Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati
Anantha Chandra Reddy vs The State Of Andhra Pradesh on 4 May, 2026
APHC010597482025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3521]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
MONDAY,THE FOURTH DAY OF MAY
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY SIX
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO
CRIMINAL PETITION NO: 11917/2025
Between:
1. ANANTHA CHANDRA REDDY, S/O. LATE A. VENKATA REDDY,AGED
55 YEARS, D.NO. 7-370,COURT ROAD, ANANTAPUR-515001.
...PETITIONER/ACCUSED
AND
1. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, THROUGH STATION HOUSE
OFFICER,ANANTAPUR III TOWN POLICE STATION,ANANTAPUR
DISTRICT.REP. BY ITS PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,HIGH COURT OF
ANDHRA PRADESH,AT AMARAVATHI.
2. THE ASST RETURNING OFFICER, 153 -ANANTAPURAMU URBAN
AC TAHSILDAR, ANANTAPURAMU
...RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT(S):
Counsel for the Petitioner/accused:
1. P MADHUKAR REDDY
Counsel for the Respondent/complainant(S):
1. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
The Court made the following:
ORDER:
Criminal Petition has been filed under Section 528 Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita Act, 2023 (for brevity the 'BNSS') by the Petitioner/Accused No.2, seeking to quash the proceedings against him in C.C.No.485 of 2024 on 2 the file of the learned Judicial First Class Magistrate (Special Mobile Court), Ananthapuramu.
2. The case of the prosecution is that during the enforcement of the Model Code of Conduct for the General Elections, the Petitioner, along with other accused, participated in the distribution of sarees to poor Muslim women on the eve of Ramzan in Ananthapuramu town, in the presence of YSRCP leaders, with the object of luring voters in favour of the party's candidate. This act, reported by the Assistant Returning Officer and corroborated by newspaper publication, is alleged to constitute undue influence under Section 171(F) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for brevity 'the I.P.C.,') and disobedience of lawful orders under Section 188 of 'the I.P.C.,' thereby warranting prosecution.
3. Sri P.Madhukar Reddy, learned Counsel for the Petitioner submits that the very substratum of the prosecution case is misconceived, inasmuch as the Petitioner, arrayed as Accused No.2, is neither a contesting candidate nor an agent nor a person authorised by any political party to canvass votes. The alleged act of participating in the distribution of sarees during the Ramzan festival is a charitable activity undertaken annually, devoid of any electoral nexus. The invocation of Section 171(F) of 'the I.P.C.,' is wholly untenable, for the offence of undue influence presupposes inducement or personation in the conduct of an election by a candidate or his agent, which is conspicuously absent herein. Likewise, Section 188 of 'the I.P.C.,' cannot be pressed into service in the absence of any specific order promulgated by a lawful authority 3 and knowingly disobeyed by the Petitioner. Mere reference to "violation of Model Code of Conduct" does not satisfy the statutory ingredients of Section 188 of 'the I.P.C.'
4. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner further urged that even if the charge sheet allegations are taken at their face value, no offence is disclosed under Sections 171(F) or 188 of 'the I.P.C.' The continuation of proceedings against the Petitioner amounts to abuse of process and harassment of an innocent person. The Petitioner therefore requests for quashment of C.C.No.485 of 2024 on the file of the learned Judicial First Class Magistrate (Special Mobile Court), Ananthapuramu.
5. Per contra, Sri A.Sai Rohith, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor submits that the allegations are not baseless but are substantiated by contemporaneous material including the adverse news item published in Eenadu Telugu daily and the report of the Assistant Returning Officer. The distribution of sarees in the presence of prominent YSRCP leaders during the subsistence of the Model Code of Conduct clearly amounts to an attempt to influence voters and falls within the mischief of Section 171(F) of 'the I.P.C.' The Petitioner, though not a candidate, acted in concert with party activists and leaders, thereby rendering himself liable for participation in the offence.
6. It is further contended that Section 188 of 'the I.P.C.,' is rightly invoked, as the Election Commission of India and the District Election Officer had promulgated binding instructions prohibiting distribution of freebies during the election period. The Petitioner, having participated in the programme, cannot 4 plead ignorance of the Model Code of Conduct. The proceedings are therefore maintainable, and it is urged to dismiss the Criminal Petition.
7. Heard the learned Counsel for the Petitioner and the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor.
8. Thoughtful consideration is bestowed on the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for both sides. I have perused the entire record.
9. In the light of the case of the prosecution and the contentions of the learned Counsel for both the sides, now the point for consideration is:
"Whether the proceedings in C.C.No.485 of 2024 on the file of the learned Judicial First Class Magistrate (Special Mobile Court), Ananthapuramu is liable to be quashed in exercise of the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of 'the Cr.P.C.,'/Section 528 of 'the BNSS'?"
10. As per Section 195 of 'the Cr.P.C.,' there is a bar for taking cognizance for the offences punishable under Sections 172 to 188, both inclusive of, 'the I.P.C.,' unless there is a complaint in writing by the public servant concerned.
11. In the instant case, there is no 'complaint' by the public servant, and there was only chargesheet filed under Section 188 of 'the Cr.P.C.' The 'complaint' as contemplated under Section 190 read with 200 of 'the Cr.P.C.,' was not filed.
12. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in C. Muniappan v. State of T.N., 1 has categorically held that Section 195(1)(a)(i) of 'the Cr.P.C.,' imposes a jurisdictional embargo on courts from taking cognizance of offences under Section 188 of 'the I.P.C.,' unless preceded by a written complaint of the 1 (2010) 9 SCC 567 5 competent public servant, thereby safeguarding against vexatious or mala fide prosecutions. This provision, being an exception to the general rule under Section 190 of 'the Cr.P.C.,' must be applied in its true spirit, and any attempt to circumvent it by mislabelling or recharacterizing the offence under other provisions of 'the I.P.C.,' is impermissible. The judicial test remains whether the allegations, in substance, disclose an offence that squarely falls within the ambit of Section 195 of 'the Cr.P.C.,' ensuring strict adherence to legislative intent and procedural sanctity.
13. In Govind Mehta v. State of Bihar2, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the legality of cognizance under Section 190 of 'the Cr.P.C.,' must be judged at the moment it is taken, and at that stage the Magistrate must determine whether his jurisdiction is curtailed by Section 195(1)(b) and (c) of 'the Cr.P.C.' Since Section 195 of 'the Cr.P.C.,' is a statutory limitation on the otherwise broad powers under Section 190 of 'the Cr.P.C.,' any non- compliance strips the learned Magistrate of authority to proceed, rendering cognizance without adherence to its mandate wholly without jurisdiction. 1
14. In Surjit Singh v. Balbir Singh3, the Hon'ble Apex Court underscored that Section 195 of 'the Cr.P.C.,' serves to shield individuals from vexatious private prosecutions driven by vendetta, while simultaneously safeguarding the integrity of judicial proceedings and the administration of justice. Where the alleged act amounts to contempt of lawful authority, offences against public justice, or relates to documents produced in evidence, the law 2 (1971) 3 SCC 329 3 (1996) 3 SCC 533 6 mandates an absolute bar on private complaints, vesting exclusive authority in the court to initiate proceedings under Section 340 of 'the Cr.P.C.' The ruling makes clear that private prosecution in such circumstances is impermissible, as public justice demands strict adherence to this statutory safeguard.
15. In State of Punjab v. Raj Singh4, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the embargo under Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of 'the Cr.P.C.,' applies only at the stage of cognizance under Section 190(1) of 'the Cr.P.C.,' and does not restrict the statutory power of the police to investigate an FIR disclosing cognizable offences under Chapter XII of 'the Cr.P.C.,' even if committed in relation to court proceedings. While the court cannot directly take cognizance of such offences due to Section 195 of 'the Cr.P.C.,' it may still initiate a complaint under Section 340 of 'the Cr.P.C.,' on the basis of the FIR and investigation materials, provided the requisite opinion is formed and procedure followed. Thus, police investigation remains unaffected, though cognizance by the court is strictly subject to the statutory bar.
16. In K. Vengadachalam v. K.C. Palanisamy 5 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the bar under Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of 'the Cr.P.C.,' applies only when forgery is committed with respect to a document after it has been produced or given in evidence in court, i.e., while in custodia legis. Since the alleged forgery occurred prior to filing, the High Court erred in quashing the prosecution on that ground. The Court further clarified that Section 195(1)(a) of 'the Cr.P.C.,' which covers offences under Sections 172 to 188 of 'the 4 (1998) 2 SCC 391 5 (2005) 7 SCC 352 7 I.P.C.,' was irrelevant because the case concerned forgery of documents rather than falsity of a complaint before the Deputy Registrar. Accordingly, the High Court's order was unjustified, and prosecution was held maintainable.
17. In Basir-Ul-Huq v. State of W.B.,6 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that Section 195 of 'the Cr.P.C.,' bars cognizance of offences under Sections 172 to 188 of 'the I.P.C.,' unless initiated by a written complaint of the concerned public servant, but this embargo does not extend to distinct offences arising incidentally from the same facts. Allegations may possess a dual character, constituting contempt of public authority on one hand and distinct offences like defamation on the other, and while cognizance of the former requires compliance with Section 195 of 'the Cr.P.C.,' the latter remains prosecutable independently. However, the Court cautioned that prosecution cannot evade the statutory bar by misdescribing or relabelling the offence under other provisions of 'the I.P.C.,' as such circumvention would defeat the legislative intent.
18. In State of U.P. v. Mata Bhikh7, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the expression "public servant concerned" under Section 195(1)(a) of 'the Cr.P.C.,' includes not only the officer who originally promulgated the order but also his successor in office, since otherwise the continuity of proceedings under provisions like Sections 133, 145 or 146 of 'the Cr.P.C.,' would be disrupted if the officer retires, is transferred, or ceases to hold office. The Court clarified that the successor lawfully steps into the shoes of the original 6 (1953) 1 SCC 637 7 (1994) 4 SCC 95 8 officer and is fully competent to lodge a complaint against disobedience of such orders. Consequently, the High Court's contrary view was set aside, affirming that successors in office fall squarely within the ambit of "public servant concerned."
19. In State of Karnataka v. Hemareddy8, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that when, in the course of the same transaction, offences requiring a court's complaint under Section 195(1)(b) of 'the Cr.P.C.,' and other offences not covered by that provision are committed together, it is impermissible to split them up and sustain prosecution only for the latter. The statutory bar under Section 195 of 'the Cr.P.C.,' must be applied in its entirety, ensuring that proceedings cannot be upheld selectively by isolating offences outside its scope.
20. In Ajaib Singh v. Joginder Singh 9 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court rejected the contention that only the Magistrate before whom the original proceedings were taken could file a complaint under Section 195(1)(b) of 'the Cr.P.C.' Referring to Section 559 of 'the Cr.P.C.,' the Court held that a successor in office is fully empowered to exercise the same powers and duties as his predecessor, including filing complaints under Section 476 of 'the Cr.P.C.,' for offences like perjury or false evidence committed before the predecessor. Sub-section (2) of Section 559 of 'the Cr.P.C.,' merely resolves doubts about succession and does not limit the scope of sub-section (1) of 8 (1981) 2 SCC 185 9 1968 SCC OnLine SC 253 9 Section 559 of 'the Cr.P.C.' Thus, the Court affirmed that the complaint filed by the successor Magistrate was valid and within jurisdiction.
21. In Bandekar Bros. (P) Ltd. v. Prasad Vassudev Keni10, the Hon'ble Apex Court reaffirmed that when, in the course of the same transaction, offences are disclosed, some requiring a court's complaint under Section 195(1)(b) of 'the Cr.P.C.,' (such as fabrication of false evidence under Sections 192 & 193 of 'the I.P.C.,') and others not so covered (like forgery under Sections 467 & 471 of 'the I.P.C.,'), it is impermissible to split them up and sustain prosecution only for the latter. The statutory drill of Section 195 of 'the Cr.P.C.,' must be followed in its entirety, ensuring that the bar cannot be circumvented by prosecuting under provisions outside its scope when the gravamen of the allegations squarely attracts Section 195 of 'the Cr.P.C.'
22. In Kantamaneni Ravishankar v. State of A.P., 11 a learned Single Judge of this Court held that for prosecuting disobedience of an ordinance under Section 188 of 'the I.P.C.,' a written complaint from the concerned public servant (or one duly authorized) is mandatory. Consequently, the police are incompetent to register a crime under Section 188 of 'the I.P.C.,' based on a private complaint, and any such registration stands vitiated as contrary to the settled law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and other High Courts.
23. This Court, in Kollu Ravindra v. State of A.P12 has categorically held that a complaint invoking offences under Sections 172 to 188 of 'the I.P.C.,' must emanate from a "public servant" as envisaged under Sections 190 and 10 (2020) 20 SCC 1 11 2020 SCC OnLine AP 726 12 2025 SCC OnLine AP 3870 10 200 of 'the Cr.P.C.' In the absence of such a statutory complaint, the learned Magistrate is divested of the competence to take cognizance of the alleged offence. The bar contained in Section 195 of 'the Cr.P.C.,' therefore, operates as a clear embargo on the assumption of cognizance based merely on a police report.
24. This Court, further also held in Kanakamedala Ravindra Kumar v. State of A.P 13 that when the allegations arise out of a single, indivisible transaction giving rise to multiple offences, one falling squarely within the ambit of Section 195 of 'the Cr.P.C.,' and another ostensibly outside its sweep, such offences, being inextricably interwoven, cannot be artificially segregated to bypass the statutory embargo. The Court has categorically held that mere deletion of Section 188 of 'the I.P.C.,' from the charge sheet does not efface the bar, for the factual substratum of the alleged act continues to be integrally connected with the disobedience of a promulgated order, thereby mandating a complaint by the competent public servant as required under Section 195(1)(a) of 'the Cr.P.C.'
25. Considering the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in C. Muniappan supra, the learned Special Mobile Magistrate Court, Guntur was not authorised to take cognizance in view of the embargo under Section 195 of 'the Cr.P.C.'
26. On a careful consideration of the record and the settled legal position, this Court is persuaded that the prosecution against the Petitioner is vitiated 13 Criminal Petition No: 987/2020 11 by a fundamental jurisdictional infirmity. The gravamen of the charge under Section 188 of 'the I.P.C.,' suffers from the statutory embargo contained in Section 195 of 'the Cr.P.C.,' which mandates a written complaint of the competent public servant as a condition precedent for cognizance. In the present case, no such complaint exists, and mere reliance on a police report or newspaper publication cannot substitute the statutory requirement. Equally, the invocation of Section 171(F) of 'the I.P.C., is misconceived, as the Petitioner is neither a candidate nor an authorized agent, and the alleged charitable distribution of sarees lacks the essential electoral nexus to constitute undue influence. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has consistently held in C. Muniappan supra, Govind Mehta supra, Surjit Singh supra, Raj Singh supra, Vengadachalam supra, Basir-Ul-Huq supra, Mata Bhikh supra, Hemareddy supra, Ajaib Singh supra, and Bandekar Bros supra that the bar under Section 195 of 'the Cr.P.C.,' is absolute, cannot be circumvented by mislabelling offences, and extends to indivisible transactions where offences are interwoven.
27. Considering these binding precedents, continuation of proceedings against the Petitioner would amount to an abuse of process and a travesty of justice. Therefore, the proceedings against the Petitioner/Accused No.2 in C.C.No.485 of 2024 on the file of the learned Judicial First Class Magistrate, (Special Mobile Court), Ananthapuramu, are liable to be interfered and quashed.
12
28. In the result, the Criminal Petition is allowed. Accordingly, the proceedings in C.C.No.485 of 2024 on the file of the learned Judicial First Class Magistrate, (Special Mobile Court), Ananthapuramu, are quashed.
________________________ DR. Y. LAKSHMANA RAO, J Date: 04.05.2026 VTS