Orissa High Court
Chambara Soy vs State Of Orissa And Ors. on 3 October, 2007
Equivalent citations: 2007(II)OLR728, AIR 2008 ORISSA 148, 2008 (6) ALL LJ NOC 1286, (2007) 2 ORISSA LR 728, (2007) 38 OCR 685, (2009) 4 ACC 184, (2009) 3 ACJ 1837
Author: B.P. Das
Bench: B.P. Das, M.M. Das
JUDGMENT B.P. Das, J.
1. This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner, Chambara Soy, resident of village-Gobarghati, P.S. Kalinga Nagar in the District of Jajpur with the following prayers:
(i) to direct the O. Ps. to take immediate action to lift the illegal blockage over National Highway No. 200 at Kalinga Nagar.
(ii) to direct the Police to take appropriate action against the persons named in the F.I.R. as mentioned in paragraph-12.
(iii) to direct the State Government to initiate appropriate disciplinary proceedings against the officials, who have failed in their duty to lift the illegal road blockage on N.H. 200 at Kalinga Nagar, and
(iv) to direct the O.Ps. to pay compensation of Rs. 10 lakhs to the petitioner.
2. The facts as delineated in this writ petition tend to reveal as follows:
The petitioner belongs to Scheduled Tribe being Munda by tribe and is a permanent resident of village-Gobarghati, Tahasil-Sukinda, P.S.-Kalinga Nagar in the district of Jajpur. On 2.1.2006 due to disputes between the tribals of the area and the local Police, there was a violent clash in which thirteen persons lost their lives, for which some members of his community wanted to carry on peaceful agitation to draw the attention of the Government to their demands. However, certain unscrupulous elements in order to further their own political ambitions managed to hijack the entire movement and started 'rasta roka' agitation and totally blocked N.H. 200 near Ambagadia village under Kalinga Nagar P.S. According to the petitioner, due to such blockage of N.H. 200, total lawlessness prevailed in the area and some people instigated the public to take up arms and adopt the path of violence. On 23.4.2006 at about 7 p.m. the petitioner along with his ailing son was proceeding in a car to Danagadi hospital on N.H.200 to provide him medical treatment as he was suffering from Malaria and on his way to Danagadi hospital, he was stopped near village Ambagadia on account of the road blockage agitation resorted to by a mob comprising of the persons named in paragraph-12 of the writ petition, claiming themselves to be members of an organisation named and styled as 'Bistapan Birodhi Janamanch', Kalinga Nagar.Despite earnest request of the petitioner to allow him to take his son in the vehicle to the hospital, the mob did not allow the petitioner's vehicle to pass through N.H. 200 and detained his vehicle for two hours. The petitioner somehow or other escaped the mob and arrived at Danagadi hospital where his son was declared dead on arrival. The petitioner filed an F.I.R. on 25.1.2006 indicating the entire facts and requested the Police to take appropriate action in the matter and as no action was taken against the offenders who were responsible for blocking the N.H. 200 and due to such illegal road blockage his son died, the petitioner has filed this writ petition with the prayers herein above mentioned.
As already observed above, the petitioner filed an F.I.R. on 25.1.2006 before the Kalinga Nagar Police Station in this regard. No action having been taken on the F.I.R., on 28.4.2006 the petitioner along with other members of the Kalinga Nagar Surakshya Committee filed a representation before the Superintendent of Police, Jajpur indicating the death of his son and requesting to remove the blockage made by certain persons on N.H.200. According to the petitioner, even though road blockage was continuing, the State Government, O.P.1 was not taking any step for removal of such blockage, which caused immense difficulties to the commuters and users of N.H. 200 as the plying of commercial and passenger vehicles in that area of N.H. 200 has been totally stopped. The petitioner submitted that the inaction on the part of the authorities to remove the blockage from the national highway has resulted in total stoppage of vehicular traffic at that part of national highway and the petitioner became a victim of such negligence of the State authorities which led to the untimely death of his son, who was a student of I.T.I., for which the State is liable to compensate the petitioner.
3. A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the Superintendent of Police, Jajpur, (O.P.2) refuting the allegation of the petitioner that due to road blockage on N.H. 200 near Ambagadia under Kalinga Nagar, lawlessness crept into the area but in paragraph-7 it is indicated that Sanjaya Soy, the son of the petitioner-Chambara Soy, was treated in Danagadi hospital during the month of March 2006 and on the date of occurrence, he was taken to the hospital for treatment but due to road blockage, the petitioner was not able to take his son for necessary treatment to Danagadi hospital. It is further indicated that the present petitioner was not supporting the agitation against the Government and was not agreeing to the cause of such road blockage resorted to by a group of persons and his son died due to delay in shifting him to the hospital on account of obstruction, which was under investigation. It is also indicated that on the basis of the F.I.R. filed by the petitioner, Kalinga Nagar P.S. Case No. 63 dated 27.4.2006 was registered under Sections 341, 342, 384, 506, 304, 34, IPC. In paragraph-9 of the said counter affidavit, it is stated that the members of Kalinga Nagar Surakshya Committee had given a representation to the Superintendent of Police, Jajpur to take steps for removal of the blockage on the express highway but as the agitation was led by political leaders, who were instigating the agitators to protest by violence, the Police and administration were maintaining utmost restraint and trying to sort out the problem through negotiation, persuasion and dialogue. In paragraph-10, it is stated that the death of the petitioner's son is due to delay in treatment, which was attributable to the community people of the petitioner. According to O.P. 2, the cause of death was not due to negligence on the part of the Government authorities or the Police officials but it was due to the act of certain persons, who were resorting to road blockage. It is further stated that the F.I.R. filed bv the petitioner was under investigation and may take some more time, as the agitators were not allowing the police to cause fair investigation of the case.
4. The writ petition was taken up on 11.10.2006 and this Court considering the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the Superintendent of Police, Jajpur, passed an interim order directing O.P. 1 to pay a sum of Rs. 10,000/- as aid/assistance to the bereaved family and while hearing the matter, it was stated at the bar that not only at Kalinga Nagar but also at many other places throughout the State, such road blockages were illegally caused by agitators on flimsy grounds and the authorities of the State failed to take immediate action to clear such blockages for maintaining free flow of vehicular traffic and as a consequence, innocent citizens undergo harassment and suffering. It was further stated at the bar that not only public roads but very often railway tracks were also blocked by such agitators for no reason whatsoever and inaction on the part of law enforcing agency encourages more of such incidents. Taking cognizance of such submissions made at the bar, this Court directed to all the Collectors and Superintendents of Police in the State to file affidavits clearly indicating therein the number of such road blockages which occurred in their respective districts during last one year and the steps taken by the authorities in the matter. Accordingly, affidavits were filed.
5. Mahanadi Coal Fields Ltd. filed an application for intervention and the same was allowed. Thereafter on 5.1.2007 when this matter was listed, Mr. M. Kanungo, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that as the petitioner amongst other prayers had prayed for a direction to be issued to the O.Ps. to take immediate action to lift the illegal blockage of National Highway No. 200 at Kalinga Nagar by antisocial elements, it was necessary in the interest of justice to pass appropriate interim order to lift such blockage, which was continuing since last more than one year, thereby causing serious inconvenience to the commuters and free flow of traffic over the said National Highway.
6. Taking into consideration the aforesaid submission of Mr. Kanungo and the fact that blockage of N.H. is continuing for more than one year, which is unheard of in a civilized society, and looking at the apathetic attitude of the State Government, which had not taken effective step for clearance of the aforesaid road blockage from N.H. 200 and virtually remained insensitive to the issues and allowing it to remain in the hands of some hooligans, this Court as an interim measure directed the State in its Home Department to issue appropriate direction to the concerned Superintendent of Police and the I.I.C. of the concerned P.S. to take effective steps for removal of the blockage over the said N.H. immediately. The Superintendents of Police and I.I.Cs, were directed to provide adequate protection to the commuters and vehicles passing through that portion of N.H. 200. It was further directed that in the process of removal of such blockage, if any law and order-situation would arise, the control and prevention of which was within the domain of the administration, the district administration would be at liberty to take appropriate remedial measures under various provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the provisions of any other relevant law, since in our view, as already expressed by us in the order dated 11.10.2006, blockage of Highways, railway lines, etc., which are the lifeline of commerce and economy of the State, cannot be tolerated. This Court further directed that the Police Administration would be at liberty to take appropriate action against the persons propagating and instigating others to block the N.H. 200 at Kalinga Nagar.
This matter was listed on 9.3.2007, on which date learned State Counsel submitted that the order of this Court dated 5,1.2007 was complied with and the blockage over N.H. 200 at Kalinga Nagar was removed.
7. The following issues now fall for consideration.
(a) Whether the petitioner is entitled to any compensation for the death of his son, as he was prevented from taking his son to hospital for treatment by some persons, who were indulged in blocking N.H. 200 at Ambagadia under Kalinga Nagar P.S.?
(b) Whether the State Government is liable to pay compensation?
(c) Whether the action of different individuals and organizations in resorting to road blockages/railway line blockages, as disclosed in the affidavits filed by all the Collectors and the Superintendents of Police of the districts in the State can be said to be illegal and prejudicial to public order?
8. Addressing ourselves to the above issues, we find that the Superintendent of Police, Jajpur in paragraph-9 of the counter affidavit has stated that the members of Kalinga Nagar Surakhya Committee had given a representation to the Superintendent of Police, Jajpur to take steps for removal of the blockage on the national highway and as, the agitation was led by political leaders who were instigating the agitators to protest by acts of violence and as an unfortunate incident of firing had already taken place, the Police and District Administration were maintaining utmost restraint and were trying to sort out the problem through negotiation, persuasion and dialogue. In paragraph-8, it is stated that on the basis of the report of the petitioner, Kalinga Nagar P.S. Case No. 63 dated 27.4.2006 under Sections 341/342/384/506/ 304A/34 IPC was registered and the same was under investigation and as the occurrence in this case was alleged to have taken place at the point of blockage of the highway where the adivasi people belonging to Bistapan Birodhi Janamanch were strongly protesting police presence, investigation could not proceed. In paragraph-10 of the counter affidavit it is stated that while the petitioner was taking his son to hospital, he was obstructed from proceeding through that road by some tribals, who were continuing road blockage and the delay on the way caused the death of his son, which can be attributed to his community, who indulged in road blockage. According to the deponent, the State Government cannot be held responsible for death of the son of the petitioner and hence is not liable to pay any compensation to the petitioner for the death of his son.
Till the last hearing of this case, this Court has not been informed whether after the blockage was removed, any step has been taken against the offenders, who indulged in blocking the road and obstructing the petitioner from taking his son to hospital for treatment leading to the death of his son for which an F.I.R. was filed and a case was registered, as stated by the Superintendent of Police, Jajpur in his affidavit.
9. From the facts as narrated in the foregoing paragraphs, the irresistible conclusion is that the State authorities failed in their duties to provide protection to the innocent persons like the petitioner and to remove the blockage, which the State is bound to do, as the petitioner as well as the citizens have a right under Article 19(1)(d) of the Constitution of India to move freely within the territory of India. This right of the petitioner is admitted by the State authorities to have been interfered by some hooligans blocking the road. In our considered opinion, the State is liable to pay the compensation for the death of the petitioner's son due to the inaction on the part of the State authorities in removing the aforesaid blockage, which resulted in delay in treatment of the ailing son of the petitioner leading to his death. The said blockage also caused immense loss to the State economy.
In this regard, we may refer the decision in Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa . Relying upon the said decision, in our considered opinion, an amount of Rs. 1,00,000/- (rupees one lakh) would be the appropriate compensation to the victim family of the petitioner. Accordingly, we direct that an amount of Rs.1,00,000/-shall be paid by the State Government to the victim family and it will be open to the State to recover the said amount from those who were involved in blocking N.H. 200. The amount already paid to the petitioner by virtue of our earlier order shall be deducted from the awarded amount and the balance amount shall be paid within a period of two months from the date of communication of this judgment.
10. Now the question comes whether this type of hooliganism that is, blocking of public roads and railway tracks should be allowed to be continued in a civilized society under a democratic form of government in the name of agitation?
By order of this Court dated 11.10.2006, all the Collectors and Superintendents of Police in the State were required to file affidavits indicating the number of road blockages done in their respective districts during the last one year, i.e., between 1.10.2005 and 30.9.2006, and accordingly they have filed their affidavits. The number of road blockages/ railway line blockages done in different districts, as stated by the Superintendents of Police/Collectors in their respective affidavits, are indicated below:
Superintendents of Police/Collectors No. of road blockages Collector/S.P., Jharsuguda 8 Collector/S.P., Rayagada 14 Collector/S.P., Suoamapur 8 S.P., Ganjam 32 S.P., Railways, Rourkela 15 railway line blockage S.P., Rourkela 5 S.P., Dhenkanal 23 S.P., Koraput 13 S.P., Berhampur 17 S.P., Nabarangapur 8 Collector/S.P., Puri 22 Collector/S.P., Kandhamal 7 Collector/S.P., Kendrapara 19 Collector/S.P., Angul 22 Collector/S.P., Nuapada 5 Collector/S.P., Balasore 42/11 railway line blockage Collector/S.P., Bolangir 6 Collector/S.P., Bhadrak 23 Collector/S.P., Deogarh 6 Collector/S.P., Gajapati 14 Collector/S.P.,Bargarh 7 Collector/S.P., Kalahandi 7 Collector/S.P., Cuttack 43 Collector/S.P., Nayagarh 2 Collector/S.P., Boudh 3 Collector/S.P., Sundargarh 34/9 railway line blockage Collector/S.P., Sambalpur 21/3 railway line blockage Collector/S.P., Mayurbhanj 24 Collector/S.P., Jagatsinghpur 5 Collector/S.P., Khurda 25/5 railway line blockage Collector/S.P., Jajpur 20 Collector/S.P., Keonjhar 22 Collector/S.P., Malkangiri 11
The reasons for the aforesaid road blockages, as indicated by the Collectors and the Superintendents of Police in their respective affidavits, are for loss of life in vehicular accidents, transfer of Government Officials, scuffle between students of the University and staff of Dhaba, release of some arrested persons from jail custody, plying of bus on specific routes, restriction for taking weapons in Akhada procession, demolition of statute of political leaders, repair of roads, permanent solution to the problem in supply of electricity to college, hike in prices of petrol/diesel as well as for various other reasons, which are flimsy in nature. Even if there be any genuine grievance or demand for fulfilment of the same, nobody can resort to road blockage/railway line blockage and take the law into their own hands and let loose vandalism and put the general public to untold harassment as well as loss to the State Exchequer. No one can imagine the loss caused to the commuters in such road blockages and the harassment meted out to general public. The trauma suffered by the innocent commuters can never be compensated in any manner.
11. From the above, it is explicitly clear that the reasons for resorting to the aforesaid road blockages by political persons, organisations, students and villagers, thereby bringing a grinding halt to the movement of vehicular traffic on public roads and not allowing the vehicles coming from different towns, districts and States to pass through such roads, which ultimately disrupted the normal run of traffic, are not on any serious issue. Even if the issues are serious and deserve for drawing the attention of the authorities of the State Government or the Union Government, the measure is not to block the movement of traffic on pubic roads and cause unnecessary harassment to the general public and commuters of public and private transport carriers and trains. If we look at the recent past, we will find that in most of the road blockages the entire area was left to the hands of hooligans, who unleashed the reign of terror in the area thereby causing damage to the vehicles and public properties, burning tyres on the roads, which ultimately result in the damage to the roads constructed by spending huge money from the State Exchequer. No prudent man having a little sense of patriotism could resort to such type of vandalism and hooliganism, which are usually seen during the road blockages. We have a democratically set up Government. Part III of the Constitution of India encapsulates the Fundamental Rights. Those who are resorting to road blockages, in our considered opinion, are interfering with the fundamental right of the citizens, which has been guaranteed in Article 19(1)(d) of the Constitution. In this regard we may refer to a decision of the apex Court in Communist Party of India (M) v. Bharat Kumar AIR 1998 SC 184, wherein it was held that there cannot be any doubt that the fundamental rights of the people as a whole cannot be subservient to the claim of fundamental right of an individual or only a section of the people.
12. There are also instances of snap road blocks without any prior information mostly on local problems, which are usually taken over by the hooligans end in damaging the vehicles, attacking the commuters and destroying the public and private properties. This sort of incidents in the absence of any stringent action against the persons involved in such incidents now create a psychosis of fear in the mind of the general public and they are in doubt whether they can return home safely once they are out on the road. In all those incidents, the maximum suffer is the general public as public property and private property becomes the first target of such persons. The persons, who indulged in such senseless and mindless violence, do not realise the plight of women, children and patients passing through the road blocked by them. An impression perhaps has crept into their mind and it is due to the inaction on the part of the law enforcing authorities that they can go scot-free without any punishment after committing such vandalism. The law-enforcing agency also does not take any action against them after the violence and there is lack of post-violence justice. The usual practice is either to let those violators free after detaining them for a brief period or book them under minor offences, which makes no consequence for them. This attitude of the law enforcing authorities encourages the violators and emboldens them to commit similar type of violence with more vigour in future.
13. With this scenario, let us see whether blocking of National Highway No. 200 and other roads in the State causing serious dislocation and disruption of public transport system can be held to be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.
14. Before delving into the above question, it would be profitable to go through the history with regard to the right of the citizens to use highways for the purpose of holding political or non-political meetings and processions. In Blackwell's Law of Meetings (9th Edition P.5), it has been stated as follows:
There appears to exist a view that the public has a right to hold meetings for political and other purposes on the Highway. This is an erroneous assumption. A public highway exists for the purpose of free passage and free passage only, and for purposes reasonably incidental to this right. There can be no claim on the part of persons who desire to assemble for the purpose of holding a meeting to do so on the highway. The claim is irreconcilable with the purpose for which a highway exists.
In the case of Parhasaradi v. Chinna Krishna (1882) ILR 5 Mad, 304, which was approved by the Privy Council in Manzur Hassan v. Muhammed Zaman AIR 1925 P.C. 36, it has been held that the right to pass in procession through the public streets of a town in such a way as the Magistrate might not object to as dangerous to the public safety, was a right inherent in every subject of the State. Similar was the view expressed with regard to religious procession in Sadagopachariar v. A. Rama Rao (1903) ILR 26 Mad. 376. In Vijiaraghava Chariar v. Emperor 1903 ILR 26 Mad. 376. In Vijiaraghava Chariar v. Emperor 1903 ILR 26 Mad. 554, Benson. J. observed that no doubt a highway is preliminarily intended for the use of individuals passing and re-passing along it in pursuit of their ordinary avocations, but in every country, and especially in India highways have, from time immemorial, been used for the passing and re-passing processions as well as of individuals and there is nothing illegal in a procession or assembly engaging in worship while passing along a highway, any more than in an individual doing so.
15. According to English Law, which has been applied in India, a highway has its origin, apart from statute, in dedication, either express or implied by the owner of the land, of a right of passage over it to the public and the acceptance of that right by the public. The only right acquired by the public is a right to pass and re-pass over the same at their pleasure for the purpose of legitimate travel.
It would be profitable here to quote what Wills, J., speaking for the Court in Ex parte Lewis (1888) 21 QBD. 191, observed:
A claim on the part of persons so minded to assemble in any numbers, and for so long a time as they please to remain assembled, upon a highway to the detriment of others having equal right, is in its nature irreconcilable with the right of free passage, and there is, so far as we have been able to ascertain no authority whatever in favour of it. It was urged that the right of public meeting, and the right of occupying any unoccupied land or highway that might seem appropriate to those of her Majesty's subjects who wish to meet there, were, if not synonymous, at least correlative. We fail to appreciate the argument.
In Halsbury's Laws, it is said that it is a nuisance to organize or take part in a procession or meeting, which naturally results in an obstruction and is an unreasonable use of the highway.
16. From the above, it is inevitable for us to come to the conclusion that even under our Constitution, though under Article 19 thereof citizens have a right to use the highway for procession, which can be reasonably restricted by regulatory measure under the Police Act, the said right cannot extend to a point where the persons so gathered can prevent others from using the highway for passing and re-passing and they cannot in any way obstruct the free passage of traffic and commuters, which in itself would amount to a nuisance.
17. Keeping in view the above nature of rights of the citizens over the highway, we may now proceed to examine as to whether in the nature the obstruction was caused on the National Highway 200, the same can be held to be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.
In the case of State of U.P. v. Kamal Kishore Saini , the apex Court held that whether an act relates to law and order or to public order depends upon the effect of the act on the life of the community or in other words the reach and effect and potentiality of the act is so put as to disturb or dislocate the even tempo of the life of the community, it will be an act which will affect public order.
In the case of Wasi Uddin Ahmed v. District Magistrate, Alligarh, U.P. , the apex Court while making a distinction between the concept of 'law and order' and 'public order', held that the said distinction is one of the degree and the extent of the reach of the act upon the society and an act by itself is not determinant of its gravity. In its quality it may not differ from another but in its potentiality it may be very different. Any contravention of law always affects order but before it could be said to affect 'public order', it must affect the community or the public at large. In order to appreciate the extent and scope of each one of the three concepts, namely, 'law and order, 'public order' and 'the security of the State' generally used in preventive detention laws, three concentric circles have to be conceived of, the largest of them representing 'law and order', the next representing 'public order' and smallest representing 'the security of the State'. An act may affect 'law and order', but not 'public order', just as an act may affect 'public order' but not 'the security of the State'. The true distinction between the areas of law and order and public order lies not merely in the nature or quality of the act but upon the degree and extent of its reach upon the society. The acts similar in nature but committed in different reactions. In one case, it might affect specific individuals and, therefore, touches the problem of law and order only, while in another it might affect pubic order. In order to see whether an act has affected 'public order' what has to be seen is whether the detenu's activities have any impact upon the local community, or in other words 'disturb the even tempo of the life of the community of that specified locality'.
In the case of State of U.P. v. Hari Shankar Tewari the apex Court in paragraph-7 held as follows:
These are sufficient to draw the conclusion that conceptually there is difference between law and order and public order but what in a given situation may be a matter covered by law and order may really turn out to be one of public order. We may now refer to two cases of this Court for that purpose. In Arun Ghosh's case (supra) Chief Justice Hidayatullah stated thus:
Take the case of assault on girls. A guest at a hotel may kiss or make advances to half a dozen chambermaids. He may annoy them and also the management but he does not cause disturbance of public order. He may even have a fracas with the friends of one of the girls but even then it would be a case of breach of law and order only. Take another case of a man who molests women in lonely places. As a result of this activities girls going to colleges and schools are in constant danger and fear. Women going for their ordinary business are afraid of being waylaid and assaulted. The activity of this man in its essential quality is not different from the act of the other man. But in its potentiality and in its effect upon the public tranquillity there is a vast difference. The act of the man who molests the girls in lonely places causes a disturbance in the even tempo of living which is the first requirement of public order. He disturbs the society and community. His act makes all the women apprehensive of their owner and he can be said to be causing disturbance of public order and not merely committing individual action which may be taken note by the ' criminal prosecution agencies.
Equally useful would be reference to two other cases, Mathew, J. in S.K. Kader v. State of West Bengal approved the ratio of the decision referred to above and indicate at p.1649 of AIR:
The question whether a person has only committed a breach of law and order or has acted in a manner likely to cause a disturbance of the public order is one of degree and the extent of the reach of the act upon the society. An act by itself is not determinative of its own gravity. In its quality, it may not differ from other but in its potentiality it may be very different. Similar acts in different contexts affect differently law and order on the one hand public order on the other. It is always a question of degree of the harm and its effect upon the community. Public order is the even tempo of the life of the community taking the country as a whole or even as specified localities. It is the degree of disturbance and its effect upon the life of the community in locality which determines whether the disturbance amounts only to a breach of law and order.
In Nagendra Nath Mondal v. State of West Bengal the Court observed as follows:
The target of arson was an educational institution and particularly the registers and other papers maintained by it. The object obviously was vandalism, to disrupt its working by burning its records and to create a scare so that neither the teaching staff nor the pupils would dare attend it for prosecution of studies. The acts in question, no doubt, would be acts similarly to those committed by a person who resorts to arson, but in the circumstances, were acts different in potentiality and, therefore, amounted to affecting public order.
18. Applying the ratio decidendi in Hari Shankar Tewari (supra) vis-a-vis the affidavit filed on behalf of the Superintendent of Police, Jajpur, we have no doubt in our mind to conclude that the incident of the nature as happened due to Kalinga Nagar road blockage is nothing but a breach of Public Order. We are, therefore, constrained to say that the State Government had not reacted to the situation as it should have done and no effective steps had been taken for bringing the persons involved in committing such violence to book, in order to give justice to the persons affected by the aforesaid violence and to prevent such breach of Public Order.
19. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, we direct the State Government in the Home Department as well as the District Magistrate and Collector and the Superintendent of Police, Jajpur, to take effective steps on the F.I.R. of the petitioner as well as against the persons involved in the road blockage since it is a case of breach of Public Order. The State Government in the Home Department is further directed to instruct all the District Magistrates and Collectors and the Superintendent of Police in the State to take stringent action in case of any such road blockage, by treating the same to be a case of breach of Public Order, if necessary under the appropriate detention law in force.
20. Apart from the directions as noted above, we suggest to the State Govt.(i) to make adequate provision of law for assessing the damage caused to the public and private properties in such violence and for realizing the cost of such damage from the persons responsible in organizing such road blocks and to recover the same by treating the amount of damages as arrear of land revenue, under the Orissa Public Demand Recovery Act; and (ii) to bring in appropriate provisions in the Orissa Education Act and/or the Rules made thereunder so that the acts of the students involved in road blocks and responsible for causing damage to the public and private properties are reflected in their conduct certificates as well as for recovery of cost of such damages from the parents of such students. In the meantime, the State Government shall issue necessary instruction to the school/ college authorities in the State to obtain an undertaking from the parent's/guardians of the students to the effect that they shall be responsible for making good of the loss caused to the pubic or private property by their child/ward in the process of roadblock.
21. With the aforesaid observations/directions this writ petition is disposed of.
22. A copy of this judgment be furnished to the Secretary to the Government in Home Department.
M.M. Das, J.
23. I agree.