Forum For National Uniformity In Labour Adjudication

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Law Commission Report

Forum For National Uniformity In Labour Adjudication

LAW COMMISSION OF INDIA

ONE HUNDRED TWENTY -- SECOND REPORT

FORUM FOR NATIONAL UNIFORMITY
IN LABOUR ADJ UDICATION

DECEMBER, 1987

Tel. No. 384475 I

LAW COMMISSION

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
SHASTRI BHAWAN

NEW DELHI
DAA. DESAI '
C 1' ' e
a "nan December 9, 1987
My dear Shri Shiv Shanker,

Continuing the series on decentralisation of administration of justice, I am happy
to forward today One Hundred and Twenty--second report of the Law Commission
on 'Forum For National Uniformity In Labour Adjudication'. ,

As you have by now become aware that the task of recommending judicial re-
forms was assigned to the Law Commission in February, 1986. The terms of reference
for the proposed commission to deal with and recommend judicial reforms were sent
to the Law Commission with a request to accord top priority to this assignment.

The Law Commission appreciating the anxiety of the Government of India to
accord priority to recommending reforms in judicial system which as some analysts
say is on the brink of collapse, topic-wise reports are being sent to you and your
predecessor-in-office. for more than a year. Undoubtedly -the Law Commission
is fully occupied with this work alone but it hopes to deal with all items before its
term expires. -

The present report deals with the_question of introducing and setting up a fo-
rum having All-India jurisdiction developing an All-India perspective dealing with
labour laws simultaneously excluding the jurisdiction of High Courts and retaining
one appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. As this re-
port deals primarily with the setting up of such a forum for dealing with labour
laws, it is in the ﬁtness of things that the Department of Justice establishes direct
liaison with the Labour Ministry so that they may have the beneﬁt of the report; The
element of urgency in this request lies in the fact that according to the media
report, Labour Ministry is engaged in recommending comprehensive amendments
to Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The recommendations herein contained can
become an integral part of it and it may not be treated in isolation. I would
request you to look into this aspect at your earliest convenience. '

With regards,

Yours Sincerely,
Sd/-

(D.A. Desai)

Hon'ble Shri P. Shiv Shanker,
Minister for Law and Justice,
Government of India,

Shastri Bhavan,

New Delhi.

.Encl : A report.

CHAPTER I
CHAPTER II
Cmrran III

VCHAPTERIV

CHAPTER V

REFERENCES
APPENDIX I

APPENDIX 11

Apprmnix III

Amzumx IV

Armmnxx V

Apraunrx VI

CONTENTS

Introduction

Present Structure V

Approach of the bodies in thepast to this question
Approach and justification A

Theforum,' Its Format, Iurisdiction and personnel
manning the same ' . . . . . .

Working Paper
List of Industrial and Labour Laws

Part A : Labour Pendency in Supreme Court as on
1-10-1987 under Article 136 . . .. . .

Part B : Number of Regular. Hearing of Non-Consti-
tutional Labour Matters pending in Supreme Court
ason 1-1-86~Age-wise .. ' .. .. ..

Pendency of cases in thel-Iigh Courts----Statement in

reply to unstarred question No. 17 93 in the Lok Sabha'

Statement of cases under Labour Laws pending in,
Highcourts .. » .. .. .. ..
Annexure to Appendix V

List of Labour Laws indicating the provisions regar-
ding. settlement of disputes and appellate authorities . .

'mi:

PAGE

11+-

16
21
22
29

32
33

_ CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

1.1. One of the tasks assigned to the present Law Commission is to study
measures for judicial reforms and to recommend innovative su estions, inter alia,
with a view to decentralise the system of a his ration of justigﬁ amongst -others,
by estalishing other tiers or systems within he j dicial hierarchy to reduce the

volume of work in the Supreme Court and the High Courts. One of the ways-
indicated in the Terms of Reference in the Context of Studying Judicial Reforms '

is to devise specialist tribunals as envisﬁged in Part 'XIVA of the Constitution
for expeditious resolution of causes an controversies coming before generalist
courts, including Supreme Court and the High Courts.

1.2. The Law Commission submitted a Report recommending setting up of
Central Tax Courts for dealing with causes and controversies under. Direct Tax
Laws, Indirect Tax Laws, and Export and Import Regulations'. In that Report,
detailed analysis has been made for decentralisation of monolithic system of
administration of justice as operating in India today. Conceding that at the trial level,
there are specialist courts and tribunals dealing with disputes arising under different
sets of laws, the High Courts enjoy the Constitutional power of judicial review over
decisions of all the 'specialist courts and tribunals. There was thus a fusion of specia-
list and generalist court work at the High Court level as also in the Supreme Court.
The fall out was that at the High Court "level, all sorts of causes and controversies
of specialist nature were dealt with by non-specialist Judges. The need for decentra-
lisation with a view to providing specialist appellate level bodies has been reasoned
out in that Report and in continuation of those reasons, the present report deals
with the questions of suggesting an all-India forum for bringing about uniformity
in the matters/disputes arising under numerous' labour laws.

1.3. The need for setting up qaecialist courts and tribunals has been felt in
almost all common law countries. The' movement to specialised jurisdiction is thus
common to many parts of the world. The various industrial jurisdictions which have
existed in Australia throughout the present -century are unique' in character'.
The Tax Court and Emergency Court of Appeals in America are speciﬁc examples
of specialist courts. Not that this method of setting up specialist courts by decen-
tralisation of administration of justice is without a caveat. The protagonists of the
specialist courts assert that knowledgeable Judges would not need to be educated
about how the instant dispute ﬁts into the broader corpus of law. As a consequence',
specialist Judges could resolve questions faster and" perhaps more 'correctly' without
as much effort on the part of counsel to teach them the law. Further, specialist Judges
could devote more time to individual matters without the press of other business.
Limiting certain acts of litigation to a single specialist court would ensure uniformity
and predictability and allow lawyers to settle more disputes without resort to all the
courts. In sum, efficiency and predictability are said' to result when. a court hearing
dispute works constantly with the law to beAapplied3. The opponents of specialist
court assert that setting up specialist court would result in isolation and less research
and scrutiny of the arguments if certain class of cases are withdrawn.from judicial
mainstream'-'. There is a tendency in the Bar to treat specialist courts as inferior courts
regardless of their place in the judicial hierarchy. Members of the Bar are less prone
to accept judgeship in specialist courts. This fear in Indian condition is wholly
unwarranted. '

1 .4. Decentralisation of administration of justice has taken place by setting up
numerous types of specialist courts. Theknown specialist courts in Australia are :
(l) Childrenis Courts, (2) Family Courts, (3) Industrial Courts, Commissions and
Boards, (4) Small Claims Courts and Tribunals, (5) Coroner's Courts, (6) Licensing
Courts, (7) Warden's Courts, (8) Land and Environment Court, (9) A Local Govern-
ment Court, (l0) A Market Court, (1 1) Miner's Courts, ctc5. Requirements of infor-
mality and expertise provide an adequate support to such specialist courts. This is
in contrast with the impression of laymen about ordinary courts as excessively
formal and lacking in expertise. '

1.5. A reform movement is in process to modernise court structure and
administration and to achieve additional court related objectives around which
some consensus has developed.6 . _

1 .6. Since a demand for specialist court for dealing with disputes arising under
labour laws, as distinct from general civil jurisdiction courts, is founded on the
assumption that while the courts of general civil jurisdiction would take the contract
as it is, the formal approach would be inconsistent with courts set up to resolve
disputes between the employers and workmen where the approach is what ought to
be the contract. To some extent, it was also a response to the mounting case law pro-
blems in generalist courts. As work proliferates, lawyers are getting increasingly
specialised. In America, solo practitioners have largely joined partnerships, solo local
ﬁrms are being supplemented by national ﬁrms. If that be so, the inter-relation bet-
ween the Bar and the Bench can be established by providing more specialist courts

'with knowledgeable Judges of the special nature of the disputes coming before the

specialist courts. One's possible response to this greater specialisation amongst
Judges is that while no one advocates the demise of the generalist judiciary,
complex cases requiring technical knowledge and an insight into the inter--relation
between the parties and the nature of Iis are not always handled well by Judges with
no expertise in the particular area of law involved.

1.7. Judges dealing with disputes under numerous labour laws must be
equipped in humanities, social sciences, need for socioeconomic justice, unequal
position of parties to the dispute, the national economy, goals of planning and
the shape of future society which the Constitution envisages. In short, they must
have knowledge of all aspects which will help them in balancing the individual need
and the social good. '

1 .8. Law reform to be effective must reﬂect the views of those likely to be aﬂ'ec-

.ted by the change suggested as also the society at large, which is vitally interested

in the development of law as an instrument of social engineering. In order to reach
the interest groups concerned with administration of labour laws in this country, the
Law Commission drew up a comprehensive working paper to which a short
questionnaire was added in the hope that the attention of those interested in the
discussion would be focussed on the speciﬁcs with which the Commission would
deal in this report. It may appear that the tentative approach of the Commission
in the working paper undergoes reﬁnement when the ﬁnal report emerges. This
should be so in the very nature of things because it shows the impact of suggestions
received, discussions and deliberations heard and the recent literature dealing
with the subject. For proper appreciation, the-working paper is annexed to this"
report as Appendix I.

1.9. The Law Commission is also happy to record that central trade unions,
employers' organisation and various other interest groups positively responded to the
working paper and the questionnaire and we owe a debt of gratitude to them in that
they helped us in formulating our recommendations. A measure of consensus has

laid the foundation of this report.

CHAPTER II
PRESENT STRUCTURE

2.1. In a power-ridden society divided into segments, one capable of excercising.
powerful authority over the other, conflict of interests would inevitably surface. It is-

inherent in the very texture of society. In an industrial society where means of pro-
duction are privately controlled, maximisation of proﬁt is the only desired end.'
This, to some extent, legitimises exploitation of those. who are unequal in the matter
of contracting with those who employ them. Let no one be beguiled that out of humani~
tarian consideration or in order to be fair and just, some rights were conferred on
the labour force. In fact, it is' a trite saying that labour law such as the one that can
be found in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, was not enacted as a measure of
socio-economic justice but it was in fact a law and order measure. Where interests
clash such as the employers' keenness to pay the least and labour's keenness for pay-

ent which can keep body and soul together, the clash of interests would lead to
confrontation which, in turn, would lead to direct action impinging upon production.
In the First Five year Plan, it was observed. . . .:

"Answer to class,-antagonism and world conflict will arrive soon if we succeed
in discovering a sound basis for human relations in industry. Economic progress
is also bound up with industrial peace. Industrial relations are, therefore, not
« a matter between the employers and employees alone but a vital concern of the

community which may be expressed in measures for the protection of its larger
interest.".7 ' .

2 . 2. This realisation grew as a consequence of according high priority to economic
development by laying down a strong infrastructure for industrialisation of the
feudal Indian society. Till then, and especially commencing from the days of the
Second World War, the State machinery was geared to avoid direct action which may
impinge upon production--unhampered production-----ﬁrst forthe war effort and
then for the planned development of Indian society.

2. 3. Rule 81A of the Defence of India Rules, the precursor of the Industrial Dis-'

putes Act, 1947, empowered the appropriate Government to intervene in industrial dis-
putes by compelling the parties to go to compulsory adjudication by prohibiting strikes

or lock-outs during the pendency of adﬁidication proceedings and tor a period of two'

months thereafter. A blanket ban was'impos_ed on strikes which did not arise out of
genuine trade disputes.3 "A process of conciliation, with arbitration in the background,
is substituted for the rude and barbarous process of strike and 1ock--out. Reason is to
displace force: the might of the State is to enﬁorce peace between industial combatants
as well as between other combatants; and all in the interest of the public."° On the

' termination of war, the rule was due to lapse effective from October 1, 1946; but was

kept in operation by the Emergency Powers; (Continuance) Ordinance, 1946. Simu-

ltaneouly, Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, was enacted providing ' -

for framing and certiﬁying of standing orders covering various aspects of service
conditions with a view to compellingvthe e ployers in industiral establishments to

prescribe with suﬂicient precision the condi us of service under them and to make . -

the industrial employees aware of those itions. On the adventiof the Constitu-

tion, under Part IV thereof, the State, meaning thereby all limbs of Government, _ _

had to strive to promote the welfare of theipeople, by securing and protecting as,

effectively as it may, a social order in whichjiustioe, social, economic and political,'
shall inform all the institutions of the national life. The State' had, in particular, to

strive to minimise the inequalities of ineomefand endeavour to eliminate inequalities

in status, facilities and opportunities, not only amongst individuals but also' amongst '

groups of people residing in different areas or engaged in different vocations (article

38). The State had, within its limits of economic capacity and development, to make .

effective provision for securing the right to work, to education and to public assistance
in cases of unemployment, old age, siclsnem; and disablement, and in other cases of
undeserved want (article 41). The State was required to make endeavour to secure,
by suitable legislation or economic or'g'aniisation or in any other way, to all workers,
agricultural, industrial or otherwise, work, a living wage, conditions of work ensuring
a decent standard of life and full enjoyment of -leisure and social and cultural

3: .

opportunities (article 43). The State was required to take steps, by suitable legislation
or in any other way, to secure the participation of workers in the management of

undertakings, establishments or other organisations engaged in any industry (article ,

43A).

2.4. As the Constitution envisaged a society governed by rule of law, the State
had to enact numerous legislations to translate into reality the promise in the Pre~
amble that the State shall secure to its citizens, justice, social, economic and political
and equality of opportunity. Law was to ensure_socio-economic justice to labour,
transforming their position from being a factor of production to partner in industry.
Through the instrumentality of law, the unequal bargaining power of the labour
was to be strengthened so as to avoid direct action, confrontation, or conflict and
to ensure peace and harmony in the industry which was a prerequisite for higher
production and thereby improving and ameliorating the economic position of the
labour force. Exploitation by the powerful industrial employers of the workmen
had to be eschewed by enacting numerous iegislations, which would help in
avoiding confrontation and impel parties having apparently conﬂicting interests to
negotiate and resolve their disputes. With this end in view, the Central Govern-
ment enacted roughly about 5l legislations since 1947, a list of which appears at
Appendix II of this report.

2. 5. The underlying assumption in all these enactments is that once law is enacted,
legal sanctions are created, machinery for its enforcement provided and violations
are dealt with, peace and harmony would reign in the industry. The word "peace",
as used in this context, should not mislead anyone. "Peace" does not imply slavish
subjugation imposed upon the weaker sections by the more powerful dictating its
own terms. "Peace, in the profound sense of the term, is not a mere negative con~
cept of the avoidance of strife, but a positive idea of the fruitful co-operation of
all for the fullest possible development of each."1°

2.6. Law, to be an effective instrument of change for social transformation
and for rendering socio-economic justice, must have sanction behind it_ and must
compel obedience. In its eﬂective implementation, the expectation from the law
must be wholly fulﬁlled, otherwise law itself becomes an instrument for further
exploitation. The laws for improvement of the 'conditions of labour employed
in various industries provided for promoting arbitration by consent of parties,
failing which by compulsory adjudication, with a further power to compel, obedience
to these provisions by declaring strike or look-out illegal after an order for com-
pulsory adjudication is made. '

2.7. To appreciate this position adequately, a, brief reference to the provisions
of Industrial Disputes Act would become nccessitous. The dictionary clause deﬁnes,
amongst others, "appropriate Government" on which power' to make a reference
for compulsory adjudication is conferred. Section 3 envisages setting up of a works
committee consisting of representatives of employers and workmen engaged "in the
industrial establishment charged-with a duty to promote measures for securing
and preserving amity and good relations between the employer and the workmen
and, to that end, to comment upon the matters of common interest or concern. and
endeavour to compose any difference- of 'cpinion in respect of such matters. The
State of Gujarat, in the application of section 3, has also introduced sections 3A
and. 3B providing for joint management council and prescribing the functions of
the council. One can safely say that these provisions are a non-starter. In fact,
for a long time the operation of section 3 was stayed by an injunction granted by
the Supreme Court of India. Section 4 envisages appointment of conciliation
oﬂicers. ' Section 5 deals with setting up of boards of' conciliation and section 6
empowers the Government to constitute courts of inquiry. Section 7 confers power
to constitute one or more labour courts. Such labour court 'will have jurisdiction
to adjudicate industrial disputes relating to any matter speciﬁed in the Second' St:he~
dule, to the Act. Section 7A, which was introduced in 1956, conferred power on
the appropriate Government to constitute. one or more . industrial tribunals for
adjudication of industrial disputes relating to any matter speciﬁed' in the Second

Schedule' or the Third Schedule. Section-7B, which also was introduced in 1956, '

conferred power on the Central Government to constitute National Industrial
Tribunal for adjudication of industrial disputes which may involve questions of
national importance or are of such a nature that industrial establishments consti-
tuted in more than one State are likely to be interested in, or affected by such disputes;

Section 9A, which was introduced by the same Act of 1956, obliged the employer
to give a notice of change if it is intended to effect a change in I116 C0116!-iti0_I1 _0f 86!"
vice applicable to any workmen in respect of any of the matters speciﬁed in the
Fourth Schedule. Section 10 confers power on the appropriate Government_to
refer any industrial dispute that exists or is apprehended to a board for promoting
settlement or toa court of inquiry or to a labour court or to a tribunal, as the case
may be, for adjudication. Sub-section (5) of section 10 confers 'power on the ap-
propriate Government, while making a reference of an industrial dispute for ad-
judication, to include in the reference such establishment, group or class of estab-
lishments, whether or not at the time of such inclusion any dispute exists or is ap-
prehended in the establishment or group or class of establishments. Section _22
prohibits strike in a public utility service without giving to the employer a notice
of strike as provided therein. Section 23 puts a general embargo on strike and
lock-out during the period of proceedings before a labour court, tribunal or National
Tribunal and for a period of two months after the conclusion of the proceedings.

2.8. A brief resume of these provisions will show at a glance that effective power
was conferred upon the appropriate Government to intervene in an existing in-
dustrial dispute or to interdict a threatened situation to compel the ' parties to re-
sort to adjudication and to avoid direct action. '

2.9. The award made by the authority empowered to adjudicate the industrial
dispute is binding on the parties subject to the power of the appropriate Govemment
under section 17.

2.10. Labour Courts, industrial tribunals, National Industrial Tribunal, all enjoy
the power of compulsory adjudication. Their awards enjoy ﬁnality. The statute
docs not envisage any appeal over the decision of the aforementioned fora.

2.11. Since the advent of the Constitution, the awards of the aforementioned
fora can be questioned by writ of certiorari, prohibition or even mandamus invoking
the constitutional power of judicial review conferred on the High Court under article
226 and the Supreme Court under article 32. In the absence of any appellate fora,

as a matter of course, a large number of awards are challenged either before the.

High Court or before the Supreme Court of India. Thus, High Courts and the
Supreme Court, while exercisingextraordinary jurisdiction under the Constitution,
have for all practical purposesbecome appellate fora.

2.'l2. 'The twin purposes underlying the enactment of Industrial Disputes Act,
1947, were to provide mode and machinery for arbitration/compulsory adjudication
between two segments of society amongst whom conﬂictof interest was inherent as
also to arm the State with power to effectively intervene in industrial disputes which,
if left to the warrin parties to settle by direct action and confrontation, would
certainly hamper an thwart economic regeneration of the nation. If the industrial
disputes are sought to be resolved by -the force of might, there was a distinct possibility
of chaos and anarchy in the Society. The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is, in the
opinion of the Supreme Court, a benign measure which seeks to pre--empt industrial
tensions, provide the mechanics of dispute-resolutionsand set up necessary infra-
structure so that theenergies of partners in production may not be dissipated in
counter-productive'matters and assurance of industrial justice may create a climau:
of goodwill. Industrial peace is a national need and, absent law, order in any ﬁeld
will be absent. Chaos is the enemy of creativity sans which production will suffer.
Thus, the great goal to which the I.D. Act is geared is legal mechanism for canalis-
ing conﬂicts along conciliatory or adjudicatory processes." The emerging concept
of welfare state, which was in the air-since independence, implied an end to exploi-
tation of workmen and they were to be ensured a living wage, decent conditions of
work and dignity of labour. Some legal mechanism was necessary and one under-
lying the Industrial Disputes Act is 'geared to conferment of regulated beneﬁts to
workmen and resolution, according to sympathetic rule of law, of the conﬂicts,
actual or potential, between management? and the workmen. «Its goal is ameliora-
tion of the conditions of workers, tempered by a practical sense of peaceful co-
existence, to the beneﬁt of both----'not a neutral position but restraints on Iaissez

aire and concern for the welfare of the weaker lot'.12

2. 13. With the pace of industrialisatioii, numerous labour courts and industrial

tribunals had to be set up throughout the length and breadth of this country. Bach »

forum was having power to make awardswith ﬁnality attaching' to it. What was

inherent in this situation was that conﬂicting awards, decisions and approaches
would emerge. An approach to the High Court under article 226-227 of the Consti-
tution would, at best, bring about some uniformity at the State level but the High
Courts inter se differ. The situation was agonising for industrial establishments
having inter-State operations or having production units in more States than
one and being subject to jurisdiction of different High Courts. Ultimately -the matter
had to be taken to the Supreme Court which was both dilatory and time consuming.

2.14. The situation herein discussed attracted the attention of the law makers
"which, in a welfare state, cannot aiford to look askance at industrial unrest and

' industrial disputes".1-3 The law makers, being aware of a need to' provide uniformity

in the matter of conditions of service andlbeneﬁts which the workmen may enjoy
asia consequence of industrial adjudication, enacted Industrial Disputes (Appellate
Tribunal) Act, 1950. The establishment of Appellate Tribunal having all-India
jurisdiction was thus a natural response to the need for a measure of uniformity of
underlying principles and norms to govern the awards of the different Industrial
Tribunals. Accordingly, the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) . Act, 1950,
was put on the statute book. It provided for constituting a Labour Apellate Tribunal
for hearing appeals from the awards or decisions of Industrial Tribunals in accor-
dance with the provisions of the Act. Section 7 of the Act conferred jurisdiction on
the Appellate Tribunal to entertain an appeal from any award or decision of In-
dustrial Tribunal if---- ' ~

(a) the appeal involves-any substantial question of law, or

(b) the award or decision is in respect of any of the following matters,
namely :--

(i) wages,

(ii) bonus or travelling allowance, g -

(iii) any contribution paid or payable by the employer to any pension
fund or provident fund,

(iv) any sum paid or payable to, or on behalf of, the workmen to defray --

special expenses entailed on him by nature of his employment,
(v) gratuity payable on discharge,
(vi) classiﬁcation by grade,
(vii) retrenchment of workmen,
(viii) any other matter which may be prescribed.

Practically the entire gamut of industrial. relations was covered and any award
on any of these aspects would become appealable to the Appellate Tribunal. Even
if the award does not cover any of the aforementioned items, an appeal can still
be entertained by the Appellate Tribunal on the footing that the appeal involves a
substantial question of law. Almost all awards became appealable to the Appellate
Tribunal. Undoubtedly, the Tribunal having all-India jurisdiction and an all-India
perspective could, by exercise of ' its appellate jurisdiction, bring about uniformity
in the matter of industrial relations which otherwise would have almost developed
into a law of jungle because of conﬂicting awards by different tribunals including
those having jurisdiction in the same State. , i i '

2.15. Somehow, this Appellate Tribunal incurred .the wrath of the leading national
organisations of workmen. As it was inherent in the situation, the haves, i.e., the
employers, were ﬁnancially well oﬁ" and could afford the luxuryof litigation. They
preferred numerous appeals to the Appellate Tribunal and, according to workmen,
there was inordinate delay in the disposal of these appeals whereby the implemen-
tation of awards was held up and thereby prolonged the litigation. The workmen
with their weak staying power could 'ill-afford such delay'-while on the other hand.
the employers protracted the litigation by casually preferring appeal and abused the
inherent tendency of every judicial process, namely, delay. Undoubtedly, what was

then considered the prolongation of the litigation by the Appellate Tribunal taking' a

roughly about two years on an average in deciding appeals has now boomeranged by
its abolition. There was also a feeling among the workmen that the Appellate
Tribunal, being manned by the retired Judges of the High Courts, disclosed a tiltjn

favour -of the management disclosing a class bias, compounded by the lack of .

7 .

knowledge of industrial relations. Crass legalistic approach and lack of commit-
ment to social justice in deciding appeals further accentuated the feeling of the work-
men and a near unanimous demand was voiced for the abolition of the Labour.
Appellate Tribunal. This found its echo in the Statement of Objects and Reasons
accompanying the Industrial Disputes (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions)
Bill, 1955, which inter alia made provision for abolition of Labour Appellate
Tribunal.' It was therein stated that : "There is a large volume of criticism tha_
appeals ﬁled before the Appellate Tribunal take a long time for disposal and in
volve a great deal of expenditure which the workers cannot afford." The employers-
on the other hand, contended that the Appellate Tribunal has introduced consider-
able uniformity in the basic principles underlying industrial awards and was buil-
ding up sound case law on industrial relations. They asserted that an appellate
forum was a necessary adjunct of compulsory adjudication and its abolition, while
retaining Industrial Tribunals and the method of compulsory adjudication, would
again usher in a jungle of conﬂicting awards. Ultimately, in a democracy, the voice
of numerically stronger section prevailed. Shri K.K. Desai, formerly Labour
Minister, said during the discussion on the Industrial Disputes (Amendment and
Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill, 1955, that : 'It is not that justice is not being done
but the workers should believe that the justice is being done to them as expeditiously .
as possible and, therefore, the Appellate Tribunal is going'. No factual data was
supplied to the Parliament as how much delay an appeal to the Tribunal entails.
At any rate, it was stated in the Statement of Objects and Reasons accompanying
the Industrial Disputes (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill. 1955.
that Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950, be repealed while conceding
that the Appellate Tribunal had achieved some uniformity in the basic principles
governing awards of Industrial Tribunals but the consideration of future uniformity '
had to be balanced against the requirements of speedy settlement of industrial dis-
putes." Even though no formal enquiry was made, it appears that on an average
the Appellate _Tribunal took two years to dispose of an appeal before it. There-
fore, the execution and implementation of the award was postponed at best by pre-
ferring of the a: neal by two years. When it was pointed out that some uniformity
was necessary in industrial relations which the Appellate Tribunal brought about,
it was conceded that the Supreme Court would certainly take care of it in future.

' On that note, the Labour Appellate 'Tribunal was formally abolished in 1956.

2. 16. Since the abolition of the Labour-Appellate Tribunal, award of the Labour
Court and Industrial Tribunal is challenged either by invoking the jurisdiction of
the High Court under articles 226-227 of -the Constitution or by special leave petition
to the Supreme Court of India under article 136 of the Constitution. Even oc-
casionally they are questioned by a writ petition under article 32 of the Constitution
to the Supreme Court of India. Article 141 of the Constitution provides that the
law declared by the Supreme Court shall bebinding on all courts, including tribunals
and Government, within the territory of India. Obviously, therefore, Supreme
Court can bring about uniformity in the matterof industrial relations. '

2.17. Industrial disputes occur very frequently. There are a number of statutes
which, directly or indirectly, deal with industrial relations. Numerous laws have
been enacted fdr ameliorating the conditions of service of industrial labour. All .
these statutes provide"a fruitful ground for litigation. Undoubtedly some of the
statutes /provide amechanism and forum fqrresolution of disputes_under the statute
as well as an appellate forum. ' However, the desirability of introducing unifor- '
mity in industrial relations throughout the length and breadth of this country must
be kept in view. On the abolition of the Labour Appellate Tribunal, that function .
reverted to the Supreme Court. Now if the Supreme.Court can deliver the goods
expeditiously, the rais_on c.i'etre' for this repnrt may disappear. If Labour Appellate
Tribunal could have justified its existence.' and continued to be alive, it would not
have become necessary to think anew about the subject. There was, of course,
one primary defect in_ the Act setting tag the Labour Appellate Tribunal. Un-
guesticgrggbly, the :It')ribulr1al_tglndc:li; til: nidustigiall Disputes (Appellatei Triabéunalg

c , , was a n una wi 11 e ea ngo e expression in ar ices an
227 of the Constitution. The Appellate Tribunal held sittings in various States.
The constitutional outcome of this situation was that each High Court within
whose jurisdiction the Appellate Tribunal held a sitting would have jurisdiction
under article 227_ to examine the legality and correctness of its award. A piquant
situation arose because of this position. ~_ While all the decisions of the Labour ..

Appellate Tribunal would be binding on the Industrial Tribunal and Labour Court
and the expression "Industrial Tribunal" was widely deﬁned by section 2(c) of the
Act, yet once the High Court had jurisdiction to interfere, different High Courts
took irreconcilable view and the national uniformity again got disturbed and dis-
rupted. While setting up Labour Appellate Tribunal having all-India jurisdiction,
it was then not considered advisable to exclude the jurisdiction of the High Court
which can now be done under article 323B(3) (d) of the Constitution. This glaring
lacuna proved counter-productive in as much as while the Labour Appellate Tri-
bunal was intended to bring about uniformity in industrial relations by bringing
different awards of different tribunals to a common denominator, yet the High Court,
in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction, could successfully disrupt the uniformity
leaving it again to the Supreme Court to re-introduce the same.

2.18. Thus 'he question looms large whether the faith reposed in the Supreme
Court to bring about uniformity throughout the length and breadth of this country
has been fulﬁlled. - Under successive plans, the pace of industrialisation accele-
rated, and as its necessary corollary, the industrial disputes multiplied. Public
sector in this respect behaved almost in the same manner as the private sector and
there was phenomenal proliferation of industrial disputes. Conﬁicting awards
multiplied emergence of industrial disputes. The Supreme Court, with its widest
possible jurisdiction, had to deal with this large number of awards by different
Industrial Tribunals and even conﬁicting decisions of the High Courts to bring about
a semblance of uniformity in the ﬁeld of industrial relations. If the Supreme Court
had done it expeditiously, no further question could have been raised. But the
phenomenal backlog of cases in the Supreme Court has considerably thwarted the
disposal of labour cases by the Supreme Court which alone could bring about uni-
formity. The greater the delay in disposing of labour cases, the greater the pro-
portionate rise in industrial disputes year after year; and the delay in disposal of
labour cases by the Supreme Court is gradually increasing. Appeals under the labour
laws not involving any constitutional interpretation that are coming to the Supreme
Court by way of special leave petitions under article 136 are pending from the year
1973 and the total pendency is 690 as on lst October, 1987. (See Appendix III-
Part A). 953 appeals under labour laws were pending as on 1-1-1986 (See Appen-
dix III--Part B). By the end of 1985, the pendency of cases under the labour laws
in the High Courts, except four High Courts, namely, Madras, Calcutta, Madhya
Pradesh and Jammu & Kashmir, aggregatedto 14,818. (See Appendix V). Some
of these matters are over a decade old. Is it to be assumed that during this period
of ten years, no industrial dispute of a similar nature arose anywhere else? Can it
be kept pending for ten years till the Supreme Court ﬁnds time to pronounce its
decision on it which may be binding on all Tribunals and Courts so as to bring about
uniformity in industrial relations ? Some instance of a revealing nature may be
set out here. A wage board for revising emoluments of. working and non-working
journalists under Working Journalists 'and 0ther.Newspaper Employees (Condi-
tions of Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955, was set up under the
Chairmanship of Mr. Justice Palekar, retired Judge of the Supreme Court in June,
1975. The wage board gave its award on 12-8-1980. It was challenged by some
newspaper establishments in the Supreme Court in the year 1980. The writ petition
is awaiting disposal in the Supreme Court. In the meantime, a new wage board has
been constituted on 11-7-85 under the Chairmanship 'of Bachawat, J. The award
of the present wage board will supersede the earlier award which is under
challenge. What guidance will the present wage - board get from the Sup-
reme Court in this situation ? There is such inordinate delay in disposal of all cases,
including cases under the labour, laws, coming before the Supreme Court that the

' faith reposed in it that it will expeditiously pronounce its verdict and help in in-

troducing uniformity has been belied. And, in the, absence of the Supreme Court,
on the abolition of the Labour Appellate Tribunal, all the labour courts and In-
dustrial Tribunals almost enjoyed ﬁnality of their award save under some State
statutes. The result is a tremendous lack of uniformity in the awards of the In-
dustrial Tribunals and multiplicity of litigation and proliferation of industrial dis-
putes which very often' threaten industrial peace and harmony dislocating the goal
set up in the plan documents.

2.19. Industrial sickness has acquired a high visibility. Thousands of units
are closed. Textile industry, the fulcrum of the economic activity of Gujarat, is
in ruins. Thousands of workmen have been rendered jobless. Can the situation be

'remedied by a. judicial or, say, quasi-judicial_proce_s,s ? j The entire enquiry in this

behalf is for the Ministry of Labour to undertake. Only one limb of it can be exa-
mined here, namely, to devise a machinery for bringing about uniformity in industrial
relations by setting up a body having an all-India perspective and jurisdiction below
the Supreme Court so that industrial strife can be minimised.

2.20. There is almost near unanimity on the question of providing a forum
having an all-India jurisdiction and perspective to which an appeal may lie or
which may also enjoy some original jurisdiction so that much desired uniformityin
industrial relations can be brought about. Since the abolition of the Labour Appellate
Tribunal, numerous awards were challenged in the Supreme Court by invoking juris-
diction under article 136. Decades after, appeals arising out of the special leave
petition were heard. Time, on -an average, of two years taken by Labour Appellate
Tribunal in disposing of an appeal before it has paled into insigniﬁcance when one
views the delay in the Supreme Court on which the protagonists of the abolition of
Labour Appellate Tribunal reposed faith for expeditious disposal of cases under
the labour laws so as to provide the much needed uniformity. Truth has dawned
upon them that the Supreme Court will not be able to deliver the goods.' In fact,

. Supreme Court was not meant to be a regular forum for appeal. Even when article

136 confers jurisdiction of widest amplitude on the Supreme Court, yet it was to
be exercised to deal with legal formulations of general public importance. It was
a cryptic saying that even where a point of law is of vital importance to the two
parties to the dispute, that by itself would not be sufficient to invite the Supreme
Court to entertain the special leave petition. Every question of law cannot be clo-
thed with the garb of an important question of law. Not only the question of law
must be important but it must be of general public importance vital to the community
which alone would permit the Supreme Court'to entertain a petition for special
leave. Undoubtedly, this jurisdiction of widest amplitude was conferred on the
Supreme Court so that, without being trammelled by technical argumentsas to
want of jurisdiction it can reach every nook and cranny to render justice where
rank injustice appears to have been perpetrated. But in a country of India's dimen-
sions and its litigious traditions which have acquired a high visibility 'proﬁle, 15
if the Supreme Court, merely on the feeling that there is some injustice to the
party by an award of the Industrial Tribunal, agrees and undertakes to examine the
same, it was inherent in the situation that the delay in disposing -of the cases coming
before it would be inordinate and would accordingly be counter-productive. That is
the present situation. Therefore, there is a revival for the demand of an appellate fo- '
rum over the Industrial Tribunals having an all-India jurisdiction. In a well-ordered '
judicial system, it is considered absolutely essential to provide for one appeal as of
right with safeguards of a further possible appeal by leave in appropriate cases.
The International Labour Organisation had recommended that workman whose
service is terminated must have a right of appeal to a neutral body." Supreme Court
cannot be a forum for regular appeals as a matter of right. Therefore, an intermediate .
appellate forum is the need of the day. There is a renewed interest in either devising
such a forum, if not the revival of the Labour Appellate Tribunal.

2.21. The ﬁrst Law Commission recommended that 'the Legislature should
provide for an adequate right of appeal in labour matters either by reviving the La-
bour Appellate Tribunal or by empowering the High Court to hear appeal in suitable
cases." Empowering the High Court to hear appeals in labour matters would be a
remedy worse than the disease. The High Court did enjoy the jurisdiction to enter-

' :tain a writ petition against the award of the Industrial Tribunal or even the Labour

Appellate Tribunal. The outcome is there for everyone to see. The problem got «
further accentuated. ' '

2.22. The representatives" of the All-India Trade Union Congress, while conced-
ing in principle the setting up of an all-India forum for entertaining appeals against
the award of the Industrial Tribunal, simultaneously submitted that-the jurisdiction
of the High Court should be excluded. It even went to the extent of suggesting that
the writ jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may be excluded. That would be rather
inappropriate. It also expressed an opinion that statute setting up such a forum
must provide a time-limit within which the appeals coming before such forum must '
bedisposed of. ' .

2.23. The Indian National Trade Union Congress was of the opinion that at least
one appeal should be allowed either to the special Bench of the Supreme Court or to
the revived Labour Appellate Tribunal. In any event, the INTUC was in the fore- ,
front for demand of the abolition of the Labour Appellate Tribunal,' which, having.

seen the developing scenario, has reconsidered its stand and is in favour of an
appellate forum having an all-India jurisdiction and perspective.

2.24. The Law Commission approaches the problem from two different angles .

The Law Commission is primarily interested in decentrialisation of administration of '

justice with a view to reducing the burden on the High Courts and the Supreme Court.

Simultaneously, it is of the opinion that matters arising under the labour laws require _

specialist knowledge of industrial relations, humanities, social sciences, goals of
planned economy, targets of planning and, 'above all, the attainment of the goals of
the Constitution as hereinbefore set out. As pointed out earlier, if lawyers are becom-
ing increasingly sp§5ialised, such as labour lawyers, tax lawyers, patent lawyers, even
tort lawyers,why should this specialisation be not reﬂected in the judicial fora and
hierarchy 'I The notion that most people want the black-robed Judges, well-dressed
lawyers and panelled court rooms for the resolution of disputes is a myth. People
with problems like people with pain want relief and they want it as quickly as possi-
ble.19 This report aims at attaining all the three objectives, keeping in view the
present depressing and distressing situation. ' i

CHAPTER III

APPROACH-OF THE BODIES IN THE PAST
TO THIS QUESTION

3.1. The Law Commission submitted its Fourteenth Report on Reform of Judi-
cial Administration in September 1958. By that time, Labour Appellate Tribunal
was already abolished. The'Law Commission, while examining the inﬂow of work in
the Supreme Court, took special notice of the fact that the Court had to grant special
leave to appeal against decisions of various Labour Tribunals. It was noticed that in
the year 1956, as many as 257 special leave applications against decisions of Labour
Tribunals were granted, out of which l40 such applications were allowed. The Commi-
ssion was of the opinion that the situation created by these large number of appeals
admitted in labour matters causes concern in two respects. The first effect noticed was
that it clogged the work of the Supreme Court notwithstanding the recent increase
in its strength and secondly, that the disposal by the Supreme Court was not
equal to the rising institution with which it was faced. According to the Commission,
these matters have in a sense been forced upon the Court inasmuch as the Court could
not refuse to entertain appeals against the decisions which appeared to be arbitrary
and capricious and made in disregard of well-accepted principles of law and natural
justice. According to the Commission, a large number of applications for special
leave in these matters made to the Supreme Court synchronised with the abolition of
the Labour Appellate Tribunal. The situation of which notice was taken was that
against the decisions of the Industrial Tribunals, no appeal lay to any forum. Accor-
dingly, in most cases, a petition for special leave was ﬁled in the Supreme Court
contending that the decision was unjust and arbitrary. The fact that the relief under
article 226 of the Constitution by the High Court would be by a writ of certiorari
which would permit the High Court -to set aside theaward/order of the Industrial
Tribunal ; but the High Court cannot make its own decision and substitute for that

of the Tribunal, the rush to Supreme Court under article 136 was inevitable. Having'

noticed this situation, the First Law Commissin was of the opinion that :

"It is, therefore, imperative that the Legislature should intervene and provide
' for an adequate right of appeal in these matters. Such a right of appeal could
be provided either by constituting Tribunals of Appeal under the labour legisla-
tion itself or by conferring a right of appeal to the;High Court in suitable cases''."

3.2. It may be recalled that the situation noticed by the Law Commission in 1958
was the emerging scenario on the abolition of the Labour Appellate Tribunal and the
situation had not deteriorated,to theextent it has now. The latest situation is more
depressing. The ﬁgures tell their own tale. Let them speak for themselves--l4,82,450.
(Appendix IV)--'as per the information given to the Parliament on 18-11387. One
aspect that unfortunately escaped the notice of the Law Commission was that
on the abolition of the Labour Appellate Tribunal, the awards of the Industrial
Tribunals scattered throughout the length and breadth of this country had ﬁnality
subject to constitutional remedies. There was no body at an all-India level which can
provide uniformity in this matter----a function discharged by the Labour Appellate'

Tribunal. The awards of the Industrial Tribunals on questions of wages, deamess

allowance, retirement beneﬁts, diﬂerentalliowanoes, if not brought , to some common
denominator, were likely to introduce conﬂict and chaos. Uniformity in this behalfcan
only be introduced by an Appellate Tribunal having an all-India jurisdiction and a
national perspective. Conferring appellate jurisdiction on the High Court over the-
awards of the Industrial Tribunal would not only not have improved the matterbut

the much desired uniformity would be shattered. The lack and absence of unifonnity g

surfaced itself on the disappearance of the; Labour Appellate Tribunal.

3.3. The Government of India constituted a Commission, chaired by Justice P.B.
Gajendragadkar, Cheif Justice ( retired) of the Supreme Court, for a comprehensive
review of various matters connected withlabour. One of the importantaspects 'dealt
with by it is the power of the State to intervene in the settlement of industrial disputes

commencing with the Trade Disputes Act," 1929, and ending with the Industrial DiI- A

putes Act, 1947. Conceding that the "ultimate legal remedy for 'the settlement of an
unresolved dispute is its neference to 'adjudication by the appropriate Government,

the Commission observed that during the last twenty years, the adjudication machi-
nery has exercised considerable inﬂuence on several aspects of conditions of work and C

1!'

labour-management relations. It was noticed that 'adjudication is dilatory, expensive
and even discriminatory as the power of reference vests in the appropriate Govern-

' ment'. It was also of the opinion that by and large . 'it has failed to achieve indust-

rial peace'. The Commission felt that disadvantages noticed by it may have been
over-stated. It indicated that greater scope should be given to collective bargaining.
Ultimately, it recommended the setting up of an Industrial Relations Commission
at National and State' levels for settling disputes broadly covering matters listed in
the Third Schedule to the I.D Act. The broadset up of the Industrial Relations
Commission and the method of appointment of the President and the Judicial and
Non-Judicial Members of the Commission was indicated. The procedure for settle-
ment of disputes was chalked out. The Commission was to replace Industrial, Tri-
bunals and National Industrial Tribunal. Labour Court was to be set up in each State
to be presided over by Judicial Members and appeal over the decision of the Labour
Court in certain clearly deﬁned matters may lie to the High Court within whose
jurisdiction the Court is located.20 The recommendation remained unattended.

3.4. The National Labour Conference held on 17th and 18th of September, 1982,
appointed a Committee under the Chairmanship of Shri Sanat Metha, the then Minis-
ter of Finance and Labour, Gujarat, inviting it to examine important industrial rela-
tions' issues, one of which being machinery and fora for resolution of industrial dis-
putes. This Committee took note of the fact that a National Labour Conference had
practically approved the recommendations of the National Commission on Labour
for setting up of Industrial Relations Commissions at the Centre and State level for
resolution of indtistrial disputes. The Committee recommended that the new legis-
lation dealing with industrial relations must provide for setting up of independent
Industrial Relations Commissions and the constitution, set up, qualiﬁcations of
Chairman, Members and the subordinate officers and staﬂ' shall be on the same lines as
given in the recommendations of the National Commission on Labour. It recommen-
ded setting up of Standing Labour Courts to work under the overall supervision of
the Industrial"Relations Commission and they would deal with disputes relating to
rights and obligations, interpretation and implementation] of award etc. Reading
the Report as a whole, it appears that the Industrial Relations Commission at the
Centre as well as State level was to have original jurisdiction.

3.5. On receipt of the Report of the Committee chaired by Shri Sanat Metha, the
Standing Labour Committee formulated the infra-structure of the legislation to be
introduced in this behalf. The State level industrial Commission was to have an-
appellate jurisdiction over the orders and decisions of' the Labour Courts. The Indust-
rial Relations Commission at the Centre will have _both original and appellate juris-
diction. . , '

3.6. Commencing from the setting up of the Labour Appellate Tribunal in 1950
upto the recommendations of the Committee chaired' by Shri Sanat Metha, and conse-
quent upon its recommendations, the inf ra-structure drawn up by the Standing Labour
C mmittee unambiguously converge on the view that there has to be a forum at-the
nagional level having both original and appellate jurisdiction which would enable that
body-to introduce' an all-India perspective in the matter of industrial relations. Of

_ necessity, such body must be composed of such persons having intimate knowledge

of labour problems, economic planning, just and fair distribution of wealth, socio-
economic justice and legal formulations as would enable it to dispose of matters
expeditiously and effectively. It also clearly emerges that the jurisdiction of the High

I Court in labour matter has to be abolished to avoid the confusion arising from

dilferent High Courts taking different view in» matters of common interest. The
present approach is that apart from the advantages' herein indicated,- this new set up
will help in reducing the workload in the High Courts and the Supreme Court, be-
cause the jurisdiction of 'the High Court in labour matters will be abolished and the
jurisdiction under" article 136 of the Supreme Court' will be sparingly exercised, as a
specialist body with an all-India jurisdiction has examined the matter. This is the
justiﬁcation, if one is needed, for the present approach.

' as-MIJ(i3)89MotLJ&cA~2

CHAPTER lV '
APPROACH"AND JUSTIFICATION

4.1. The Law Commission was required to study measures for judicial xreforms
and make recommendations, inter alia, on the need for decentralisation of the system
of administration of justice by setting up of a system of participatory justice' with
deﬁned jurisdiction and powers in suitable areas and centres; and establishing other
tiers or systems within 'the judicial heirarchy to reduce the volume of work in the
Supreme Court and the High Courts. This twin objective set out in the Terms of
Reference in .the Context of studying Judicial Reforms must inﬂuence, and has
considerably inﬂuenced, our approach. - . » '

4.2. On the question of participatory justice, the present Law. Commission
has given cogent, convincing and extensive reasons for modelling justicesystem
on participatory basis. In the Report on Gram Nyayalaya"-, while recommending
a novel body for resolution of disputes emanating from rural areas, the Commission
extensively examined the need for replacing the existing model of State courts by a
forum manned bylay justices catering to the need of participatory justice. Parich
system, both at regional and caste level,'had the trappings of participatory justice.
There is a tribe called Nandiwala with a habitat on -the South-Eastern
Border of Maharashtra. It is a, Scheduled Tribe. Like the Greek City states,
the whole community constitutes into at. body to render justice. The delibera-

tions are guided by one who is called Guru, an outsider. The entire tribe ,

participates in resolving disputes arisingbetween the members of the tribe brought
before it. Where the entire -tribe participates in resolving a dispute, it is the

most ideal model' of participatory justice. rBut practical consideration outweigh

the ideal. Therefore, many local areas had their regional Panch and some castes
had also their caste Panch. The Law Commission is not unaware of the tyranny
of caste Panch. At present, only its. feature of participatory justice is beingtaken
note of. Magna Carta included ademand for Peer's justice. If"the Judge is not

some black robed elite butaman of lrisown level of his locality, aware of his'-own '

traditions, talking in'his,own language, he would inspire greater conﬁdence in, the
litigant. Under the imperial rulers, the entire. justice system underwent 'a transfor~
mation and the judicial power of the State: came to be exercised by' State courts.
-It was a non-participatory model. Slowly and imperceptibly, while this non-parti-
cipatory model introduced an' aura of outward respectability, it failed to gene-
rate the conﬁdence in consumers of justice. This non-participatory model overa
course of time became very formal, -legalistic, professionally manned, dilatory,
technical and prolix. Its.rigid rules of procedure, its deliberations ina foreign
language and its highly technical approach rendered justice illusory. A yawning
chasm developed between those whoihave to render justice and the consumer of the

system. Therefore, participatory justice. with many of its advantages already dis-. V

cussed in earlier reports has guided tpheideliberations of this Commissionand
virtually. dictated the course. As pointed.'-out; even the Terms of Reference-"require
the Law '-Commission to recommend setting up of a system of participatoryijustice
with deﬁned. jurisdiction and powers in suitable areas and centres. ' '

4.3. The second object inﬂuencing the 'approach of the Commission this
behalfis to introduce decentralisation in the system of administration of justice. There

are two distinct advantages of decentralisation of -the system of administration of. 4
justice. 'To brieﬂy mention them, they are zspecialist courts in contra-distinction tn'
generalist courts, and consequent expediious disposal of cases and controversies»

coming up before the Tribunals manned by specialists, .

4.4. Industrial disputes, in the interest of the'-parties concerned,' the society at '

large and the public, must be disposed of as expeditiously as possible. Adjudication
of industrial disputes is quasi-judicial in character. While some legalformulations
would certainly enter the adj udicator's verdict, by and large industrial adjudication
requires the approach guided by consideration of socio-economic justice, in' its':ex-
tended meaning. The industrial. adjudicator has to keep in view the Directive
Principles of State Policy which requirehim to so mould his decision as to .be able to
effectively enforce the Directive Principles of State-Policy relating to socio-economic

a nu: «. ..

;. ._eliicient adjudicator. _
cemed iidustry in which the dispute has arisen, the adjudicator may have to acquire

. tier or system within ju I
liierarciiy, to reduce volume of work in the 'Supreme Court and the High Courts_

the Concurrent List reads

Iii

justice and eliiniuation of inequality in status and income. The approach is dic-
tated by constitutional goals and objects. Anyone gnjcying the power of . industrial
adjudication must have adequate knowledge of. apart from other things. norms of
'SOC~i0-CC.);1i)m.'-=C justic;, industrial relations, economic planning and ailied subjects.
One need not be dyed in the wool in legal formulation to be an accomplished and
epending upon the technological advancement of the con-

ktiowledge of technology 01' may have to seek assistange of assessors who may be
well-versed in the subject. '

4.5. li', therefore, a body for industrial adjudication can be devised in which, apart
,fro.;.n those conversant with legal norms and .formula._tions, there are other partici-

""p'ar'its"who'are well-versed in economic planning, industrial relations, norms of socio-

economic justice and allied subjects, not only the ideal of participatory justice would

. beachieved but this inter-action amongst such adjudicators w'ould'cer'tainly' help in

expeditiously resolving theiindust-rial disputes. Therefore, labour adjudication is

*_ anarea in which system of participatory justice with deﬁned jurisdiction and'"po"wers

can be effectively introduced.

4.6. Itie second object soughtto be achieved by this approach is to ' provide' for a
licial hierarchy, which would 7 certainly include 'qiiasi'-judicial

14.7. 'Article 226 of the Constit'ution confers power on the High Court, through-

"-out theterritories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to_ issue to anyiperson
.{Qi'n_IlIh0l'lty, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within thcsetenitories

fdirgction, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus.
;,prohibition,,quo warranto and certiorari, or anyxof them, for the enforcement of

fanyof the rights conferred by Part III or for any a.tl1er'pui'pose. Article 22? confers
_ on every High Court the power of superintendeiice over all courts and 'tribunals
.',th;:oi'igbout.tl1e territories in relation tozwhich it "exercises jurisdiction. Article '227

has been so interpreted as to confer on the'!-Iigh Court the power of judicial review

over the decisions of the tribunals functioning in the State for which the High Court is

,setup. Inthe absence ofan intermediate appellate forum, against almost all the

' Wﬂds of the Industrial Tribunal and the orders the Labour Courtwhich are not
subject to appeal under any State statute, writ petitions are always ﬁled in the High S
,Court-clogging up the work in the High Court. Pendency as on 31-l2--85 of matters , '

under labour laws High Court-wise is tabulated in Appendix V. Compared withthe
infarlnation supplied by Ministry of Justice, the.pendency is higher as' per statement
attached to Appendix V. '

4.8. Article 32 of the Constitution confers jurisdiction on the Supreme Court to

tissue directions, orders or all prerogative writs for the enforcement of 'any of ' the
_ _!'i3ht6 conferred by Part III of the Constitution. Article 136 confers jurisdiction-'on

thefsupreme Court to grant special leave to: appeal against any judgment, decree;

A , determination, sentence or order passed by a tribunal iltthe territory of India. Thus,
,_,_all the awards of the tribunal can directly bejquegtioned in the Supreme Court by a
petition for special leave to appeal. And numerous matters are ﬁled inthis manner 1

(Appendix III). _ '
4. 9. After the High Courtdecides the matterfa petition for special leave to 'appeal

' Lagaiiist the decision of the High Court can be in the -Supreme Court' ﬁnder

article 136. As pointed out earlier, an appeal is aidinitted by the Supreme as a'

fmatter of right where it is pointed outtliat there is 1a conﬂict amongst decisions of

various!-Iigh Courts or two High Courts have difered o'n.thee'ame point. Ooﬂﬂict

in apprbach in dealing with labour "matters amongst High Courts is not unknown. ~

4. 10. Article 3238 in Part XIVA of the Constitution confers powers on the' appro-'
priate Legislature; by law, to provide for - adjudication or trial by tribunals'of'any'

C .'.diSp'l'l!¢'_Si, complaints or offences with respect to atlloif any of the matters speciﬁed in

clause" (2), which,'inter alia, includes industrial and "labour disputes. Entry '.113 in
the Concurrent List reads
sation of all courts, except the Supreme Court and 'the 'High.Court_s'. Entry ' 22 in
: 'Trade unions; industrial and ' labour disputes'. Entry
HA, read with entry 22 in the Concurrent'List would enable the Parliament to

enact a law for setting up of a tribunal as contemplated by agicle 323,B(2)(3c)',bfor *

adjudicating industrial disputes, both with original as well as appellate jurisdiction.

: "Administration of"jIistrice; constitution and'v6fgani-'

If such a tribunal is'set up having jurisdiction' at an all-India level, _it will develop
an all-India perspective. its decision could be questioned under; article 136 before
the Supreme Court only. In order to avoid the unfortunate experience of an omis-

_ sion while setting up the Labour; Appellate Tribunal. the law setting up a tribunal,

as herein conceived, must also simultaneously provide for excluding the jurisdiction
of all courts, including the High Courts, except. the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court a
under article I36 with respect to all or any of , the matters falling within the jurisdiction
of such tribunal as contemplated by article 323B(3)(d)., Once the tribunal. as
herein conceived, is set up, it will provide for a forum for participatory justice j.n.,an ..
area where it is sorely needed and simultaneously. it will bring in the mis§inx,ell_-'Z
India perspective and would certainly reduce the volume of work considerabl-y"in"_
High Court and proportionately in the Supreme Court. These objects have inﬂuerioed' I
and guided the approach of the Law Commission in devising such a forum.

CHAPTER V

THE FORUM, ITS FORMAT, JURISDICTION AND
PERSO_NNEL MANNING THE SAME

5.1. To have a comprehensive view of the new model herein to be indicated and
.to appreciate its functional adaptability, it would be advantageous tobrieﬂy refer to
the existing "nodel devised by the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, for resolution of
industrial disputes. A . -

5.2. Section 7 of the I.D. Act envisages setting up of Labour Courts for adjudi-
cation of industrial disputes relating to any matter speciﬁed in the Second Schedule
to the Act. The qualiﬁcations prescribed for a person to be eligible to be appointed
as the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court are such as would almost make it an
impelling necessity to select persons from civil judiciary and therein lies the poten-

I tiality for spill over of all the technicalities, dilatcriness-and formal approach quite

evident in administration of civil justice. To be a Presiding Officer of a Labour Court
one has to be either a Judge of the High Court, sitting or retired, or has been, for a
period of not less than three years, a District Judge or Additional District Judge,
or has held any judicial ofﬁce 'in India for not less than seven years, meaning thereby
sitting or retired members of the subordinate judiciary, or has been a Presiding
Oﬂicer of a Labour Court constituted under any of the State statutes for a period of
not less than ﬁveyears. It would merely add to the length of this report if one were
to refer to all those State statutes prescribing qualiﬁcations of eligibility for being
appointed as Presiding Officer of Labour Court. In sum, they are such as would
only make members of the State civil judiciary eligible for being appointed with the
same undesirable consequences. The subject matter of jurisdiction of the Labour

Court is referable to topics set out in the Second Schedule of ' the l.D. Act. By and
large, they involve day-to-day conditions of work in industrial establishments and .

indicate the grey areas where disputes might arise. _ '

5.3. 'Section 7A confers power on the appropriate Government to I constitute '

i one or more Industrial Tribunals for the adjudication of industrial disputes relating _

to any matter speciﬁed in the Second Schedule or the Third Schedule. Sub-section
(3) prescribes qualiﬁcations for bein.g appointed as Presiding Oﬂicer of a Tribunal.
To be-eligible, one has to be either a sittingor a retired Judge of a High Court or
District Judge or Additional District Judge for a period of three years. The criticism
hereinbefore set out will apply mutatis mutandis to the present situation also which
tends to perpetuate the hold of the judiciary dealing with administration of civil
justice over Labour Courts and Industrial Tribunals.

~ 5.4. Section 5 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act. 1950; pres-
cribed the qualiﬁcations for a member of the Labour Appellate Tribunal. The app-
roach was the same. The qualiﬁcations were" that 'the member, to be eligible for
being appointed, is or has beena Judge of a' High Court, or is qualiﬁed for appoint-
ment as a Judge of a High Court, or has been_a member of an Industrial Tribunal
for not less than two years'. The only opening made here for entry of persons other
than members of civil judiciary was in favour of a practisingadvocate.

5.5. Way back in 1973, a Committee appointedby the Government of Gujarat,
known as Labour Laws Review Committee, took notice of "this situation when it
observed as under :-- ' . ,

"The Judges so drawn from the civil judiciary do carry with them their life-
long experience of administration of civil an.d criminal justice. Undoubtedly,

they were the officers who had the perspective and objectivity of a Judge and -

their experience had taught them to look each dispute or problem -coining be-
fore them from an objective standpoint. While administering socio-'economic
justice in Labour and Industrial Courts, this"approa_ch may not be very help-
. ful. The principal object of the labour laws is to smoothen the passage of
State, having sole object of maintaining law 'and order, to Welfare State.
For achieving ideal of a Welfare -State, four.dation of which is socio-economic
justice, new norms of industrial relations have to' be formulated, shaped and
enforced. Targets set out in various Five Year Plans have to be kept in view _.

'16" '

17.

In other words, social philosophy of . the day is to be fully imbibed and given
legal form by devising norms of socio-economic justice- The officer. must have

training and aptitude to understand how persons consigned to miserable exis- _

tence are lifted and taken to tolerable existence, if not wholly civilized existence

which should be the ideal . . . . . . ..The Judges who have worked for their whole
active life in civil judiciary undoubtedly, with notable exceptions, may not be -'

able to rise to the occasion and stand up to the requirement. _No attempt has
been made over a quarter of a century to create Labour Judicial Service?"

5.6. As the ﬁrst step, this Committee recommended that retired Judges or those
about to retire from civil' judiciary should not be inducted in the Industrial and

Labour;Courts and Industrial Tribunals.

5. 7. One of the grounds in support of vociferous demand for abolition of Labour
Appellate Tribunal was that the Judges manning the Tribunal were mostly drawn
from the cadre of retired High Court Judges and, therefore, by habit, temperament

and tradition, they were prone to be technical, formal and non-responsive to the-

demands of socio-economic justice. Assuming that the demand for abolition of
Labour Appellate Tribunal was an immature reaction of some persons annoyed by
the slight delay in disposal of appeals by the Tribunal, the fact remains that those
who had spent their whole active life in courts administering civil justice are prone
to be precedent-oriented', technical, traditional and impervious, if not blind, to the
utter inequalities of parties appearing before them when functioning as members of
Tribunals set up to resolve industrialdisputes. If in their journey through life as
Judges, they were accustomed to ﬁnd out what the contract is and sincxzrely believed
that parties. must be held to their own contracts, it would be expecting too much
from them to say that when taking up an industrial adjudication they will be looking

A at the unfairness of contracts and devise what contract ought to be, that is, what
ought to be a fair relation between the employer and the workmen. This historical V

perspective is to be kept in view while devising a forum for resolution of industrial
disputes, both at the State level and national level. . .

5 . 8. To sum up, three aspects have emerged from the preceding discussion and
historical review since 1947 till today. In the absence of an all-India body having
jurisdiction to reconcile conﬂicting awards of Labour Courts/Industrial Tribunals
so asto frame a consistent noteworthy industrial jurisprudence within the perspec-

' tive of Part IV of the Constitution, contradictory, conﬂicting and irreconcilable

industrial relation norms have emerged. 'Secondly, the ex tation that Supreme
Court of India will supply this lacuna by providing quick uni ormity has been wholly
belied. Thirdly, .indust_rial adjudication cannot operate purely in a legal frame-
work devoid of liumanistic touch. It requires _understanding of constitutional goals,
humanities, social sciences, economic planning and national and international
economic developmentsfln short, it is thus a ﬁeld of specialist study and, therefore,

i must bea concern of specialist court. Finally, the fundamental consideration govem-

ing industrial adjudication being industrial peace and harmony creating fruitful
"environment for economic advancement of the nation, the adjudicator must have
vision and capacity to move in that direction. Over a period, industrial adjudication
has developed all the trappings of civil litigation bringing in all its imperfections,

limitations and disadvantages. A bold and innovative approach must dictate the --

choice. The solution lies in providing a system of participatory justice. Industrial
adjudication is an area where_ a- system of V participatory 7 justice with deﬁned
'urisdiction and powers can be introduced advantage'-which will remove the
ills so far noticed and set out above. ' . A - . .'

. 5.9. At the base level, a Labour Court, as contemplated bywsection 7 of
I.D. Act, is functioning. _It is generally a one tgman Tribunal,_ mostly manned by
members drawn from civil judiciary. At_this'level, drawing upon our experience
in the Report on Gram Nyayalaya, it is necessary to 'introduce.a participatory
model. The Judge of the Labour Court should be assisted by two lay Judges drawn
from the rank of workmen and employers. ' Today, the Labour Court' has all the
trappings of a court administering civil justice. 'It is desirable to transform the present
model of Labour Court, which is 'formal and legalistic, to an informal and parti-
cipatory model. The jurisdiction of the Labour Court coversitems set out inithe
Second Schedule of the I.D. Act. A reference to Second Schedule will "show at 'a_
glance that subjects therein set out are lxttet' dealt with by inter-action of all the

18--

thteegmembers constituting the Labour Court. The Labour Court can examin
thenptopriety or legality of an order passed by an employer under the standing
orders. It can examine the implications and interpretations of standin.g orders.
Matters covering these items are generally of a simple nature. Item No. 3 in the
Second Schedule deals with 'Discharge or dismissal of workmen including rein-
statemerzt of, or grant of relief to, workmen wrongfully dismissed', The bulk of
litigation in this ﬁeld arises from discharge or dismissal of workmen and claim
for reinstatement or other ancillary relief, such as, compensation for retrenchment,
back wages whercreinstatement is ordered, ancillary benefits if reinstatement is
ordered after a long time. It is here that interaction of a lay Judge coming from

classof workmen with one coming from employer and a third having a legally' trained,

mind would produce a result which would be more or less very satisfactory. Item
No. 4 provides for withdrawal of any customary concession or privilege. Those
who are working either as trade union leaders or in employer's association would
be well conversant with what are customary concessions and privileges. Item 5 deals
with illegality or otherwise of u_ strike or lockout. It apperas crystal clear that the
matters set out in the Second Schedule are such as can better be dealt with by a
participatory model.

5.10. industrial Tribunals have to be set up by the appropriate Government in
exercise of the powers conferred by section 7A of;I.D. Act. Central Government

caniset up a'National Industrial Tribunal in exercise of the power conferred by section. .

7B for the adjudication of industrial disputes which, in the opinion of the Central
Government, involve questions of 'national importance or are of such a nature that
industrial establishments situated in more than one State are likely to be interested
in, or affected by, such disputes. Sub-section (2) of section 7B provides that a Natio-

nal Industrial Tribunal shall consist of one person only, to be appointed by the A

Central Government. By and large, this one man National Tribunal is generally
presided over by a retired Judge of theHigh Court or-of the Supreme Court. This
model has been tested since 1956. Most, of the awards of National, Tribunals"

have been questioned in the High Courts and the Supreme Court. A new thinking I

and departure from present day set up is necessary in this behalf. A participatory
model, both at the National and State level, replacing the National Industrial Tribu-
na_l.and Industrial Tribunal respectively, would 'certainly be a step forward and
hopefully_result-oriented. Let it be made crystal clear that in this behalf we are
not.-writing on a_ clean slate. National Commission on Labour has examined the
advisability, desirability and the feasibility of introducing Industrial Relations Commi-
mission," both at the State and Central level. Sanat Mehta Committee," as
late as 1982, endorsed the. recommendation of the National Labour Commission.
The subsequent meeting of the Standing Labour Committee accepted the recommen-
dation of Sanat.Mehta Committee._ We are inﬂuenced by this recommendation
not only for all those reasons which appealed "to those august bodies but also for the

additional reason that the model of participatory 'justice can be conveniently intro- A
duced in the ﬁeld of industrial adjudication. It-would effectively help in decentrali-.

sation of administration of justice which is at present monolithic.

5. ll . Industrial Relations Commission herein envisaged canlalso come under the. ,
generic term 'Tribunal for Adjudication of Industrial Disputes' and these-recommen-A -

dations can be effectively implemented by law passed for this purposein exercise
of power» conferred by article 323B of the Constitution. .

. 5.12. It needs to be re-emphasised. that the Industrial Relations Commission, "

both at the Central and State level, would be providing a model of participatory
justice. ' V A ' -

5.13. The additional advantage would be the cpnsequent reduction' in the work-
load in the High Court and the Supreme Court betfause the jurisdiction of the~I-ligh
Court to deal with matters falling within the jurisdiction of the Industrial Relations'
Commission should be excluded. " ' i

J . . ' t
'5. 14. The Industrial Relations Commission at the Central and State level would

be composed of a President. drawn from the rank of' aretired Judge of the Supreme

Court for the Central Commission_ and a retired Judge of the High Court forvthei .
State Commission. There will be an equal number of members drawn from the.rank'

of .. unionleaders and 'employees' organisation constituting the Commission. _It

must be made speciﬁcally clear that these members not have a degree -inilew or. a

bacltground of legal training as essential qualiﬁcations. Theymust, how'eYer,"lI"&Ve

adequate knowledge in the ﬁeld of industrial relations, management of ' inhﬁsfﬁes,
economic planning and industrial. ﬁscal and monetary palicies of the Govemiffént
of India. . ' '

5.15. The Industrial Relations Commission at the State and at the Centre 'will
have both original and appellate jurisdiction. Appeal against the decision of the Lab-
our Court purely on an important question of law will lie to" the State Industrial Rela-

' tions Commission. The appeal shall be heard by a Bench of three Judges; one of

them must be a judicial member, the other two non-judicial members. All industrial
disputes at present falling within the jurisdiction of Industrial Tribunals shall fall
within the jurisdiction of State Industrial Relations Commission and the reference
should be made to it by the State Government as appropriate Government under
section 10 of the I.D. Act. All matters which could have been referred to the
National Industria_l Tribunal shall fall within the jurisdiction of I.R.C. at Centre.
It shall be heard by such number of persons as may be decided by the President of the
Commission. The I.R.C. at the Centre will also have appellate jurisdiction over the
awards and decisions of the I.R.C. at the State level but. the appeal will be limited
purely to the important questions of law to be stated speciﬁcally at the time of admis-
sion of the appeal.

5.16. The members of the I.R.C., both at the Central and State level, will be
appointed by the Central and State Governments respectively in consultation with
National Iudicial Service Commission to be set up as recommended by the Law
Commissioninits 121stReport. The Act setting up such Commission may as well
consider conferring power of conciliation on I.R.C. ~

5.17. The terms and conditions of service of the President and members of
I.R.C. at Central and State level shall be determined by the Central Government' in
consultation with the National Judicial Service Commission.

5.18. Arrangement for effective training of the members to be appointed to
the Commission shall be made by the Government, in tun: with the scheme of
training recommended by the Law Commission in its 117th report. _ .

5. l9. The law setting up I.R.C. shall provide, amongst others, for exclusion of
the jurisdiction of the High Court in each State from dealing with matters which
fall within the jurisdiction of the I.R.C. at the State and Central level. The Labour

» Court shall be outsidethe superintendenee of the'High Court and shall be brought

within the superintendence of the State I.R.C. _ »

5.20. In the event of a dispute ammgst the members constituting the ,Commi- -

ssion dealing with a particular matter, the decison of the 'majority' will prevail. In
the event of conflict between decisions of State level Commissions, the matter
can be withdrawn by the I.R.C. at the Centre to be decided by it. The decision of the
I.R.C. at the Centre will be binding on all State I.R.Cs. a'nd Labour Courts.

5.21. The jurisdiction of the Supreme 'Court under article 136 over decisions, of
the I.R.C. at the Centre will remain intact. . I

5.22. Todaythere are roughly' around 51 statutes passed by Parliament dealing
with industrial_ labour (Appendix II). Some statutes have provided for setting up its

own machinery, original and appellate, for resolution of disputes arising under the .

statutes. An attempt is made to tabulate various authorities functioning under these
statutes. The Table at Appendix VI alsoshows the appellate body to which an
appeal can be preferred against the decision of authority having original jurisdiction.
To illustrate, under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, the dispute can originally be
brought before the controlling authority. and the appeal would lie to the appro-
priate Government. - This is a quasi-judicial adjudication. To avoid the charge
of bias and administration taking over quasi-judicial function, the appellate juris-
diction under each statute must be conferred on I.R.C. at State level. The Table at
Appendix VI also sets out the authorities competent to take cognizance of oﬁenees
under these statutes. In-order to simplify and specialise, it is necessary to confer
jurisdiction to try offences under these statutes on the Labour Courts. Similarly,

the appellate authority must be' the State I.R.C. That would provide for all labour

am being dealt with by specialist jurisdiction courts. It would bea step for rationa-'
lising the laws, the procedure and the forum. When it is recommended that a
law will have to be enacted to set up I.R.C. at the State and Central level, that very
opportunity should be seized to provide for what is herein indicated about the forum
for taking cognizance of offences under the labour laws as well as one State appellate

forum under all those laws.

We recommend accordingly.

Sd . /-
(D.A. DESAI)
-Chairman

. Sd,«.- '
(v.s. RAMA DEVI)
Member Secretary'

Nnw,DELm, dated
the 9th December, 1987.

LII

>-'coo
o...'~'.<7'

ll.

-12.

i3.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

88-

REFERENCES

L.C.I. 115th Report on Tax Courts.
James Crawford, Australian Courts of Law, p. 260.

Ellen R. Jordan : Should Litigants have a.choiee between specialised Courts and Courts of
General Jurisdiction ? 66 Judicature, 14-17 (1980); '

Ibid.

James Crawford : Australian Courts of Law. pp. 251--2-53.

H. Ted Rubin, The Courts, p. 208.

First Five Year Plan Document, p. 572.

Report of the National Commission on Labour, p. 56, para 6 .48.

HB. Higgins 2 A New Province for Law and Order.

. Quoted in the Report of the Labour. Law: RkriemC;'0nun¢'ttee. G_ujarat.State, 1974.,' p. 6.. pm-:28,

Life Insurance Corporation vs. DJ. BahndIr.'(-1-981) 1 'S,_CG3l5:at 334435:
Bangalore Water Supplyandsewrqe Board us. (1 9,78) 2SCC.2l3 a.t232.
Dhzyxbhzi Rznchhotidas Shah vs. J:zy.t/xtilal gM.zaa,nla1, 1973 Lab, & IC 967.

B.S. Narula, The Abolition of Labour Appclhtefﬂfliuml, 272----279; _

Rajiv Dhawan 2 Litigation Explosion in Iiliia; "w y
I.L.O. Resolution N0. N9 of June: 1963,

L.C.I. Fourteenth Report, p. 283. ''

Chief Justice Burger of the Supreme Court of America in his famous speech "Arbitration, Not' '

Litigation". _ _

L.C.I., Fourteenth Report (1938), Vol. I, pp,

National Labour Commission, Chapter 23; paras 23 . 61 to 23 .65.

L.C.I., 1140» Report, Chapter-III; "

(1974) Report om; Labour Lawsiaeview Cem§iua.=n. 29. 4.-

Report of the National' conimission omlbboiﬁ. pp. 332-335, paras 23.61 to 23.65'
Sanat Mehta Committee Report, para'2'. 1 '.2. ~ 7

. /J(D)s9MorI.IeoA-3

APPENDIX I
(Para 1 . 8)

LAW COMMISSION OF INDIA

WORKING PAPER
(QUESTIONNAIRE

A ON »
FORUM FOR NATIONAL UNIFORMITY IN LABOUR ADJUDICATION
QUESTIONNAIRE

Introduction :,
The Government of India had resolved to set up a Commission to study,

examine and recommend judicial reforms. One of the terms of reference was :-- I

"The need for decentralisation of the system of administration of justice by---
(iii) establishing other tiers or systems within the judicial hierarchy to reduce
the volume of work in the Supreme ,Court and the High Courts".

While examining this aspect, it was indicated that provisions containedin Part XIV
A of the Constitution permitting establishment of tribunals may be kept in view.
The ultimate aim was to translate the object underlying 'article 39A of the Constitu-
tion into reality. Article 39A provides that 'the State shall secure that the operation
of the legal system promotes justice, on a basis of .equal opportunity, and shall, in

particular, provide free legal aid, by suitable legislation or schemes or in any other .

way, to ensure that opportunities for securing justice are not denied to any citizen

by reason of economic or other disabilities'.

2. Ultimately, the Government of India assigned this task of studying and re-'
commending judicial reforms to the present Law Commission. 'Accordingly the Law

* Commission drew up a comprehensive programme of restructuring justice delivery

system in all its limbs.

The Law Commission has by now dealt with litigation emanating from rural
areas, structuring and strengthening subordinate judiciary in States, setting up an all-
India judicial service as envisaged by article 312 of the Constitution, imparting_trai-

ning to members of the judiciary at _all levels and setting up, Central Tax Court-
, for both direct and indirect taxes as well as for resolving 'disputes in the ﬁeld of import

and export of commodities. The twin objects, behind re-structuring judicial system
are to make the justice delivery system resilient, effective, time-bound, inexpensive
and deprofessionalised so as to reduce arrears and to remove the backlog of
cases. The second object is to make access to justice easy, inexpensive and non-
technical.

' 3. Even in the hoary past it was felt that .the Civil andC_riminal Courts, as operat-
ing in this country since the colonial days, would be ill-equipped to deal with labour]
industrial disputes in which the approach is to expanddistributive justice. Integral
to this was the other belief that a developing country like ours can ill-afford the luxury
of confrontation in commerce and industries which aﬂects production and retards
development and therefore, it must have an effective machinery for resolution of

~ labour/industrial disputes. Compulsory adjudication was devised as an. alternative

to strikes and confrontation. Ignoring the earlier stray efforts, such as Employers
and Workmen (Disputes) Act, 1860, the Indian Trade Disputes Act, 1929, Bombay

. Industrial Disputes Act, 1937, the ﬁrst major step was taken by enactmenttof the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The provisions of tln 1947 Act did not seek to confer
any speciﬁc beneﬁts on the workmen but it merely provided a forum for adjudication
of industrial disputes by conferring power on the Government to compel the parties
to avoid confrontation and to resort to adjudication. I Broadly stated, it was an act
for industrial arbitration. Some later amendments to this Act did confer some speci-
tic beneﬁts on the workmen and also imposed some liabilities on the employers.

For the present purpose, this part is hardly relevant.

2'2

4. It may be mentioned here that a number of States have enacted legislation for
acquiring power to compel parties to resort to industrial adjudication and to curb
the strikes. Some of them, such as the Bombay Industrial Relations Act," are quite
comprehensive in character. Some others, like the U.P. Industrial Dipsutes Act.
more or less adopt the Central Act as a model. In this questionnaire. the scheme of
the Central Act is kept in view. - The questionnaire has a very limited aim, T namely
to devise a forum intermediate between labour Courts/Industrial Tribunals on the
one hand and High Courts/Supreme Court of India on the other so as to remove the
jurisdiction of High Courts and interpose a tribunal with all-India jurisdiction. The
enquiry is related to term of reference extracted ,in para 1.

5. Industrial Disputes Act, l947, was enacted to make provision for investigation
and settlement of industrial disputes. It envisages setting up of a Labour Court

foradjudication of industrial disputes relating to any matter specified in the second ,
schedule (Sec. 7); Industrial Tribunals for the adjudication of industrial disputes ,

to any matter as speciﬁed in the second or the third schedule, and for performing

such other functions as may be assigned to them under that (sec. 7A) ; National 7 '

Tribunals for adjudication of industrial disputes which, in the opinion of the Central

Government, involve questions of national importance or are of such a naturethat A

industrial establishments situated in more than one State are likely to be interested
in or affected by such disputes (sec. 7). It also envisages setting up of Courts of
Enquiry for inquiring into any matter appearing to be connected with or relevant to
an industrial disputes (sec. 6). It further envisages setting up of a Grievance
Settlement Authority for settlement of industrial ldisputes connected with an
individual workman employed in the estblishment (sec. 9C).

6. Section 10 confers power on the appropriate Government as deﬁned in the Act
to refer any industrial dispute which either exists or is apprehended to a Board, Court
of Inquiry, Labour Court, or an Industrial Tribunal, as the case may be, for adj-
udication thereof. Section 10 (IA) confers power on the Central Government to refer

a an industrial dispute of the naturethereiri spelgﬁed or any matter appearing to be con-
a .

nected with, or relevant to, the disputes tlo ational Tribunal for adjudication. Sub-
section (2) of section 10 obligates the appropriate Government to refer an industiral
dispute to a, Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case
may be, where the parties to such an industrial dispute apply in the prescribed manner.
The Body, to which a reference is made; shall adjudicate upon the dispute and give

an award. The award has to be submitted to the appropriate Government and the".
appropriate Government has to publish the same within thirty days from the date of

its receipt. A -

7. The scheme relevant to the provisions for adjudication of an industrial dispute,
would show that there is no provision for an it ' al against an award, by a_ Board,
Court, Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal oi: ational Tribunal. It is assumed that
the decision by any of the aforesaid authorities' would be ﬂawless and aeeepxlf to

the parties whatever be the outcome of the dis , e. In all other jurisdictions, er rily s v' -

every decision can be appealed against. Th 'will be an appeal on facts; there will be
a second 'appeal on a question of 'law; 'there? will be an appeal to the Supreme Court
of India under article B6 of the 'Cons'tituti6n.,Even under such socially beneﬂeent

, laws such as for introducing agrarian refbrnia,' the relevant statutes provide for one or

two appeals.'lt is only in the ﬁeld 'oflabdur judication that the statute under which
adjudication could be or ordered did not pr, ,, "do for any appellate forum. Now there
is a considerable body of legal opinion that where the statute setting up an administ-'
rative or quasi-judicial tribunal does not proyvide for an appellate forum, the decision
of the tribunal is challenged in the High Court invoking article 226 of the Constitution.
Petition is generally entertained on the speeioiis plea that there is no alternative efficac-
ious remedy. Extendingtbis principle to the situation where the statute provides for
an appeal or revision, the High Court raises the question whether alternative remedy
under the statute is an eﬂicaciousiremed . Where the statute levying tax provides for
an apeal against the decision of an assessi g authority and makes deposit of assessed
tax, a condition precedent to the entertaining of appeal, the Supreme Court has held
that the alternative remedy is not elﬁcacious or adequate} Same view was adopted

1.. Hlmmqtlql Hqrilal Melitq vs State Prq&.rh'.(1954) _SCR.11g_2 at 1128,

while examining the scheme of Employees State Insurance Act. It was observedthat
High Court was right in holding that the remedy under the Act should have been
pursued before approaching the High Court under art. 2261. A

The fall out of a total absence of any provision for appeal under Industrial Dis-
putes Act may induce an instinctive reaction and art. 226 may be freely invoked. What
is the fall out ? The fall out is that every award of a Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal,
or a National Tribunal, one can question in a certiorari proceeding before the High
Court under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and before the Supreme Court
of India under article 136 of the Constitution. The more ugly feature of the fall-out is
that where a preliminary contention is raised that there reference is either incompetent
or bad in law, a writ of prohibition is sought under articles 226 and 227 before the
High Court or under article 136 before the Supreme Court. Occasionally, article 32

was invoked on the specious plea that such invalid and illegal proceedings contravene p

the fundamental right of the employer to carry on any occupation, trade or business
guaranteed by article 19 (1) (g). And cases are not known where the High Courts and
the Supreme Court have entertained the writ petition at an interlocutory stage and
stayed. further proceedings with the result thata ﬁnal adjudication of the dispute suffer-
ed inordinate delay. The Courts while entertainingisuch proceedings indicated that
in the absence of a corrective forum in the form of an appeal, it is inevitable

-for enforcement of the Rule of Law that extraordinary jurisdiction conferred by

the constitution has to be invoked. a

8. The powers that we were not unaware of this distinct possibility since the
introduction of the Constitution. Accordingly, in the year 1950, Labour Appellate
Tribunal was set up under a statute called The Industrial Disputes (Appellate
Tribunal) Act, 1950 providing for an appeal against the awards of the Labour
Courts/Industrial Courts Din respect of speciﬁed topics.

9. The Labour Appellate Tribunal had two-fold function to perform 1-
(i) It would be a correctional forum against human fallibility; and

(ii) it would bring about a national synthesis in conﬂicting and differing
awards all over the country.

It was all the more necessary in the case of industrial establishments
having inter-State operations. The establishment of Labour Appellate
Tribunal was, in fact, a natural response to the need for a measure of
uniformity of underlying principles and norms to govern the awards of
different industrial tribunals for maintaining industrial peace and sta-
bility in the interest of un-interrupted production.

10. Somehow, this Labour Appellate Tribunal fell foul with the workmen.
A, country-wide» movement voicing its giievances against the Labour Appellate
Tribunal swept the country. The movement received its powerful support from the

'Indian National Trade Union Congress. The governing consideration in support

of the demand for abolition of the Labour Appellate Tribunal was, according to
the standards of -those days, the inordinate delay in. the disposal of appeals with'con-
sequent prolonged litigation and hardship. The award may have given some mone-
tary beneﬁt. As soon as the employer appealed, ordinarily interim stay would
follow; the staying power of the workers being weak, they could ill-afford the ex:

« tended period of litigation while the employers used the appellate forum with a view

to thwarting the aspirations of the workmen and exhaust them. Experience of
working of courts and especially superior courts in India that any legislative pro-
cess becomes a hand maid of the wealthy and the ﬁnancially affluent section of
the society and a tool for unfair use of courts. Another argument was that the ad-
judicatory process with an added appellate forum would thwart trade union activity
and convert the trade union olﬁce into a solicitor's forum thereby weakening the
trade union movement. The battle cry as it appeared then was that where the ap-
pellate tribunal reversed the award by which some monetary beneﬁt was granted,
itleft bitterness and led to mutual recrimination widening the gulf between the em-
ployers and the employees and. thereby threatening industrial peace. Different Cen-
tral Trade Unions articulated different approaches inthis behalf, but the cry was
common that the labour appellate tribunal should be abolished. One of the grie-
vances voiced on behalf of the Indian National Trade Union Congress was that the

m i.911a§zsamKumar Sarkarandother vs. Earle Rolling M11: Ltd. andothers, (l964)6 scn
at . I , . _

personnel manning the Labour Appellate Tribunal was drawn from the cadre of
retired High Court Judges who. in their active days. had hardly dealt with labour
matters and were ill-equipped .0 deal with distributive justice or social justice, as
the case may be, and because of their training and up-bringing, their approach was
mechanical and legalistic. Probably, the Full-Bench formula on Bonus fuelled the
fire. Avoiding going into the various objections to the continuance of the Labour
Appellate Tribunal, the on: that was to be in the forefront was that the delay it
entailed in finally implementing the award, and adding to theuncertainty of the situat-
ion. The voice of the labour prevailed and ﬁnally the Labour Appellate Tribunal was
abolished in September, 1956. The situation returned to square one as it existed prior
to the setting up of the Labour Appellate Court. Everyawa rd, both at the intermediate
and ﬁnal stage, more or less. came to be questioned before the High Court under
articles 226, 227 and before the Supreme Court under article I36 and also under
article 32 of the Constitution. '

l 1. What is the present position 30 years after the abolition of the Labour Appel-
late Tribunal '? If delay in resolution of disputes by continuing it before the appellate
forum was widely resented so as to strive for abolition of . the appellate forum, then the
situation at present is, to say the least, atrocious. In the Supreme Court of India,
953 matters under the labour laws are pending as on 31-l2-l 985 and they ranged from
l97l to 1985. The dispute which has come before the Supreme Court in 1971 and which
is pending here for 15 years must have started before the Labour Court at least five
years before, if it has not come via the High Court and if it has come via the High Court,
10 years befoer 1971. Calculating either way, the 1971 disputes pending in the Supreme
Court of India must now be pending for over 25 years. Similarly, the labour matters
pending in_ 18 High Courts, at the end of the years 1982 were 5766. The ﬁgures avail-
able for seven High Courts upto and inclusive of December 31, 1985 would show pen-
dency at 10,233. Pendency has doubled within three years. It is difﬁcult to workout
an acceptable detailed analysis and the duration of their pendency. In any event,
the duration' must be not less than ve years excluding the time taken before the
adjudication forum. Reverting to the grievance that the Labour Appellate Tribunal
took about two years for deciding the appeals coming before it, which was considered
atrocious as to call for its abolition what would one say about the present situation
where the matters are pending with the High Court and the Supreme Court for

~ over decades'? Those who were votaries of abolition had also reposed faith in the

Supreme Court to bring about expeditious disposal and national conformity.
What a shock for them ?

12 Two ugly features of the system have surfaced. There has . been a
general tendency to avoid the High Court and to rush to the Supreme Court
because Labour Court/Industrial Court' is a tribunal whose orders and awards are
judicially reviewable by the Supreme Court of India under article 136. But even
if the matter is taken to High Court, the delay is inordinate. Industrial disputes
affectin individuals, such as dismissal, termination of service, punishment for
miscon uct, individual. monetary beneﬁts, are dragged onto the High Court and
the Supreme Court not with 2 view to get effective justice, but to force upon a
weak adve-sary namely the workman an unjust compromise keeping in view that
the staying power of the worlcman is limited. Two cases in this connection may
be illustrated .1 -

*In'Goyal's case the workman was suspended from the service of Bank of Baroda
in July 1965. He sought a reference under sec. 10 of the I. D. Act which was given.
The t:}bunal held the reference invalid on a ﬂimsy ground. The S. C. in 1978 held the
reference valid and remanded for award on merits. This award was challenged and
the matterwas brought to Supreme Court. Reinstatement was granted on 18-7-1979
and stayed. Finally he went back in service in 1983 i.e., eighteen years after his
suspension. '

It the second case of Shambunath Mukherjee facts are more gruesome. His
name was struck off the rolls on January 19, I966. Till he died on May 30, 1984 he
was chasing a mirage of justic: through the labyrinth of High Court and Supreme
Court. -

I . Shambhunatlr Goya] vs. Bank of Baroda, 1978 2 353.
Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd. vs. Sharubu Natl! Mukherjee, 1984 Supp. SCC. 534.

13. The second feature of an appellate forum with an all-India jurisdiction was
that by its awards, it can bring about a measure of uniformity in the norms of in-
dustrial relations and formulate principles for guidance of the Labour Courts and
Industrial Tribunals. On the face of it, the High Court cannot bring about this
uniformity because its jurisdiction is conﬁned to the State in which it operates. While
there are a number of big industrial undertakings which have Inter-State operations,
there are also monopolies like the Life Insurance Corporation, General Insurance
Corporation, which have all-India operations. Similarly, there are such cartels
as Bharat Petroleum, Hindustan Petroleum, etc. which fall within the category of
industrial employers and are subject to conflicting awards by Labour Courts/Im
dustirial Courts operating in various parts of the country and subject to the jurisdic-
tion of local State Governments. This is not conducive to the healthy growth of
norms of industrial relations. Further, these industrial undertakings with Inter-
state operations ﬁnd themselves subject to varying awards introducing a certain
amount of differential treatment amongst its employees.

14. Can the Supreme Court ﬁll the bill of providing a sort of uniform norms
of industrial adjudication applicable all over the country, that was the expectation of
votaries of abolition of Labour Appellate Tribunal. Let it be made clear that the
Supreme Court was never conceived as a. Court of Appeal. It was a body with a
very wide plenitude of jurisdiction to correct some glaring of errors involving mis-
carriage of justice, or constitutional provisions. It cannot function as a Court of
Appeal in the sense in which a Court of Appeal functions. It is, therefore, inevitable
that abody having an all-India jurisdiction operating at a level below the Supreme

Court which can bring about uniformity in industrial relation norms, and which can _

provide a sort of uniformity in dealing with 'disputes in industrial undertakings

. having Inter-State operations.

15. The National Labour Commission, afterhaving viewed at close quarters the

vacuum created by the abolition of the Labour Appellate Tribunal, recommended

setting up of an Industrial Relations Commission, both at National level and
State level. It recommended the continuance of Labour Courts and recommended
an appeal over its decision to the High Court} With respect, a decision by the High
Court over the award or the decision of the Labour Court, would hardly be helpful
in bringing about uniformity at national level. The High Courts differ and again the
Supreme Court is made to intervene to resolve the conﬂict and in this process,
the delay is inevitable. -

16. Even before the National Labour Commission. dealt with this aspect, the
Law Commission of India examined this aspect. The Law Commission, having
taken note of the pending appeals in labour matters on the ﬁle of the Supreme
Court observed :--- s ' e -

"These matters have, in a sense, been :foncj_ed upon the Court, inasmuch asthe
Court could not refuse to entertain appeals against decisions which appeared to
be arbitrary and capricious and 'made in disregard -of well accepted principles of
law or -natural justice. It will be noticed that a large number of applications
for special leave in these matters made to thqLSup'reme Court synchronise with the
abolition of the Labour Appellate Tribtmalt The new labour legislation constitu-
tes tiibunals against the decisions of which no appeal lies. Not unnaturally,
therefore, in most cases of unjust or arbitrary decisions, there are applications
for special leave to appeal to thesupreme Court. T e aggrieved party approaches
the Supreme Court because the jurisdidtionfof the igh Court under article 226
' is too narrow to afford relief in theseniattqfs. Under article 226, the High Court
can only quashan order made by these. tribunals, but cannot make its own deci-
sion and substitute it for that of the -tribunal. '_I' he High Court, would, generally
speaking, quash these orders only in cases of excess of jurisdiction or an
error of law apparent on the face of the record or a contravention of the princi-
ples of natural justice or the like. It is,:therefore, imperative that the legislature
should intervence and provide for an adequate right of appeal in these matters."

17. The High Courts and the Supreme Court are under a great pressure of torren-
tial inﬂow of work.'When the Court tries to control one branch of litigation, the other
goes out of control. The High Court -is unable to provide a Labour Bench round the
year. So also, the Supreme Court. The unedifying outcome is that the longest delay

1. Report of the NationalLabour on iabour. Cliaptet 23 para 23.63 to 23.66,
pp.3l2-315. f. 1 I

occurs at the Supreme Cout level, comparatively less at the High Court level and
and large, there is expeditious disposal before the Labour Court Industrial Tribuna .
This reverse phenomenon clearly indicates that the abolition of the Labour Appellate
Tribunal was short-sighted measure. If there was any legitimacy in the grievance about
the personnel manning the tribunal, the sensible solution was to deal with the
manpower problem but not put anend to the body itself. ~

18. The Law Commission is of the opinion that the time has come to review the
situation in all its aspects. The High Court and the Supreme Court would go on enter-
taining matters because the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal may commit errors.

Though the jurisdiction of High Court is narrow, the matters are dealt with as if these T

courts are hearing appeals . Cases are not unkown where the awards are interfered
with under the pretext that the ﬁndings are perverse and the delay is horrendous. 'To
illustrate, some matters questioning the correctness of Palekar Award in the
matter of wage structure 'between the journalists and the newspaper employers
are still pending in the Supreme Court even though Bachawat Panel has already been
set up and started functioning about a year back. One would stand aghast
at the idea that till Bachawat Panel ﬁnalises its recommendation, those alfected by
the Palekar Award are not certain as to whatwould be the outcome of the delibera-
tions of the Supreme Court of India. A remedial measure has become inevitable.

19. The Law Commission, in its search for expeditious disposal and liquidation of
backlog of cases, has a tentative plan to. recommend an Industrial Relations Commis-
sion having an appellate jurisdiction over the awards of the Labour Court/Industrial
Tribunals. This Cemrnission can sit in benches. It will have an all-India jurisdiction.

Efforts will be made to provide manpower imbued with notions of social justice, -

industrial relations, norms, peace and harmony in industry, avoidance of class
conﬂict, growth of industrial prosperity, etc. The Law Commission, therefore, reque-
sts you to please answer the questions set out in the annexure to this introductory part
and submit the same on or before 15th March, 1987, to the Law Commission of India.

10.
11.

AN NEXU RE

QUESTIONS

Are you in favour of an Appellate forum having all-India jurisdiction over awards
of the Labour Courts/Ind ustrial Tribunal ?

If the answer to the first question is in the.aﬂ'irmative, would you suggest the
nature and format of the forum '?

Would it be advisable to revive the Labour Appellate Tribunal '?

What measures would you suggest to expedite hearing of appeals before such an
appellate forum ? '

What will you consider to be the yardstick for selecting personnel for such an
appellate forum ? . '

'In whom the power to select personnel may be vested ?

Would such an appellate fcrum be investediwith power to grant interim stay of
the award unconditionally or always subject to conditions or no such power
should be conferred. ' . .

(You may kindly keep in view sec. 17B recently introduced in the Industrial
Disputes Act by Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1982, which provides for
payment of full wages to workmen pending proceedings in higher courts.)

What, in your opinion, should be the time-frame for disposal of appeals 'I
Would you be in favour of every award being made appealable or the appeal may
lie only on a question of law on the analogy of section 30 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act, 1923, or See. 8 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate
Tribunals) Act, 1950 '?

Are you in favour of a total ban on entertaining any appeal at the interim stage ?
If the forum, as herein indicated, is set up, should the jurisdiction of the High

Court under articles 226, 227 be retained or abolished '? You may consider
article 3238 of the Constitution in this behalf. '

V28

be A »
s.t:.~f=*se:-s:.7~'.a.:;c::s>° ~°°-*e="-**~°*r°--

B)
U!

as
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no
3°

' APENDIX II
(Paras 2.4,/5.22)
LIST OF INDUSTRIAL AND LABOUR LAWS

Apprentices Act, 1961.

Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) Act,'1966.
Beedi Workers Welfare Cess Act, 1976.

Beedi Workers Welfare Fund Act, 1976.

Boilers Act, 1923.

Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976.

Children (Pledging of Labour) Act , 1933.

Cine-Workers and Cinema Theatre Workers (Regulation of Employment) Act;
1981.

Cine-Workers Welfare Cess Act, 1981.

Cine-Workers Welfare Fund Act, }98l.

Coal Mines Labour Welfare Fund Act, 1947.

Coal Mines Provident Fund and Miscellaneous-Provisions Act, 1948. '
Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970.

Dangerous Machines (Regulations) Act, 1983.

Dock Labourers Act., 1934.

Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Act, 1948.

Emigration Act, 1983. ' .

Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952.
Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948. '

Employers' Liability Act, 1938.

The Child Labour (Prohibition .and Regulation) Act, 1986. H
Employment Exchanges (Compulsory Notiﬁcation of Vacancies) Act, 1959.
Equz43Remuneration Act, 1976.

. Factories Act, 1948.
. Fatal Accidents Act, 1855.

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

. Industrial Disputes (Banking and Insurance Companies) Act, 1949.
. Industrial Disputes (Banking Companies) Decision Act, 1955;

Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946.
Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951.

. Inter-State Migrant Workman (Reg/ulation of Employment and Conditions of

Service) Act, 1979.

Iégaergsoprgtf/Iliggé, Manganese Ore Mines and Chrome Ore Mines Labour Welfare

;r:oni:d(1)q1:t'I\%i9ri7e6ss., Manganese Ore Mines and Chrome Ore Mines Labour Welfare

34.
35.
35.
37.
38.

39.

4r'.
42.
43.

45.

47.
48. «

49.,
so.

' I .

Limestone and Dolomite Mines Labour Welfare Fund Act, 1972.
Maternity Beneﬁt Act, 1961. '
Mica Mines Labour Welfare Fund Act, 1946.

Mines Act, 1952.

Minimum Wages Act, 1948.

Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961.

Payment of Bonus Act, 1965.

Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972.

Payment of Wages Act, 1936.

Personal Injuries (Compensation Insurance) 'Act , 1963.'
Plantations Labour Act, 1951. '

Sales Promotion Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1976.
Trade Unions Act, 1926. I

Weekly Holidays Act, 1942.

Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service)
and Miscellaneous provisions Act, 1955.

Working Journalists (Fixationof Rates of Wages) Act, 1958.
Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923. '6
Collection or Statistics Act, i953.

m-mu' 1 T ; ;ze«
PunA
(Inn 2.18)
LABOUR PBIDINCY lN'SUPl.l1al8 COURT

Asou1Iroc'§ol'l'n.1m
unounnaztu

Labour
Year I ,-- -'~
Rudy not land!

(1)

f\
no
:1

§
'a=ai2=uaa.2m~:m

§'

2';

S =a$38e3us:.e.~,

vg 3$3=¢133333aoﬁ» 3 E

I ?n1_-#3
fga.92'.lll4.8_§
Nimbus I . ' ofmn-Couitut'ioad-- ' .
9 Illlllﬂinirmt ' l.abakaneussmndinuuSuaunnCaa¢

on 1-!

§
§t§§xa:s:a:=..§I»:3' E

Tall

I G

»1.>Imn1xTI.v

, (Pr; 3.2), _,

Sutuneut in reply to parts (a) & (b) .0! thc_ Lok Sabha unstarred Question No. 1793

' {at 18-1 1-87

_ T ,sn'lIia1Nr.I . .
Pendency of can: In the-'E1':h.Ca1a-I: arrayed in descending order

('foul

SI. Name'ofHi;hCourt No.-ofcases Ason
No. . . Pcﬂdiﬂl
' 1 Allahabad ' 233050 30-5-35
2 mam' 137250 31-12-86
3 cucum 155447 31-12-35
' 4 Bombay 133245 3125-317
5 Kenla * .. 120390 30:-6-8.6
' 5 Anaruamdeszz 35137
7 Delhi j" 11191 30-5-31
3 55741 31-12-35
9 Patna _» .. 55904 31-12-35
.19 Madhya 1.-ndesh 53333 31-12-35
7 11 '1>unjaba'Huyana 53553 30-5-37
-12 Gujarat ' .. L. .. 52523 30-5-37
-13 Rliuthnn' 43921 31-12-35
14 Orhsa .. 37354 30-5-37
15 Junmu&Ka:hmir 35945 30-5-37
15 Gauhati 17330 31-12-35
11 Himacnnl Prndesh 3320 ' 31-12-35
13 Sikkim 35 30-5-31

14,82,450

APPENDIX v
(Ian: 4.7')
(lﬁvu 2.18)

31111111115111 o/cam under the Lab12ur Laws pending in High caurg: 11.1. 1977 to 1935

Namcohhellighcourt 1977 .1973 1979 1930 1931 1932 19113 1954 1935
I.Bombay .. .. 11091345 1305 1073 71114 _ 2597.; 3051 3215
2. Sikkim.. _ .. .. ~-- 4 -- ~ 4 ~ ~ ~-- -
1. 11111111111151 P1555411 .. - -- v_ 5 5 5 12 1s 17
4.011111 .. .. .. 4 37 75 115 131 301 1345 1174 so:
5. Patna .. .. .. 135 1119 173 245 35-0 -4 452 471 5344
5. Punjab and Haryana .. a a _ ~ --. 552 5113 571 3 9111
7.1351111 .. .. .. 531 574 813 842 1751 _ s3o ass 4 91»
q.xen1a .. .. 4. 234 214 .290 355 we 515 551 1195
9. Gujarat .. .. -A 954 151 145 233 537 975. 1410 1991
10. Maahyarmdesn .. -4 ;-- -- '_v ~ 4. _- -1 4.
11. Gauhati .. .. -- .--- ~ 47 59 70 1.3 25% _ 32
12. Jammudcxashmir ---- ; ._ _ 49 _ _ _ .. . 1..
13.111111111111155 .. .. 527 510 575 555 1119 1155 1259 1575 311951
14. Andhra Pradesh .. ---- 324 357 503 7311 591 915121-s .
.15.1.m1m .. .. 1314 735 711 1105 13321 ---- ~'=-- «Q. +
15. 11111111111111 .. .. -- 192 233 351 ' 347 535 174 2533 3'55
17. Kamataka .. 44 434 579 453 735 505 1432 2331 1950
I8.Calc111ta '_ .. + 195 375 444 _ 334 531 _. .1 ..
Total .,. 3557 5317 .5724 533711155 sm11g§13wi;14s15
Aunmctxuxmumnnnc IV "

Mam.-r ands: Labour Lew: padat in he High Co11r!s'(as supplied of

1751151113 .1 j -1115111111511 during _ Disposed of 5111111 1.-51151 V 4.
' 0.01-1 5 « thcyar-IRS ' the year _' 313:2.-'.85°!.-i
13545 8262 ' A 4557 I725)

. ..L.

3'3

15a2Ilo[IJoDlalwiIﬂMlntMpivVld¢_alIrq¢'ﬂQuﬂIemIfnt ofnﬂwmuandappellate authoriliau

NaxnaofAc! A V ' Auzhaicyaecmng . Pmvisipm Appellate Authority cognizance
Aulhoriti authority
2 33 4 5 V 6 * 7 %

Apprentices Act, 1961 20(1) Apprenticeuhip Adviser 30(2) ' Apprcnficeship Council ' ~
2 Beodi sud Cigar Workcn (Conditions ofEm- 4 Competent Authority 5 , Authority speciﬁed by -'

playment) Act. 1966. . my: state Government
3 Beedi Workets Welfare Gas Act. 1976 -- , --- --. ' -- L--
4 Beedi'Worke:sWe1famFundAot,l9'76 ---o ---. --- _- --'
5 1'I:'undbnnoiIanAn.1923 - +u_ ' 19 L cmcunapectoz . - ---
6 'l'heBond¢dLtbout Symtn (Abolition) Act, 10 ' District as --- --- Cr.P.C.provisionure attracted

1976 31 _ ' '

* - . A or M

'rnuqm¢:u:(P1ea¢an¢acu5ou:)" 1933 ;. ' » .. _. -- _ ---- _
8 Cine-WotkenandCinemaThea¢roWorku1 4 Coaenig' ._ - --- .. R " al ' with 1114! High 0011"

(lhgulationof Employment) Act, 1981. A S "I'ribunnlmn om": _ . N:"cs<;$'t sh§3x7s°'?.xe cognizance of otfence

-nu-tn-'
N500

except' on a complaint made with permission
of State Government
Cine-Workers Welfaxu Ceca Act, 1931' .-

Cine Workets warm Fund Act. m1__ .1, :_.
Coal-MinesLnbourWelfareFtindAct. I941 -

Coal-Minos Providmt Fund and Miwdlr 9-
neousPxovis_ionsAu,l948. A

is
17

- 19

":3 an.

- 2.4
25
'ﬂ
.37.

1.':

of Statistics Act, 19;}

Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition)
na, 1970. _

Dangerous (Regulation. mi, 1983

Dock Labourers Act, 1934
hock Workers (n;g..1..s§,; and Employment)
Act, 1953 u _ .
Emigration Act. 1983
1 neon: Pxounionsjict. 1952: '

4 .

Ltehlityira, 1938- - ..
us. Child Labour (Prohibition and Resale-
&oo)Act, 1986 * ,
nnploymntf [ Exdnnau'. (Comm 1 L NOE '
ﬁcationofV_Ictnciu)Act.19$9. '

jn.e1=.ccociesA¢i,'194's ' _ "
Act. ms, --
Disputes Act, 1947

I . v». f » .~ ..~u'.";

_ Act,.1999-_,, 1

$1 195;.

S.6

S.5

S. 15
'S. SA

_s.s4

s. is
s.'s

'IA

vs-1

I 2
-......

Regiatring Oﬁicet
Controller V

. -. is

S. 15

3.13

54-A

Appellate Olﬁccr

State Government

Central _GoV/eminent
Medical Appeal Tribumtl
Employee': Insurance
Courts.

mm." '15:: Author!' ':1

. No prosecution will be made without the

permission of the Statistics authority.
Prosecution may be launched with the pr:-.

vious sanction of the Inspectors. V
Complaint by the Controller will be
cogﬁtsanceby the _ _
No prosecution except with the previous
sanction of the Inspector.

Cognisance of oﬁence on the} report of the
officer or Inspector. V -

V Oﬂieoces under the Act are cognisahle S. 26
Prosecution with the previous sanction of'

Provident _Commissionet.

__..

-----so

No court inferior to that of hietropolimn Ma-'
castrate shnll try the offence.

No prosecutio shallbe' tituted except 'th
the persisting or the ":ﬁicer authoriseémby
Govunment.

Do.

.....

__ J SS msrmx " . ' 32 ~34 3.5.

V2" 3 nidustazl Etrtploynutat (Staodtng ordet-s)"

¥;§t'nt'ries (Dcvlopment and Regulation) Act, -- The 1n'm--sum Migrant workmen' (Regular s. 7 tibn of Employment and Conditions of ser- vice Act, 1979.

Inca Oms Mines, Manganego 0-$.Min_cs uni - (l3tI.;"ome_0tc Mines Labour Wel{a:e'CesstAct, Itgon Ore "Mines, Manganese Ofc Minas "amt ~~ (!3;1_;<6)me-Ore Mims'Labour Welfare Fund Act, Limeétona and Dolomite Mia :; Lwo-'.1: Wc1~ ----- fu: Fund Atj.t,.1972. . nitaeexnicy Benefit Act, 19.51' ' s.,.u4 3'1' Hsuutauubebewownnﬁmia. wnm -s". 5»- Mincs Act, 1952 - S. 5 39 Minimum Wages'Act, .1333 s. 19 ' 40 Motor Transport Act, t9tSl' S. 4 41 mymenrornonus Aot, 1965 ' W' 9. 27 42 Payment ot'._Gratui_ty Act, 1972 3 ' 7

3. 5(2).

Certi!y'in¢A05icer_ ' 3. m7 Lia.-nsingt Oﬁiom It'f$p§Ct()'r : I > --«

-Iu'_spaotat'_5 Ad» ---- tntnhtratton _ Chief Impector e Inspector In-sp:ctor S. '30 Chief; Itnpector ----

Inspector Inspector --

Controlling. Aulhotity S. 7 ('I') Inspector 6 Ptcstribzzd Auth ority App.:!ia,tc O3i:.:»r' Cam.ni&1ioner for Work- rn.-,n's G:mpamat1on.. Agpropriatc govemmnnt . No prosscutin to b: lnnﬁx-:1 swept with the sanction of appropriate Govnmmsat. Co3ni_san':: of o&':n:;: with _ ch: prcvious pcrnusston of _[.-up act-car. # Prosecution to'bc lsaamched with the prcviou' sanction of Inspector. No court shall take cognisauae of oﬂonce expept with the parmiuion of Labour Com. xmsnonet. -

9'£ 43 Payment of Wages Act, 1936 S. 15 J 44 Personal Injuries (Comp.-.mation' Insurance) ----~ Act, 1963.

45 Plantations Labour Act, 1951 S. 3A 46 Sales Promotion Employees (Conditions of 8.8 Service) Act, 1976.

41 The Trade Unions Act, 1926 S. 3 48 Weekly Holidays Act, 1942 S. 7 'a 'rao.womngJomuiouu¢.eaucNm- 9 per Employees (Conditions of Service) 'and Provisions Act. 1955.

N The W orklns Journalists (Fixation of Rites - of W883!) Act, 1958.

SI The Workmen's Compensation Act, l923 S. 19 as-I4lIJ(n)89uonJ«ecA--x.o.oo--s1.so.oe--_orps Presiding Omeet of any , Labour Court or Indus- S. l7 trial Tribunal or Com-

missionerfor Workmen's . Compensation.

Registering Ollleer S. 3-C Inspectors , -

Registrar of Trade Unions 8. ll _ Inspector -

_-- .._c Commissioner for Work- S. 30 men's Compensation Court of Small Causes in Presidency Town and Distt. Court elsewhere. Prescribe! Authority ~ Cognizance of the offence will not be take unless made within 6 months. 8. 11. High Court in Presidency Previous sanction of Registrar is necessary towns or Principal Civil for prosecution. Court of Origin! Juris- diction elsewhere.

__ _...-

High Court No prosecution shall be instituted except by or with the previous sanction of :2 Com- missioner, and no Court shall take cognizance of any offence unless complaint thereof is made within six months of the date on which the alleged commission of the offence came to the knowledge of the Commissioner. LE"

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