Allahabad High Court
Yashwant Singh vs State Of U.P. And Others on 3 February, 2012
Author: Sabhajeet Yadav
Bench: Sabhajeet Yadav
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD A.F.R. Reserved Case :- WRIT - A No. - 43561 of 2006 Petitioner :- Yashwant Singh Respondent :- State Of U.P. And Others Petitioner Counsel :- Vishwajeet Singh,V.S. Singh Respondent Counsel :- C.S.C. Hon'ble Sabhajeet Yadav,J.
Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned standing counsel for respondents.
2. By this petition, the petitioner has sought relief of writ of certiorari for quashing the orders dated 28.3.2005, contained in Annexures-10 and 11 of the writ petition, passed by the respondent no.4, orders dated 7.11.2005 and 5.11.2005, contained in Annexures-12 and 13 of the writ petition, passed by the respondent no.3 and orders dated 27.5.2006, contained in Annexure-14 and 15 of the writ petition, passed by the respondent no.2. And further a writ of mandamus is sought for directing the respondents to reinstate the petitioner as constable in G.R.P., Jhansi or any other place.
3. Brief facts leading to the case are that while working on the post of constable in Civil Police, Banda the petitioner was transferred to Government Railway Police, Jhansi and was relieved on 22.10.1999 from Police Line, Banda to join Government Railway Police Line, Jhansi by 29.10.1999. It is stated that during the joining period he became seriously ill and attended the doctor at District Hospital, Banda as he had no option but to receive regular treatment and could not make any application for sanction of medical leave. In this way, he was found to be unauthorisedly absent from duty. It is stated that with regard to his illness, he had regularly sent information to the Superintendent of Police, Banda and ultimately, he joined his duties on 1.02.2003 at Government Railway Police Line, Jhansi. On account of his such absence from the duty he was placed under suspension on 20.11.2002 by Superintendent of Police, G.R.P., Allahabad. Thereafter a preliminary inquiry for his absence from duty was held by Deputy Superintendent of Police, Kanpur, who had recommended for regular departmental inquiry, thereafter a charge sheet was served upon him on 26.9.2003 in which there was only one charge regarding his unauthorised absence from duty for a period of 1198 days. A photostat copy of charge sheet is on record as Annexure-2 of the writ petition.
4. It is stated that the petitioner submitted his detail reply to the charge sheet and in support of his reply he has filed photostat copy of several documents including medical certificates. A photostat copy of reply of charge sheet is on record as Annexure-4 of the writ petition. It is stated that the Inquiry Officer was not satisfied with the reply submitted by the petitioner and after holding inquiry, has submitted his inquiry report on 17.1.2005 holding the petitioner guilty of charge levelled against him. In the inquiry report the Deputy Superintendent of Police, G.R.P., Kanpur has also recommended that the petitioner may be reverted by placing him on minimum pay scale for a period of one year. A true copy of inquiry report submitted by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, G.R.P., Kanpur is on record as Annexure-5 of the writ petition. It is stated that while disagreeing with the findings and / or recommendation of Inquiry Officer, the Superintendent of Police, G.R.P., Allahabad directed to issue show cause notice for removal of the petitioner from service and for order of no pay for no work during the period of his unauthorised of absence from duty, vide order dated 27.1.2005. In compliance of the said order of Superintendent of Police, G.R.P., Allahabad two show cause notices were issued on 28.1.2005. In first show cause notice it was mentioned that since the petitioner was found absent from duty so he is not entitled for any salary and other financial benefits for the said period. In another show cause notice it was mentioned that the petitioner being unauthorisedly absent from duty is not capable of serving the police department and will be removed from service The copies of show cause notices are on record as Annexure-6 and 7 of the writ petition.
5. It is stated that on receipt of aforesaid show cause notices the petitioner submitted detail reply to both the show cause notices separately. A photostat copy of reply of show cause notices are on record as Annexures-8 and 9 of the writ petition. Thereupon the Superintendent of Police, G.R.P., Allahabad has passed two orders on 28.3.2005 contained in Annexures-10 and 11 of the writ petition. By one order it has been held that the petitioner is not entitled for any salary and other financial benefits during the period he was absent from duty and by another order of the same day dt. 28.3.2005 the petitioner has been removed from service. Feeling aggrieved against which the petitioner preferred two appeals separately, which were dismissed by appellate authority on 7.11.2005. Feeling aggrieved against the aforesaid orders, revisions filed by the petitioner have also been dismissed on 27.5.2006 contained in annexure-14 and 15 of the writ petition.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the inquiry officer while holding formal disciplinary inquiry against the petitioner, has examined the witnesses from both the sides. Shri Virendra Kumar Singh, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Railway, Jhansi, who conducted the preliminary inquiry against the petitioner, was also examined and cross-examined. Though in his said examination, the genuineness of petitioner's medical certificates was neither doubted nor disputed by him and instead thereof in cross-examination, he has admitted that the aforesaid medical certificates were genuine and counter signed by the Chief Medical Superintendent/Chief Medical Officer, therefore, there was no occasion to doubt its genuineness. Not only this, in defence the petitioner examined Dr. Santosh Kumar Gupta, posted as a doctor in Ayurvedic College and Hisptal, Attarra, district Banda who supported the medical certificates issued by him, but strangely enough while accepting these medical certificates, the inquiry officer has drawn wrong inference that since the petitioner was treated as out door patient by aforesaid doctors, therefore, it is not possible for him to make any comment about the illness of the petitioner and instead thereof, he has recommended that on that issue, the report from the Medical Board may obtained, for the reason that the absence of the petitioner was of 1198 days, but without seeking any opinion from the Medical Board, contrary to the material available on record, the inquiry officer has held that since the petitioner has failed to observe the provisions of Paras 381 and 382 of Police Regulations, and earlier also, on account of absence from duties, his leave was sanction without pay, therefore, he was in habit of absenting himself from duty and further held that he is guilty of negligence and dereliction from duty. Thus the aforesaid inference drawn by the inquiry officer is wholly perverse and contrary to the material on record.
7. It is further submitted that from perusal of the order dated 27.1.2005, passed by the disciplinary authority on the foot of the report of inquiry officer dated 17.1.2005, there is nothing to indicate that the disciplinary authority has recorded any reason for his disagreement with regard to the findings of the inquiry officer, rather, it appears that his disagreement was only in respect of proposed punishment to be awarded to the petitioner and in any view of the matter such disagreement without any reason is not sustainable in the eye of law.
8. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that although from the material available on record, inquiry officer has found that the medical certificates issued by the doctors to the petitioner about his illness, cannot be disputed or doubted but contrary to it, at another place, under wrong notion of law, inquiry officer has held that since absence was for more than 1198 days, therefore, opinion of medical board should be sought for. In this connection, learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that since inquiry officer has found the medical certificates of the petitioner are genuine, therefore, there was no occasion to hold that he cannot give any final opinion about the illness of petitioner instead thereof, only inevitable inference from the aforesaid facts and events could be drawn that the petitioner was ill during the aforesaid period. So far as grant of medical leave for the aforesaid period was concerned, it was no doubt true, that the inquiry officer was not authority on the point to recommend for grant of medical leave instead, it was upon the disciplinary authority to grant medical leave for the aforesaid period of 1198 days on the basis of those medical certificates or he could refer the matter before the medical board for examination but the disciplinary authority did neither refer the matter to medical board nor granted medical leave to the petitioner to the extent of which medical leave was admissible to him and has taken wholly illegal and arbitrary view in the matter for removing the petitioner from service without any rhyme or reason and without any justification under law.
9. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that it is very strange that one show cause notice was issued to the petitioner for denying him salary for the period of 1198 days and another show cause notice was issued for removal of the petitioner from service and two orders have been passed by the disciplinary authority one by denying the pay to the petitioner for the period of 1198 days and another by removing the petitioner from service on the same day and further submitted that once the petitioner has been removed from service, there was no occasion to pass another order for denying his salary for the period of 1198 days on account of his alleged unauthorised absence from duty. Thus, it appears that the disciplinary authority was not aware of the legal position and impugned order has been passed under wrong notion of law. In any view of the matter in given facts and circumstances of the case, penalty imposed upon the petitioner is unwarranted, arbitrary and under wrong notion of law for the reason that once the illness of the petitioner has not been disputed or doubted by the enquiry officer or disciplinary authority only course which was open for the disciplinary authority to grant medical leave to him to the extent it was admissible to him and for the remaining period for which no leave was admissible to him, he should have granted leave without pay by reinstating the petitioner in service and without imposing any punishment or penalty.
10. Contrary to it learned Standing counsel has tried to justify the impugned orders passed by authorities concerned.
11. Having regard to the rival submissions of learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of record the first question arises for consideration of this court is that as to whether while disagreeing with the findings and recommendation of inquiry officer the disciplinary authority was required to give opportunity of hearing to the petitioner at that stage or at any rate the disciplinary authority was bound to record its reason for disagreement with the findings of inquiry officer?
12. In this connection, it is to be noted that the Apex Court has considered the issue at several occasions. In Yoginath D. Bagde Vs. State of Maharashtra and another, AIR 1999 S.C. 3734 after referring several earlier decisions in para 30 to 33 Apex Court observed as under:-
"30. Recently, a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Punjab National Bank V. Kunj Behari Mishra (1998) 7 SCC 84 : AIR 1998 SC 2713: (1998 AIR SCW 2762 : 1998 Lab IC 3012 : 1998 All LJ 2009), relying upon the earlier decisions of this Court in State of Assam V. Bimal Kumar Pandit (1964) 2 SCR 1 : AIR 1963 SC 1612; Institute of Chartered Accountants of India V. L. K. Ratna (1986) 4 SCC 537 : (AIR 1987 SC 71) as also the Constitution Bench decision in Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad V. B. Karunakar (1993) 4 SCC 727 : (1994 AIR SCW 1050 : AIR 1994 SC 1074 : 1994 Lab IC 762) and the decision in Ram Kishan V. Union of India (1995) 6 SCC 157 :(1995 AIR SCW 4027 : AIR 1996 SC 255), has held that (AIR 1998 SC 2713 : 1998 AIR SCW 2762 : 1998 Lab IC 3012 : 1998 All LJ 2009, para 17) :
"It will not stand to reason that when the finding in favour of the delinquent officers is proposed to be overturned by the disciplinary authority then no opportunity should be granted. The first stage of the enquiry is not completed till the disciplinary authority has recorded its findings. The principles of natural justice would demand that the authority which proposes to decide against the delinquent officer must give him a hearing. When the enquiring officer holds the charges to be proved, then that report has to be given to the delinquent officer who can make a representation before the disciplinary authority takes further action which may be prejudicial to the delinquent officer. When, like in the present case, the enquiry report is in favour of the delinquent officer but the disciplinary authority proposes to differ with such conclusions, then that authority which is deciding against the delinquent officer must give him an opportunity of being heard for otherwise he would be condemned unheard. In departmental proceedings, what is of ultimate importance is the finding of the disciplinary authority."
31. The Court further observed as under (AIR 1998 SC 2713 : 1998 AIR SCW 2762 : 1998 Lab IC 3012 : 1998 All LJ 2009, para 18):
"When the enquiry is conducted by the enquiry officer, his report is not final or conclusive and the disciplinary proceedings do not stand concluded. The disciplinary proceedings stand concluded with the decision of the disciplinary authority. It is the disciplinary authority which can impose the penalty and not the enquiry officer. Where the disciplinary authority itself holds an enquiry, an opportunity of hearing has to be granted by him. When the disciplinary authority differs with the view of the enquiry officer and proposes to come to a different conclusion, there is no reason as to why an opportunity of hearing should not be granted. It will be most unfair and inequitous that where the charged officers succeed before the enquiry officer, they are deprived of representing to the disciplinary authority before that authority differs with the enquiry officer's report and, while recording a finding of guilt, imposes punishment on the officer. In our opinion, in any such situation, the charged officer must have an opportunity to represent before the disciplinary authority before final findings on the charges are recorded and punishment imposed."
32. The Court further held that the contrary view expressed by this Court in State Bank of India V. S.S. Koshal, 1994 Supp (2) SCC 468: (1994 AIR SCW 2901) and State of Rajasthan V. M.C. Saxena (1998) 3 SCC 385 : (1998 AIR SCW 965 : AIR 1998 SC 1150 : 1998 Lab IC 1038) was not correct.
33. In view of the above, a delinquent employee has the right of hearing not only during the enquiry proceedings conducted by the Enquiry Officer into the charges levelled against him but also at the stage at which those findings are considered by the Disciplinary Authority and the latter, namely, the Disciplinary Authority forms a tentative opinion that it does not agree with the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer. If the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer are in favour of the delinquent and it has been held that the charges are not proved, it is all the more necessary to give an opportunity of hearing to the delinquent employee before reversing those findings. The formation of opinion should be tentative and not final. It is at this stage that the delinquent employee should be given an opportunity of hearing after he is informed of the reasons on the basis of which the Disciplinary Authority has proposed to disagree with the findings of the Enquiry Officer. This is in consonance with the requirement of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution as it provides that a person shall not be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an enquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges. So long as a final decision is not taken in the matter, the enquiry shall be deemed to be pending. Mere submission of findings to the Disciplinary Authority does not being about the closure of the enquiry proceedings. The enquiry proceedings would come to an end only when the findings have been considered by the Disciplinary Authority and the charges are either held to be not proved or found to be proved and in that event punishment is inflicted upon the delinquent. That being so, the "right to be heard" would be available to the delinquent up to the final stage. This right being a constitutional right of the employee cannot be taken away in any legislative enactment or Service Rule including Rules made under Article 309 of the Constitution."
13. Thus, in view of legal position stated by Apex Court it is clear that a delinquent employee has right of hearing not only during the enquiry proceeding conducted by enquiry officer into the charges levelled against him but also at the stage at which those findings are considered by disciplinary authority and the disciplinary authority forms a tentative opinion that it does not agree with the findings recorded by enquiry officer. If the findings recorded by enquiry officer are in favour of delinquent employee and it has been held that the charges are not proved, it is at this stage that the delinquent employee should be given an opportunity of hearing after he is informed of the reasons on the basis of which the disciplinary authority has proposed to disagree with the findings of inquiry officer. This is in consonance with the requirement of Article 311(2) of the Constitution. This right being a constitutional right of the employee cannot be taken away in any legislative enactment or Service Rule including Rules made under Article 309 of the Constitution.
14. In instant case although the enquiry officer has not exonerated the petitioner from the charge levelled against him but he has recommended a lessor punishment to be awarded to the petitioner, but the disciplinary authority while disagreeing with the aforesaid punishment has imposed a major penalty of removal from service of the petitioner without affording any opportunity of hearing to him and without recording any reason for his disagreement to the findings and recommendations made by enquiry officer before forming tentative opinion of disagreement with the findings recorded by enquiry officer, as such in view of law laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court referred herein before, in my opinion, the order impugned passed by disciplinary authority is wholly erroneous, therefore, cannot be sustained.
15. Now next question arises for consideration is that as to whether in given facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner can be held to be guilty of negligent in discharge of duty or not? From the records it transpires that the inquiry officer while holding formal disciplinary inquiry against the petitioner, has examined the witnesses from both the sides. Shri Virendra Kumar Singh, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Railway, Jhansi, who conducted the preliminary inquiry against the petitioner, was also examined and cross-examined. Though in his said examination, the genuineness of petitioner's medical certificates was neither doubted nor disputed by him and instead thereof in cross-examination, he has admitted that the aforesaid medical certificates were genuine and counter signed by the Chief Medical Superintendent/Chief Medical Officer, therefore, there was no occasion to doubt the illness of the petitioner during aforesaid period. Not only this, in defence the petitioner examined Dr. Santosh Kumar Gupta, posted as a doctor in Ayurvedic College and Hisptal, Attarra, district Banda who supported the medical certificates issued by him, but strangely enough while accepting these medical certificates, the inquiry officer has drawn inference that since the petitioner was treated as out door patient by aforesaid doctors, therefore, it is not possible for him to make any comment about his illness and has recommended that on that issue, the report from the Medical Board may obtained, for the reason that the absence of the petitioner was of 1198 days, but without seeking any opinion from the Medical Board, contrary to the material available on record, the inquiry officer has held that since the petitioner has failed to observe the provisions of Paras 381 and 382 of Police Regulations, and earlier also, on account of absence from duties, his leave was sanction without pay, therefore, he was in habit of absenting himself from duty and further held that he is guilty of negligence and dereliction from duty. Thus the aforesaid inference drawn by the inquiry officer, in my considered opinion, is wholly perverse and contrary to the material on record.
16. Thus, from the findings of enquiry officer it is clear that the medical certificate submitted by the petitioner in respect of his illness during the period of his unauthorised absence from duty was neither doubted nor disputed by the enquiry officer, nevertheless inquiry officer and disciplinary authority have held the petitioner guilty of negligent in discharge of his duty merely on account of fact that while on unauthorized absence from duty he did not observe the provisions contained in para 381 and 382 of the U.P. Police Regulations, which reads as under:-
"381. It is incumbent on all applicants for medical leave or extension of leave on medical certificates to apprise the Superintendent of Police in writing of their intention to apply for a medical certificate. Any failure to do so may result in a decision that the medical certificate has been obtained by misrepresentation and may thereby entail serious consequences.
382. Under-officers and constables who fall ill when on duty or who are ill when due to return to duty, must apply for admission to the district police hospital or for treatment at the nearest dispensary, if the police hospital is out of easy reach. The fact of their admission or treatment must be reported to the local Superintendent of Police who unless they are his own subordinates will take immediate steps to communicate the fact to the Superintendent of Police whose subordinates they are. Officers of higher rank are not compelled to apply for admission to police hospitals, but are not relieved of the responsibility, while on leave of intimating their intention of obtaining medical certificate to the Superintendent of Police as prescribed above."
17. From a plain reading of para 381 of the U.P. Police Regulations, it is clear that any police personnel, who wants to take medical leave on medical certificate must apprise the Superintendent of Police in writing of his intention to apply for a medical certificate and any failure to do so entails serious consequence and raise presumption that the medical certificate obtained by such police personnel is based on misrepresentation and further para 382 of the said Regulations postulates that under-officers and constables who fall ill while on duty must apply for admission to the district hospital or for treatment at the nearest dispensary, if the district hospital is out of easy reach. The fact of their admission or treatment must be reported to the local Superintendent of Police who unless they are his own subordinates will take steps to communicate the fact to the Superintendent of Police whose subordinates they are. Officers of higher rank are not compelled to apply for such admission to police hospital, but they are not relieved of the responsibility of intimating their intention of obtaining medical certificate to the Superintendent of Police as prescribed under para 381 of the Regulations. These police Regulations are administrative instructions compiled in the U.P. Police Regulations. They have no statutory force. Non-compliance/observance of aforesaid regulations by sub-ordinate police officers entails serious consequence by raising presumption of misrepresentation by them in obtaining medical certificate for grant of medical leave, such presumption appears to have been raised by deeming provisions in the Regulation 381 of Police Regulations.
18. A legal fiction is one which is not an actual reality but which the law requires the court to accept it as a reality, therefore, in case of legal fiction, the court believes something to exist which in reality does not exist. It is nothing but a presumption of the existence of a state of affairs, which in actual reality is non-existent. In this connection, it would be useful to refer statements of law contained in few passage of IV Edition of Legislation and Interpretation ( By Late Jagadish Swarup) at page 307 and 308:
"A legal fiction is one which is not an actual reality but which the law requires the Court to accept it as a reality. Therefore, in case of legal fiction, the Court believes something to exist which, in reality, does not exist. In other words, it is nothing but a presumption of the existence of a state of affairs which in actual reality is non-existent. When viewed from this context there is not much difference between a legal fiction and a presumption. However, it cannot be said that legal fiction and a presumption are wholly identical in all respects. A presumption may be conclusive or it may be rebuttable. A presumption gives rise to a legal fiction. It is conclusive, if no evidence can be permitted to be led to deny it. In case of a presumption which is rebuttable, unless the contrary is established, fictitious state of affairs is presumed to exist as if it is an actual reality.
A deeming provision creates a legal fiction. The effect of such a legal fiction is that a position which otherwise would not obtain is deemed to obtain under certain circumstances.
A deeming fiction can not be introduced by construction and it is the exclusive privilege of the legislature to apply a deeming fiction in a given case."
19. Thus from the aforesaid statements of law, it is clear that such deeming provision creates legal fiction through the statute. A legal fiction through deeming provision can not be introduce by the interpretation and it is exclusive privilege of the legislature to apply a deeming fiction in a given case, therefore, such deeming provision, in my view, can not be created through administrative instructions. The aforesaid view also finds support from various decisions of Apex Court including a decision rendered in V.C., Banaras Hindu University Vs. Shree Kant, 2006 (11) S.C.C. 42:AIR 2006 S.C.2304: 2006(4) ALJ 578 wherein it has been held that no legal fiction in law can be created by an administrative order. Thus the aforesaid presumption raised by the Regulation 381 of the Police Regulation is beyond the scope of authority under law, as such can not be sustained, therefore, the aforesaid presumption raised by said regulation is liable to be ignored and a substantial compliance thereof, in my opinion, would be sufficient.
20. Although inquiry officer has found that the medical certificates issued by the doctors to the petitioner about his illness, cannot be disputed or doubted but contrary to it, at another place, under wrong notion of law, inquiry officer has held that since absence was for more than 1198 days, therefore, opinion of medical board should be sought for. In this connection, it is to be noted that since inquiry officer has found the medical certificates of the petitioner are genuine, therefore, in my opinion, there was no occasion to hold that he cannot give any final opinion about the illness of petitioner instead thereof, only inevitable inference from the aforesaid facts and events could be drawn that the petitioner was ill during the aforesaid period.
21. Thus, keeping the aforesaid provisions of Regulations in mind, it can not be disputed that the petitioner was ill during the period he was found unauthorizedly absent from duty. The medical certificates submitted by him during the aforesaid period, were also not disputed or doubted by disciplinary authority. Not only this, but his brother has also intimated the Superintendent of Police about illness of the petitioner who was taking care of the petitioner. Since it has not been found that the police hospital was existing at nearest place in district Banda where the petitioner has taken treatment, therefore, in my opinion, taking treatment from another doctor by the petitioner, cannot be faulted with under regulation 382 of said regulations. In this back drop of the case, I am of the view that the petitioner has substantially observed the provisions of paras 381and 382 of the U.P. Police Regulations. Thus, the view taken by the enquiry officer and disciplinary authority that the petitioner has not observed provisions of paras 381 and 382 of the U.P. Police Regulation during the period of his absence from duty, thus he was found unauthorisedly absent from duty, in my considered opinion, cannot be held to be justified and the petitioner cannot be treated to be absent unauthorizedly from duty for the period of 1198 days.
22. So far as grant of medical leave for the aforesaid period was concerned, it was no doubt true, that the inquiry officer was not authority on the point to recommend for grant of medical leave instead, it was upon the disciplinary authority to grant medical leave for the aforesaid period of 1198 days on the basis of those medical certificates or he could refer the matter before the medical board for examination but the disciplinary authority did neither refer the matter to medical board nor granted medical leave to the petitioner to the extent of which medical leave was admissible to him and has taken wholly illegal and arbitrary view in the matter for removing the petitioner from service without any rhyme or reason and without any justification under law.
23. In view of foregoing discussion, the punishment of removal from service of the petitioner awarded by the disciplinary authority, affirmed by the appellate and revisional authorities is wholly illegal, arbitrary, therefore, cannot be sustained. The impugned orders dated 28.3.2005, contained in annexure no. 10 and 11 to the writ petition, passed by the respondent no.4, order dated 7.11.2005 contained in annexure 12 and order dated 5.11.2005, contained in annexure no. 13 to the writ petition, passed by the respondent no.3, and orders dated 27.5.2006 , contained in annexures no. 14 and 15 to the writ petition, passed by the respondent no.2, are hereby quashed.
24. In the result, writ petition succeeds and allowed. The petitioner is reinstated in service with continuity in service. The respondents concerned are directed to grant medical leave to the petitioner to the extent, same was admissible during the period he was found unauthorizedly absent from duty on the basis of medical certificate submitted by the petitioner and to grant extraordinary leave, and/or leave without pay for the remaining period by regularizing aforesaid period of absence from duty, on leave and appropriate order be passed by the competent authority in respect of arrears of salary and other admissible dues to the petitioner by sanctioning medical leave, extraordinary leave or leave without pay during the period of his absence.
25. The petitioner shall be teated to be continuous in service from the date of his termination till the date of his reinstatement. However, he shall be paid his 50% back wage from the date of his removal from service till today and there after he shall be paid his full salary till his actual reinstatement in service.
26. With these observations and direction, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed.
Order Date :-03.02.2012 LJ/-