Uttarakhand High Court
Dilip Singh Alias Dallu vs State Of Uttarakhand & Another on 26 August, 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND
AT NAINITAL
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE SRI G. NARENDAR
AND
HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE SUBHASH UPADHYAY
WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. 682 OF 2025
26TH AUGUST, 2025
Dilip Singh alias Dallu ...... Petitioner
Versus
State of Uttarakhand & another ...... Respondents
Counsel for the petitioner : Mr. Rishi Malhotra, learned Senior
Counsel assisted by Mr. Kanti Ram,
learned counsel
Counsel for the respondents : Mr. J.S. Virk, learned Deputy
Advocate General assisted by Mr.
Rakesh Kumar Joshi, learned Brief
Holder for the State
The Court made the following:
ORDER:(per Hon'ble The Chief Justice Shri G. Narendar) Heard the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner and the learned Deputy Advocate General for the State of Uttarakhand.
2. The petitioner is seeking for the following reliefs:
"A) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari setting aside of arbitrary Rule 5 of "2022 Policy" and for premature release as per Rule 4 of "2022 Policy" (Annexure 3) framed by the State of 1 Uttarakhand as the petitioner has already undergone around 19 years of conviction in FIR No. 201 of 2005 at P.S. Kotwali Tanakpur, District Champawat;
B) Issue a writ of Certiorari for setting aside Rule 5 "Prohibited Category" of Uttarakhand State (For Sentence Pardon/Premature Release of Convicted Prisoners Punished with Sentence of Imprisonment for Life by the Court) Permanent Policy, 2022, being ultra vires the Constitution of India, 1950;
C) Issue a writ of Mandamus directing the respondent State government to consider the case of the petitioner for premature release in terms of Rule 4 Uttarakhand State (For Sentence Pardon/Premature Release of Convicted Prisoners Punished with Sentence of Imprisonment for Life by the Court) Permanent Policy, 2022."
3. Matter has been heard on several dates and the point that is strenuously canvassed by the learned Senior Counsel is that the categorization of the petitioner by the Review Board categorizing him as a convict falling under the Prohibited Category under the Uttarakhand State (For Sentence Pardon/Premature Release of Convicted Prisoners Punished with Sentence of Imprisonment for Life by the Court) Permanent Policy, 2022.
4. Para 5 of the Policy reads as under :
"5.(i) All such convicted prisoner punished with imprisonment for life, wherein, the Hon'ble Court, has 2 fixed a specific time period in its judgment for detention in prison.
ii) All such convicted prisoners punished with imprisonment for life, wherein, the case investigations were conducted by Delhi Special Police Establishment, constituted under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1947 (Sec. 25 of 1946) or National Investigating Agency or by any other investigating agency competent for investigations of offences under any central act, other than the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Sec. 02 of 1974).
iii) Such convicted prisoners, who have been convicted of such "offences" under section 435 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; those are related to such subjects, to which the executive power of the Union Government extends and to whom, separate sentences of imprisonments have been awarded to be served collectively. Any order to suspend remit or commute the sentences given by State Government shall be only effective, when the order to suspend, remit or commute the sentences of the offence committed, has also been passed by Union Government.
iv) All such convicted prisoners punished with imprisonment for life, who have been convicted for offences related to collectively homicides/massacre (three or more than three murders).
v) All such convicted prisoners punished with imprisonment for life and, who have also been punished by prison administration for any "minor punishment", other than "warning" as provisioned in para no. 814 of the Uttar Pradesh Jail Manual during the period of last 2 years and for any "major punishment" as provisioned in 3 para no. 815 of the Uttar Pradesh Jail Manual in past 5 years.
vi) Such convicted prisoners punished with imprisonment of life, who also been convicted for any offence during period of suspension of sentence/parole/furlough.
vii) All such convicted prisoners punished with imprisonment for life, who have escaped from prison or police custody during detention period.
viii) Such convicted prisoners, who have been punished with sentence of imprisonment for life, in more than one offence.
ix) Such convicted prisoners, who are not the citizen of India.
x) All such convicted prisoners, punished with imprisonment for life for offences under the following Acts-
. Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, . Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (Act No. 61 of 1985) . The Prevention of Illicit trafficking in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 (Act No. 42 of 1988) . The Customs Act, 1962 (Act No. 52 of 1962) . The Official Secrecy Act, 1923 . The Foreigners Act, 1946 . The Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 . The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act 2012) 4
xi) All such convicted prisoners, punished with sentence of imprisonment for life for offences under section 363A (Kidnapping or maiming a minor for the purpose of begging); 370 (Human Trafficking, selling or purchasing as slaves), 376A (committing rape by imposing criminal "intimidation of relatives), 376D (Gang Rape), 376E (Punishment for rape by a rape convict), 489B (sale purchase of forged or counterfeit-currency) and 489D (Counterfeiting of currency notes or bank notes) of Indian Penal Code, 1960.
xii) Professional killers, found guilty for contract killings.
xiii) All such convicted prisoners punished with Sentence of imprisonment for life for offences such as waging a war against the state or attempt to wage a war against the state or abetting to wage a war against the Government under sections 121 to 130 of Indian Penal Code, 1960.
xiv) All such convicted prisoners, punished with Sentence of imprisonment for life for offences for murdering a Government official during discharge of his official duty."
5. At this juncture, it is pertinent to reproduce certain paragraphs of the judgment of this Court, rendered in Criminal Appeal No. 173 of 2011, Yogesh Rautela Vs State of Uttarakhand, and other connected matters, whereby the appeals preferred by the instant petitioner and co-accused came to be rejected : 5
"All the above-titled five appeals have arisen out of the same judgment and order rendered on 2.8.2011, by learned Sessions Judge, Champawat, hence have been heard together, and are being adjudicated by this single verdict hereinbelow.
On 26.5.2006, learned Sessions Judge initially levelled the Charges against six accused persons for the offences of Section 302, 364, 120-B, 396, 201 and 412 IPC, but as the trial commenced, one of the accused, namely, Rajendra Singh @ Raju Rawat escaped from the jail custody and somehow, was killed during an encounter with the police on 24.6.2006, so the trial stood abated against him vide order dated 18.8.2006. The case pertains to Police Station, Tanakpur, District Champawat, bearing Sessions Trial No. 14 of 2005 (Crime No. 201 of 2005), wherein all the accused persons remained in caption eversince the date of their arrest and were not favourably considered to be released on bail till date.
For convenience, we would refer the accused Rohit Malik as 'A1', Daleep @ Dallu 'A2', Vimal 'A3', Yogesh Rautela 'A4', Rajendra Singh @ Raju Rawat (case abated as above) as 'A5' and Chandra Shekhar @ Shekhar Upreti as 'A6'. They all are the youths running in their mid twenties and resident of nearby places of Champawat or Tanakpur.
Learned Sessions Judge found all the five accused persons, who against trial proceeded, guilty for the charges levelled against them and has convicted all of them awarding sentences appropriate to each of them.
All the accused were found guilty for commission of triple murder along with dacoity, plundering a wealthy jeweller, namely, Munish Kumar Agarwal. Mr. Agarwal used to run his jewellery shop along with his brother Rajiv Kumar Agarwal (PW1) in the big city Bareilly which is not far away from the place of incident. He kept on visiting the hilly towns of Pithoragarh via Banbasa-Tanakpur-Champawat periodically in connection with his business transactions, and almost every time, he carried with him a large number of items made of 6 gold, silver besides precious stones, to supply them to the local goldsmiths and, in turn, to collect cash from them.
On the fateful day of 10.5.2005, Mr. Agarwal along with his employee (accountant) Mr. Devesh Ganagwar and driver Mr. Kanhaiya Lal, left the Bareilly town in the morning and at around 9:30 AM, he was in Tanakpur city where he completed his business dealings with Mr. Bablu Verma (PW4) running his shop there in the name and style of 'Surbhi Jewelleries', and then further, after having a little refreshment in the nearby shop of PW2 Anil Kumar, left the town of Tanakpur at about 10 AM, to advance his journey towards Champawat. Just after about half an hour of such leaving, they all corssed 'Kiroda Bridge' in their 'Qualis' vehicle bearing No. HR264-U- 1691. On the steep turn, the vehicle was made to slow and meanwhile, A1 and A2, coming from front and getting information about every movement of victims, from co- accused A3 and A4 through their cell phones, slowly dashed their motorcycle at the side of such Qualis. With the result, accused and the victims, both stopped their respective vehicles and began to indulge in altercations, raising allegations of wrong driving against each other. In the meantime, A3 and A4, (chasing the victims since Banbasa- Tanakpur) also arrived there. A1 then took out the key of Qualis in his possession and looking to these gestures of accused persons, Mr. Agarwal started making noise. Then, A2, A3 and A4, in order to achieve their common object, exhorted A1 to open fire upon Mr. Agarwal, which A1 did from his 315 bore country-made pistol. The bullet hit the chest of Mr. Agarwal and all these accused persons, A1 to A4, overpowered the driver Kanhaiya Lal and accountant Mr. Devendra Gangwar, to carry the Toyota Qualis vehicle 10-15 kilometers away in the jungle. All the three victims were also administered the poisonous injection of Fortwin in order to make them unconscious. Thereafter, the locker beneath the seats of vehicle was broken open and the jewellery items, kept therein, were plundered by all the culprits A1 to A4 and 7 concealed the same nearby beneath the stones and green leaves.
A2, while making disclosure statement, confessed that after taking the country-made pistol of A1, he shot dead the driver Kanhaiya Lal as well and they all ensured the death of accountant Mr. Devendra Gangwar by giving fatal blow of iron-wheel spanner. Thus, the accused persons made sure that all the three victims had died. The vehicle was then taken to another appropriate place, as has been shown in different Maps Ex.Ka-51 and Ka-55, for the purpose of disposing of the dead bodies. Body of Mr. Munish Agarwal was thrown as such while the dead bodies of remaining two victims were thrown into the nearby flowing Sharda Canal after being kept in two big bags."
*** Thus, we find no infirmity in the impugned judgment except that we still have doubt about the murder of driver Kanhaiya Lal in the entire scenario, nonetheless, we confirm holding the guilt of murder of Munish Kumar Agarwal along with his accountant Devendra Gangwar as well as commission of dacoity by these appellants. We, thus, feel that it would not be conclusive to hold all these appellants guilty for the murder of driver Kanhaiya Lal. However, even if assuming that Mr. Kanhaiya Lal, the driver, may still be alive, but feel that the gravity of offence, wherefor the appellants have been found guilty and convicted, is not mitigated because after all, they have committed the murder of at least two innocent persons in a brutal manner along with the dacoity."
6. Thus, the conviction of the petitioner for a triple murder was modified by the High Court and the petitioner stood convicted for the offence of a double murder. 8
7. It is imperative to refer to para 5 of the "Policy 2022". Paras 5(i) to 5(xiv) prima facie do not appear to be applicable to the petitioner. The case of the petitioner has been categorized as falling under para 5(xii). Para 5(xii) relates to professional killers found guilty for contract killings. It is neither the case canvassed by the prosecution nor is there material demonstrating otherwise. The gist of the allegations, as recorded by a Co-ordinate Bench while disposing of the appeals preferred by the petitioner and the other co-accused, would reveal that neither was there any contract given to the petitioner nor was any such case canvassed by the prosecution, yet the respondents while responding to this Court in a Public Interest Litigation, being WPPIL No. 50 of 2024, have placed a list of convicts in para 15, and in all names of 50 convicts have been placed before this Court in a tabular form. The name of the petitioner is found at Sl. No. 30, and in the remark column i.e. the 6th column, which deals with the opinion of the Board as to whether he falls under the prohibited category or not, it is noted against his name that he falls under the prohibited category as his case falls under Para 5(xii) [(though it is a Policy, para (v) is referred to as Rule (v)], and in the remarks column, i.e., the 7th column, it is opined that he 9 is not entitled for consideration under the said policy. This part of the factual aspect can be dealt with on the basis of the judgment of this Court which ultimately convicted him for a double murder by modifying the judgment of conviction of the trial court convicting him for triple murder.
8. In that view there being no material demonstrating him to be a contract killer, the categorization or classifying the petitioner as a contract killer is without basis.
9. The learned Deputy Advocate General would fairly submit that there is no material nor is there a charge that the petitioner carried out the killings pursuant to a contract and that the killings were to aid the act of dacoity and to destroy evidence. In that view, in our considered opinion, the initial hurdle i.e. categorization of the petitioner as falling under para 5(xii) is per se erroneous.
10. With regard to the other aspect of the Policy, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner has contended that in the light of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Joseph Vs The State of Kerala and others, reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 10 1211; Bilkis Yakub Rasool Vs Union of India and others, reported in (2024) 5 SCC 481, and Rajo @ Rajwa @ Rajendra Mandal Vs The State of Bihar and others, Writ Petition (Criminal) No(s). 252 of 2023, decided on 25.08.2023, the Policy which was existing as on the date of conviction and sentencing alone is the Policy relevant for the purpose of considering a case of remission in exercise of powers u/s 432 and 433-A of Cr.P.C.
11. In Para 20 of the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Joseph's case (Supra), it has been observed as under :
"20. A reading of the observations of this court in State of Haryana v. Jagdish, (2010) 3 SCR 716, which was followed in State of Haryana v. Raj Kumar, (2021) 9 SCC 292, makes the position of law clear: the remission policy prevailing on the date of conviction, is to be applied in a given case, and if a more liberal policy exists on the day of consideration, then the latter would apply.
This approach was recently followed by this Court in Rajo v. State of Bihar (Supra) as well."
12. The observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court in paras 32 and 37 also have an impact and bearing on the petitioner's case on hand. That apart, this position in law has been reiterated by the Apex Court in the case of Bilkis 11 Yakub Rasool Vs Union of India and others, reported in (2024) 5 SCC 481, wherein in para 222.4, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under :
"222.4. The policy of remission applicable would therefore be the Policy of the State which is the appropriate Government and which has the jurisdiction to consider that application. The policy of remission applicable at the time of the conviction could apply and only if for any reason, the said policy cannot be made applicable a more benevolent policy, if in vogue, could apply."
13. Elaborating further the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner would contend that in the relevant point of time, i.e., in 2011, when the petitioner was convicted, the State of Uttarakhand did not have a remission policy and, in fact, in Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 272 of 2023, Rajesh Sharma Vs The State of Uttarakhand & another, in their counter-affidavit filed before the Hon'ble Apex Court, which is extracted in para 4 of the order passed by the Apex Court while disposing of the said writ petition on 10.11.2023, the State has stated as under:
"4. The State of Uttarakhand has stated thus in its counter affidavit:12
"That it is pertinent to mention that the State of Uttarakhand was carved out from the erstwhile State of Uttar Pradesh on 09.11.2000 thereafter till the time the successor State of Uttarakhand could make laws by its own legislature certain laws operating in the State of Uttar Pradesh was adopted, in view hereof earlier the prisoners where considered for premature release on the basis of Chapter VIII of U.P. Jail Manual Rules, therefore until the policy of premature release of prisoner was formulated by the State of Uttarakhand, the policy in vogue in State of Uttar Pradesh was applicable in the State of Uttarakhand."
14. This position is not disputed. In fact, the learned Deputy Advocate General would submit that the Uttar Pradesh Jail Manual was relied upon till the framing of the permanent policy, and that para 198 constituted the policy for consideration of cases for premature release.
15. Para 198 contained in Chapter VIII of the U.P. Jail Manual, 1968, as modified in 1968, reads as under :
"198.(a) The superintendent shall submit through the Superintendent of Police and the District Magistrate of the district of conviction for the consideration and the orders of the State Government under Section 432 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the nominal roll in duplicate of every life-convict as soon as the term of imprisonment undergone by the convict together with any remission earned by him 13 under the rules amounts to fourteen years. Immediately on receipt of the roll, the District Magistrate shall move the court concerned for supplying him with the certified copy of the relevant judgment in the case free of cost and record on the roll after consulting through the Superintendent of Police or the District Magistrate of the district of residence, if such district of residence is other than the district of conviction -
(1) his opinion whether there is any objection to the immediate release of the convict;
(2) if there is any objection to the immediate release of the convict, his suggestion as to the total period of imprisonment inclusive of remissions which the convict should serve; and (3) a brief account of the circumstances of the crime or crimes for which the convict was convicted.
16. On a reading of para 198(a), it is apparent that once the convict sentenced to life imprisonment has undergone imprisonment for 14 years is entitled to be considered by the State Government under Section 432 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
17. In the above background, though the writ petition could have been disposed of, yet addressing the larger issue of policy, as canvassed by the learned Senior Counsel, by way of an interim arrangement, only one of the reliefs prayed for is granted, i.e., prayer (C). We deem it necessary and appropriate to grant the relief 14 despite the Co-ordinate Bench, in WPPIL No. 50 of 2024, having accepted the categorization by the respondents that the petitioner falls under the prohibited category, in view of the fact that the categorization is not only erroneous, but it directly affects the right guaranteed to a citizen under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, and also in view of the fact that the petitioner was not heard by the Co-ordinate Bench in the PIL. Accordingly, prayer (C) is allowed, pending disposal of the writ petition.
18. In such view of the matter, prayer (C) is allowed. There shall be a direction to the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 to forthwith refer the case of the petitioner to the permanent committee constituted under para 3 of the Permanent Policy of 2022. The records relating to the petitioner shall be placed before the committee for reconsideration, and a copy of this order shall also be placed before the Board. It is made clear that the committee shall be constituted within 15 days, and the committee shall take decision and report the decision within the next 15 days, and the committee shall forthwith communicate the decision to the petitioner.
19. In the event, the consideration of the case of the petitioner for early release is not completed within 30 15 days, re-list the writ petition for consideration of interim relief.
20. At this juncture the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court made in paras 15.2 and 15.3 in the case of Sukhdev Yadav @ Pehalwan Vs State of (NCT of Delhi) & others, rendered in Criminal Appeal No. 3271 of 2025, decided on 29.07.2025, can be profitably quoted hereunder:
"15.2 In the instant case, as already noted, the life imprisonment being twenty years of actual imprisonment was without consideration of remission. Soon after the period of twenty years is completed, in our view, the appellant has to be simply released from jail provided the other sentences run concurrently. The appellant is not under an obligation to make an application seeking remission of his sentence on completion of twenty years.
This is simply for the reason that the appellant has completed his twenty years of actual imprisonment and in fact, during the period of twenty years, the appellant was not entitled to any remission. Thus, in the instant case, on completion of the twenty years' of actual imprisonment, it is wholly unnecessary for the appellant to seek remission of his sentence on the premise that his sentence is a life imprisonment i.e. till the end of his natural life. On the other hand, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent- State and respondent-complainant contended that once the period of twenty years is over, which was without any consideration of remission, the appellant 16 had to seek remission of his sentence (life imprisonment) by making an application to the Sentence Review Board which would consider in accordance with the applicable policy and decide whether the remission of sentence imposed on the appellant has to be granted or not. Such a contention cannot be accepted for the following reasons:
(i) firstly, because, in the instant case, the sentence of life imprisonment has been fixed to be twenty years of actual imprisonment which the appellant herein has completed;
(ii) secondly, during the period of twenty years the appellant was not entitled to seek any remission; and
(iii) thirdly, on completion of twenty years of actual imprisonment, the appellant is entitled to be released.
15.3 This is because in this case, instead of granting death penalty, alternative penalty of life imprisonment has been awarded which shall be for a period of twenty years of actual imprisonment. That even in the absence of death penalty being imposed, life imprisonment of a fixed term of twenty years was imposed which is possible only for a High Court or this Court to do so. The period of twenty years is without remission inasmuch as the appellant is denied the right of remission of his sentence on completion of fourteen years as per Section 432 read with Section 433-A of the CrPC. Such a right has been denied by the High Court but that does not mean that on completion of twenty years of imprisonment the appellant has to still seek reduction of his sentence on the premise that he was awarded life imprisonment which is till the end of his natural life. If that was so, the High Court would have specified it in those terms. On the other hand, the High Court has imposed life 17 imprisonment which shall be twenty years of actual imprisonment without consideration of remission. The High Court was of the view that for a period of twenty years, the appellant has to undergo actual imprisonment which would not take within its meaning any period granted for parole or furlough."
21. The writ petition is retained on Board for consideration of prayer Nos. (A) and (B).
_______________ G. NARENDAR, C.J.
__________________ SUBHASH UPADHYAY, J.
Dt: 26TH AUGUST, 2025 Negi 18