Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
S.K. Ramju vs A.P.S.R.T.C. And Ors. on 22 March, 2001
Equivalent citations: 2001(3)ALT72
Author: Satyabrata Sinha
Bench: Satyabrata Sinha
JUDGMENT Satyabrata Sinha, C.J.
1. This writ appeal is directed against the order dated 19-11-1999, passed by the learned single Judge, dismissing the writ petition W.P. No. 23754 if 1999, filed by the appellant herein.
2. The appellant herein in the afore-mentioned writ petition questioned the purported action of the respondent-Corporation in proceeding to complete the disciplinary proceedings initiated against him.
3. The fact of the matter in brief is that a charge sheet was issued to the appellant on 15-2-1996 as regards an accident that allegedly occurred on account of his rash and negligent driving resulting in the loss of a valuable life of a cyclist, and by reason whereof the image of the respondent-Corporation was badly damaged. A criminal case was also registered against the appellant under Section 304-A IPC in C.C. No. 177 of 1996 on the file of the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Nalgonda. The said case resulted in the acquittal of the appellant. It is admitted at the bar that the appellant had not been driving the vehicle, involved in the accident, as held by the Criminal Court.
4. Be that as it may, the question that arises for consideration in this writ appeal is as to whether in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the respondent-Corporation should be permitted to continue the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the appellant.
5. It is true that the validity of the departmental proceedings were subject-matter in earlier writ proceedings and this Court permitted the respondent-Corporation to proceed with the departmental proceedings upon conclusion of the criminal case. Before the learned single Judge, as also before us, reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the appellant on the decision of the apex Court in M. PAUL ANTHONY v. BHARAT GOLD MINES LTD., wherein having regard to the fact that the facts and the evidence in both the proceedings viz., departmental proceedings and the criminal case being one and the same, it was held:
"... without there being any iota of difference. The distinction which is usually drawn between the departmental and criminal proceedings on the basis of approach and burden of proof, would not be applicable to the instant case".
6. In the instant case, the appellant qua employee is not charged with the commission of any misconduct. He by reason of the alleged act of rashness and negligence of driving of the vehicle, as a result whereof a valuable life of a cyclist was lost, is said to have damaged the reputation of the respondent-Corporation. Since rash and negligence on the part of the driver in the driving of the vehicle and/or his driving of the vehicle did not stand proved in the criminal case, the question of the appellant causing any damage to the reputation of the Corporation does not arise.
7. Mr. Harinath, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-Corporation, however, placed strong reliance upon a recent Division Bench judgement of this Court in V. SRINIVAS v. SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, (DB) in which one of us S.B. SINHA, CJ, was a member. In paras 7 and 8 of the said judgement it was held:
"7. It is further well settled that even in a case where the criminal trial ends in acquittal in favour of the delinquent employee, there does not exist any embargo on the part of the disciplinary authority in initiating disciplinary proceedings on the self same charges. As noted herein before, in M. Paul Anthony's case (1 supra), the Supreme Court itself has categorically held that it is possible that a person can be found guilty of commission of misconduct despite his acquittal in the criminal trial. The learned counsel for the petitioner, however, would urge that as in the instant case the criminal trial and the departmental proceedings are based on the same set of facts and the evidence adduced before the Criminal Court and the disciplinary authorities being the same without any variance, exception to the aforementioned rule would be attracted. The learned counsel, however, could not produce any material whatsoever in support of the aforementioned contention before the Court. Even the judgement of the criminal case has not been produced.
8. The submission of the learned counsel to the effect that despite the fact that the departmental proceedings were completed before the conclusion of the criminal trial, but having regard to the fact that the judgement in the criminal case was rendered before any order of punishment was passed against the petitioner, it was obligatory on the part of the disciplinary authority to take the same into consideration, cannot also be accepted keeping in view the decision of the apex Court in M. Paul Anthony (1 supra).
8. The afore-mentioned decision, in our opinion, cannot be applied to the present case having regard to the distinction of factual matrix.
9. In Paul Anthony's case (1 supra), the apex Court para 34 held:
"There is yet another reason for discarding the whole of the case of the respondents. As pointed out earlier, the criminal case as also the departmental proceedings were based on identical set of facts, namely, "the raid conducted at the appellant's residence and recovery of incriminating articles therefrom". The findings recorded by the enquiry officer, a copy of which has been placed before us, indicate that the charges framed against the appellant were sought to be proved by the police officers and panch witnesses, who had raided the house of the appellant and had effected recovery. They were the only witnesses examined by the enquiry officer and the enquiry officer, relying upon their statements, came to the conclusion that the charges were established against the appellant. The same witnesses were examined in the criminal case but the Court, on a consideration of the entire evidence, came to the conclusion that no search was conducted nor was any recovery made from the residence of the appellant. The whole case of the prosecution was thrown out and the appellant was acquitted. In this situation, therefore, where the appellant is acquitted by a judicial pronouncement with the finding that the 'raid and recovery' at the residence of the appellant were not proved, it would be unjust, unfair and rather oppressive to allow the findings recorded at the ex parte departmental proceedings to stand".
10. In that case, there was absolutely no iota of difference between the criminal case and the departmental proceedings, and as such, it was held that the departmental proceeding is vitiated in law. In the instant case, we are of the opinion that the case of the appellant stands on a better footing, in the sense, the misconduct which is said to have been committed by the appellant goes out of factual matrix, which was also subject matter of criminal case and not independent. It is not a case where the petitioner was charged with any misconduct unconnected with the said accident. In any event, as it has been held by the criminal court that the appellant was not guilty of the charge of causing death, and he had not been acquitted on the ground of benefit of doubt, we fail to understand as to how despite the said finding of competent court of law, the reputation of the respondent-Corporation has been damaged.
11. Therefore, each case should be considered in the light of the facts and circumstances of that case as indicated in V. SRINIVAS (2 supra) supra. There is absolutely no bar for initiation of disciplinary proceedings despite acquittal in criminal case.
12. The submission of Mr. Harinath to the effect that the writ petition could not have been entertained having regard to the fact that the petitioner could show no cause of action surviving for continuation of disciplinary proceedings despite the findings arrived at by the criminal Court in the criminal case. The observations made by the learned single Judge of this Court in the earlier writ petition are not final and conclusive so as to operate as res judicata. A fresh cause of action has arisen for the petitioner to move this Court having regard to the subsequent event viz., order of acquittal having been passed by the criminal Court in his favour in the criminal case.
13. In the result, we set aside the order of the learned single Judge, allow the writ appeal. No order as to costs.