Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur
Vimala Devi vs Suman And Ors on 13 October, 2017
Author: Alok Sharma
Bench: Alok Sharma
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
AT JAIPUR BENCH
ORDER
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.16600/2017
Vimla Devi wife of Rohitash Gurjar, aged about 33 years, resident of Dhani Bhopawali
tan Kankariya, Panchayat Samiti Khetri, District Jhunjhunu (Raj.).
---- Petitioner
Versus
1. Suman wife of Rajesh by caste Gurjar, aged about 27 years, resident of Dhani Daula
Kali tan Kankariya, Panchayat Samiti Khetri District Jhunjhunu (Raj.).
--- Respondent
2. Asha Suiwal wife of Jeevanram Saini by caste Saini, resident of Dhani Dhaba wali
tan Kankariya, Panchayat Samiti Khetri District Jhunjhunu (Raj.).
3. Babita Devi wife of Dilip Kumar Saini by caste Saini, resident of Dhani Bera tan
Kankariya, Panchayat Samiti Khetri District Jhunjhunu (Raj.).
4. Returning Officer, Gram Panchayat Election 2015, Gram Panchayat Kankariya,
Panchayat Samiti Khetri, District Jhunjhunu (Raj.) Harphool Singh Meena, Principal
Government Sr. Secondary School, Indali Tehsil and District Jhunjhunu (Raj.)
--- Proforma respondents.
Date of Order: October 13th, 2017.
PRESENT
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ALOK SHARMA
Mr. Kamlakar Sharma, Senior Advocate with
Mr. MS Rajpurohit, for the petitioner.
Mr. M.M. Ranjan, Senior Advocate with
Mr. Sanjay Mehla, for the respondent.
BY THE COURT:
Under challenge is the impugned judgment dated 4-9-2017 passed by District Judge Jhunjhunu whereby election of the 2 petitioner-returned candidate (hereinafter `the RC') as Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat Kankariya, Panchayat Samiti Khetri, District Jhunjhunu has been declared null and void on the ground that she did not have the requisite minimum educational qualification of class VIII pass as mandated under Section 19(t) of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 (hereinafter `the Act of 1994').
RC's election to the post of Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat Kankariya, Panchayat Samiti Khetri, District Jhunjhunu in an election on 1-2-2015 was put to challenge by the respondent- election petitioner (hereinafter `the EP') under Section 43 of the Act of 1994 read with Rule 80 of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj (Election) Rules, 1994 (hereinafter `the Rules of 1994') on the ground that she had not in fact passed the class VIII examination form a school as claimed and was ineligible with reference to the minimum educational qualification under Section 19(t) of the Act of 1994. It was stated that the RC was never admitted to the Gayatri Middle School Harjanpura (`the School') where she claimed to have read as a regular student or at all or passed class VIII examination. The mark- sheet (Ex.4) and Transfer Certificate (Ex.3) purportedly issued by the school based on which the requisite minimum educational qualification was claimed by the RC before the Returning Officer with her nomination form were forged and fabricated in the sense of being nominal in nature having been issued to the RC on her mere 3 askance. It was submitted that the RC was practically an illiterate lady and in fact at the time when she purportedly was admitted to the school in issue in class VIII in academic year 2010-11 as a regular student she was about 28 years old, and married with two minor children. The school was not located in the village where her matrimonial home was. In the circumstances it was prayed that election of the RC to the post of Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat Kankariya, Panchayat Samiti Khetri, District Jhunjhunu be set aside.
The RC filed reply of denial. It was asserted that she was indeed admitted to the school in class VIII in the year 2011 as a regular student, passed examination therein and was thereafter issued mark-sheet evidencing the aforesaid fact as also a transfer certificate on leaving the school. It was submitted that both the class VIII mark-sheet and TC issued thereafter by the school were genuine.
On pleadings of contesting parties, the following issues were framed:-
1- vk;k vizkFkhZ l[a;k 1 }kjk xzke iapk;r dkadfj;k ds ljiap in ds pquko ds fy, fnukad 31-01-2015 dks Lo;a dh "kS{kf.kd ;ksX;rk vkBoha d{kk mRrh.kZ iznf"kZr dh x;h tcfd vizkFkhZ la[;k 1 }kjk dHkh Hkh xk;=h ek/;fed fo|ky; gjtuiqjk esa d{kk vkB esa uk rks izos"k fy;k x;k vkSj uk gh v/;;u fd;k x;kA bl izdkj vizkFkhZ la[;k 1 }kjk Lo;a dks vkBoha d{kk mRrh.kZ crkdj vlR; dFku fd;s x;s vkSj vkBoha d{kk mRrh.kZ dk dwVjfpr nLrkost izLrqr fd;k x;k \ 2- vk;k v;kph l[a;k 1 dh ljiap in ij vkBoha d{kk mRrh.kZ 4 ;ksX;rk ugha gksus ds dkj.k vizkFkhZ la[;k 1 dk fuokZpu fnukad 01- 02-2015 "kwU; ?kksf'kr fd;s tkus ;ksX; gS \ 3- vk;k vizkFkhZ la[;k 1 dk fuokZpu "kwU; ?kksf'kr gksus ds mijkUr izkFkhZ;k crkSj ljiap fuokZpu dh ?kks'k.k dh vf/kdkjh gS \ 4- vuqrks'k \ The EP examined herself as AW-1 and exhibited 12 documents. The RC except for herself despite several opportunities failed to produce any oral evidence. She relied on 20 documents in defence.
Before the trial court, the EP submitted that as per the RC's mark-sheet itself based whereon she claimed to have passed class VIII, the RC's date of birth was 1-1-1983 and at the time of admission in class VIII in the year 2010, as claimed by her, she was about 28 years old, and married with two minor children. It was submitted that although the RC was admittedly married at the time of her alleged admission to the school, instead of the name of her husband, the names of her father and mother were indicated in the alleged school record. It was submitted that the school in issue was not in the village where RC's matrimonial home was nor where her parental home was situate. It was submitted that the RC's class VIII mark-sheet utilised by her in support of the nomination form was different from the certified copy obtained by the EP, inasmuch as the marks in the subjects of Mathematics and Social Studies in the two did not match and were clearly different as was the whole format of 5 the mark-sheet. It was further submitted that the result-sheet of RC with regard to her purportedly having passed class VIII was not submitted before the District Education Officer along with that of other students of class VIII who passed the class in the year 2011. And in the attendance register oddly the name of the RC was entered at the end of the list of students, establishing that it was a subsequent addition in the course of tampering with the school's record. It was submitted that the RC was an illiterate lady and incapable of reading and writing. Other witnesses of EP supported her case with regard to ineligibility of the RC to contest the election for the post of Sarpanch for reason of lacking in the requisite minimum educational qualification.
The RC in defence placed reliance on Ex.A-1 and Ex.A-2 the mark-sheet and the TC claimed to have been issued by the school, but it was not disputed in her cross examination that when she was admitted to class VIII she was 28 years old, was married and had two children. It was however denied that mark-sheet and TC were forged and fabricated asserting that the RC was classmate with much younger students in class VIII at the school. It was submitted that the election petition was filed out of pique of EP having lost the election without anything more. And it therefore be dismissed.
The trial court on appreciation of evidence passed the 6 impugned judgment dated 4-9-2017 holding that the RC was not class VIII pass and set aside the RC's election as Sarpanch, inter alia taking into consideration the following facts:-
(i) That it was extremely improbable verging on the impossible that the RC as a 28 years old, married and with two children, ten years subsequent to her marriage and without any formal education class I to VII was admitted to a school several kilometers away from her matrimonial home when she alleged regularly stayed with her parents in the nearby village;
(ii) In her cross examination the RC stated her inability to read even bold letters in her nomination form and supporting documents of eligibility including her mark-sheet of class VIII and TC for the purported reason that she did not carry her spectacles; the trial court held that the alleged reason for the RC's inability to read even bold letters in her nomination form/ papers therewith was incapable of any credibility and indicative of her illiteracy;
(iii) Despite the EP having discharged her initial burden to prove her case from the circumstances brought on record in her evidence as to RC's lack of educational qualification of class VIII and onus thus shifting to the RC, she failed to discharge the said onus by either producing the witnesses from the school wherefrom she claimed to have passed class VIII in the year 2011 to prove her class VIII mark-sheet and TC or by requiring the court to summon the original record of the school/ witnesses therefrom to establish the genuineness of the mark-sheet and TC issued to her by the school.
For its conclusion the trial relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Sushil Kumar Vs. Rakesh Kumar [(2003)8 SCC 673] and other decisions of the Apex Court, 7 wherein it was held:
"It is no doubt true that the burden of proof to show that a candidate who was disqualified as on the date of the nomination would be on the election petitioner. It is also true that the initial burden of proof that nomination paper of an elected candidate has wrongly been accepted is on the election petitioner. In terms of Section 103 of the Indian Evidence Act, however, the burden of proof as to any particular fact lies on that person who wishes the court to believe in its existence, unless it is provided by any law that the proof of that fact shall lie on any particular person. Furthermore, in relation to certain matters the fact being within the special knowledge of the respondent, the burden to prove the same would be on him in terms of Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act. However, the question as to whether the burden to prove a particular matter is on the plaintiff or the defendant would depend upon the nature of the dispute. (see Orissa Mining Corporation and another vs. Ananda Chandra Prusty, AIR 1997 SC 2274].
The age of a person, in an election petition has to be determined not only on the basis of the materials placed on records but also upon taking into consideration the circumstances attending thereto. (underlining mine) The initial burden to prove the allegations made in the election petition although was upon the election petitioner but for proving the facts which were within the special knowledge of the respondent, the burden was upon him in terms of Section 106 of the Evidence Act. It is also trite that when both parties have adduced evidenc, the question of onus of proof becomes academic [See Union of India and others vs. Sugauli Sugar Works (P) Ltd (1976)3 SCC 32 (para 14) and M/s. Cox and Kings (Agents) Ltd. vs. Their Workmen and others,. AIR 1977 SC 1666 (para 36)]. Furthermore, an admission on the part of a party to the lis shall be binding 8 on him and in any event a presumption must be made that the same is taken to be established.
The trail court on the state of law recorded above as to proof in an election petition, on appreciation of evidence before it concluded that the RC did not have the requisite minimum educational qualification of class VIII pass as mandated under Section 19(t) of the Act of 1994, as she had not actually studied at the school in class VIII and therefore was ineligible to contest the election for the post of Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat Kankariya, Panchayat Samiti Khetri, District Jhunjhunu.
Mr. Kamalakar Sharma, Senior Advocate appearing with Mr. M.S. Rajpurohit and Ms. Alankrita Sharma on behalf of the RC submitted that the trial court in setting aside the election of the RC has acted on mere surmises and conjectures on the fact of the RC at age of 28 years, married with two minor children without education class I to VII having gone to her parental village to enroll and study as a regular student in class VIII. He submitted that in so doing the trial court was in error in overlooking that there was no proof of any legal prohibition with regard to such admissions as regular students into class VIII of a school. He submitted that from the documentary evidence before the trial court it was established that the RC had been formally admitted in class VIII as a regular student at the school 9 by her father. This was evidenced from the scholar and attendance registers which were both exhibited. The RC was thus clearly a regular student of class VIII in AY 2010-11 and passed class VIII examination pursuant to which mark-sheet Ex.A-1 was issued to her. Thereafter on the RC's seeking to leave the school, TC Ex.A-2 was issued to her. It was submitted that the mere fact that in the admission form for admission of the RC to the school the names of her father and mother and not of her husband was recorded was of no consequence, inasmuch as the form in question required father's/ mother's name not the husband's. It was submitted that on an enquiry on the complaint of EP's father in law to the Senior Secondary School Khandela, Sikar the record of the school in issue with regard to RC's admission in class VIII as a regular student and passing it was examained and both documents found to be genuine. It was submitted that in a subsequent enquiry by the Development Officer of Panchayat Samiti Khetri the record of the school with regard to issue of mark-sheet and TC to the RC were again found to be genuine. Mr. Kamlakar Sharma further pointed out that in fact an FIR was lodged against the RC by the EP's father in law and on investigation the police submitted a final negative report finding the RC's mark-sheet and the TC in order and not forged or fabricated. Mr. Kamlakar Sharma submitted that the trial court overlooked all the evidence beneficial to the RC and only on the improbability of her admission in class VIII in a school away from the RC's 10 matrimonial home at the age of 28 years after having borne two children, held that she was not a regular student at the said school nor had passed the class VIII examination. Mr. Kamlakar Sharma submitted that in doing so the trial court acted perversely. As it did in relying upon the cross examination of the RC to conclude that she was not a literate lady who could claim to have passed class VIII. It was submitted that the jurisdiction of the trial court in an election petition was not at all to decide the mental ability or proficiency of the RC, but to ascertain whether she had read in and passed class VIII from a school recognized by the State Government. It was submitted that the trial court has not come to a specific finding that mark-sheet and TC issued to the RC were forged and fabricated yet set aside her election. This misdirection, Mr. Kamlakar shrma, submitted required intervention and correction by this court in the exercise of its superintending jurisdiction.
Mr. M.M. Ranjan, Senior Advocate appearing with Mr. Sanjay Mehla has supported the impugned judgment. He submitted that it is based on a finding of fact that the RC at no point of time had actually studied in the school in class VIII and her mark-sheet (Ex.4) and TC (Ex.3) evidencing the aforesaid facts were nominal, false and fabricated. Mr. M.M. Ranjan submitted that finding of fact of the trial court based on appreciation of evidence laid by contesting parties are not to be interfered with by this court in exercise of its 11 superintending jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Mr. M.M. Ranjan submitted that EP had from the unimpeachable circumstantial evidence established that the RC at the age of 28 years married and having two children falsely claimed to have left her matrimonial home and gone to study in class VIII in another village even though did not have any formal education class I to VII. It was submitted that this piece of uncontroverted evidence was further fortified by the fact that the mark-sheet Ex.A-1 of the RC filed in support of her nomination form had a distinct format as against the certified copy thereof obtained by the EP from official records of the school. Aside of the format being different, the marks in the subjects of Mathematics and Social studies in the two mark- sheets of the RC were also different. Counsel further submitted that from the record it was evident that even while the school in its Scholar Register recorded that there were 19 students in Class-VIII AY 2010-11, the RC's name was recorded at Sr.No.20 in the scholar register exhibited before the trial court. Similarly in the attendance register for the year 2010-11 the RC's name was also recorded at Sr.No.20. These mismatches fortified the inevitable factual inference of the falsity of the RC's claim to have passed class VIII as a regular student at the school. Mr. M.M. Ranjan submitted that as against the EP's evidence of high probative value as to RC's lacking minimum educational qualification which was sufficient to discharge the initial burden of EP in support of the election petition resulting from 12 which the onus shifted on the RC, she did not lead any evidence of probative worth to discharge her onus. It was submitted that no attempt was made by the RC to prove the contents of mark-sheet (Ex.A-1) and TC (Ex.A-2) exhibited by her either by summoning any witness from the school or otherwise by moving an application before the trial court for summoning of the record from the school for ascertaining the truth of her mark-sheet and TC purportedly issued to her. Contrarily in her cross examination, as noted by the trial court, the RC appeared to be totally illiterate, incapable of reading even the words in bold letters in her nomination form and the supporting affidavit/ documents based on which she contested the election for the post of Sarpanch. Mr.M.M. Ranjan submitted that in the circumstances it was thus established before the trial court on preponderance of probabilities that the RC did not have the requisite education qualification of having passed class VIII as mandated under Section 19(t) of the Act of 1994, and was thus ineligible to contest the election for the post of Sarpanch. Yet having contested and won, her election was therefore liable to be set aside as has been rightly so done by the trial court.
Heard. Considered.
Proof of allegations in an election petition is a matter which has engaged attention of the courts from time to time. It is also well to note that burden/ onus of the election petitioner can be discharged 13 both by circumstantial and documentary evidence brought on the trial court's record and the returned candidate with knowledge of special facts has to plead and prove them.
Under the Evidence Act, 1872 "A fact is said to be proved when, after considering the matters before it, the Court either believes it to exist, or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists." Proof of a fact is thus not dependent on a singular piece of evidence of the plaintiff or defendant. It is a conclusion struck on consideration of multiplicity of evidences, laid by contesting parties, leading a prudent man to the supposition of the existence of a fact. A three judgment bench of the Apex Court in Chhedi Ram Vs. Jhilmit Ram [(1984)2 SCC 281] has therefore reiterated that under the Indian Evidence Act, a fact is said to be proved when after considering the matters before it i.e. the evidence and also the circumstances, (underlining mine) the court either believes it to exist or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists, and having regard to the facts and circumstances of a case, the reasonable probability is all one way. It was held that in such a scenario the court must not boggle at the necessary conclusion, and instead lay down an impossible standard of proof and hold a fact as not proved for lack of 14 mathematical precision in the evidence laid. The above enunciation applies fully to the instant case where the issue before the trial court was not one of corrupt practice at an election where proof beyond reasonable doubt is required, but one whether the RC had the requisite eligibility to contest the election to the post of Sarpanch, where standard of proof required was only a preponderance of probability.
A three judge bench of the Apex Court in the case of Gopal Krishnaji Ketkar Vs. Mohamed Haji Latif [AIR 1968 SC 1413] has held that notwithstanding the initial burden on the plaintiff to prove her case in the first instance, where the defendant, in knowledge of special facts on which the case turns, withholds the best evidence, the court may draw an adverse inference that the party withholding it, would have been the sufferer on the issue before it if such evidence had been produced. The Apex Court proceeded to hold that it is not sound practice for those desiring to rely upon a certain fact, to withhold from the court the best evidence which is in their possession or in respect of which the onus has shifted to such person and which could have thrown light upon the issue in controversy and instead rely upon the abstract doctrine of burden of proof.
In the case of Narayan Govind Gavate Vs. State of Maharashtra [(1977)1 SCC 133] the Apex Court held that the result of a trial or 15 proceeding is determined by weighing of the totality of facts and circumstances and presumptions operating (underlining mine) in favour of one party as against those which may tilt the balance in favour of another. The weight of the evidence would be wholly against the party which did not bring any competing evidence before the trial court to displace the evidence of the other party buttressed by Sections 114 (e) of the Evidence Act. In my considered view, therefore the evidence led by the witnesses of the EP and EP herself with regard to the extreme improbability of a 28 years old woman with two children never having had any formal education class I to VII leaving her matrimonial home for another village--even her paternal home--to enroll at that age as a regular class VIII student could not have been jettisoned in the facts of the case. More so when on her part the RC failed to bring on record any evidence of probative worth to dilute and rubbish the evidence of the EP as she was also under a legal duty with reference to Section 106 of the Evidence Act. No attempt was made to place on record of the trial court the reasonableness of the circumstances in which the RC acted as she did in enrolling at age of 28 years with two minor children as a regular class VIII student away from her matrimonial home. Nor were the discrepancies in the class VIII mark-sheet produced by the RC with the certified copy thereof produced by the EP explained. Similarly no explanation was brought on record with regard to the discrepancies on the number of students in class VIII in the school in 16 AY 201-11 where the total number of students recorded was 19, while the RC was in the scholar register at Sr. No.20. It was for the RC to have laid positive evidence of probative worth before the trial court to dislodge the EP's evidence and explain the discrepancies on record. Reference in this regard can be had to L.N. Gadodia & Sons Vs. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner [2011(13) SCC 517], wherein the Apex Court held as under:-
"... When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact lies on him. This rule (which is also embodied in Section 106 of the Evidence Act) expects such a party to produce the best evidence before the authority concerned, failing which the authority cannot be faulted for drawing the necessary inference."
I am of the considered view that albeit the mark-sheet (Ex.4) and TC (Ex.3) of the RC were indeed exhibited by the EP, it did not tantamount to any admission of contents or truth/ correctness thereof by the EP. And the Apex Court in the case of Bishwantath Rai Vs. Sachhidanand Singh [AIR 1971 SC 1949] has held that even where the contents of document may be proved, by itself it does not tantamount to correctness of those contents. For the purpose of proving correctness of contents of the document exhibited, the author of the said document has to enter the witness box to prove the genuineness/ correctness of the contents. In the case of Gangamma Vs. Shivalingaiah [(2005)9 SCC 359], albeit in the context of presumption under Section 90 of the Evidence Act, 1872, the Apex 17 Court held that even if a formal execution of a document is proved, the same by itself cannot lead to a presumption that the contents of the said documents are also correct. And it is open to the parties to raise a plea contra thereto as was raised by the EP in the instant case). No presumption of the correctness of the mark-sheet of class VIII (Ex.4) and the TC (Ex.3) relating to RC could thus be drawn.
In the case of LIC of India vs. Ram Pal Singh Bisen [(2010)4 SCC 491] the Apex Court held that admission of a document is not proof of truth of the contents thereof. A document exhibited does not dispense with the necessity of its proof as required in accordance with the Evidence Act, whereunder contents of documents are required to be proved either by primary or secondary evidence. Contents of the document cannot be proved by merely filing in a court. In the case of Oriental Insurance Company Limited vs. Premlata Shukla [(2007)13 SCC 476], the Apex Court held that truth of facts stated in document in question were required to be proved and marking the documents as exhibit before the trial court was not by itself enough.
It is thus evident that mere exhibiting of certified copies of mark-sheet (Ex.4) and TC (Ex.3) even by the EP under which the RC purported to have passed class VIII did not tantamount to EP's admission either the contents of the said documents or correctness 18 thereof. The genuineness of said documents was to be proved by the RC as per the Evidence Act by bringing into the witness box an official of the school or the author of the documents themselves, as relying thereon she had contested the election for the post of Sarpanch. The RC did not take any such steps in terms of Section 61 of the Evidence Act to prove the contents and correctness of mark- sheet and TC either by summoning the officials of the school or summoning the record of the school for establishing the correctness and genuineness thereof and establish that she indeed had the requisite minimum educational qualification of class VIII pas as mandated under Section 19(t) of the Act of 1994. The exoneration in fact finding enquiries or a negative report on police investigation in a FIR lodged in respect of the RC's mark-sheet of class VIII and TC from the school evidencing her having passed class VIII (in respect of which a protest petition is stated to be pending) do not suffice as proof of genuineness of the said documents as warranted in a trial. In any event such conclusions were only pieces of evidence not binding by themselves alone on the trial court, which was entitled to evaluate their probative worth juxtaposed to other evidences on record. The trial court has come to its conclusions in the impugned judgment on a wholistic reading and appreciation of all evidences laid before it.
I also do not find any force in the contention of Mr. Kamlakar Sharma, counsel for the RC that the trial court could not have relied 19 upon the cross examination of the RC to conclude that she was not class VIII pass. It is no doubt true that cross examination of a witness is not to decide her proficiency with regard to her putative educational qualification. Yet it is equally true that cross examination of a witness is sure fire method of assessing the veracity of her statement in examination-in-chief before the court. In regard to assertion of the RC as to her educational qualification of class VIII pass, it was wholly within the scope of cross examination to ascertain her basic literacy. On that cross examination if the witness faulted and was admittedly incapable of reading even bold letters in her own nomination and affidavit/ documents filed in support thereof, the trial court cannot be faulted for concluding that the witness was quite illiterate and in conjunction with other telling circumstantial evidence which remained unexplained and displaced by manner known to law bringing forth the best evidence duly proved, could not be held to have passed class VIII.
Further in any event, Mr. M.M. Ranjan counsel for the EP is correct in contending that this court in the exercise of its superintending jurisdiction cannot address and evaluate the judgment of the trial court/ tribunal rendered on a reasonable view of evidence before it as if in appeal or revision. The impugned judgment passed by the tribunal requires no interference by this court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, submitted Mr. 20 M.M. Ranjan again rightly suffer as it does neither perversity, patent illegality nor error of jurisdiction.
The upshot of the above discussion is that the impugned judgment dated 4-9-2017 passed by the trial court setting aside the election of the RC as Sarpanch of village Kankariya, Panchayat Samiti Khetri, District Jhunjhunu is not even remotely perverse or vitiated by any illegality going to the root of the court's jurisdiction or entailing a jurisdictional error. I am of the considered view that the finding of the trial court on the RC not having passed class VIII, the minimum educational qualification as per Section 19(t) of the Act of 1994 to be eligible to contest the election for the post of Sarpanch, is unassailable. The RC was thus ineligible to contest the election on the post of Sarpanch. Her election on the post in issue has thus rightly been set aside under the impugned judgment.
The petition is without force. Dismissed.
(Alok Sharma), J.
arn/ 21 All corrections made in the order have been incorporated in the order being emailed.
Arun Kumar Sharma, Private Secretary.