Gujarat High Court
Vaghabhai Rajubhai Bharwad vs State Of Gujarat & on 26 August, 2013
Author: Harsha Devani
Bench: Harsha Devani
VAGHABHAI RAJUBHAI BHARWADV/SSTATE OF GUJARAT R/SCR.A/742/2013 ORDER IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 742 of 2013 ================================================================ VAGHABHAI RAJUBHAI BHARWAD & 3....Applicant(s) Versus STATE OF GUJARAT & 2....Respondent(s) ================================================================ Appearance: MR ABHIRAJ R TRIVEDI, ADVOCATE for the Applicant(s) No. 1 - 3 MS DHARA M SHAH, ADVOCATE for the Applicant(s) No. 4 MR AMIT N CHAUDHARY, ADVOCATE for the Respondent(s) No. 3 PUBLIC PROSECUTOR for the Respondent(s) No. 1 ================================================================ CORAM: HONOURABLE MS.JUSTICE HARSHA DEVANI Date : 26/08/2013 ORAL ORDER
1) Rule.
Mr. Himanshu Patel, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, waives service of notice of rule on behalf of the respondent No.1. Having regard to the facts of the case and with the consent of the learned advocates for the respective parties, the matter is taken up for final hearing today.
2) By this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India read with section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (hereinafter referred to as the Code ) the petitioners seek quashing of the first information report registered vide Fatehgunj Police Station I- C.R. No.72 of 2013.
3) The third respondent-Miteshbhai Rajnikant Shah lodged the above referred first information report against the petitioners herein alleging commission of the offences punishable under sections 323, 384, 504, 507, 506(2) and 34 of the Indian Penal Code. Subsequently, it appears that the parties have amicably settled the dispute between them, pursuant to which, a settlement and compromise purshis dated 21st August, 2013 executed before a Notary has been placed on record. The said compromise purshis has been signed by the petitioners as well as the third respondent, wherein it has been stated that an amicable settlement has been arrived at between the parties; that there was some misunderstanding between them; and that since the dispute has been resolved by way of amicable settlement, both the first informant and the petitioners urge the court to quash the above referred first information report. The first informant has stated that there is no force or any kind of undue pressure or coercion, compulsion or any pressure from the petitioners to settle the dispute and that he has agreed to settle the dispute of his own free will and consent. It is further stated that the family members and business associates successfully brought about the settlement between the parties and, therefore, they have jointly submitted the present settlement purshis.
4) Mr. Abhiraj Trivedi, learned advocate for the petitioners and Mr. Amit Chaudhary, learned advocate for third respondent, have jointly submitted that in the light of the amicable settlement arrived at between the parties, the first information report in question is required to be quashed in the interest of justice.
5) This court has also heard Mr. Himanshu Patel, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the respondents No.1 and 2.
6) At this juncture reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court In Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303, wherein the court after considering its earlier decisions in this regard held thus:
61.
The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz.: (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where the offender and the victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim s family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and the offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, etc.; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil flavour stand on a different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.
7) In Madan Mohan Abbot v. State of Punjab, (2008) 4 SCC 582, the Supreme Court was dealing with a case whereby the High Court had declined the prayer for quashing of the prosecution for the offences punishable under Sections 379, 406, 409, 418, 506/34 IPC despite a compromise entered into between the complainant and the accused. The High Court had taken the view that since the offence punishable under section 406 was not compoundable, the settlement between the parties could not be recognised nor the pending proceedings quashed. The court summed up the approach to be adopted in such cases in the following words:
6.
We need to emphasise that it is perhaps advisable that in disputes where the question involved is of a purely personal nature, the court should ordinarily accept the terms of the compromise even in criminal proceedings as keeping the matter alive with no possibility of a result in favour of the prosecution is a luxury which the courts, grossly overburdened as they are, cannot afford and that the time so saved can be utilised in deciding more effective and meaningful litigation. This is a common sense approach to the matter based on ground of realities and bereft of the technicalities of the law.
We see from the impugned order that the learned Judge has confused compounding of an offence with the quashing of proceedings. The outer limit of Rs.250 which has led to the dismissal of the application is an irrelevant factor in the latter case. We, accordingly, allow the appeal and in the peculiar facts of the case direct that FIR No. 155 dated 17-11-2001 PS Kotwali, Amritsar and all proceedings connected therewith shall be deemed to be quashed.
8) Examining the facts of the present case in the light of the above decisions, the dispute involved in the present case is a purely private dispute. The parties to such dispute have arrived at an amicable settlement. Resultantly, the third respondent is no longer willing to prosecute the petitioners. Under the circumstances even if the proceedings pursuant to the impugned first information report are permitted to continue, the chances of an ultimate conviction are very bleak. In the aforesaid premises, no useful purpose would be served if the proceedings are permitted to continue. This is, therefore, a fit case for exercise of inherent powers under section 482 of the Code for quashing the first information report.
9) For the foregoing reasons, the petition succeeds and is, accordingly, allowed. The first information report registered vide. Fatehgunj Police Station I- C.R. No.72 of 2013, is hereby quashed and set aside. Rule is made absolute accordingly.
Direct service is permitted.
(HARSHA DEVANI, J.) Vahid Page 6 of 6