Madhya Pradesh High Court
Ramkuamr Sharma vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 23 October, 2017
1 MCRC Nos. 3787, 3791 & 3794 of 2015
HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
BENCH AT GWALIOR
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SB:- Hon'ble Shri Justice G. S. Ahluwalia
MCRC 3787 /2015
Haricharan Sharma &Anr.
Vs.
State of MP & Anr.
MCRC 3791/2015
Ashok Kumar Sharma
Vs.
State of MP & Anr.
And
MCRC 3794/2015
Ramkumar Sharma and Anr.
Vs.
State of MP & Anr.
===============================================
Shri Kuldeep Thapak, counsel for the applicants in MCRC 3787,
3791 and 3794 of 2015.
Shri SS Dhakad, Public Prosecutor for the respondent No.1/ State
in MCRC 3787, 3791 and 3794 of 2015.
Shri Pawan Singh Raghuvanshi, counsel for the respondent No.2
in MCRC 3787, 3791 and 3794 of 2015.
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ORDER
(Passed on 23/10/2017) This order shall also dispose of M.Cr.C. No. 3791/2015 and 3794/2015 filed by Ram Kumar Sharma, Smt. Shweta Sharma, Ashok Kumar Sharma, Haricharan Sharma and Smt. Sagun Bai.
2. These applications under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. have been filed for quashing the F.I.R. in Crime No.194/2014 registered by Police Station Dehat, Vidisha for offence under Section 498-A/34 of I.P.C.
2 MCRC Nos. 3787, 3791 & 3794 of 20153. The undisputed facts are that applicants in M.Cr.C. No. 3787/2015, namely Haricharan Sharma and Smt. Sagun Bai are the father-in-law and mother-in-law of the respondent no.2, whereas Ashok Sharma in M.Cr.C. No.3791/2015 is uncle-in-law (Chacha Sasur) of respondent no.2 and Smt. Shweta Sharma and Ramkumar Sharma in M.Cr.C. No.3794/2015 are sister-in-law (Nanad) and husband of sister-in-law (Nandoi) of the respondent no.2.
4. It is pointed out by the Counsel for the respondent no.2, that after filing the present applications under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., a false statement was made by the applicants and co-accused Dharmendra Sharma before the Trial Court, that this Court has stayed the further proceedings and sought time to place the order of stay before the Trial Court and the Trial Court, relying on the statements made by the accused persons had adjourned the case and only after the respondent no.2 filed the ordersheets of these cases before the Trial Court, further proceedings could take place. To buttress his contentions, the Counsel for the respondent no. 2 has provided the certified copy of the order dated 29-7-2016 and 29-8-2016, passed by the Trial Court, from which it is clear that on 29-7-2016, the Counsel for the co-accused made a statement that interim order has been passed by this Court. The Counsel for the respondent no. 2 appeared before the Trial Court and sought permission to assist the prosecution and the Trial Court directed the Counsel for the respondent no.2 to produce the copy of the interim order passed by this Court. On 29-8-2016, the Counsel for the accused persons after filing the copy of some orders passed in M.Cr.C. No.3252/2015, 3794/2015, 3791/2015, and 3785/2015 before the Trial Court, made a statement that the further proceedings have been stayed and sought for time to produce the copy of the same. Thus, it is submitted that the applicants have not come with a clean hands and had tried to play fraud on the 3 MCRC Nos. 3787, 3791 & 3794 of 2015 Trial Court by making false statements.
5. Orders dated 29-7-2016 and 29-8-2016 passed by the Trial Court read as under :-
''29-7-2016 jkT; }kjk ,-Mh-ih-vks-
vkjksih gfjjpj.k lfgr vf/k- Jh larksi 'kekZA vkjksih euksgj e`rA 'ks"k vkjksihx.k vuq- mudh vksj ls muds vf/k- Jh us mi- gksdj gktjh ekQh vkosnu izLrqr fd;k] ckn fopkj LohdkjA iz- vkjksi rdZ gsrq fu;r gSA izdj.k esa vkjksihx.k dh vksj ls mifLFkr fo}ku vf/k- Jh larks"k 'kekZ us O;Dr fd;k fd ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky; ls bl izdj.k dh dk;Zokgh LFkfxr fd;s tkus dk vkns'k gks pqdk gS] muls vkns'k izLrqr djus gsrq dgs tkus ij mUgksus crk;k fd nwjHkk"k ij lwpuk izkIr gqbZ gS] vkns'k dqN gh fnu es izkIr gksxkA blh izdze ij izdj.k dh Qfj;knh ehuw 'kekZ dh vksj ls vf/k- Jh jkeukjk;.k }kjk /kkjk 301 na-iz-la- ds varxZr vfHk;kstu ds leFkZu dh vuqefr pkghA izdj.k dk voyksdu fd;k x;kA mHk; i{k dks lquk x;kA viuh ilan ds vf/k- ls iSjoh djkus dk vf/kdkj ,d laoS/kkfud vf/kdkj gS] fadrq nkafMd ekeyksa es ;g /kkjk 301 na-iz-la- es of.kZr lhekvksa ds v/khu gS] ckn fopkj vkosnu varxZr /kkjk 301 na-iz-la- Lohdkj dj vfHk;kstu dh lgk;rk gsrq vuqefr iznku dh tkrh gSA cpko i{k dks funsZf'kr fd;k tkrk gS fd og vkxkeh fu;r fnukad dks ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky; ds LFkxu vkns'k dks izekf.ke izfr is'k djs vU;Fkk lHkh vkjksihx.k vkjksi dh dk;Zokgh gsrq mifLFkr jgsaA iz-vkjksi rdZ gsrq fn- 29-8-2016 dks j[kk tk;sA'' ''29-8-2016 jkT; }kjk ,-Mh-ih-vks-
vkjksih gfjjpj.k lfgr vf/k- Jh larks"k 'kekZ A vkjksih euksgj e`rA 'ks"k vkjksihx.k vuq- mudh vksj ls muds vf/k- Jh us mi- gksdj gktjh ekQh vkosnu izLrqr fd;k] ckn fopkj LohdkjA iz- vkjksi rdZ gsrq fu;r gSA vkjksih ds vf/k- us mifLFkr gksdj ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky; esa yafcr ,e-lh-vkj-lh- uEcj 3252@2015 ,oa ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky; ds vkijkf/kd izdj.k 3794/2015, 3791/2015 ,oa 3785/2015 ds U;k;ky; ds vkns'k dh izfr;ka is'k dhA vkjksih ds vf/k- }kjk O;Dr fd;k x;k fd izdj.k es ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky; ls dk;Zokgh LFfxr fd;s tkus dk vkns'k gks pqdk gSa] fdarq mUgs vkns'k dh izfr;ka izkIr ugh gqbZ gS 4 MCRC Nos. 3787, 3791 & 3794 of 2015 le; iznku fd;k tk;sA cpko i{k dks funsZf'kr fd;k tkrk gS fd og vkxkeh fu;r fnukad dks ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky; ds LFkxu vkns'k dks izekf.kr izfrfyfi izLrqr djs vU;Fkk lHkh vkjksihx.k vkjksi dh dk;Zokgh esa mifLFkr jgsaA iz- fn- 29-9-2016 dks j[kk tk;sA''
6. It is submitted that only when the Counsel for the respondent no.2 filed the order-sheets of the High Court to show that there is no interim order, the further proceedings for framing of charges were taken up. Thus, from the order-sheets dated 29-7-2016 and 27-8-2016, it is clear that false statements were made before the Trial Court with regard to the interim orders passed by this Court and the case was got adjourned. At this stage, the Counsel for the applicants submit that as they were absent therefore, they were not aware of any statement made by the Counsel for the co-accused Dharmendra. Be that as it may. The fact is that, on two occasions, statement was made before the Trial Court to the effect that the further proceedings have been stayed by this Court, which was factually incorrect.
7. It is further submitted by the Counsel for the respondent no.2 that during the pendency of this application, charges were framed and some of the prosecution witnesses have also been examined and thus, the Trial has reached to an advance stage and therefore, at this stage, the legitimate prosecution of the applicants may not be stifled. Further it is submitted by the Counsel for the respondent no.2 that the applicants had an opportunity to challenge the order framing charge which has not been done, therefore, where a specific remedy is available to a party, then the provision under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. should not be resorted to. It is further submitted that the applicants had sought the quashment of F.I.R. and did not pray for quashment of the charge sheet as the same was already filed, therefore, on that ground also, the present petition is not maintainable.
5 MCRC Nos. 3787, 3791 & 3794 of 20158. The necessary facts for the disposal of the present applications in short are that the respondent no.2, on 4-4-2014, made a written complaint to the S.H.O.,. Police station Civil Lines, Vidisha on the allegation that She was married to Dharmendra on 29-5-2012 as per Hindu Rites and Rituals at Vidisha. Several household articles, ornaments and cash amount of Rs. 50,000 was given at the time of marriage. The marriage was fixed by keeping the respondent no.2 in dark that Dharmendra is in job whereas he was unemployed. Immediately after the marriage, the applicants and Dharmendra started demanding Rs. 5 lacs for starting business and also demanded a diesel car in place of Alto car. When the respondent no.2 refused to accept the demands of the applicants, then the applicants started instigating Dharmendra and in his turn, Dharmendra started assaulting the respondent no.2. Ramkumar Sharma and Shweta who are residing at Vidisha, were also instigating Dharmenda as a result of which, She was beaten by Dharmendra. The respondent no.2 was also forced to do the entire household work and proper treatment was not provided during her pregnancy as a result of which, her son is not well and his treatment is going on in Delhi. The applicants used to pressurize the respondent no.2 to bring the amount which was spent on the treatment of her son. The co-accused Dharmendra also used to beat her under the influence of liquor. An amount of Rs. 2 lacs was once again demanded at the time of marriage of her younger sister-in-law Ritu, by co-accused Dharmendra. On 22-12-2013, the applicants and co-accused, by keeping the respondent no.2 in dark, left her in her parent's home and did not take her son to Delhi for treatment. Now a threat is being extended by the applicants and co-accused Dharmendra, that they would not keep the respondent no. 2 with them unless and until, an amount of Rs. 5,00,000/- a diesel car and expenses for the treatment of son, is brought by the respondent no.2 from her parents. The police on 6 MCRC Nos. 3787, 3791 & 3794 of 2015 the basis of the written complaint, lodged the F.I.R. and after recording the statements of the witnesses and completing remaining formalities, filed a charge sheet for offence under 498A/34 of I.P.C.
9. Heard the learned Counsel for the parties.
10. It is submitted by the Counsel for the applicants, that in order to prosecute the near and dear relatives, specific allegations should have been made and in the present case, only vague allegations have been made which are not sufficient to prosecute them. It is further submitted that the co-accused Dharmendra had filed an application under Section 9 of Hindu Marriage Act, for restitution of conjugal rights which has been allowed and a decree for restitution of conjugal rights has been passed but still the respondent no.2 has not joined the company of the co-accused Dharmendra, which clearly shows that it is the respondent no.2 who is not interested in living with the co-accused Dharmendra and is residing separately without any reasonable reason. To buttress his contentions, the Counsel for the applicants has also relied on the judgment of Supreme Court passed in the case of Geeta Mehrotra & Anr. vs. State of U.P. & Ors. reported in (2012) 10 SCC 741.
11. Per contra, it is submitted by the Counsel for the respondent no.2, that the findings of the Civil Court are not binding on the Criminal Court and the Criminal proceedings are to be decided on its own merits. There are specific allegations against the applicants. The Counsel for the respondent no.2 also relied upon the judgment passed by the the Supreme Court in the case of Taramani Parakh v. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in (2015) 11 SCC 260.
12. So far as the judgment passed in a petition under Section 9 of Hindu Marriage Act is concerned, suffice it to say that the findings recorded by the Civil Court are not binding on the 7 MCRC Nos. 3787, 3791 & 3794 of 2015 Criminal Court and therefore, the proceedings under Section 498A of I.P.C. cannot be quashed on the said ground. The Supreme Court in the case of Pratibha v. Rameshwari Devi and Ors. reported in (2007) 12 SCC 369 has held as under:-
"16. It is pertinent to note that the complaint was filed only when all efforts to return to the matrimonial home had failed and Respondent 2 husband had filed a divorce petition under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. That apart, in our view, filing of a divorce petition in a civil court cannot be a ground to quash criminal proceedings under Section 482 of the Code as it is well settled that criminal and civil proceedings are separate and independent and the pendency of a civil proceeding cannot bring to an end a criminal proceeding even if they arise out of the same set of facts. Such being the position, we are, therefore, of the view that the High Court while exercising its powers under Section 482 of the Code has gone beyond the allegations made in the FIR and has acted in excess of its jurisdiction and, therefore, the High Court was not justified in quashing the FIR by going beyond the allegations made in the FIR or by relying on extraneous considerations."
13. Furthermore, in the present case, the written complaint was made by the respondent no. 2 on 4-4-2014 and the petition under Section 9 of Hindu Marriage Act was also filed on 4-4-2014 itself, therefore, it cannot be said that the F.I.R. was counterblast of the Petition filed under Section 9 of Hindu Marriage Act.
14. So far as the allegations against the applicants Haricharan and Smt. Sagun bai are concerned, the Supreme Court in the case of Taramani Parakh (Supra) has held as under :
"10. The law relating to quashing is well settled. If the allegations are absurd or do not make out any case or if it can be held that there is abuse of process of law, the proceedings can be quashed but if there is a triable case the Court does not go into reliability or otherwise of the version or the counter-version. In 8 MCRC Nos. 3787, 3791 & 3794 of 2015 matrimonial cases, the Courts have to be cautious when omnibus allegations are made particularly against relatives who are not generally concerned with the affairs of the couple. We may refer to the decisions of this Court dealing with the issue.
11. Referring to earlier decisions, in Amit Kapoor vs. Ramesh Chander (2012) 9 SCC 460, it was observed (SCC pp. 482-84, para
27):
"27.1. Though there are no limits of the powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly, the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases.
27.2. The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may interfere.
27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge. 27.4. Where the exercise of such power is absolutely essential to prevent patent miscarriage of justice and for correcting some grave error that might be committed by the subordinate courts even in such cases, the High Court should be loath to interfere, at the threshold, to throttle the prosecution in exercise of its inherent powers.
27.5. Where there is an express legal bar enacted in any of the provisions of the Code or any specific law in force to the very initiation or institution and continuance of such criminal proceedings, such a bar is intended to provide 9 MCRC Nos. 3787, 3791 & 3794 of 2015 specific protection to an accused. 27.6. The Court has a duty to balance the freedom of a person and the right of the complainant or prosecution to investigate and prosecute the offender.
27.7. The process of the court cannot be permitted to be used for an oblique or ultimate/ulterior purpose.
27.8. Where the allegations made and as they appeared from the record and documents annexed therewith to predominantly give rise and constitute a "civil wrong" with no "element of criminality" and does not satisfy the basic ingredients of a criminal offence, the court may be justified in quashing the charge. Even in such cases, the court would not embark upon the critical analysis of the evidence. 27.9. Another very significant caution that the courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction; the court is concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading to injustice.
27.10. It is neither necessary nor is the court called upon to hold a full-fledged enquiry or to appreciate evidence collected by the investigating agencies to find out whether it is a case of acquittal or conviction.
27.11. Where allegations give rise to a civil claim and also amount to an offence, merely because a civil claim is maintainable, does not mean that a criminal complaint cannot be maintained.
27.12. In exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 228 and/or under Section 482, the Court cannot take into consideration external materials given by an accused for reaching the conclusion that no offence was disclosed or that there was possibility of his acquittal. The Court has to consider the record and documents annexed therewith by the prosecution. 27.13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court 10 MCRC Nos. 3787, 3791 & 3794 of 2015 should be more inclined to permit continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to decide admissibility and reliability of the documents or records but is an opinion formed prima facie. 27.14. Where the charge-sheet, report under Section 173(2) of the Code, suffers from fundamental legal defects, the Court may be well within its jurisdiction to frame a charge. 27.15. Coupled with any or all of the above, where the Court finds that it would amount to abuse of process of the Code or that the interest of justice favours, otherwise it may quash the charge. The power is to be exercised ex debito justitiae i.e. to do real and substantial justice for administration of which alone, the courts exist. (Ref. State of W.B. v. Swapan Kumar Guha [(1982) 1 SCC 561 : 1982 SCC (Cri) 283 : AIR 1982 SC 949]; Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre [(1988) 1 SCC 692 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 234]; Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary [(1992) 4 SCC 305 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 36 : AIR 1993 SC 892]; Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill [(1995) 6 SCC 194 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 1059]; G. Sagar Suri v. State of U.P. [(2000) 2 SCC 636 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 513]; Ajay Mitra v. State of M.P. [(2003) 3 SCC 11 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 703]; Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate [(1998) 5 SCC 749 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1400 : AIR 1998 SC 128]; State of U.P. v. O.P. Sharma [(1996) 7 SCC 705 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 497]; Ganesh Narayan Hegde v. S. Bangarappa [(1995) 4 SCC 41 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 634]; Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque [(2005) 1 SCC 122 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 283]; Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd. v.
Biological E. Ltd. [(2000) 3 SCC 269 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 615 : AIR 2000 SC 1869]; Shakson Belthissor v. State of Kerala [(2009) 14 SCC 466 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1412]; V.V.S. Rama Sharma v. State of U.P. [(2009) 7 SCC 234 :
(2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 356]; Chunduru Siva Ram Krishna v. Peddi Ravindra Babu [(2009) 11 SCC 203 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1297];
Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar [(1987) 1 SCC 288 : 1987 SCC (Cri) 82]; State of Bihar 11 MCRC Nos. 3787, 3791 & 3794 of 2015 v. P.P. Sharma [1992 Supp (1) SCC 222 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 192 : AIR 1991 SC 1260]; Lalmuni Devi v. State of Bihar [(2001) 2 SCC 17 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 275]; M. Krishnan v. Vijay Singh [(2001) 8 SCC 645 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 19];
Savita v. State of Rajasthan [(2005) 12 SCC 338 : (2006) 1 SCC (Cri) 571] and S.M. Datta v. State of Gujarat [(2001) 7 SCC 659 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 1361 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 1201]).
27.16. These are the principles which individually and preferably cumulatively (one or more) be taken into consideration as precepts to exercise of extraordinary and wide plenitude and jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code by the High Court. Where the factual foundation for an offence has been laid down, the courts should be reluctant and should not hasten to quash the proceedings even on the premise that one or two ingredients have not been stated or do not appear to be satisfied if there is substantial compliance with the requirements of the offence."
12. In Kailash Chandra Agrawal & Anr. vs. State of U.P. (2014) 16 SCC 51, it was observed: (SCC p. 553, paras 8-9):
"8. We have gone through the FIR and the criminal complaint. In the FIR, the appellants have not been named and in the criminal complaint they have been named without attributing any specific role to them. The relationship of the appellants with the husband of the complainant is distant. In Kans Raj vs. State of Punjab [(2000) 5 SCC 207], it was observed:- (SCC p.217, para 5) "5. ... A tendency has, however, developed for roping in all relations of the in-laws of the deceased wives in the matters of dowry deaths which, if not discouraged, is likely to affect the case of the prosecution even against the real culprits. In their over enthusiasm and anxiety to seek conviction for maximum people, the parents of the deceased have been found to be making efforts for involving other relations which ultimately weaken the case of the prosecution even against the real accused as appears to have happened in the instant case."
The Court has, thus, to be careful in summoning distant relatives without there 12 MCRC Nos. 3787, 3791 & 3794 of 2015 being specific material. Only the husband, his parents or at best close family members may be expected to demand dowry or to harass the wife but not distant relations, unless there is tangible material to support allegations made against such distant relations. Mere naming of distant relations is not enough to summon them in absence of any specific role and material to support such role.
9. The parameters for quashing proceedings in a criminal complaint are well known. If there are triable issues, the Court is not expected to go into the veracity of the rival versions but where on the face of it, the criminal proceedings are abuse of Court's process, quashing jurisdiction can be exercised. Reference may be made to K. Ramakrsihna and Ors. vs. State of Bihar [(2000) 8 SCC 547], Pepsi Foods Ltd. v.
Judicial Magistrate [(1998) 5 SCC 749], State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal [(1992) Supp (1) SCC 335] and Asmathunnisa v. State of A.P. [(2011) 11 SCC 259]."
13. In the present case, the complaint is as follows:
"Sir, it is submitted that I was married on 18.11.09 with Sidharath Parakh s/o Manak Chand Parak, r/o Sarafa Bazar in front of Radha Krishna Market, Gwalior according to the Hindu rites and customs. In the marriage my father had given gold and silver ornaments, cash amount and household goods according to his capacity. After the marriage when I went to my matrimonial home, I was treated nicely by the members of the family. When on the second occasion I went to my matrimonial, my husband, father-in-law and mother-in-law started harassing me for not bringing the dowry and started saying that I should bring from my father 25-30 tolas of gold and Rs.2,00,000/- in cash and only then they would keep me in the house otherwise not. On account of this my husband also used to beat me and my father-in- law and my mother-in-law used to torture me by giving the taunts. In this connection I used to tell my father Kundanmal Oswal, my mother Smt. Prem Lata Oswal, uncle Ashok Rai Sharma and uncle Ved Prakash Mishra from time to time. On 2.4.2010 the members of the 13 MCRC Nos. 3787, 3791 & 3794 of 2015 family of my matrimonial home forcibly sent me to the house of my parents in Ganj Basoda along with my brother Deepak. They snatched my clothes and ornaments and kept with them. Since then till today my husband has been harassing me on the telephone and has not come to take me back. Being compelled, I have been moving this application before you. Sir, it is prayed that action be taken against husband Sidharath Parakh, my father-in-law Manak Chand Parakh and my mother-in-law Smt. Indira Parakh for torturing me on account of demanding the dowry."
14. From a reading of the complaint, it cannot be held that even if the allegations are taken as proved no case is made out. There are allegations against Respondent No.2 and his parents for harassing the complainant which forced her to leave the matrimonial home. Even now she continues to be separated from the matrimonial home as she apprehends lack of security and safety and proper environment in the matrimonial home. The question whether the appellant has in fact been harassed and treated with cruelty is a matter of trial but at this stage, it cannot be said that no case is made out. Thus, quashing of proceedings before the trial is not permissible."
15. So far as the allegations against Ashok Sharma, Ramkumar Sharma and Shweta Sharma are concerned, in the F.I.R., it is alleged that they were also demanding Rs. 5,00,000/- and a diesel Alto Car in place of Petrol Car. Further, it was alleged that the marriage was fixed by keeping the respondent no.2 and her family in dark by projecting that the co-accused Dharmendra is in job whereas he was unemployed. Thus, fixing the marriage by making false statements with regard to the employment of the bride groom may also amount to cruelty or fraud. These are the highly disputed questions of fact which are required to be proved at the Trial and cannot be decided at this stage. Furthermore, as already submitted, some of the witnesses have already been examined in 14 MCRC Nos. 3787, 3791 & 3794 of 2015 the Trial Court and the Trial has reached to an advance stage therefore, interference in the Trial at this stage is not warranted. Further, the applicants have filed the present application for quashment of the F.I.R., although by that time, the charge sheet was already filed and they could have prayed for quashment of charge sheet which was not done. It is well established principle of law that when the allegations made in the complaint makes out a cognizable offence, then it is obligatory on the part of the police to register the F.I.R. The Supreme Court in the case of Lalita Kumari Vs. Govt. of U.P. reported in (2014) 2 SCC 1 has held as under :
''120. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we hold:
120.1. The registration of FIR is mandatory under Section 154 of the Code, if the information discloses commission of a cognizable offence and no preliminary inquiry is permissible in such a situation. 120.2. If the information received does not disclose a cognizable offence but indicates the necessity for an inquiry, a preliminary inquiry may be conducted only to ascertain whether cognizable offence is disclosed or not. 120.3. If the inquiry discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, the FIR must be registered. In cases where preliminary inquiry ends in closing the complaint, a copy of the entry of such closure must be supplied to the first informant forthwith and not later than one week. It must disclose reasons in brief for closing the complaint and not proceeding further.
120.4. The police officer cannot avoid his duty of registering offence if cognizable offence is disclosed. Action must be taken against erring officers who do not register the FIR if information received by him discloses a cognizable offence.
120.5. The scope of preliminary inquiry is not to verify the veracity or otherwise of the information received but only to ascertain whether the information reveals any cognizable 15 MCRC Nos. 3787, 3791 & 3794 of 2015 offence.
120.6. As to what type and in which cases preliminary inquiry is to be conducted will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The category of cases in which preliminary inquiry may be made are as under:
(a) Matrimonial disputes/family disputes
(b) Commercial offences
(c) Medical negligence cases
(d) Corruption cases
(e) Cases where there is abnormal delay/laches in initiating criminal prosecution, for example, over 3 months' delay in reporting the matter without satisfactorily explaining the reasons for delay.
The aforesaid are only illustrations and not exhaustive of all conditions which may warrant preliminary inquiry.
120.7. While ensuring and protecting the rights of the accused and the complainant, a preliminary inquiry should be made time-bound and in any case it should not exceed 7 days. The fact of such delay and the causes of it must be reflected in the General Diary entry.
120.8. Since the General Diary/Station Diary/Daily Diary is the record of all information received in a police station, we direct that all information relating to cognizable offences, whether resulting in registration of FIR or leading to an inquiry, must be mandatorily and meticulously reflected in the said diary and the decision to conduct a preliminary inquiry must also be reflected, as mentioned above.''
16. Thus, where the allegations contained in the F.I.R., prima facie makes out an offence, then neither the F.I.R. can be quashed nor the consequential proceedings can be quashed.
17. Accordingly, the applications i.e., M.Cr.C. Nos. 3787/2015, 3791/2015 and 3794/2015 fail and are hereby dismissed.
(G.S. Ahluwalia) Judge /10/2017 *MKB*