Karnataka High Court
Registrar General, High Court Of ... vs Advocate N. Vasudevan on 19 March, 1997
Equivalent citations: 1998CRILJ2291, ILR1998KAR3399
Author: M.B. Vishwanath
Bench: M.B. Vishwanath
ORDER
1. This is a contempt proceeding of considerable importance for a variety of reasons, the main one being that the facts of the case are unusual or rather extraordinary, but more importantly because, the respondent-contemner happens to be a senior practising advocate. He had addressed a letter dt. 16-11-1994 to the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of this High Court. The letter is rather long one and we would prefer to refrain from reproducing it because such a procedure is unnecessary. A reading to that letter indicates that the respondent was desirous of corrective action being taken in respect of several areas. For example, one of the grievances projected by him was that when the subordinate judicial officers are transferred, that some amount of consideration be afforded to the consequences of such an abrupt transfer vis-a-vis the litigations that are pending before those officers. As an example, he had cited a very long drawn out litigation which had been very competently handled by a particular Judge and the abrupt transfer of that Judicial Officer effectively required a de novo consideration of the entire case. The offending part of the letter basically dealt with two of the learned Judges who were at that time sitting Judges of this High Court. As far as the first of them is concerned, nothing very much had been pointed out except a grievance to the effect that the learned Judge did not prepare himself by scrutinising the records that were sent to him and that as a result, not only did it take a lot of time in the Court room, but more importantly that the advocates faced a serious problem in basically projecting the points at issue. The more serious grievance that was made and the one which is really the gravamen of the present contempt proceedings related to an allegation that one of the senior Judges, to whom the rent control cases were assigned, was continuously projecting a heavy bias in favour of the landlords and that therefore, it became quite impossible for cases in which the tenants had a grievance to obtain any form of relief. There was also a reference in the letter to the fact that the background of the learned Judge had contributed to his attitude, approach and mental make-up. It is principally on the basis of this material that the Hon'ble the Chief Justice directed suo motu action against the respondent under the Contempt of Courts Act.
2. Pursuant to the service of notice, the respondent filed a detailed reply in which he has essentially contended that as a responsible member of the bar and as a senior advocate and as a lawyer who owed a sacred duty to his client, that the respondent was seriously aggrieved by the problems that had been set out in that complaint and that it was in this background, with the sole objective of obtaining necessary redress and in order to bring about an improvement in the working of the system, that he had written to the Chief Justice. The respondent did not stop there because, he has filed detailed compilations before us in order to substantiate the ground that his complaint was not frivolous, that it was not unjustified and that it was not devoid of substance. We are not on the aspect of justification by way of truth, but what the respondent obviously attempted to do was to point out that this was not a situation where a person who is suddenly rattled or enraged because of some adverse order, has impulsively tried to hit back at the Judicial Officer, but that there was valid and sufficient cause for having addressed the complaint in question. Among other things, the respondent has filed before us a lot of material in order to point out that purely out of a sense of responsibility, over the years he has devoted considerable time and energy towards bringing to the notice of the various authorities such as the Chief Justices from time to time, the Law Commission, the law ministry and the Government, many grey areas, but more importantly, issues which do require radical reform. A perusal of this material does indicate to us that the respondent is anything but a busy body and that he has been most responsibly and seriously dedicated, almost with a sense of missionary zeal, towards bringing about a process of not only improvement, but perhaps purification or even chastisement in certain quarters. Undoubtedly, such an exercise is not a pleasant one and it does not always meet with favourable response because, there are many individuals who will always be extremely hostile to any idea or reformation. This briefly is the factual defence that has been pleaded by the respondent.
3. It is true that the respondent has not tendered any apology in this case, because he has told us that he stands by his letter, that it was written with the objective and in the circumstances set out. He has however, clarified to us that right through his career as lawyer, that he has never ever shown any disrespect to the Courts or to the Judicial Officers, but he has also qualified it that this does not mean that he would permit any form of injustice to continue within this system. This is perhaps an admirable approach because, it is only from such quarters that the internal pitfalls within a mechanism can be identified and corrected. The respondent has also given evidence and he has adopted more or less the same line of defence. We have heard him at considerable length because, he was at pains to impress upon us one important fact, namely that he has raised an issue of principle and his request to the Court was that as a matter of propriety, the case must be viewed at purely from the angle. He did make certain submissions with regard to the legalities of this case because, it was his contention on a point of law that his action can never be construed as an act of contempt and that therefore, the notice against him ought to be discharged. It is customary in contempt proceedings for a party to tender an apology and in several of the cases where there are extenuating circumstances or where the party desires to put forward a defence, the Court does certainly take that aspect into cognizance. An apology however, is not an essential requirement in all contempt proceedings and it is equally permissible for a respondent to take up a bold defence and satisfy the Court that no contempt has ensued, the rider however being that there is an inherent risk in following such a procedure in so far as if the contention were to fail, then a belated apology could never be accepted by the Court. The respondent in this case preferred to take the risk and he was perhaps justified in doing so.
4. The learned S.P.P. supported the issuance of the contempt notice principally on a point of propriety. He has relied heavily on the latest decision of the Supreme Court in Dr. Saxena's case, . The Supreme Court had occasion to examine the law relating to criminal contempt in depth and virtually threadbare. The learned S.P.P. relied on several observations from that judgment for purposes of contending that an allegation made against a Judicial Officer of any rank would undermine the position of that Officer and that it would consequently and directly affect the administration to justice and that it is therefore, punishable ipso facto. He has referred to the fact that Judges at different levels require to be given adequate protection and safeguards in the discharge of their functions particularly, since several of these decisions are often unpleasant and would therefore, undoubtedly invite resentment and hostility and it was therefore, equally essential to ensure that Judges are free from counterblasts and counterattacks. We are in agreement with this argument which basically represents the substratum of the law of contempt and the learned S.P.P. developed his argument from thereon to contend that if an allegation is made against a Judicial Officer, particularly a generalised allegation or even a specific allegation which again undermines the judicial position of that officer or vicariously of the Court, that it would come squarely within the ambit of criminal contempt. He also pointed out, and perhaps very rightly, that the real test would be with regard to the manner in which the allegation is made and more importantly, the surrounding circumstances. It is in this background that he submitted that an Advocate cannot be the Judge, particularly for purposes of evaluating either the performance or the conduct or the achievement of a Judicial Officer and that therefore, even the imputations that have been made by the respondent in the present complaint would be totally on par with direct allegations that would undermine the Judges' position and consequently shake the confidence of the bar and the litigating public in that Judicial Officer and would therefore, be actionable. He drew our attention to some of the expressions used by the respondent in the complaint and particularly the language used by him in certain parts of it and he submitted that even if under normal circumstances, no action on the material concerned was called for, that having regard to the manner in which the complaint was worded, parts of which are offensive, that the issuance of the notice was justified. A parallel was sought to be drawn from the legal position that emanates as far as the law of libel and defamation is concerned, where the wording is what could make all the difference between a statement that is actionable and one which is innocuous.
5. As far as this last aspect of the matter is concerned, Mr. Vasudevan was at pains to point out to us that a person does not react impulsively on the very first occasion, but that if the situation has built up over a period of time, that one's emotions sometimes run wild and that while giving expression to them, inevitably strong language is used, though he did concede that this has very little to do with the subject-matter placed before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice and that perhaps a certain amount of restraint and temperateness could have been in order. He was quick to point out to us that he had always had not only respect, but a lot of esteem and regard for the members of the judiciary and that therefore, that last factor should be taken into consideration rather than a few stray words here and there in his complaint.
6. The basic issue that has arisen for determination in this case and one of very far-reaching consequences is the question as to whether by virtue of the application of the law of contempt, the Courts will have to read that there exists a total and complete bar to any form of allegation being made in relation to a judicial proceeding or a Judicial Officer. This is slightly different from the principles that are enunciated in Section 5 of the Contempt of Courts Act which is basically an embodiment of the law that has emerged over the decades, particularly from England. The law of contempt has had its genesis in the Ecclesiastical Courts in England and judicial authorities have thereafter enforced those principles for purposes of ensuring a degree of ethics and propriety in the conduct of all Court proceedings. The vigour with which the Courts originally commenced has been considerably diluted over the years and the law in England has even gone to the extent of permitting strong criticism not only of judicial decisions, but of the Judges who render such decisions in cases where the criticism is justified and is in the public interest. It was in this background that Lord Denning, an otherwise fierce defender of the position of the judiciary, had observed that the Judges can no longer insist on existing in ivory tower protection, that when they render public decisions, that they will have to be equally open to just and fair reaction which could include strong criticism of decisions that are unfair, unjust or perverse. The law in India also recognises the right to criticise, provided it is not motivated and malicious and provided it is fair and justified. There is a thin line between the two segments, but it is a definite line and propriety requires that the moment the line is transgressed, like the traditional Laxman Rekha, that the Courts will be quick to come down heavily on the offender principally from the point of view of maintaining the dignity of the system. It is more or less in this background, that the issue involved in the present case will have to be viewed. To start with, as we have indicated, that the respondent has placed before us the entire background of the facts and circumstances that preceded the filing of the complaint to the Hon'ble the Chief Justice. This is the distinguishing factor in the present proceeding because, the complaint was addressed to a person in authority for the benefit of the party who had made the complaint and those whom he represents and the fraternity to which he belongs and in this background, it is respondent's contention that there is nothing offensive in the complaint that could even remotely undermine the position of the Judicial Officers referred to by him and that therefore, there is no question of its having any adverse effect on the administration of justice. His contention is that on the other hand, in all likelihood, the complaint would have been beneficial; the law does not prescribe a total embargo on the making of allegations and put very simply, that this can never be the case because judicial proceedings themselves often not only require but necessitate allegations being made. The most common-place example is a situation where something has gone seriously wrong before a particular forum and the lawyer on behalf of his client is required to make direct charges against the Judicial Officer some times of serious impropriety or there may be instances of total lack of integrity or efficiency giving rise to a situation whereby it is imminent that the party will not receive justice from that forum. If the allegations are not set out, the relief cannot be granted and it is therefore, incumbent that the allegations have to be set out in black and white howsoever unpleasant the operation may be. That being the general situation, the question arises as to whether the same position has to be made to the head of the judiciary wherein more or less similar corrective action is being asked for. It is inevitable that the complaint cannot be too generalised, it is also inevitable that it cannot be vague because if the complaint is to be acted upon, statements will have to be made in black and white. Bias is one of the grounds on which a transfer can be prayed for in a Court of law and the same applies to inefficiency as far as one's performance is concerned and if these roughly are the grounds, then it stands to reason that they will have to be referred to very clearly and set out perhaps even in some detail in the complaint. The curious position that arises is if such an act is actionable under the Contempt of Courts Act, it would mean that no such complaint can be filed and that therefore, the state of affairs which requires rectification can never be brought to the notice of the concerned authority nor can any corrective action result. That again can never be the intention of the law.
7. We need to slightly advert here to one allied principle that requires to be re-stated with regard to situations of this type. The Scandinavian experience when the need to set up an authority known as the Ombudsman indicated that a peculiarly difficult occasion arises when it becomes necessary to review the action or suggest correctives in relation to a particularly high or sensitive category of institutions and individuals. Taking on from here, the Judicial Reforms Commission in Britain expressed the need to "police the police" which principle was subsequently not only realised, but embodied in a variety of reforms, both judicial and administrative. Briefly stated, the social need of setting up a machinery for purposes of enquiring into blemishes or faults in some of the areas which the Courts could not or would not normally embark upon, has created in modern times the pressing need to the present realisation that some modification with regard to the conceptional aspect is absolutely necessary. It is from this angle really that this Court would have to adjudicate upon the question as to whether in addressing the complaint in question to the Hon'ble the Chief Justice, the respondent-advocate has committed an act of contempt and that too, an act punishable as criminal contempt.
8. The Courts have from time to time laid down varied guidelines and applied various tests in arriving at decisions in these matters. It would be relevant for us to very briefly re-state that the action in question if found to be motivated, in other words if it is accompanied by malice or mala fides, would certainly come within the ambit of contempt. If the action is genuinely constructive, if it is bona fide and if it is addressed to an authority which is empowered to carry out the correction that is sought, it would be impossible to categorise it as being offensive. A parellel could perhaps be drawn from Section 499, IPC wherein, the law has carved out an exception in cases where it becomes necessary to convey information or allegations to a person in authority for purposes of achieving a desired relief or result and where, even if such material is per se defamatory, the law confers a total unity. It is more or less this principle which will have to be engrafted on to the normal contempt law in respect of situations of the present type because, as pointed out by us earlier, that though it is eminently desirable that the Courts must work as well and as perfectly as possible that there do arise situations wherein the opposite position is prevalent and it would be wrong to assume that the aggrieved party, particularly a member of the bar whose professional duty is to resist injustice, should be smothered from resisting that state of affairs and asking for reformation. We are concious of the fact that this does not mean that the flood gates should be opened to indiscriminate, irresponsible, motivated, malicious and frivolous attacks because, the law will be quick to punish persons regardless of their status, who resort to such misconduct. We are concerned with the small category of genuine cases wherein with a full sense of responsibility and with a constructive and bona fide intention, a state of affairs is confidentially brought to the notice of the Chief Justice, with the sole purpose of ensuring some rectification.
9. One of the principal tests that the Courts have always applied in gauging as to whether an act is punishable by way of contempt is by ascertaining as to whether it would impede the course of justice by adversely affecting the working of the justice dispensation system. That test could very correctly be applied to a situation of the present type and it will have to be seen that where, when there in no other option available, it becomes necessary to bring this state of affairs to the notice of the Chief Justice, that it can never be said that such a process would be counter-productive or destructive. In fact, this is precisely the formula which has been repeatedly suggested by the Chief Justice of India and by the Supreme Court and the High Courts because, it is equally necessary that any problems with regard to the working or any defects or blemishes be first brought to the notice of the administrative head and that it is only when this is done, that it will be possible to remedy the situation. Resorting to outside publicity and adverse criticism in other quarters is invariably counter-productive and it is not the right remedy. Viewed at from this background therefore, the respondent who is himself a senior advocate, chose the right course of action and we see little ground on which what he had done can be faulted.
10. We have had occasion to deal at some length with the facts of the case as also with regard to the law on the point, but before concluding, we would like to sound a note of caution in so far as we do not propose to approve of reckless, malicious, unwarranted or unjustified attacks or complaints against Judicial Officers and if these are indulged in, as has been pointed out by the Supreme Court recently while dealing with Dr. Saxena's case, the Courts will not be slow in very firmly and effectively punishing persons who indulge in such conduct. On the other hand, the right to represent and the right to point out as also the right and the need to bring to the notice even of the head of the judiciary, blemishes or faults that require to be checked, controlled rectified, must necessarily be upheld. We do expect however that if such occasions to arise, that the complainants, be they litigants members of the public or members of the bar, will be selective with regard to the occasion, that there will be sufficient cause, that the person will be acting with a full and total sense of responsibility, that the complaint will be addressed confidentially to the head of the judiciary concerned and above all, that even while making such complaints, the complainant will not lose sight of the need to maintain the dignity of the profession and the judiciary and more importantly, to refrain from any defamatory language. We have had occasion to refer to this last aspect of the matter as far as the present complaint is concerned and we have brought it to Mr. Vasudevan's notice that even though he has told us that the grievances were gross and that they were of a long standing nature and that therefore, he got carried away, that we do not approve of some of the expressions and strong language used by him and he has assured us that there will be no occasion for any such repetition. We have appreciated the assurance and we let that aspect of the matter pass because a mature judiciary would never be hypersensitive to such situations.
11. Mr. Vasudevan has argued this case in person and has done and admirable job as far as the deep seated research with regard to certain facets of the law of contempt is concerned. He has prefixed his submissions with several references from "Masters of Sociological Thought" by Lewis A Coser. Mr. Vasudevan relied on some of the passages from Auguste Comte, Karl Marx, Herbert Spencer, Emile Durkheim, George Simmel, Max Weber and Karl Mannheim in support of his contention that the time has now come for the Courts to make departure from the proectionist approach vis-a-vis the Judiciary and the Judges, as this was not in consonance with a healthy social outcome. While we have no quarrel with the views of the learned authors or for that matter with the submission in general, we still need to reiterate that it is essential, for the Courts to uphold the status and dignity of the institutions and its officers against all lor any attempt that undermine them, but we do concede that there could be instances such as the present case, which call for a more liberal approach.
12. Another limb of Mr. Vasudevan's argument was based on the views expressed by the celebarated authors Edwin H. Sutherland and Donald R. Cressey in their masterpiece on Criminology. In substance, Mr. Vasudevan relied on the theory propounded, that a criminal act involves the element of delinquency. He contended that the consequences of a conviction for criminal contempt are identical to a sentence on a penal charge and that it was therefore condition precedent that the offending contempt must not only be a case of bad behaviour but that it should be grave enough to rank on par with a criminal offence. We do see considerable substance in this submission though, the nature and type of contempt could vary in its seriousness which is why, the Court are quite circumspect in their approach and it is only in the grossest cases of criminal contempt that a jail sentence is awarded. We do however uphold the principle that before such a conviction takes place, the fact must be gross enough to bring the case on par with a criminal offence.
13. Mr. Vasudevan relied extensively on the following decisions :-
1. AIR 1978 SC 727 wherein the Supreme Court had occasion to do an indepth analysis of the question as to whether criticism of the judiciary by the press amounts to contempt and the Court held that it is essentially dependent on the nature of the criticism in question.
(2) wherein the Supreme Court upheld the principle that a fair and reasonable comment of a judicial act did not amount to contempt.
(3) 1936 (1) ALL ENGLAND REPORTS, p. 704 wherein the Privy Council reiterated the principle that it is only malicious and personal criticism of the judiciary or a judicial officer that would merit action for contempt.
(4) wherein, in the celebrated case of E.M.S. Namboodiripad, the Supreme Court had occasion to examine the law threadbare through a detailed reference to the following cases :-
(1968) 1968-2 WLR 1204 : 1968-2 All ER 319, R. v. Metropolitan Police Commr. para 7 (1964) 11 Law Ed 2nd 686 : 376 US 254, New York Times Co. v. L. B. Sullivan, para 12 , Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, para 12 (1962) Criminal Appeal No. 110 of 1960, d/-3-5-1962 (SC) in re Basudeo Prasad Advocate Patna High Court, para 10 (1957) 1 Law Ed 1498 : 354 US 476, Samuel Roth v. United States of America, para 12 (1948) 93 Law Ed 1131 : 337 US 1, Arthur Terminiello v. City of Chicago, para 12 (1938) AIR 1938 Bom 197 (V 25) : ILR (1938) Bom 179 : 39 Cri LJ 440, Govt. Pleader, High Court, Bombay v. Tulsidas Subhanrao, para 7 (1936) AIR 1936 PC 141 (V 23) : 1936 All LJ 671 Andre Paul Terenee Ambard v. Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago, para 8 (1925) 71 Law Ed 1995 : 274 US 357, Charlotte Anita Whitney v. People of the State of California para 12 (1900) 1900 2 QB 36 : 69 LJ QB 502, R. v. Grav para 8 (1899) 1899 AC 549 : 68 LJ PC 137, Meleod v. St. Aubyn paras 7, 8 This was the case in which the Supreme Court held that the criticism had crossed the permissible norms and consequently convicted the contemnor.
(5) wherein the Supreme Court was considering the all important aspect of the rationale behind punishment for contempt and had occasion to examine the following :-
1978 AC 435 : (1977) 3 WLR 300 : (1977) 3 All ER 70, Couriet v. Union of Post Office Workers, paras 44,58 (1977) 1 QB 729 : 1977 (2) WLR 310 : (1977) 1 All ER 696, (1974) 1. Andh LT 170 : 1974 APLJ 43 para 46, 57 (1973) 1 All ER 815 : (1973) 2 WLR 452 : 117 SJ 186, Attorney General v. Times Newspapers Ltd. para 42 (1973) 3 All ER 54 : (1973) 3 WLR 298 : 1974 AC 273, Attorney General v. Times Newspapers Ltd. para 42 1978 AC 277, Thalidemide Case, Attorney General v. Times Newspapers paras 58, 59 (1968) 2 WLR 1204 : 1968 (2) QB 150, Regina v. Commr. of Police of the Metropolie, Ex Parte Black Burn, para 14 (1964) 376 US 254 : 11 L Ed 2d 686 : 84 S ct 710 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan para 13 The Supreme Court laid down the important principle that the effect of the act namely that it should hamper the administration of justice or impair it must be evident and that in the absence of these ingredients, even harsh criticism would not be actionable.
(6) which is the latest and virtually the leading case in recent times on the point of contempt wherein the Supreme Court had occasion to examine the following decisions :-
1995 AIR SCW 3768 : (1993) 5 SCC 457 paras 20, 38,45, 58, 74 1994 AIR SCW 4679 : 1994 Supp (3) SCC 509 para 47 1993 Supp (4) SCC 446 : 1992 JT (Suppl) SC 66 para 46 (1990) 2 QB 36, R v. Grey 75 (1976) 65 DLR (3rd) 608 in Re : A.B. of Canada and Alexander et al para 75 1969 NZLR 55, Re : Wiseman para 75 AIR 1943 Cal 595 : 45 Crl LJ 224 para 12 1936 AC 322 : (1936) All ER 704, 154 LT 616, Ambard v. Attorney General for Trinidad and Tobago paras 42, 75 (1826) 35, Ch D 449 : 56 LT 72 : 3 TLR 139, Helmore v. Smith para 75.
The Supreme Court summarised the legal position with regard to the limitations on the freedom of expression under Art. 19 of the Constitution by pointing out that it brings within its ambit the corresponding duty and responsibilities and puts limitations on the exercise of that liberty and that it does not give a licence to make unfounded allegations against any institutions much less the judiciary. In sum and substances, the Supreme Court had occasion in this case to go into the all important aspects of whether or not there was some background or justification for the act.
14. We have had occasion to do some research on our own with regard to the field of contempt law and consider it useful to briefly summarise some of the principles that have emerged. In the decision the Supreme Court laid down the well settled principle that if the allegations are per se scandalous that they would ipso facto call for action but, the decision postulates that this is one of the important tests with regard to the offensive material. In the decision the important principle was laid down that a libellous reflection upon the conduct of a Judge though actionable under the I.P.C. for defamation may not necessarily constitute contempt.
In the decision reported in 1981 Bombay Law Report p 251 wherein a Division Bench exonerated a contemnor on the ground that the total effect of the speech in question only constituted criticism of various judgments but that it was not actionable in contempt.
(7) 1968 (2) All England Reports 319 wherein the English Court upheld the principle that the press was within its rights if the criticism however vigorous was made in good faith and if it was reasonable.
(8) 1974 (3) All England Reports 217 wherein the English Courts have enunciated the principle that the object of contempt proceedings is not intended to gag all forms of criticism.
(9) 1979 (3) All England Reports 45 wherein Lord Denning in a celebrated dissenting judgment laid down that the traditional view whereby the Courts were extremely shy of any form of criticism would not hold good in contempt proceedings and that something more contumacious must be demonstrated.
(9) H.R. (1971 (1) Delhi (sic) wherein a Full Bench of the Delhi High Court laid down that before action for contempt is sustained that it must be demonstrated that it had a damaging effect on the system.
(10) ILR 74(1) Delhi 1 wherein the Court had occasion to consider divergent views expressed with regard to the question of appointment of the Chief Justice of India and to hold that even if the ideas expressed were not very palatable, that this alone would not be sufficient to sustain an action for a contempt.
15. We have effectively undertaken the process of digesting and analysing a wealth of material on all conceivable aspects of the law of contempt because this is a case in which Mr. Vasudevan has contested the proceedings and has contended that his action does not constitute contempt. Undoubtedly, the danger in taking up such a defence is that if he were to fail, he could invite a straight conviction. We are dealing with a case of a senior member of the Bar and a very important issue that is involved namely as to whether he was justified in approaching the Chief Justice on a question of vital importance. This is an aspect of the administration of the High Courts which has come in for considerable debate in so far as there is a legitimate expectation that while the work assignments are done, certain norms will be taken into account the first of them being the question of assessing the areas of specialisation and competence of the Judges and as far as possible utilising these skills to their maximum advantage. Where a Judge has knowledge and expertise of the field of law, there is an immediate benefit to the Bar and to the litigants apart from the aspect of speed. On the other hand, if the Judge is unfamiliar with a particular field or a total stranger to it, the pace of disposal will be seriously impeded. It also creates obvious problems to the litigants and the advocates and there is a remote possibility that the best results may not be achieved. Mr. Vasudevan submitted in all humility, that the only purpose of lodging the complaint with the Hon'ble Chief Justice was in order to request that the aforesaid principles be adopted while assigning the different fields of work to the different Judges. Undoubtedly, it is true that the judicial talent would be best utilised if the aforesaid norms are followed and that on the other hand, if the best Judges are not utilised to their best potential but are mechanically assigned to inconsequential and run of the mill work, it is a total loss to the system and an equally damage would be the effect of wrong assignments in the case of Judges who may have to take up fields of law which are virtually foreign to them. That the Judge would research and do his very best is not doubted by us but it could still result in problems.
16. On a general review of the facts and the law, in the aforesaid circumstances, and in our considered opinion, it would be impossible and incorrect to hold that the respondent is liable to be punished under the Contempt of Courts Act. The notice issued to him is accordingly discharged and the petition is disposed of.
17. order accordingly.