Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
N. Ram Reddy vs Bar Council Of The State Of A.P., Hyd. on 23 April, 2002
Equivalent citations: 2002(3)ALD484, 2002(3)ALT717, AIR 2002 ANDHRA PRADESH 484, (2002) 3 CIVLJ 738, (2002) 3 ANDHLD 484, (2002) 3 ANDH LT 717
Author: Ar. Lakshmanan
Bench: Ar. Lakshmanan
JUDGMENT Ar. Lakshmanan, C.J.
1. Heard Sri Mohan Vinod for the petitioner and Sri A. Sudershan Reddy for the respondent.
2. The writ petition was filed by the petitioner, N. Ram Reddy, questioning the legality and validity of the order dated 15-12-2001 passed by the Enrollment Committee of the Bar Council of Andhra Pradesh in returning his application for admission as advocate on the roll of the Bar Council of the State of Andhra Pradesh.
3. The order impugned in this writ petition reads thus:
"With reference to your application cited above, I am to inform you that the Enrolment Committee of the Bar Council of Andhra Pradesh at its meeting held on 13-12-2001 has considered your application and passed the following order:
It is stated in the judgment of the Hon'ble High Court, that the applicant is stated to be relieved on 6-4-2000. As such the present application in the present form cannot be processed and deserves to be returned as not maintainable. Applicant be informed accordingly.
Therefore, I am herewith returning your application. Kindly acknowledge the receipt of the same."
4. The facts of the case, in brief, are as follows : The petitioner was appointed as Inspector of Central Excise in 1978 and was promoted as Superintendent of Central Excise and assumed charge on 9-7-1993. He gave notice of voluntary retirement on 24-7-1998 under Rule 48 of the Central Civil Service (Pension) Rules, 1972 to be effective from 1-8-1999. The said notice was not accepted by the department on the ground that charge-sheet issued to him on 31-12-1997 was pending. The petitioner filed OA No. 1905 of 1999 before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad Bench praying for setting aside the orders of non-acceptance of his voluntary retirement by the Commissioner of Central Excise. The Tribunal by its order dated 3-3-2000 ordered that the petitioner is deemed to have retired from service with effect from 31-7-1999. The petitioner relinquished the post of Superintendent of Central Excise on 6-4-2000 on voluntary retirement consequent upon the judgment of the Tribunal dated 3-3-2000. The respondents therein filed a review petition praying for modification of paragraph 33 (d) of the judgment in OA No. 1905 of 1999 relating to issue of a fresh charge memo. The respondents did not contest the order of petitioner's deemed retirement from 31-7-1999. The Tribunal by an order dated 27-6-2000 in RA No. 41 of 2000 in OA No. 1905 of 1999 modified the order passed in OA No. 1905 of 1999 in paragraph 33(d) and ordered that the existing charge-sheet issued to the petitioner should be processed and a final decision be taken within six months from the date of receipt of order by the respondents in the OA. The order of the Tribunal that the petitioner is deemed to have retired from service on 31-7-1999 has become final.
5. The petitioner filed Writ Petition No. 14152 of 2000 in this Court to quash to order in OA No. 1905 of 1999 of the Tribunal, insofar as paragraph 31 is concerned, directing the respondents therein to appropriate the salary and emoluments paid to the petitioner from the deemed date of retirement i.e., 1-8-1999 till the date of relief on 6-4-2000 towards provisional pension. This Court allowed the writ petition and clarified that the pensionary and other terminal benefits payable to him shall be computed on the basis that the petitioner retired from service on 31-7-1999.
6. The petitioner on 4-12-2001 submitted an application to the Bar Council of State of Andhra Pradesh. He opted for enrolment on 6-12-2001. He submitted the law degree, date of birth certificate, date of relief and the order of the Tribunal in OA No. 1905 of 1999 and the judgment in Writ Petition No. 14152 of 2000 along with his application. The petitioner's name was not included in the list of candidates to be enrolled as advocates. On verification, the petitioner was given a letter dated 15-12-2001 signed by the Secretary to the effect that his application in the present form cannot be processed and deserves to be returned as not maintainable. The contention of the petitioner is that the action of the respondent in not assigning any valid reasons consistent with the Rules of the Bar Council of State of Andhra Pradesh, the Rules of Bar Council of India and the Advocates Act, 1961 is illegal, arbitrary and is against the principles of natural justice.
7. In the above circumstances, the petitioner preferred the above writ petition contending that the respondent has committed manifest error of law in returning his application for admission as advocate without any valid and legal grounds. It is further submitted the provisions contained in Section 26 of the Advocates' Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") and Rule 75-C of the Bar Council of Andhra Pradesh Rules have not been followed. The petitioner, therefore prayed to quash the order passed by the Bar Council of Andhra Pradesh and consequently to direct the respondents to admit the petitioner on the roll of Bar Council of State of Andhra Pradesh.
8. Along with the writ petition, the petitioner had filed the orders dated 3-3-2000 and 27-6-2000 passed in OA No. 1905 of 1999 and RA No. 41 of 2000 in OA No. 1905 of 2000 respectively by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad Bench, the judgment dated 30-3-2001 in Writ Petition No. 14152 of 2000 passed by this Court and the certificates issued by the Osmania University and the copy of his application made to the Bar Council of State of Andhra Pradesh.
9. The respondent-Secretary of Bar Council of Andhra Pradesh filed counter-affidavit. According to the respondent, the petitioner is not entitled to be enrolled as advocate pending finalisation of disciplinary proceedings before his employer and that the petitioner cannot be enrolled in view of Section 24-A of the Act, and Rule 70 of the Rules of Bar Council of A.P. Apart from the fact that the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner are pending, the petitioner on the culmination of the said disciplinary proceedings may be also found guilty of charges which may amount to dismissal on the basis of moral turpitude. It is further submitted that the case on the petitioner falls under Rule 70 of the Rules of the Bar Council of A.P., which reads thus:
"A person who is otherwise qualified to be admitted as an advocate but is cither in full or part time service or employment or is engaged in any trade, business or profession shall not be admitted as an advocate."
10. It is further averred in the counter-affidavit that earlier the petitioner has submitted his explanation to the show-cause notice issued by the department on 6-9-2001 where he is employed and no final orders have been passed in this regard. In view of this, it is deemed that the petitioner is not yet relieved from his employment and as such he conies within the ambit of Rule 70 of the Rules of the Bar Council of Andhra Pradesh and as such consideration of his application for enrolment as advocate does not arise.
11. It is further stated that an enquiry is pending before the department and in the event the petitioner is found guilty of charges framed against him, he would suffer disqualification as envisaged under Rule 70 of the Rules of Bar Council of A.P., and Section 24-A of the Act. So the present application of the petitioner is premature and deserves no consideration.
12. A reply affidavit was filed by the writ petitioner denying the allegations contained in the counter-affidavit.
13. The learned Counsel appearing for the respective parties reiterated submissions made in their receptive affidavit and counter-affidavit.
14. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the question at issue. We have already extracted the impugned order in paragraph supra. The impugned order does not mention any disqualification and as to when the disqualification is attracted and as to when it ends. The order is not based on the advice of the Bar Council of India as stipulated under Section 26 of the Act. The respondent has not mentioned what specific disqualification is attracted in the case of the petitioner under Section 24-A of the Act. The contention of the respondent that the petitioner may be found guilty of charges which may amount to dismissal is a mere surmise and is totally baseless. In our opinion, there cannot be any dismissal or removal after retirement. Pending disciplinary proceedings are deemed to be proceedings under Rule 9(2) of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1971 after retirement. There can only be, if at all, a cut in pension under CCS (Pension) Rules after retirement and that the respondent cannot deny the petitioner admission as advocate on future dismissal or removal, which is imaginary, non-existing and which is not permitted any existing law.
15. It is stated that the respondent in the impugned order stated that the petitioner was relieved on 6-4-2000 and the respondent is estopped from denying its own statement. According to the petitioner, he is deemed to have retired from service with effect from 31-7-1999 as per the judgment dated 3-3-2000 delivered by the Central Administrative Tribunal in OA No. 1905 of 1999, a copy of which and the relief report dated 6-4-2000 were also annexed to the application for enrolment as well as to this writ petition. In our opinion, the respondent without any legal and valid basis and in utter disregard to the judicial decisions has observed that the petitioner cannot be deemed to have retired, which is contrary to facts.
16. Learned Counsel for the respondent made a submission regarding applicability of Rule 70 of the Bar Council of A.P. Rules in paragraphs 5, 6, 7, 10, 11 and 12 of the counter-affidavit. According to the said provisions, person engaged in full or part time employment shall not be admitted as advocate. Reference to the said rule, in our view, is extraneous to the impugned order and is not relevant to the case of the petitioner in view of the fact on record and law as stated in the preceding paragraphs. The petitioner's case, in our opinion, did not fall in any of the categories of disqualification, viz., dismissal, removal and conviction. The order of the Tribunal dated 3-3-2000 and the relief report were enclosed with the application for enrolment and the respondent could not have entertained any reasonable belief that some disqualification was attracted in the petitioner's case on the relevant date, viz., 6-12-2001. The action of the respondent in not considering the petitioner's application on 6-12-2001 is discriminatory and illegal. In our opinion, the Bar Council ought to have issued notice to the petitioner before passing the impugned order rejecting his application, more so when the Bar Council relies on the certain alleged pending proceedings with the employer. Unless the statute, in unequivocal and in unmistakable terms exclude the application of audi alteram parterm rule at pre-decisional stage, the opportunity of being heard cannot be denied. In this case, the opportunity of being heard was denied to the petitioner which adversely affect his case for defence before the order was passed. We, therefore, feel that the order is liable to be quashed.
17. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that his constitutional spirit of right to earn the livelihood is sought to be denied by the Bar Council of Andhra Pradesh. It is submitted that the right to practice as an advocate and to carry on any profession is created by the statute, the exercise of which may be subject to terms and conditions imposed by the statute and by the imposition of any terms and conditions the fundamental right cannot be infringed. Reliance was placed upon Section 24 of the Act.
18. Per contra, learned Counsel for the Bar Council would submit that the persons, who retire from various Government and quasi Government Departments and other services and establishments on superannuation seek to start a second life in legal profession and that they enjoy life in legal profession, that they enjoy various retirement benefits such as a pension, provident, fund, gratuity etc., that the profession is only a side business for them and that they want to make additional gains from legal profession.
19. It is further submitted that the influx of large number of pensioners and other retired Government employees seriously affects the organisation, discipline, honour and dignity of the profession. It is further submitted that right to practice as an advocate is a privilege conferred by a statute and not an absolute right and that only if one fulfils the conditions specified in Section 24 and the rules made in this regard one could claim to be enrolled Section 24 (1)(c) of the Act is also pressed into service to contend that one has to fulfil other conditions as any be specified by the rules made by the State Bar Council for enrolment as an advocate.
20. It would be useful to refer the relevant provisions of the Act to appreciate the grievances sought to be made out on behalf of the parties. Section 6 of the Act enumerates the functions of the State Bar Council and one such is to perform among other things all functions conferred on it by or under the Act and do all other things necessary for discharging the aforesaid functions. Section 6( 1 )(h) and (i) and Section 7 of the Act enumerates the functions of the Bar Council of India. Among other things, it is the function of the Bar Council of India to recognise Universities whose degree in law shall be a qualification for enrolment as an advocate and for that purpose to visit and inspect Universities and to perform all other functions conferred on it by or under the Act and to do all other things necessary for discharging the aforesaid functions [Section 7(1)(i), (1) and (m)]. Chapter III of the Act contains the provisions relating to admission and enrolment of advocates. Section 17 obligates every State Bar Council to prepare and maintain a roll of advocates in which shall be entered all the names and addresses of the various categories prescribed and one such is of all persons who are admitted to be advocates on the roll of the State Bar Council under the Act on or after the appointed day. Sub-section (3) of Section 17 provides that entries in each part (Part I and Part II) of the roll of advocates prepared and maintained by a State Bar Council in the order of seniority shall be determined in accordance with the date of enrolment and such other rule as may be specified by the Bar Council of India. Section 24, which specifies the persons who may be admitted as advocates on a State roll, and the relevant portion, reads as follows:
"(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, and the rules made thereunder, a person shall be qualified to be admitted as an advocate on a State roll, if he fulfils the following conditions, namely:-
(a) he is a citizen of India: Provided that subject to the other provisions contained in this Act, a national of any other country may be admitted as an advocate on a State roll, if citizens of India, duly qualified are permitted, to practice law in that other country;
(b) he has completed the age of twenty-one years;
(c) he has obtained a decree in law;
(e) he fulfils such other conditions as may be specified in the rules made by the State Bar Council under this Chapter;
(f) he has paid, in respect of the enrolment, stamp duty, if any, chargeable under the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, and an enrolment fee payable to the State Bar Council of six hundred rupees and to the Bar Council of India, one hundred and fifty rupees by way of a bank draft drawn in favour of that Council:"
Section 24-A, which provides disqualification for enrolment reads:
"(1) No person shall be admitted as an advocate on a State roll-
(a) if he is convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude;
(b) if he is convicted of an offence under the provisions of the Untouchability (Offences) Act, 1955;
Provided that the disqualification for enrolment as aforesaid shall cease to have effect after a period of two years has elapsed since his [released or dismissal or, as the case may be, removal]
(c) if he is dismissed or removed from employment or office under the State on any charge involving moral turpitude :
Provided that the disqualification for enrolment as aforesaid shall cease to have effect after a period of two years has elapsed since his release or dismissal or as the case may be removal.
Explanation :--In this clause, the expression "State" shall have the meaning assigned to it under Article 12 of the Constitution: (2) Nothing contained in Sub-section (1) shall apply to a person who having been found guilty is dealt with under the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958."
Sections 29 and 30 of the Act provide that as and from appointed day, there shall be only one class of persons entitled to practice the profession of law, namely, advocates and very advocate whose name is entered in the State roll shall be entitled as of right to practice throughout the territories to which the Act extends in all Courts, including the Supreme Court. Section 32 preserves the right of any Court, authority or persons to permit any one not enrolled as an advocate under the Act to appear before it or him in any particular case. It is made clear under Section 33 that except as otherwise provided in the Act or in any other law for the time being in force, no person shall be on or after the appointed day, be entitled to practice in any Court or before any authority or person unless he is enrolled as an advocate under the Act. Section 34 of the Act enables the High Court to make rules laying down the conditions subject to which an advocate shall be permitted to practice in the High Court and the Court subordinate thereto. Section 49 of the Act, which deals with the general power of the Bar Council of India to make rules, reads thus:
"(1) The Bar Council of India may make rules for discharging its functions under this Act, and, in particular, such rules may prescribe-
(at) the minimum qualifications required for admission to a course of degree in law in any recognised University;
(ag) the class or category of person entitled to be enrolled as advocates;
(ah) the conditions subject to which an advocate shall have the right to practice and the circumstances under which a person shall be deemed to practice as an advocate in a Court;
(j) any other matter which may be prescribed;"
21. Section 49-A empowers the Central Government to make rules for the purpose of carrying out the purposes of the Act and it reads as under:
(1) The Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, make rules for carrying out the purposes of this Act including rules with respect to any matter for which the Bar Council of India or a State Bar Council has power to make rules.
(2) in particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such rules may provide for-
(a) qualifications for membership of a Bar Council and disqualifications for such membership;
(b) the manner in which the Bar Council of India may exercise supervision and control over State Bar Councils and the manner in which the directions issued or orders made by the Bar Council of India may be enforced.
(c) the class or category of persons entitled to be enrolled as advocates under this Act:
(g) any other matter which may be prescribed."
22. In the background of the contentions raised on behalf of the parties, the question as to whether the right to practice the profession of law as an advocate is a fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution may be considered first.
23. Article 19 (1)(g) declares the right of all citizens to practice any profession or to carry on any occupation trade or business. What is guaranteed thereby, in our view, is only the right to pursue a profession of one's choice and not the right to practice a particular profession, an advocate in this case. The right guaranteed has been often held to be the natural right to enter into or carry on any trade, profession or calling which every citizen has as a member of a civilized society independent of any legislation or grant and wherever the right to carry on any profession is created by a statute, the exercise of that right has got to be subject to the terms and conditions imposed by such statute and an unrestricted right cannot be claimed on the pretext of a plea based on Article 19(1)(g). As far as we know, no one can claim the right to practice as an advocate inherent within since it cannot be considered to be natural right or a normal avocation recognised to be available to every citizen. The right to plead for others in a Court of law or before any such forum or authority depends upon the permission to be granted by such Courts, subject to rules made in respect thereof by the High Court vide Section 34 and also depends upon the enrolment of the persons concerned by the State Bar Council in the State roll. Sections 29, 30 and 33 of the Act also would go to show that the right to practice as an advocate is merely a statutory right and not fundamental right. Of course, if a citizen who satisfies the prescribed or stipulated qualifications is unlawfully prevented from practising as an advocate such citizen may complain of a violation of his fundamental right.
24. Before the Madras High Court, prescription of upper age with ceiling limit of 45 years by the Bar Council was challenged. A Division Bench of the Madras High Court, comprising of Raju and Dr. AR. Lakshmanan, JJ., reported in Sampath Kumar, J. v. Bar Council of India and another, 1995-1-LW 336, has observed as under:
"We are of the view that the rule, which has the effect of putting an axe on the right of a person, who is otherwise eligible to be enrolled as an advocate, has the consequence of in substance, prescribing a disqualification. The prescription of an upper age with ceiling limit of 45 years per se operates, as a permanent disqualification for a person otherwise entitled to get enrolled as an Advocate. As rightly contended on behalf of the petitioners, the statute itself prescribes the criteria for admitting a person as advocate on a State Roll (vide Section 24 of the Act). Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 24 stipulates that one has to have completed the age of 21 years. Though a minimum age qualification is prescribed, the maximum age limit within which one has to get himself enrolled is not stipulated and conspicuously found omitted by the Parliament, which, in its wisdom policy thought fit only to stipulate a minimum age limit, we are of the view it may not be permissible for a Bar Council of India to superimpose a further qualification by an upper age limit so as to disqualify or render ineligible a person, though otherwise qualified from being enrolled merely on the ground of having reached a particular maximum age limit prescribed as rules. Similarly Section 24(A) of the Act stipulates the disqualifying factors, which stand in the way of any one claiming to be admitted as an advocate on a State roll. The Parliament in its wisdom, has not chose to introduce any disqualification based on the criteria of age of a particular applicant .........Not only the Parliament has taken care of such situation by enacting Section 24(A) of the Act, but even in the recent amendment brought about in the year 1993 introducing Clause (C) to Sub-section (1) of Section 24 (A) of the Act, a person who is dismissed or removed from employment or office under State or any charge, involving moral turpitude is rendered disqualified for enrolment and that too for a limited period stipulated therein. The legislature, even at that stage does not appear to have thought of introducing a statutory amendment to impose any ceiling limit based on the introduction of an upper age to operate as a disqualifying factor against a person from getting enrolled into the State rolls. The matters pertaining to disqualification of a person otherwise rendered eligible under the statute must be considered to be matters pertaining to the Legislative policy and not mere, formalities relating to any procedure or mere details of implementation of the provisions of the Act effectively. Consequently, short of an amendment to the provisions of the Act, the rule making authorities cannot claim to possess any power to introduce a disqualification on whatever ground including the age of a person so as to bar his entering the profession as prescribed for and from getting enrolled as an advocate. As the matter stands we are of the view at any rate that the Bar Council of India has no such powers and cannot claim the exercise of any such authority or powers by virtue of its rule making powers under Section 49 of the Act"
25. The Supreme Court also in the judgment reported in Indian Council of legal aid and advice v. Bar Council of India, , held that the rule debarring persons aged about forty-five years is beyond rule making power of Bar Council of India and ultra vires the Act.
26. We have already extracted Section 24-A of the Act. The said section does not disqualify a person permanently. It merely bars admission of such a person for a period of two years from conviction. A person, who is convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude, is disqualified for being admitted as an advocate on the roll of State. This means that the conduct of being convicted of an offence concerning moral turpitude, which would disqualify a person from being enrolled as an advocate, has to be considered as serious misconduct when found to have been committed by a person, who is enrolled as an advocate, and it would call for imposition of punishment of removal of the name of the advocate from the roll of advocates. In the instant case, the petitioner is not convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude or an offence under the provisions of the Untouchability (Offences) Act, or he is dismissed or removed from employment or office under the State on any charge involving moral turpitude.
27. We have already referred to the contention of the learned Counsel for the respondent that the case of the petitioner falls under Rule 70 of the Rules of Bar Council of Andhra Pradesh and therefore the question of consideration of application of the petitioner for enrolment as an advocate does not arise. We are unable to accept the said contention or countenance the same. The averment relating to applicability of Rule 70 of the Bar Council of Andhra Pradesh Rules, in our view, is not tenable. According to the provisions of the said rule, the persons engaged in full time or part-time employment should not be admitted as advocates. Therefore, reference to the said rule is extraneous to the impugned order and is not relevant to the case of the petitioner in view of the facts on record and law as stated in the foregoing paragraphs.
28. The petitioner, in fact, has retired from service with effect from 31-7-1999 as per the order dated 3-3-2000 delivered by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad Bench in OA No. 1905 of 1999 and therefore there cannot be any dismissal or removal after retirement. Pending disciplinary proceedings, if any, are deemed to be proceedings under Rule 9(2) of CCS (Pension) Rules after retirement, and if at all there can only be a cut in pension under the CCS (Pension) Rules after retirement.
The Central Administrative Tribunal in paragraph-33 of its order observed as follows: "Hence we issue the following directions:
(a) The impugned order dated 13-7-1999 and 26-10-1999 are hereby set aside;
(b) The applicant shall be deemed to have retired from service with effect from 31-7-1999;
(c) As disciplinary action is contemplated against the applicant the respondent authorities shall sanction only the provisional pension to the applicant in accordance with the rules.
(d) The respondents shall issue a fresh charge memo in accordance with the rules on or before 31-12-2000. If not issued within this stipulated time, they shall release all the pensionary benefits to the applicant."
29. In paragraph 32 of the order, it has been categorically held that the action of the respondents therein, viz., Union of India and two others, in not permitting the applicant, viz., the petitioner herein, to retire from service voluntarily with effect from 31-7-1999 is not in accordance with Rule 48 of the CCS (Pension) Rules and that the request of the applicant comes into operation automatically after the expiry of the period mentioned therein. The respondents in OA No. 1905 of 1999 filed a petition in RA No. 41 of 2000 seeking for review of paragraph 33 (d) of order dated 3-3-2000 in OA No.1905 of 1999 only. The learned Tribunal by its order dated 27-6-2000 modified paragraph 33(d) of its order dated 3-3-2000 by observing that the existing charge sheet dated 31-12-1997 should be taken, processed further and a final decision taken on the basis of the disposal of the charge-sheet and the inquiry proceedings shall be completed within six months from the date of receipt of copy of the said order.
30. The learned Tribunal in paragraph 31 of its order dated 3-3-2000 in OA No. 1905 of 1999 observed as under:
"Further, if the respondents have paid to the applicant any salary and emoluments on the basis of the impugned order with effect from 1-8-1999 the same shall be appropriated towards the provisional pension to be paid to the applicant."
31. The petitioner herein filed Writ Petition No. 14125 of 2000 to quash the order dated 3-3-2000 insofar as the above direction of the learned Tribunal in paragraph 31 of the order is concerned with a consequential direction to respondents 1 to 3 to pay the gratuity, pension and the amount towards encashment of leave with 12% interest thereon. A Division Bench of this Court, comprising of S.B. Sinha, C.J., and V.V.S. Rao, J., allowed the said writ petition by its judgment dated 30-3-2001 holding as under:
"It is not in dispute that despite the petitioner's filing an application for voluntary retirement as far back as on 24-7-1998 the same had not been allowed. In fact, the same was rejected as noted herein before by a letter dated 26-10-1999. The learned Tribunal keeping in view the aforementioned provisions as also various decisions came to the conclusion that the petitioner was entitled for retirement on voluntary basis. It is, therefore, evident that the petitioner was forced to work despite the submission of the application for voluntary retirement as by reason of the impugned judgment although the petitioner has already retired from service with effect from 31-7-1999 and keeping in view the fact that the petitioner had rendered services, his salary and emoluments for the period from 31-8-1999 till he was relieved on 6-4-2000 cannot be denied having regard to the provisions contained in Section 70 of the Indian Contract Act as also Article 23 of the Constitution of India. However, there cannot be any doubt that the pensionary and other terminal benefits payable to the petitioner shall be computed on the basis that he has retired from service on 31-7-1999."
32. All the above facts would clearly go to show that the petitioner was not in employment and that the pensionary and other benefits have also been directed to be paid to him by the orders of the Court.
The impugned order passed by the Bar Council of Andhra Pradesh, in our opinion, is not correct and the Bar Council has committed an error of law in returning the application of the petitioner for admission as an advocate without any valid and legal grounds. The petitioner, in our opinion, is qualified to be admitted as an advocate on the roll of Bar Council of Andhra Pradesh.
We, therefore, issue a mandamus directing the Bar Council of State of Andhra Pradesh to admit the petitioner on the roll of the Bar Council of Andhra Pradesh State forthwith. However, there will be no order as to costs.