Bombay High Court
Shyam Lachmandas Ajwani vs The State Of Maharashtra And Another on 7 November, 1990
Equivalent citations: 1991CRILJ970
ORDER
1. The petitioner has preferred the instant petition although registered as a writ petition, under S. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short the Cr.P.C.) for quashing the process issued against him by the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, 37th Court, Esplanade, Bombay, under S. 403 of the Indian Penal Code (for short the I.P.C.) upon the complaint filed by the respondent No. 2 against him under sections 403 and 406 of the I.P.C. on the ground that the said complaint does not disclose any offence punishable under the I.P.C. and, therefore, issuance of the process amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court.
Briefly the facts are that one flat No. 5 upon the second floor in the Jai Kismat Co-operative Housing Society (for short the Society) was owned by one Laxmandas S. Ajwani, who was a member of the said society. The said society is registered under the provisions of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The said Laxmandas had nominated his wife Kalawanti L. Ajwani as his nominee as per the provisions of S. 30 of the Act and R. 25 of the Rules framed thereunder so as to facilitate the transfer of his share and interest in the society after his death. The said Laxmandas died on 6-9-1978 whereafter his nominee i.e. his wife Smt. Kalawantibai was enrolled as the member of the society and his share and interest in the society was transferred in her name. Smt. Kalawantibai, the mother of the petitioner, nominated the petitioner as her nominee and, therefore, after her death the name of the petitioner was entered as the member of the society in its register and the share and interest in the society in her name was transferred in his name, in accordance with S. 30 of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. This, according to the learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 had taken place in November, 1984. The petitioner has thereafter continued in possession and occupation of the said flat.
2. In November, 1988, the respondent No. 2, who is the sister of the petitioner, filed a complaint case before the Metropolitan Magistrate Court No, 37, Esplanade, Bombay, for suitably punishing the petitioner for the offences under sections 403 and 406 of the I.P.C. Her verification statement was recorded by the learned Magistrate on 1-12-1988. He was of the view that one of the offences in the complaint was a cognizable offence and required investigation of the same by the police. Therefore, before issuing the process he directed investigation by the police for which a copy of the complaint was sent to it. The police sent its report on 29-7-1989 and, according to it, the claim of the respondent No. 2 was about the share in the property and was a matter of civil dispute. After the receipt of the police report, the learned Magistrate by his order dated 25-9-1989, which is a reasoned order, issued the process against the petitioner under S. 403 of the I.P.C. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner has preferred the instant petition against the same under S. 482 of the Cr.P.C.
3. It is at this stage pertinent to see that the husband of the respondent No. 2, who is a counsel appearing in the above complaint case, also preferred a writ petition bearing No. 832 of 1990, which in fact is a petition under S. 482, Cr.P.C. as mentioned therein for quashing the derogatory remarks made against him by the learned Magistrate and also for framing an additional charge under S. 409 of the I.P.C. against the petitioner in the above complaint case.
3A. In the above petition, notice before admission was issued by this Court. Since the petitioner in the writ petition No. 832 of 1990 had prayed for a relief that an additional charge under S. 409 of the I.P.C. should be framed in the instant complaint case against the petitioner, I had called for the above writ petition No. 832 of 1990 for being disposed of along with the instant writ petition. The learned counsel for the respondent No. 2, who is the petitioner in the said writ petition No. 832 of 1990, has filed a pursis in Writ Petition No. 832 of 1990 that since the question of framing of charge under Sections 409 and 406, Cr.P.C. is being decided in the instant writ petition No. 777/1990, he would not agitate the said question in W.P. No. 832 of 1990. In view of the above pursis, it is not necessary to decide the W.P. No. 832/1990 along with the instant writ petition.
4. Turning to the W.P. No. 777/1990, the main question to be considered on merits is whether the facts contained in the complaint filed by the respondent No. 2 taken at their face value disclose an offence under sections 403, 406 and/or S. 409 of the I.P.C. However, before going into the said question, it is necessary to consider the preliminary objections raised on behalf of the respondent No. 2 about the maintainability of the instant writ petition. At the outset, it may be pointed out that the preliminary objection about laches, the existence of an alternative remedy, and the suppression of material facts raised on behalf of the respondent No. 2 are under the impression that this is a writ petition under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. As I have already pointed out above, although the instant petition is registered as a writ petition, the relief claimed is under S. 482 of the Cr.P.C.
5. Be that as it may, the submission as regards the preliminary objection about the inordinate delay or laches is based upon the fact that after the complaint case was filed by the respondent No. 2, the petitioner had appeared before the learned Magistrate on nine occasions and had thereafter only preferred the instant writ petition in this Court. It may be seen that after the process was issued, there is not much progress in the trial. The provisions of S. 482 Cr.P.C. relate to the inherent powers of this Court which are conferred upon this Court to see that there is no abuse of the process of the Court. If, as urged on behalf of the petitioner, the allegations in the complaint taken as they are do not disclose any offence punishable under Sections 403, 406 or 409 of the I.P.C. the mere fact that the petitioner participated in the proceedings before the learned Magistrate on nine occasions cannot come in his way in challenging the prosecution against him. On the contrary, if there is an inordinate delay of laches in the prosecution without any progress in the same, it would amount to harassment of the petitioner and an abuse of the process of the Court warranting interference under S. 482 of the Cr.P.C.
6. As regards the other preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondent No. 2, relating to the existence of an alternate remedy, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 2 has urged before me that the alternate remedy is provided under S. 245 of the Cr.P.C. On perusal of S. 245, Cr.P.C., it cannot be said that it is available to challenge the process issued by the Court at the threshold if on the basis of the allegations made in the complaint no offence is disclosed. S. 245, Cr.P.C. enables the Court to discharge the accused when upon taking of the evidence no case can be made out against him. It is thus clearly a stage in the trial of the accused person. It is true that even before that stage the Magistrate is empowered to discharge the accused under sub-section (2) of S. 245, Cr.P.C., if he considers the charge as groundless. However, the said provision cannot be said to be an alternate remedy to the challenge of the issuance of process itself at the threshold which means proceeding with the trial of the accused person itself, on the ground that the same amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court because no offence is disclosed against the petitioner on the basis of the allegations made in the complaint. At any rate, it is not a bar if a proper case for interference under the inherent powers of the Court under S. 482 of the Cr.P.C. is made out by the petitioner. There is thus no merit in the above preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondent No. 2, that there is an alternate remedy to the petitioner under S. 245, Cr.P.C.
7. As regards the preliminary objection about the suppression of material facts based on the judgment of Guttal, J. rendered on 12-12-1989 in Criminal, Appeal No. 1822 of 1989, it is a judgment in a different case where the dispute is between the petitioner and his brothers, one of whom viz. Harbhagwan Laxmandas had filed a complaint in Cri. Case No. 765/W of 1986 about the criminal breach of trust and misappropriation relating to the shop of which the father of the petitioner was the licensee. It is difficult to see how the said judgment has any relevance to the facts in the instant case. Only because the petitioner and his brothers are involved and since the charge is about the criminal breach of trust and misappropriation, failure to bring to the notice of this Court the said judgment would not mean that the petitioner is guilty of suppression of material facts for which the petition is liable to be thrown away at the threshold, The questions involved in the instant petition have to be considered on the basis of the facts contained in the complaint in the instant case. The said judgment does not deal with the facts relating, to the residential flat in question. The above preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondent No. 2 thus deserves to be rejected.
8. It is next urged on behalf of the respondent No. 2 that unless the impugned order is perverse, no interference is called for in the same under S. 482 of the Cr.P.C. It may be seen that an order can be said to be perverse if it is based on a finding for which there is no evidence on record or which is not supported by the evidence on record. In the instant case, where the order issuing process is challenged which challenge is at the threshold before the stage of evidence, the said order can be characterised as perverse if the facts on record as disclosed through the complaint and its verification do not disclose any offence. The question thus for consideration in the instant case is whether the allegations made in the complaint by the respondent No. 2 taken at their face value disclose any offence.
8A. The learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 has then urged before me that this Court has no power or jurisdiction under S. 482, Cr.P.C. to interfere with the order of the learned Magistrate issuing process to the petitioner. In support he has relied upon the following judgments of the Supreme Court (i) State of Bihar v. Murad Ali, ; (ii) Radhe Shyam v. Kunj Bihari, AIR 1990 SC 221 : (1990 Cri LJ 668); (iii) Smt. Nagawwa Shivalingappa v. Veer-anna, ; (iv) Hararam v. Tikaram, ; (v) Khacheru Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1982 SC 784 (2) : (1982 Cri LJ 629(2)) and (vi) J. P. Sharma v. Vinod Kumar, . All the above cases, except the case of Khacheru Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1982 SC 784(2) : (1982 Cri LJ 629(2)) deal with the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction of this Court under S. 482, Cr.P.C. In the case of Khacheru Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1982 SC 784 (2) : (1982 Cri LJ 829(2)) the question of scope of jurisdiction of this Court under S. 482, Cr.P.C. is not considered and hence it is not relevent for the purpose of this petition.
8B. As regards the scope and ambit and jurisdiction of this Court under S. 482, Cr.P.C., the law is well settled in view of the various judgments of the Supreme Court, including the judgments cited supra relied upon on behalf of the respondent No. 2. The leading case of the Supreme Court is R. P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, upon the analogous provisions of S. 561A of the old Cr.P.C. Some of the cases in which inherent jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceedings can and should be exercised are pointed out in para 6 of the said judgment. The test with which we are concerned in the instant case is whether the allegations in the complaint even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do constitute the offence alleged against the petitioner without involving any question of appreciation of evidence as such. The above test is also reiterated in the judgments of the Supreme Court cited supra relied upon on behalf of the respondent No. 2 and in particular the case of Nagawwa v. Veeramma, . In para 5 of which similar tests are laid down to show in which cases the process issued by the Magistrate can be quashed or set aside under S. 482, Cr.P.C.
9. Turning now to the contentions raised on merits in the instant petition and keeping in mind the above scope and ambit of the jurisdiction of this Court under S. 482, Cr.P.C., if the complaint made by the respondent No. 2 is examined, the facts which appear from the said complaint and which are not in dispute are that the father of the petitioner was a member of the society and was the owner of the flat in question. As per the provisions of S. 30 of the Act and R. 25 of the Rules framed thereunder, he had nominated his wife as his nominee in respect of his share and interest in the society. After his death on 6-9-1978, as his nominee, his share and interest in the society was transferred as S. 30 of the Act in the name of his wife. The wife in turn had nominated as her nominee under S. 30 of the Act read with R. 25 of the Rules framed thereunder the petitioner, who is her son. She died on 22-10-1984 and, therefore, after her death being her nominee, in November, 1984, the share and interest in her name in the society was transferred in the name of the petitioner.
10. It may then be seen that admittedly the petitioner is the brother of the respondent No. 2. In fact, the petitioner had 3 other brothers and four married sisters including the respondent No. 2. According to the respondent No. 2, after the death of their parents, all the above brothers and sisters had equal interest in the flat in question. It is the case of the respondent No. 2 in the complaint that each of the brothers and sisters was entitled to the 1/8th share in the flat which the petitioner was occupying since Diwali 1984. Further, according to the allegations made by the respondent No. 2 in para 2 of the complaint, the petitioner had no right, title or interest solely to live in the said furnished flat with fixtures and furnitures taken possession of by him in all of which the respondent No. 2 had 1/8th share.
11. The complaint of the respondent No. 2 then discloses in para 3 that the petitioner is using and claiming to be owner of the flat to the exclusion of the other heirs illegally and wrongfully. Wrongful misappropriation and criminal breach of trust in respect of the income and the value of the flat which according to the respondent no. 2 would be about Rs. 12 lacs is sought to be shown in the said para on the basis of the hypothetical calculation that the flat on the second floor above the flat occupied by the petitioner has been let out by its owner under an agreement under which the owner of the flat gets payment of Rs. 3,000/- per month and had received Rs. 2 lacs by way of deposit upon which she earned interest since 1982.
12. It is further alleged in para 4 of the complaint that on 10-9-1987, a letter was written to the advocate of the petitioner on behalf of the respondent No. 2 calling upon the petitioner to take the decision from the Court about his shares of the heirs and give the respondent No. 2 her share in the flat. The allegation is that since the petitioner did not comply with the said notice, he has with dishonest intention, illegally and wrongfully failed to make the payment and give the share to respondent No. 2 in the flat with fixtures and the furniture therein.
13. The verification statement of the respondent No. 2 in support of the complaint was recorded on 1-12-1988. The question thus to be considered is whether the above facts narrated in the complaint make out an offence under S. 403, 406 and/ or 409 of the I.P.C. as submitted on behalf of the respondent No. 2.
14. The learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 has urged before me that in view of the judgment of this Court in the case of Gopal Vishnu v. Madhukar, , the petitioner was holding the property i.e. the fiat in question as a trustee being the nominee of his mother, in which capacity the share and interest in the society was transferred in his name by the society. His submission thus is that the petitioner was bound to comply with the obligation as a trustee in respect of the flat in question. The learned counsel for the petitioner has, however, urged before me that apart from being the nominee, the petitioner was a legal heir and was entitled to reside in the flat as a legal heir as his share in the flat was even recognised by the respondent No. 2 in her complaint. The submission thus is that since the occupation of the flat as a joint or a co-owner was legal, he cannot be held guilty of criminal breach of trust of misappropriation. In support of the above submission, reliance is placed upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Velji Raghavji Patel v. State of Maharashatra, .
15. The learned counsel for the petitioner has been urged that since the flat in question is a dwelling house where his parents resided, then as per S. 23 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the respondent No. 2 has no right to claim its partition and it is only when the male heirs choose to divide the said property that she can claim her share in the said property. Perusal of S. 23 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, would show that where a Hindu intestate has left surviving him or her both male and female heirs specified in class I of the Schedule and his or her property includes a dwelling house wholly occupied by members of his or her family, then notwithstanding anything contained in the said Act, the right of any such female heir to claim partition of the dwelling-house shall not arise until the male heirs choose to divide their respective shares therein; but the female heir shall be entitled to a right of residence therein. There is also an important proviso to S. 23 of the said Act, in which it is provided that where such female heir is a daughter, she shall be entitled to a right of residence in the dwelling house only if she is unmarried has been deserted by or has separated from her husband or is a widow. It is, therefore urged that apart from the fact that the respondent No. 2 would get her share only when the male heirs choose to divide their respective shares in the dwelling house, in view of the proviso to S. 23, the respondent No. 2 has even no right of residence also because she is a married daughter.
16. It is clear from the facts narrated in the complaint that the flat in question is a dwelling house occupied initially by the parents of the petitioner and thereafter by the petitioner, who is their son, it is not shown that the male members of the joint Hindu family have claimed partition of the said house. There is, therefore, some force in the submission made on behalf of the petitioner as regards the right of the respondent No. 2 to claim 1/8th share in the flat in question. At any rate, it raises a dispute purely of civil nature for which recourse has to be taken to a civil remedy.
17. Turning now to S. 403 of the I.P.C., it is material to see that S. 403 of the I.P.C. is applicable only to the moveable property. What is urged in the instant complaint case is the misappropriation and conversion to one's own use by the petitioner the immovable property i.e. the flat. As regards the use of the flat admittedly the petitioner is residing in that flat. It is not the case that the petitioner has either sold the flat or has let out the same and was making money out of it. Even from this point of view, S. 403, I.P.C. is not attracted in the instant case. As regards S. 409 of the I.P.C. the submission on behalf of the respondent No. 2 is that the petitioner was an agent when he was made the nominee of the flat by his mother and since in that capacity the entrustment of the flat was made to him, the breach of trust committed by him and the misappropriation and conversion to his own use of the flat would bring him within the mischief of S. 409 of the I.P.C. Perusal of the said section would show that it is in respect of the criminal breach of trust committed by a public servant or in the way of his business as a banker, merchant, factor, broker, attorney or agent. There is no case made out that agency was the business of the petitioner and that he was nominated by his mother while carrying out the business of agency. Obviously, S. 409 of the I.P.C. is not attracted to the facts of the instant case.
18. Then remains S. 406 of the I.P.C. which punishes the criminal breach of trust, as defined in S. 405 of the I.P.C. S. 405 of the I.P.C. reads as follows :
"405. Criminal breach of Trust :
Whoever, being in any manner entrusted with property, or with any dominion over property, dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use of that property, or dishonestly uses or disposes of that property in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal contract, express or implied, which he has made touching the discharge of such trust, or wilfully suffers any other person so to do, commits 'criminal breach of trust'".
19. As regards the charge of criminal breach of trust, the submission on behalf of the respondent No. 2 is that as a nominee the petitioner was holding the flat in question as a trustee on behalf of all the heirs entitled to equal share in the said flat and since he has with dishonest intention wrongfully failed to discharge his trust by giving her share to the respondent No. 2 and by taking her payment for his exclusive use of the flat with fixtures and furnitures, the petitioner has committed criminal breach of trust. In the case of Gopal Vishnu v. Madhukar, cited supra upon which reliance is placed on, behalf of the respondent No. 2 in support of the above submission, it is held that under S. 30 of the Act, the intention is to provide for as to who has to deal with the society on the death of its member and not to create any new rule of succession. According to the said judgment, the purpose of nomination is to make certain with whom the society has to deal and not to create any interest in the nominee to the exclusion of the other legal heirs of the estate. It is specifically pointed out in para 10 of the judgment that the society's interest is confined only to the shares of the members and their land and therefore nomination under S. 30 of the Act is in regard to same only and not in regard to the structure put up by the deceased member. It is, therefore, clear from the above judgment that the nomination of the petitioner under S. 30 of the Act is not in respect of the flat in question. The question of its ownership would, therefore, be governed by the law applicable to the parties.
20. What is material to be seen is that the judgment cited supra nowhere states that a nominee of a deceased member holds his property i.e. his house in the society as a trustee on behalf of his legal heirs. There is no such provision in the Act or the rules framed thereunder. As per the personal law applicable to the parties in the instant case viz. the Hindu Law, it cannot be said that because the petitioner is nominated as a member of the society and because he is occupying the flat in question he is holding the same as a trustee for all the legal heirs. As is already made clear, the petitioner's occupation at the flat is in his capacity as its joint or a co-owner. His occupation of the flat is thus not illegal or wrongful.
20A. It is observed by the Supreme Court in the case of Velji Raghavji v. The State of Maharashtra, , cited supra, which is a case of partnership concern that an owner of a property in whichever way he uses his property and with whatever intention cannot be held liable for misappropriation and that would be so even if he is not the exclusive owner thereof. The occupation of the flat by the petitioner as a joint or a co-owner cannot therefore amount to dishonest misappropriation or user of the flat within the meaning of S. 405 of I.P.C.
21. It may then be seen that apart from the fact that as shown above no relationship as a trustee is created so far as the flat is concerned by the nomination of the petitioner under S. 30 of the Act, there is no provision in the Act casting any obligations upon the nominee so far as the legal heirs of the deceased members are concerned although by nomination he is made responsible to the society. Hindu Law also does not cast any obligation upon the joint or co-owner that he must give the share or shares of the other legal heirs. On the contrary, the State of every joint Hindu family is joint until it is disrupted by partition demanded by a person who is entitled to a share in partition. There are thus no obligations in the nature of a trust upon any joint or co-owner merely because he continues to reside in the house jointly owned. It may, however, be open to any person to claim a partition if he is entitled to share or partition which dispute is essentially a dispute of civil nature. As regards the respondent No. 2, S. 23 of the Hindu Sussession Act creates a doubt whether she can herself claim partition of her share in the flat in question, as pointed out above. Moreover, it is clear from the complaint that the petitioner has been only residing in the flat and that he has not disposed of the same or has let it out to earn any benefit for himself. It is only by the hypothetical calculation on the basis of the rent or other pecuniary benefit earned by some other flat owner in the society that it is sought to be demonstrated how much pecuniary loss is caused to the respondent No. 2 by the petitioner by not giving her share in the flat.
22. It is thus clear from the facts in the complaint and the special features of the case which can be taken into consideration as observed by the Supreme Court in the case of Madhaorao v. Sambhajirao, that if no share is given to the respondent No. 2 or no payment is made by the petitioner for the use and occupation of the flat, if at all she is entitled to it may constitute a civil wrong. Surely the provisions of S. 405 of the Cr.P.C. are not attracted in the said facts which thus disclose no offence. It is well settled that the criminal law cannot be allowed to be used as a speedy remedy or as a substitute for civil remedy for settlement of scores between the parties. If that is so, the instant prosecution cannot be allowed to continue, nay it is the duty of the Court to quash the prosecution by exercising its inherent jurisdiction under S. 482 of the Cr.P.C., because the continuance of the same would amount to abuse of the process of the Court and the harassment of the petitioner.
23. The learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 has relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Jaikrishnadas Manohardas Desai v. State of Bombay, AIR 1960 SC 859 : (1960 Cri LJ 1250) in support of his submission that to establish a charge of criminal breach of trust, it is not necessary for him to prove the precise mode of conversion, misappropriation or misapplication by the accused of the property entrusted to him or over which he has dominion. It is difficult to see how the observations made by the Supreme Court in the context of altogether different set of facts are attracted or have any relevance to the facts in the instant case. The facts in the above case, before the Supreme Court show that cloth admeasuring approximately 1,80,000 yards out of the cloth entrusted to the company by the Taxtile Commissioner for dyeing was, not returned and it is in the said context that the observations are made by the Supreme Court in para 4 about the failure to account for the property entrusted. In the instant case the petitioner is residing in the flat in his own right as a joint or a co-owner and not as a trustee. The ratio of the above decision is clearly inapplicable to the facts of the instant case.
24. As held by me, it cannot be said that the allegations made in the complaint taken at their face value do not (sic) disclose that the petitioner has committed any offence punishable under sections 403, 406 or 409, of the, I.P.C. The instant petition therefore, deserves to be allowed.
25 In the result, the instant petition is allowed. The impugned order of the learned trial Court issuing process to the petitioner is quashed and set aside. The prosecution launched against him as per the complaint filed in this case by the respondent No. 2 shall thus stand quashed and set aside. Rule made absolute in the above terms.
26. Order accordingly.