Punjab-Haryana High Court
Ajit Singh vs Central Bureau Of Investigation ... on 19 September, 2012
Author: Mehinder Singh Sullar
Bench: Mehinder Singh Sullar
CRR No.2493 of 2012 (O&M) -1-
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH.
CRR No.2493 of 2012 (O&M)
Date of Decision:-19.9.2012
Ajit Singh ---Petitioner
Versus
Central Bureau of Investigation ---Respondent
CORAM:- HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE MEHINDER SINGH SULLAR
Present:- Mr.R.S.Cheema, Senior Advocate with\
Mr.J.S.Mehndiratta, Advocate for the petitioner.
Mehinder Singh Sullar, J. (Oral)
The matrix of the facts & material, which needs a necessary mention for the limited purpose of deciding the core controversy, involved in the instant revision petition and emanating from the record, is that, initially, a criminal case was registered against the petitioner (accused) and his other co-accused, by means of Crime Report, bearing No.34 dated 8.8.2002 (Annexure P1), on accusation of having committed the offences punishable under section 120-B read with sections 420, 409 IPC and sections 13(1)(c) & 13 (1) (d) read with section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter to be referred as "the PC Act") by the respondent-Central Bureau of Investigation (for brevity "the CBI").
2. After completion of the investigation, the CBI submitted the final police report (Annexure P2) and accordingly, the accused were charge sheeted to face the trial of indicated offences, by way of charge CRR No.2493 of 2012 (O&M) -2- sheet dated 7.2.2006 and the case was slated for prosecution evidence. After conclusion of the prosecution evidence, the statements of the accused were recorded as contemplated under section 313 Cr.PC on 30.3.2009. As soon as, the accused examined four witnesses in defence, in the meantime, the petitioner-accused moved an application on 21.5.2012 to summon S.K.Abrol as an additional accused under section 319 Cr.PC.
3. The trial Judge dismissed the application u/s 319 Cr.PC, by virtue of impugned order dated 2.6.2012, which, in substance, is as under:-
"From appraisal of record in light of aforesaid rival contentions, it is crystal clear that S.K.Abrol is named in FIR. In challan/final report, SK Abrol was kept in column no.2 and was cited as prosecution witness. The charges were framed on 07.02.2006 against accused. The prosecution got examined 31 witnesses. Statement of accused, as per Section 313 Cr.PC, was recorded on 30.03.2009. In defence evidence, accused got examined four witnesses. The application for summoning SK Abrol as additional accused was filed on 21.05.2012. So, the application is at a belated stage of the case. If application is allowed, a denovo trial shall take place. In application, it is pleaded that SK Abrol had prepared and signed application for demand draft, demand draft; withdrawal slip; banker's cheque etc. SK Abrol is not alleged to have misappropriated any amount of money. As per judgment of Michael Machado and another case (supra), it is well settled principle of law that application under Section 319 Cr.PC is not to be entertained at a belated stage. As per Sarabjit Singh's case (supra), it is well settled that a person should be summoned, only when court finds that evidence on record would reasonably lead to conviction of person sought to be summoned. In view of above material facts and well settled principles of law, arguments of learned counsel for accused, being devoid of merit, are untenable.
No other point was argued.CRR No.2493 of 2012 (O&M) -3-
Hence, in view of above observations, application dated 21.05.2012 under Section 319 Cr.PC for summoning of SK Abrol as additional accused is dismissed."
4. The petitioner-accused still did not feel satisfied and preferred the present revision petition to challenge the impugned order, invoking the provisions of section 401 Cr.PC.
5. After hearing the learned senior counsel for the petitioner, going through the legal provisions & material on record with his valuable help and after considering the entire matter deeply, to my mind, there is no merit in the instant revision petition in this context.
6. As is clear that Section 19 (3) of the P.C.Act postulates as under:-
"Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)--
(a) no finding, sentence or order passed by a special Judge shall be reversed or altered by a court in appeal, confirmation or revision on the ground of the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in, the sanction required under sub-section (1), unless in the opinion of that court, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby;
(b) no court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on the ground of any error, omission or irregularity in the sanction granted by the authority, unless it is satisfied that such error, omission or irregularity has resulted in a failure of justice;
(c) no court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on any other ground and no court shall exercise the powers of revision in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any inquiry, trial, appeal or other proceedings."
7. What cannot possibly be disputed here is that the trial Judge has only decided the application u/s 319 Cr.PC filed by the petitioner- CRR No.2493 of 2012 (O&M) -4- accused, through the medium of impugned interim order, which, to me, cannot legally be challenged in the garb of revision petition u/s 401 Cr.PC. This matter is not res integra and is now well settled.
8. An identical question came to be decided by this Court in case Kuldipak Ahuja son of Amar Nath Ahuja v. Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) 2011(2) RCR (Criminal) 710. Having considered the relevant provisions of section 19 of the PC Act and the judgments of Hon'ble Apex Court and Delhi High Court, it was held as under (paras 16 & 17):-
"16. In this manner, the special legislative intent emanating from section 19(3)(c) of the P.C.Act is clear and explicit that it was introduced for the purpose of quick disposal of cases, involving corruption by the accused under the Act. It is well settled principle of interpretation of statute that the words of an enactment are to be given their ordinary, popular and natural meaning. If such meaning is clear and unambiguous, the effect should be given to a provision of a statute in the same manner, whatever may be the consequences. By the very nature of the things, the basis of this principle is that the object of all interpretations being to know what the legislature intended, whatever was the intention of the legislature has been expressed by it through words which are to be interpreted accordingly. The intention of the legislature can be deduced only from the language through which it has expressed itself. If the language of a statute is clear, the only duty of the Court is to give effect to it and the Court has no business to look into the consequences of such interpretation. The Court is under an obligation to expound the law as it exists and leave the remedy to the legislature, even if harsh conclusions result from such exposition. Equally, it is now well recognized proposition of law that mandatory provisions and command of law have to be complied with in the same manner as envisaged and mandated by any statute and it cannot be interpreted CRR No.2493 of 2012 (O&M) -5- otherwise. Therefore, keeping the clear mandate of section 19(3)(c) of the P.C.Act into focus, to me, the instant petition is not legally maintainable, in the obtaining circumstances of the case.
17. Not only that, an identical question arose before Delhi High Court in case Dharambir Khattar And Other Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2009 (4) A.D. (Delhi) 657. After considering the relevant provisions of section 19(3)(c) of the P.C.Act and the various earlier judgments, including the judgment in V.C.Shukla's case (supra) and Satya Narayan Sharma v. State of Rajasthan (2001) 8 SCC 607, it was held as under:-
"Coming to the present case, this Court has no hesitation in holding that the ruling in V.C.Shukla in the context of the words interlocutory order? in Section 11 SCA would apply on all fours (Sic. force). As already noticed, there is very little distinction between Section 11 SCA and Section 19 (3) (c) PCA. The opening words of Section 19(3), like Section 11 SCA, constitutes a non obstante clause that keeps out the Cr.P.C. entirely. It evidences the legislative intent not to permit a revision petition against interlocutory orders passed by the Special Court notwithstanding the position to the contrary under the Cr.P.C. When the legislature expressly excludes the applicability of the Cr.P.C. by a non obstante clause, it would not be possible for a Court to overlook it and examine whether the order on charge is in the context of Section 397 Cr.P.C. an order that is subject to revision. In other words, if one were to accept the arguments of learned counsel for the accused, then the non obstante portion of Section 19(3) of the PCA would be rendered redundant. It must be remembered that this is not a petition challenging constitutional validity of Section 19 (3) of the PCA. On the other hand the petitioners are only seeking to interpret Section 19 (3)(c) PCA to permit a revision petition against an order on charge by the Special Court."
9. Therefore, the ratio of law laid down in the aforesaid CRR No.2493 of 2012 (O&M) -6- judgments "mutatis mutandis" is applicable to the facts of the present case and is the complete answer to the problem in hand.
10. There is yet another aspect of the matter, which can be viewed from entirely a different angle. As reproduced above, the trial Judge has recorded the cogent grounds to negate the plea of the petitioner-accused to summon the additional accused, vide impugned order. Such order, containing valid reasons, cannot possibly be interfered with by this Court, in the limited revisional jurisdiction under Section 401 Cr.PC, unless and until, the same is illegal, perverse and without jurisdiction. Since no such patent illegality or legal infirmity has been pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner-accused, so, the impugned order deserves to be and is hereby maintained in the obtaining circumstances of the case.
11. No other legal point, worth consideration, has either been urged or pressed by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner.
12. In the light of aforesaid reasons and without commenting further anything on merits, lest it may prejudice the case of either side during the course of trial of the main case, as there is no merit, therefore, the instant revision petition is hereby dismissed as such.
19.9.2012 (Mehinder Singh Sullar)
AS Judge
Whether to be referred to reporter ? Yes/No