICE, GOKAK, CHARGE SHEET
DATED 13.07.2018 ORDER OF TAKING COGNIZANCE DATED 9.8.2018
IN C.C. NO.2010/2018 BY THE II ADDL. JMFC COURT AT GOKAK,
GOKAK, FOR OFFENCES PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTION 143, 147, 148,
341, 353, 333, 307, 427, 109, 504 READ WITH SECRTION 149 OF
THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860 AND ALL FURTHER PROCEEDINGS
PURSUANT TO THEREIN IN RESPECT OF THE PETITIONER HEREIN,
ETC.,.
IN CRL.P.NO.101619/2021
BETWEEN:
RAYAPPA PATIL S/O. NINGAPPA PATIL
OCC: JAWAN (MILITARY)
AGED ABOUT 26 YEARS,
R/AT: GODACHINAMALKI VILLAGE,
TQ: GOKAK, DIST: BELAGAVI-586101
...PETITIONER.
(BY SHRI AVINASH M ANGADI, ADVOCATE.)
4
AND:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
THROUGH THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE
GOKAK RURAL POLICE STATION,
GOKAK, REP. BY
THE STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
AT DHARWAD-580001.
2. B. S. ANTARAGATTI S/O. S. ANTARAGATTI
AGE: 35 YEARS, OCC: GOVT. SERVANT,
R/AT: CPC B NO.2806,
GOKAK RURAL POLICE STATION,
GOKAK, TQ. GOKAK,
DIST. BELAGAVI-590001.
...RESPONDENTS.
(BY SHRI RAMESH CHIGARI, HCGP.)
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION 482 OF
THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973, PRAYING TO QUASH THE
COMPLIANT, FIR IN CRIME NO.12/2017 REGISTERED BY GOKAK
RURAL POLICE, GOKAK, CHARGE SHEET DATED 14.07.2018, ORDER
OF TAKING COGNIZANCE DATED 9.8.2018, IN C.C.NO.2008/2018 BY
THE II ADDL. JMFC COURT, GOKAK, FOR OFFENCES PUNISHABLE
UNDER SECTION 143, 147, 148, 341, 353, 333, 307, 427, 109, 504
READ WITH SECTION 149 OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860 AND
SECTION 3 OF KPDP ACT AND ALL FURTHER PROCEEDINGS
PURSUANT TO THEREIN IN RESPECT OF THE PETITIONER HEREIN,
ETC.,.
THESE PETITIONS COMING ON FOR ADMISSION THIS DAY,
THE COURT PASSED THE FOLLOWING:
5
ORDER
Heard Shri Avinash M. Angadi, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Shri Ramesh Chigari, the learned HCGP appearing for the respondents.
2. The petitioner, who is common in all these cases, calls in question the proceedings in Crime No.10/2017 in Crl.P.No.100720/2019, Crime No.11/2017 in Crl.P.No.101618/2021 and Crime No.12/2017 in Crl.P.No.101619/2021.
3. Crime No.10 of 2017 which concerns Crl.P.No.100720/2019 is the one registered by the complainants who claim that they have been assaulted by the petitioner.
Crime Nos.11 and 12 of 2017 are registered by the Police Officers for the very same offences except that of Section 353 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The situation that has now emerged is that there are three complaints registered on the same incident for the same offences by two different complainants, one the persons who claim that they had been assaulted and two other by the police. Therefore, it is a case where there are multiple FIRs registered for the same offence 6 and for the same incident. The issue with regard to the multiple FIRs being registered on the same incident, is no longer res-integra as the Apex Court in the case of T.T.Antony vs. State of Kerala and others, reported in (2001) 6 SCC 181 and in the case of Arnab Ranjan Goswami vs. Union of India and others, reported in (2020) 14 SCC 12, has clearly delineated the issue of filing of multiple FIRs on the very same incident, albeit by different complainants.
4. The said judgments of the Apex Court are followed by this Court in a judgment rendered in Crl.P.No.3171/2018 disposed off on 20.9.2021 in the case of B.V.Byre Gowda vs. Nisar Ahmed and another, wherein this Court following the judgment in the case of T.T.Antony (supra) and Arnab Ranjan Goswami (supra) has quashed the complaint on the doctrine of sameness. Paragraphs no.10, 11 and 13 of the judgment rendered by this Court read as follows:
10. I have given my anxious consideration to the respective submissions made by the learned senior counsel and the learned counsel appearing for the respondents and in furtherance whereof, the only issue that falls for my consideration is, whether the second complaint which results in 7 second FIR being registered is permissible in the facts of the case?
11. Before embarking upon the journey of considering the facts obtaining in the case at hand, I deem it appropriate to notice the flow of law as laid down by the Apex Court with regard to registration of second complaint on the very same incident. The Apex Court right from the judgment in the case of T.T. ANTONY (supra) has held as follows:
"15. On these contentions, four points arise for determination:
(i) whether registration of a fresh case, Crime No. 268 of 1997, Kuthuparamba Police Station on the basis of the letter of the DGP dated 2-7-1997 which is in the nature of the second FIR under Section 154 CrPC, is valid and it can form the basis of a fresh investigation;
(ii) whether the appellants in Appeals Nos. 689 and 4066 of 2001 [arising out of SLPs (Crl.) Nos. 1522 and 8840 of 2000] and the respondent in Appeals Nos. 690-91 of 2001 [arising out of SLPs (Crl.) Nos. 2724-25 of 2000] have otherwise made out a case for quashing of proceedings in Crime No. 268 of 1997, Kuthuparamba Police Station;
(iii) what is the effect of the report of Shri K. Padmanabhan Commission of Inquiry; and 8
(iv) whether the facts and the circumstances of the case justify a fresh investigation by CBI.
... ... ... ...
18. An information given under sub-section (1) of Section 154 CrPC is commonly known as first information report (FIR) though this term is not used in the Code. It is a very important document. And as its nickname suggests it is the earliest and the first information of a cognizable offence recorded by an officer in charge of a police station.
It sets the criminal law in motion and marks the commencement of the investigation which ends up with the formation of opinion under Section 169 or 170 CrPC, as the case may be, and forwarding of a police report under Section 173 CrPC. It is quite possible and it happens not infrequently that more informations than one are given to a police officer in charge of a police station in respect of the same incident involving one or more than one cognizable offences. In such a case he need not enter every one of them in the station house diary and this is implied in Section 154 CrPC. Apart from a vague information by a phone call or a cryptic telegram, the information first entered in the station house diary, kept for this purpose, by a police officer in charge of a police station is the first information report -- FIR postulated by Section 154 CrPC. All other informations made orally or in writing after the commencement of the investigation into the cognizable 9 offence disclosed from the facts mentioned in the first information report and entered in the station house diary by the police officer or such other cognizable offences as may come to his notice during the investigation, will be statements falling under Section 162 CrPC. No such information/statement can properly be treated as an FIR and entered in the station house diary again, as it would in effect be a second FIR and the same cannot be in conformity with the scheme of CrPC. Take a case where an FIR mentions cognizable offence under Section 307 or 326 IPC and the investigating agency learns during the investigation or receives fresh information that the victim died, no fresh FIR under Section 302 IPC need be registered which will be irregular; in such a case alteration of the provision of law in the first FIR is the proper course to adopt. Let us consider a different situation in which H having killed W, his wife, informs the police that she is killed by an unknown person or knowing that W is killed by his mother or sister, H owns up the responsibility and during investigation the truth is detected; it does not require filing of fresh FIR against H -- the real offender
-- who can be arraigned in the report under Section 173(2) or 173(8) CrPC, as the case may be. It is of course permissible for the investigating officer to send up a report to the Magistrate concerned even earlier that investigation is being directed against the person suspected to be the accused.
1027. A just balance between the fundamental rights of the citizens under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution and the expansive power of the police to investigate a cognizable offence has to be struck by the court. There cannot be any controversy that sub-section (8) of Section 173 CrPC empowers the police to make further investigation, obtain further evidence (both oral and documentary) and forward a further report or reports to the Magistrate. In Narang case [(1979) 2 SCC 322: 1979 SCC (Cri) 479] it was, however, observed that it would be appropriate to conduct further investigation with the permission of the court. However, the sweeping power of investigation does not warrant subjecting a citizen each time to fresh investigation by the police in respect of the same incident, giving rise to one or more cognizable offences, consequent upon filing of successive FIRs whether before or after filing the final report under Section 173(2) CrPC. It would clearly be beyond the purview of Sections 154 and 156 CrPC, nay, a case of abuse of the statutory power of investigation in a given case. In our view a case of fresh investigation based on the second or successive FIRs, not being a counter- case, filed in connection with the same or connected cognizable offence alleged to have been committed in the course of the same transaction and in respect of which pursuant to the first FIR either investigation is under way or final report under Section 173(2) has been forwarded to the Magistrate, may be a fit case for exercise of power under Section 11 482 CrPC or under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution.
35. For the aforementioned reasons, the registration of the second FIR under Section 154 CrPC on the basis of the letter of the Director General of Police as Crime No. 268 of 1997 of Kuthuparamba Police Station is not valid and consequently the investigation made pursuant thereto is of no legal consequence, they are accordingly quashed. We hasten to add that this does not preclude the investigating agency from seeking leave of the Court in Crimes Nos. 353 and 354 of 1994 for making further investigations and filing a further report or reports under Section 173(8) CrPC before the competent Magistrate in the said cases. In this view of the matter, we are not inclined to interfere with the judgment of the High Court under challenge insofar as it relates to quashing of Crime No. 268 of 1997 of Kuthuparamba Police Station against the ASP (R.A. Chandrasekhar); in all other aspects the impugned judgment of the High Court shall stand set aside."
(emphasis supplied) Again the Apex Court in the case of Babubhai (supra) holds as follows:-
"23. If the two FIRs are read together, it becomes clear that the incident started in the morning as per both the FIRs CR No. I-154 of 2008, lodged by Mr M.N. Pandya, Sub-Inspector of Police, stated that 12 he reached the place of occurrence after receiving the information from the police station and found that the mob had already dispersed. The case of the prosecution is that when the police reached the place of occurrence of the first incident, the mob had already dispersed, could not be correct for the reason that some of the witnesses have stated that the clash was going on when the police arrived and police resorted to force to disperse the mob. In fact, it was the police who summoned the ambulances which took the injured persons to hospitals."
(emphasis supplied) In the case of SURENDER KAUSHIK (supra), the Apex Court holds as follows:
"24. From the aforesaid decisions, it is quite luminous that the lodgment of two FIRs is not permissible in respect of one and the same incident.The concept of sameness has been given a restricted meaning. It does not encompass filing of a counter-FIR relating to the same or connected cognizable offence. What is prohibited is any further complaint by the same complainant and others against the same accused subsequent to the registration of the case under the Code, for an investigation in that regard would have already commenced and allowing registration of further complaint would amount to an improvement of the facts mentioned in the original complaint. As is further 13 made clear by the three-Judge Bench in Upkar Singh [Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash, (2004) 13 SCC 292: 2005 SCC (Cri) 211] , the prohibition does not cover the allegations made by the accused in the first FIR alleging a different version of the same incident.
Thus, rival versions in respect of the same incident do take different shapes and in that event, lodgment of two FIRs is permissible."
(emphasis supplied) In the case of ANJU CHAUDHARY (supra), the Apex Court holds as follows:
"14. On the plain construction of the language and scheme of Sections 154, 156 and 190 of the Code, it cannot be construed or suggested that there can be more than one FIR about an occurrence. However, the opening words of Section 154 suggest that every information relating to commission of a cognizable offence shall be reduced into writing by the officer-in-charge of a police station. This implies that there has to be the first information report about an incident which constitutes a cognizable offence. The purpose of registering an FIR is to set the machinery of criminal investigation into motion, which culminates with filing of the police report in terms of Section 173(2) of the Code. It will, thus, be appropriate to follow the settled principle that there cannot be two FIRs registered for the same offence. However, where the incident is separate; offences are similar or different, or even where the subsequent crime is 14 of such magnitude that it does not fall within the ambit and scope of the FIR recorded first, then a second FIR could be registered. The most important aspect is to examine the inbuilt safeguards provided by the legislature in the very language of Section 154 of the Code. These safeguards can be safely deduced from the principle akin to double jeopardy, rule of fair investigation and further to prevent abuse of power by the investigating authority of the police. Therefore, second FIR for the same incident cannot be registered. Of course, the investigating agency has no determinative right. It is only a right to investigate in accordance with the provisions of the Code. The filing of report upon completion of investigation, either for cancellation or alleging commission of an offence, is a matter which once filed before the court of competent jurisdiction attains a kind of finality as far as police is concerned, may be in a given case, subject to the right of further investigation but wherever the investigation has been completed and a person is found to be prima facie guilty of committing an offence or otherwise, re-examination by the investigating agency on its own should not be permitted merely by registering another FIR with regard to the same offence. If such protection is not given to a suspect, then possibility of abuse of investigating powers by the police cannot be ruled out. It is with this intention in mind that such interpretation should be given to Section 154 of the 15 Code, as it would not only further the object of law but even that of just and fair investigation. More so, in the backdrop of the settled canons of criminal jurisprudence, reinvestigation or de novo investigation is beyond the competence of not only the investigating agency but even that of the learned Magistrate. The courts have taken this view primarily for the reason that it would be opposed to the scheme of the Code and more particularly Section 167(2) of the Code. (Ref. Reeta Nag v. State of W.B. [(2009) 9 SCC 129:
(2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1051] and Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali [(2013) 5 SCC 762] of the same date.) (emphasis supplied) In the case of P. SREEKUMAR (supra) the Apex Court holds as follows:-
"30. Keeping the aforesaid principle of law in mind when we examine the facts of the case at hand, we find that the second FIR filed by the appellant against Respondent 3 though related to the same incident for which the first FIR was filed by Respondent 2 against the appellant-Respondent 3 and three bank officials, yet the second FIR being in the nature of a counter- complaint against Respondent 3 was legally maintainable and could be entertained for being tried on its merits.
31. In other words, there is no prohibition in law to file the second FIR 16 and once it is filed, such FIR is capable of being taken note of and tried on merits in accordance with law.
32. It is for the reasons that firstly, the second FIR was not filed by the same person, who had filed the first FIR. Had it been so, then the situation would have been somewhat different. Such was not the case here; second, it was filed by the appellant as a counter-complaint against Respondent 3; third, the first FIR was against five persons based on one set of allegations whereas the second FIR was based on the allegations different from the allegations made in the first FIR; and lastly, the High Court while quashing the second FIR/charge-sheet did not examine the issue arising in the case in the light of law laid down by this Court in the two aforementioned decisions of this Court in Upkar Singh [Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash, (2004) 13 SCC 292: 2005 SCC (Cri) 211] and Surender Kaushik [Surender Kaushik v. State of U.P., (2013) 5 SCC 148: (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 953] and simply referred the three decisions of this Court mentioned above wherein this Court has laid down general principle of law relating to exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code."
(emphasis supplied) In the case of ARNAB RANJAN GOSWAMI (supra), the Apex Court holds as follows:
"37. In the present case, all the FIRs or complaints which have been lodged in diverse jurisdictions arise 17 out of one and the same incident -- the broadcast by the petitioner on 21-4- 2020 on R. Bharat. The broadcast is the foundation of the allegation that offences have been committed under the provisions of Sections 153, 153-A, 153- B, 295-A, 298, 500, 504 and 506 IPC. During the course of the hearing, this Court has had the occasion, with the assistance of the learned Senior Counsel, to peruse the several complaints that were filed in relation to the incident dated 21-4-2020. They are worded in identical terms and leave no manner of doubt that an identity of cause of action underlies the allegations levelled against the petitioner on the basis of the programme which was broadcast on 21- 4-2020. Moreover, the language, content and sequencing of paragraphs and their numbering is identical. It was in this backdrop that Mr Kapil Sibal, learned Senior Counsel fairly submitted (in our view correctly) that this Court may proceed to quash all the other FIRs and complaints lodged in diverse jurisdictions in the States, leaving open, however, the investigation in respect of FIR No. 238 of 2020 dated 22-4-2020 transferred from Police Station Sadar, District Nagpur City to N.M. Joshi Marg Police Station in Mumbai.
... ... ... ...
39. A litany of our decisions -- to refer to them individually would be a parade of the familiar -- has firmly established that any reasonable restriction on fundamental rights must comport 18 with the proportionality standard, of which one component is that the measure adopted must be the least restrictive measure to effectively achieve the legitimate State aim.
Subjecting an individual to numerous proceedings arising in different jurisdictions on the basis of the same cause of action cannot be accepted as the least restrictive and effective method of achieving the legitimate State aim in prosecuting crime. The manner in which the petitioner has been subjected to numerous FIRs in several States, besides the Union Territories of Jammu and Kashmir on the basis of identical allegations arising out of the same television show would leave no manner of doubt that the intervention of this Court is necessary to protect the rights of the petitioner as a citizen and as a journalist to fair treatment (guaranteed by Article 14) and the liberty to conduct an independent portrayal of views. In such a situation to require the petitioner to approach the respective High Courts having jurisdiction for quashing would result into a multiplicity of proceedings and unnecessary harassment to the petitioner, who is a journalist."
(emphasis supplied) The law in this regard as laid down in the aforesaid cases is followed in the latest judgment of the Apex Court in the case of KRISHNA LAL CHAWLA (supra) wherein, it is held as follows:
"6. Indeed, a closer look at the decision in Upkar Singh [Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash, (2004) 13 SCC 19 292: 2005 SCC (Cri) 211] takes us to the contrary conclusion. In regard to the question of material improvements made in a subsequent private complaint by the same complainant against the same accused with regard to the same incident, it may be useful to refer to the following excerpt from Upkar Singh [Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash, (2004) 13 SCC 292: 2005 SCC (Cri) 211], which further clarifies the holding in T.T. Antony [T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala, (2001) 6 SCC 181: 2001 SCC (Cri) 1048]: (Upkar Singh case [Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash, (2004) 13 SCC 292: 2005 SCC (Cri) 211], SCC pp. 297-
98, para 17) "17. ... In our opinion, this Court in that case only held that any further complaint by the same complainant or others against the same accused, subsequent to the registration of a case, is prohibited under the Code because an investigation in this regard would have already started and further complaint against the same accused will amount to an improvement on the facts mentioned in the original complaint, hence will be prohibited under Section 162 of the Code."
(emphasis supplied in the original) It is the aforementioned part of the holding in Upkar Singh [Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash, (2004) 13 SCC 292: 2005 SCC (Cri) 211] that bears 20 directly and strongly upon the present case.
(emphasis supplied) If the law that is laid down by the Apex Court in the afore-extracted judgments is considered, what would unmistakably emerge is, registration of second FIR on the same incident would be hit by the "doctrine of sameness" and will have to be annihilated as it would amount to improving the facts and the case in the subsequent complaint on the same incident. On the bedrock of the principles laid down in the afore-extracted judgments of the Apex Court, the case at hand will have to be considered.
13. A counter complaint is always permissible on the same incident as there can be complaints and two FIRs', if it is a case of complaint and counter complaint or a case of consequential complaint. These are not the facts in the case at hand. Therefore, without a shadow of doubt it would hit by 'doctrine of sameness'.
5. Therefore, in the light of the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in the aforesaid judgments and this Court in Crl.P.No.3171/2018, I deem it appropriate to obliterate the proceedings in Crime No.11 and 12 of 2017 which concerns Crl.P.No.101618/2021 and Crl.P.No.101619/2021. The trial against the petitioner in Crime No.10 of 2017 concerning Crl.P.No.100720/2019 shall continue since there are serious triable issues existing in those cases. It is for the petitioner to 21 come out clean in the said trial. The other two are obliterated owing to doctrine of sameness as held by the Apex Court.
6. For the aforesaid reason, the following:
ORDER
i) Crl.P.No.100720/2019 is dismissed.
ii) Crl.P.Nos.101618 and 101619 of 2021 are allowed.
iii) The proceedings in Crime No.11 and 12 of 2017, pending on the file of II Addl. JMFC Court, Gokak, are quashed.
iv) It is made clear that the statements recorded in Crl.P.No.100720/2019 would be treated as statement under section 161 in Crime No.10/2017.
SD JUDGE Mrk/-