Bombay High Court
Smt. Fulabai Rambhau Koshire vs . on 10 June, 2013
Author: R. G. Ketkar
Bench: R. G. Ketkar
SA1208_04.doc
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MUMBAI
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
SECOND APPEAL NO.1208 OF 2004
Rambhau Ganpat Koshire since deceased through )
his heirs and legal representatives )
1. Smt. Fulabai Rambhau Koshire )
2. Shri Barku Rambhau Koshire )
3. Madhukar Rambhau Koshire )
4. Dr. Rajesh Rambhau Koshire )
5. Shri Dattatraya Rambhau Koshire )
6. Ms Nilima alias Jijabai Vasantrao Pekhale
Vs.
) Appellants
1. Sardarshingh Rupsingh Ture )
2. Suratsingh Rupsingh Ture )
3. Gulabsingh Rupsingh Ture )
4. Kundansingh Rupsingh Ture )
5. Sundersingh Rupsingh Ture )
6. Kamalbai Rupsingh Ture )
7. Ashabai Rupsingh Ture )
8. Indirabai Rupsingh Ture )
9. Vitthal Bhikaji Gaikwad (dead) )
His son Madhukar @ Balasaheb Vithal (dead) )
through legal heirs )
9A. Tanhubai Vithal Gaikwad (Widow) )
9B. Indubai widow of Madhumar @ Balasaheb )
Gaikwad (daughter in law) )
9C. Avadhoot Madhukar @ Balasaheb Gaikwad )
(grandson) )
9D. Devendra Madhukar @ Balasaheb Gaikwad )
9E. Rajesh Madhukar @ Balasaheb Gaikwad )
9F. Kum. Sarita Madhukar @ Balasaheb Gaikwad )
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10. Bhimabai Meghraj Sancheti (dead) (deleted) )
11. Pabudan Khubchand Chordiya )
12. Mohanlal Halabhai Gujrathi )
13. Radhamohan Hiralal Agrawal )
14. Madhavgovind Hiralal Agrawal )
15. Vasudeo Hiralal Agrawal )
16. Special Recovery Officer, Income Tax Dept. )
17. Hirabai Bhagchand (dead) )
18. Raghunath Bindraj Khatod (dead) )
19. Fakira Tukaram Sope )
20. A. R. Deshpande, Advocate and Court Receiver )
ig Respondents
WITH
CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO.90 OF 2005
Rambhau Ganpat Koshire since deceased through )
his heirs and legal representatives )
1. Smt. Fulabai Rambhau Koshire )
2. Shri Barku Rambhau Koshire )
3. Madhukar Rambhau Koshire )
4. Dr. Rajesh Rambhau Koshire )
5. Shri Dattatraya Rambhau Koshire )
6. Ms Nilima alias Jijabai Vasantrao Pekhale ) Applicants
Vs.
1. Sardarshingh Rupsingh Ture )
2. Suratsingh Rupsingh Ture )
3. Gulabsingh Rupsingh Ture )
4. Kundansingh Rupsingh Ture )
5. Sundersingh Rupsingh Ture )
6. Kamalbai Rupsingh Ture )
7. Ashabai Rupsingh Ture )
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8. Indirabai Rupsingh Ture )
9. Vitthal Bhikaji Gaikwad (dead) )
His son Madhukar @ Balasaheb Vithal (dead) )
through legal heirs )
9A. Tanhubai Vithal Gaikwad (Widow) )
9B. Indubai widow of Madhumar @ Balasaheb )
Gaikwad (daughter in law) )
9C. Avadhoot Madhukar @ Balasaheb Gaikwad )
(grandson) )
9D. Devendra Madhukar @ Balasaheb Gaikwad )
9E. Rajesh Madhukar @ Balasaheb Gaikwad )
9F. Kum. Sarita Madhukar @ Balasaheb Gaikwad )
10. Bhimabai Meghraj Sancheti (dead)
ig )
11. Pabudan Khubchand Chordiya (deleted) )
12. Mohanlal Halabhai Gujrathi )
13. Radhamohan Hiralal Agrawal )
14. Madhavgovind Hiralal Agrawal )
15. Vasudeo Hiralal Agrawal )
16. Special Recovery Officer, Income Tax Dept. )
17. Hirabai Bhagchand (dead) )
18. Raghunath Bindraj Khatod (dead) )
19. Fakira Tukaram Sope )
20. A. R. Deshpande, Advocate and Court Receiver ) Respondents
Ms Smita Gaidhani for the Appellant.
Mr. P. N. Joshi and Mr. R. M. Haridas for Respondent Nos.1 to 8.
Mr. M. S. Karnik i/b. Mr. Gite and Mr. Inamdar for Respondent No.9B.
CORAM : R. G. KETKAR, J.
Reserved on: 26H APRIL, 2013
Pronounced on: 10th JUNE, 2013
JUDGMENT :
1. Heard Ms. Gaidhani, learned Counsel for the appellant and applicant, Mr. Joshi, learned Counsel for respondent Nos.1 to 8 and Mr. 3/70 ::: Downloaded on - 27/08/2013 20:31:31 ::: SA1208_04.doc Karnik, learned Counsel for respondent No.9B both in Second Appeal as also Civil Revision Application at length. Office remark shows that as per the order dated 16.01.2006 in Second Appeal, the appellant has filed affidavit of service stating therein that respondent No.9-A, among others is served by R.P.A.D. Respondent Nos.9C to 9F being minors are represented by their guardian - Respondent No.9-B. Perusal of the writ issued by this Court shows that respondent No.9E accepted service for himself and on behalf of respondent Nos.9A, 9C and 9D. Thus, respondent Nos.9A to 9F are duly served. At the request of Ms Gaidhani, names of respondent Nos.10 to 20 are deleted from Second Appeal. Amendment shall be carried out forthwith.
2. Second Appeal No.1208 of 2004 is preferred by the appellant, hereinafter referred to as the auction purchaser under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short 'C.P.C.') challenging the judgment and decree dated 28.01.2000 passed by the learned Civil Judge Senior Division, Nashik (for short 'trial Judge') below applications at Exhibits 396 and 404 in Insolvency Application No.12 of 1959 as also the judgment and decree dated 26.07.2004 passed by the learned II Ad- hoc Additional District Judge, Nashik (for short 'District Judge') in Civil Appeal No.131 of 2000.
3. By these orders, the Courts below rejected the applications at Exhibits-396 and 404 made by the auction purchaser. Application at Exhibit-396 was made by him for (i) permitting him to prepare and file the draft of the final sale deed for the purchase of the land bearing Survey No.9/1-A admeasuring 2 Acres 10 Gunthas situate at Nashik (for short 'suit land'); (ii) permitting him to deposit in Court the requisite stamp duty, registration charges among other charges; (iii) ordering lodging of the final sale deed with the Sub-Registrar, Nashik for 4/70 ::: Downloaded on - 27/08/2013 20:31:32 ::: SA1208_04.doc execution and registration through the Receiver or through any other officer, superintendent or assistant superintendent of the Court; (iv) ordering the Sub-Registrar, Nashik to register the instrument and (v) delivering the possession of the suit land in accordance with the auction sale by issuing warrant of possession with clear and specific orders by removing all obstructions / obstacles and / or objections of the occupants or third person or persons along with adequate police and including ladies constables after execution and registration of the final sale deed. The auction purchaser made application at Exhibit-404 for confirming the auction sale and for executing the sale deed in his favour.
4. The auction purchaser has also instituted Civil Revision Application No.90 of 2005 challenging the judgment and decree dated 28.01.2000 passed by the learned trial Judge below Exhibits 1 and 378 in Insolvency Application No.12 of 1959 as also the judgment and decree dated 26.07.2004 passed by the learned District Judge. By these orders, the Courts below allowed the application Exhibit-378 made by respondent Nos.1 to 8 herein under Section 35 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920 (for short 'Insolvency Act') for annulling the adjudication of their predecessor-in-title by name Roopsingh Chainsingh Ture as an insolvent. In view of the order below application Exhibit- 378, the learned trial Judge passed order on 28.01.2000 below Exhibit-1 thereby dismissing Insolvency Application No.12 of 1959. Mr. Ture shall hereinafter be referred to as 'insolvent'. Respondent No.9 - Vitthal Bhikaji Gaikwad, since deceased, was claiming to be the tenant in respect of the suit land under the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (for short 'Tenancy Act'). Respondent Nos.9A to 9F are the heirs and legal representatives of Vitthal Bhikaji Gaikwad and they shall hereinafter be collectively referred to as the 'tenant'.
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5. Second Appeal No.1208 of 2004 was heard for admission on different dates. On 02.08.2005, it was brought to the notice of this Court that Civil Revision Application is connected with the Second Appeal. Since the assignment of the Court (Coram: P. V. Kakade, J.) was not in respect of the proceedings arising out of the Insolvency Act, the auction purchaser was directed to move the Hon'ble the Chief Justice to transfer Civil Revision Application to his Court so as to facilitate the adjudication of all the matters together. In pursuance thereof, the Registry had put up the submissions before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice and pursuant to the order of the Hon'ble the Chief Justice dated 24.08.2005, Civil Revision Application was clubbed with Second Appeal.
6. By order dated 05.10.2005, the Court directed that as the matter is dragged since the year 1959 onwards, the Second Appeal and Civil Revision Application shall be heard finally at the stage of admission and called for records and proceedings. By order dated 16.01.2006, both the matters were kept under the caption "for final disposal" on 20.03.2006 and the auction purchaser was directed to take steps to serve respondents on or before 13.03.2006 and file proof of service, failing which matters would stand dismissed for non-prosecution without reference to the Court. By order dated 17.02.2010, the matters were adjourned to 22.03.2010 and were directed to be placed at the bottom of the admission board for final hearing at the stage of admission. Interim order passed in Second Appeal was ordered to be continued till then.
7. In view of these orders and at the request as also by consent of the learned Counsel appearing for the parties, Second Appeal and Civil Revision Application were heard together finally at the stage of admission. Second appeal is admitted on the following substantial 6/70 ::: Downloaded on - 27/08/2013 20:31:33 ::: SA1208_04.doc questions of law:
(i) Whether the Courts below have properly interpreted and applied provisions of the Insolvency Act, and in particular, Sections 4, 5, 27, 28, 35, 37, 41, 43 and 56 in their proper perspective?
(ii) Whether the Courts below were justified in holding that the insolvent, since deceased and respondent Nos.1 to 8 had satisfied all the debts of the creditors having regard to the material on record?
(iii) Whether the Courts below were justified in holding that auction purchaser was not entitled to confirmation of sale in view of Order 21 Rule 92 of the C.P.C.?
(iv) Whether the applications for annulment preferred by the insolvent and respondent Nos.1 to 8 at Exhibits 173 and 378 respectively are filed within limitation?
(v) Whether the Courts below committed serious error in not dismissing applications at Exhibits 173 and 191 made by the insolvent?
(vi) Whether Courts below were justified in holding that as adjudication is annulled, sale effected by the receiver became invalid and the suit land shall vest in respondent Nos.1 to 8 in view of Section 37 of the Insolvency Act?
(vii) Whether findings recorded in the order dated 22.10.1969 passed by the learned trial Judge below Exhibit-148 and confirmed by the learned Joint Judge on 29.04.1971 in Civil Appeal No.107 of 1970 will operate as res judicata in the subsequent tenancy proceedings initiated by the tenant under Section 70(b) of the Tenancy Act?
(viii) Whether in view of Section 4 of the Insolvency Act, the Insolvency Court could decide the tenancy issue that was raised by the tenant in application dated 22.04.1969 at Exhibit-148? And 7/70 ::: Downloaded on - 27/08/2013 20:31:33 ::: SA1208_04.doc if the answer is in affirmative, whether the findings recorded by the Insolvency Court being final and binding for all purposes as between the insolvent on one hand and the tenant being the person claiming through or under the insolvent on the other will preclude Mr Gaikwad from claiming tenancy?
The learned counsel appearing for the respective respondents waive service.
8. In so far as Civil Revision Application No.90 of 2005 is concerned, Rule. Learned Counsel for respective respondents waive service. Office remark shows that as per the order dated 16.01.2006, the applicant has filed affidavit of service stating therein that the respondent No.9A did not claim the service. Respondent Nos.9C to 9F being minors are represented by their guardian - respondent No.9B. Thus, respondent Nos.9A to 9F are duly served. At the request of Ms Gaidhani, names of respondent nos 10 to 20 are deleted from this application. Amendment shall be carried out forthwith. By consent of the parties, Rule is made returnable forthwith and the Application is taken up for Final Hearing along with the Second Appeal. The relevant and material facts giving rise to filing of the Second Appeal and Civil Revision Application, briefly stated, are as under:
9. On 17.08.1959, Roopsingh Chainsingh Ture (insolvent) filed Insolvency Application No.12 of 1959 before the learned trial Judge for adjudicating him as an insolvent. The suit land is included in Schedule B of that application. On 14.10.1961, the learned trial Judge adjudged Mr. Ture as an insolvent and appointed receiver on his properties. He was directed to apply for his discharge within a period of six months. By order dated 10.04.1962, the learned trial Judge appointed Mr. M. A. Kachole as Receiver to take charge of the property. On 18.08.1964, 8/70 ::: Downloaded on - 27/08/2013 20:31:34 ::: SA1208_04.doc insolvent gave application / purshis at Exhibit-84 giving his no objection for selling the suit land. On 12.02.1965, the receiver made report at Exhibit-91 praying for cancelling the name of the insolvent in the revenue record and for entering his name. It was set out therein that the suit land was attached by the Court. The Court had also restrained the insolvent from transferring the same in any manner whatsoever. Despite that, from the perusal of the 7/12 extract, it appeared that insolvent had fraudulently transferred the suit land in favour of his wife Kamlabai and son Sardarsingh Roopsingh Ture. The suit land was unauthorizedly given to Mr. Gaikwad and it is in his possession. As the suit land is included within the municipal limits of Nashik Municipal Council, the Tenancy Act is not applicable. The prayer was, therefore, made for cancelling the entry of insolvent in the revenue record and for entering the name of the receiver. A request was also made for intimating Collector, Nashik to handover possession of the suit land to the receiver from the tenant. It was further set out therein that after compliance of all these formalities, it would be convenient to sell the suit property. The Receiver solicited the orders on that report. By order dated 28.04.1965, the learned trial Judge passed the following order:
"The landed property to be recorded in the name of the receiver.
Inform to the Collector accordingly."
10. Mr. P. K. Chordia, one of the creditors of the insolvent made application on 18.02.1969, at Exhibit-141. In that application, prayer was made for directing the receiver to sell the suit land so as to pay the creditors from the sale proceeds. On 07.04.1969, the learned trial Judge recorded that no say was given by the insolvent to the application Exhibit-141. The learned trial Judge also perused Purshis dated 18.08.1964 at Exhibit-84 filed by the insolvent giving his no objection to sell the suit land. The learned trial Judge directed the Receiver to sell the suit land in public auction. On 22.04.1969, Mr. Vitthal Gaikwad 9/70 ::: Downloaded on - 27/08/2013 20:31:34 ::: SA1208_04.doc made application at Exhibit-148 expressing his intention to purchase the suit land. It was asserted that he was inducted as a tenant under the provisions of the Tenancy Act and he has a preferential right to purchase the suit land being a tenant. The said application was rejected by the learned trial Judge on 22.10.1969. Aggrieved by that order, the tenant preferred Civil Appeal No.107 of 1970 before the learned Joint Judge, Nashik. The said Appeal was dismissed on 29.04.1971.
11. In the meantime, in pursuance of order dated 07.4.1969, the receiver directed bailiff on 06.06.1969 to prepare a Panchnama of the suit land and submit report on or before 16.06.1969.
ig The bailiff prepared panchanama on 15.06.1969. As per the order dated 07.04.1969, the auction was held for selling the suit land on 19.07.1969.
On that date, Mr. Gaikwad gave application for staying the auction on the ground that he is a tenant in the suit land. The Receiver declined to stay the auction as there was neither any valid reason nor any order of the Court restraining him from conducting the auction. Several bids were made before the Receiver and the highest bid offered by the auction purchaser was Rs.16,601/-. Receiver completed two rounds and made it clear that he will place the report before the Court on 21.07.1969 so as to find out whether the price offered is proper or not and thereafter he will complete the third round. The Receiver also made it clear to the auction purchaser that after the Court accepts the auction, he will have deposit 25% amount in the Court forthwith. The Receiver also recorded that since the bid offered by the auction purchaser was five times more than the amount mentioned in the Panchnama, he solicited orders from the Court on his report. On 21.07.1969, the Court adjourned the matter to 24.07.1969. In view thereof, the Receiver postponed the auction to 24.07.1969. On 24.07.1969, the Receiver conducted auction. However, since no order was received from the Court, he postponed the auction to 10/70 ::: Downloaded on - 27/08/2013 20:31:34 ::: SA1208_04.doc 28.07.1969 and accordingly informed the participants.
12. In the meantime, on 22.07.1969, the insolvent made application under Section 14 of the Insolvency Act at Exhibit-160 for withdrawal of insolvency proceedings. Hearing of that application was fixed by the learned trial Judge on 04.08.1969. In view thereof, on 28.07.1969, the receiver postponed the auction to 05.08.1969. On 04.08.1969, the insolvent made application at Exhibit-173 under Section 35 of the Insolvency Act for annulment of insolvency on the ground that he had satisfied the debts of the creditors and for staying the auction. The said application was opposed by the creditors namely, (i) Mr. P. K. Chordia by filing reply dated 04.09.1969 at Exhibit-193; (ii) Ms. Geetabai Meghraj Sancheti by filing reply dated 08.09.1969 at Exhibit-195; and
(iii) Fakira Tukaram Sope by filing reply dated 21.09.1969 at Exhibit-
206. On 05.08.1969, the insolvent made application to the receiver setting out therein that he had filed application on 04.08.1969 for annulment of insolvency proceedings and prayed for staying the auction failing which, he will suffer irreparable loss. The Receiver passed order on 05.08.1969 to the following effect:
"The applicant (insolvent herein) has not produced the receipt from the Court that he had fully satisfied debt of all the creditors. No stay is received from the Court. However, the applicant is directed to approach the Court for stay.
Time to bring the stay is granted till 08.08.1969. The sale is adjourned till 08.08.1969."
13. As the insolvent did not get stay from the receiver, he made application on 06.08.1969 at Exhibit-174 before the learned trial Judge. In that application, it was stated that the insolvent has made application on 04.08.1969 for annulment of insolvency on the ground that he had satisfied all the debts of the creditors. The receiver has proposed to sell the suit land in auction and though he made application for stay of the 11/70 ::: Downloaded on - 27/08/2013 20:31:35 ::: SA1208_04.doc auction, the receiver directed him to obtain the stay order from the Court on or before 08.08.1969. It was, therefore, prayed that till the application dated 04.08.1969 is decided, the auction may be stayed and the receiver may be informed accordingly, failing which, the insolvent will suffer irreparable loss. It was further asserted that the market value of the suit land is Rs.50,000/- whereas receiver has proposed to sell the suit land for Rs.16,601/-. The said application was supported by an affidavit dated 06.08.1969 at Exhibit-175.
14. On 08.08.1969, insolvent made another application before the receiver setting out therein that on the application dated 04.08.1969 made by the insolvent, the Court had ordered issue of notice to the other side. Since the hearing of the application at Exhibit-173 will take some time, he prayed for staying the auction for a period of 15 days otherwise he will suffer irreparable loss. On 08.08.1969, the receiver passed following order:
"No stay order is brought from the Court inspite of directions. The matter is adjourned from time to time and sufficient opportunity was given to the applicant (insolvent herein). Under the circumstances, the application is rejected. Sale is continued."
15. In the meantime on 06.08.1969, the learned trial Judge rejected the application dated 22.07.1969 made by the insolvent at Exhibit-160 for withdrawal of the insolvency proceedings. The learned trial Judge was of the view that Section 14 of the Insolvency Act requires permission of the Court for withdrawal of the petition. No such permission or leave of the Court was asked for in this case or given. The insolvent, therefore, cannot withdraw the Petition in the manner he intends to do the same. The Purshis was, therefore, simply filed. On 08.08.1969, the auction was ultimately held and the auction purchaser had deposited the amount of Rs.16,601/- being the highest bidder with the receiver on the same day. The receiver submitted report dated 12/70 ::: Downloaded on - 27/08/2013 20:31:35 ::: SA1208_04.doc 09.08.1969 at Exhibit 177 giving all the details regarding the proceedings of auction on various dates. The receiver in turn deposited Rs.16,601/- in the Court on 9.8.1969.
16. On 11.08.1969, the insolvent gave application at Exhibit-178 before the learned trial Judge setting out therein that the receiver has conducted auction on 08.08.1969 and insolvent proposes to challenge the actions of the receiver by filing appeal. However, it will take some time in obtaining the stay order. He, therefore, requested not to confirm the sale. The said application was supported by affidavit dated 11.08.1969 at Exhibit-179.
ig On 19.08.1969, the learned trial Judge allowed that application and gave 15 days time to the insolvent to bring the stay as prayed for.
17. On 28.08.1969, the insolvent filed application at Exhibit-191 under Section 68 of the Insolvency Act challenging the acts of the receiver in conducting the auction on 08.08.1969 and accepting the highest bid of Rs.16,601/- of the auction purchaser. In that application, reference was made to the application dated 04.08.1969 filed by the insolvent for annulment of insolvency on the ground that he had paid all the debts of the creditors. It was further reiterated that the market value of the suit land is Rs.50,000/-. As against this, the receiver has proposed to sell the suit land for Rs.16,601/-. The insolvent, therefore, prayed for cancelling the sale by auction and for not confirming the sale. The said application was resisted by creditors namely (i) Mr. P. K. Chordia by filing reply dated 13.10.1969 at Exhibit 212, (ii) Mr. Fakira Tukaram Sope by filing reply dated 21.09.1969 at Exhibit 206, (iii) auction purchaser by filing reply dated 31.10.1969 at Exhibit 221 and (iv) receiver by filing reply dated 31.10.1969 at Exhibit 222.
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18. On 03.09.1969, the insolvent made another application at Exhibit- 192 setting out therein that he had made application on 04.08.1969 at Exhibit-173 for annulment of the insolvency and for setting aside the adjudication order dated 14.10.1961. It was further set out therein that the receiver has held auction on 08.08.1969. The insolvent had filed application on 28.08.1969 at Exhibit-191 for cancellation of the auction. He also referred to the application at Exhibit-178 and the order granting 15 days time for obtaining stay. It was, therefore, prayed that till decision of the applications at Exhibits 173 and 191, the sale may not be confirmed. On that application, the learned trial Judge passed order on 03.09.1969 to the effect that sale not to be confirmed till the applications at Exhibits-173 and 191 are heard and decided. On 16.03.1970, the receiver made application at Exhibit-230 for payment of remuneration for the services rendered by him. By order dated 17.03.1970, the learned trial Judge directed payment of Rs.400/- to the receiver from the amount of Rs.16,601/- deposited by the auction purchaser as the price of the suit land. The learned trial Judge held that the amount of rent should not be touched and he left this question open for decision by his successor. It was further observed that it may be taken for the present that the amount of Rs.400/- was from the amount of Rs.16,601/-.
19. On 03.12.1985, the insolvent died leaving behind respondent Nos.1 to 8 as his heirs and legal representatives. Their names were brought on record in insolvency application No.12 of 1959. Respondent Nos.1 to 8 made application on 13.03.1992 at Exhibit 341 under Section 14 of the Insolvency Act alleging that all the creditors have compromised the claims and have withdrawn proceedings i.e. Special Civil Suit No.115 of 1972 and Regular Civil Suit No.215 of 1970. By order dated 19.02.1994, the learned trial Judge rejected that application. In the course of the judgment, the learned trial Judge observed that 14/70 ::: Downloaded on - 27/08/2013 20:31:36 ::: SA1208_04.doc admittedly, the court receiver has not placed any purshis on record of the case if all the claims of the decree holder have been satisfied. Aggrieved by this order, respondent Nos.1 to 8 preferred Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No.189 of 1994. By order dated 16.09.1999, they were permitted to withdraw the appeal and were granted liberty to file application for annulment of order of insolvency in the trial Court on appropriate grounds. The learned trial Judge was directed to take up the matter on top priority basis as it was of 1959.
20. In pursuance of that liberty, respondent nos 1 to 8 filed application dated 06.10.1999 at Exhibit-378 for annulment of insolvency proceedings. On 06.10.1999, the learned trial Judge passed order directing the other side to file say. On 30.10.1999, the learned trial Judge recorded that none was present, and therefore, passed 'no say' order. On behalf of the tenant Mr. Gaikwad, time was sought for filing reply. Mr. Gaikwad filed reply dated 01.12.1999. The auction purchaser apparently was not made party either in application dated 04.08.1969 at Exhibit-173 as also the application dated 06.10.1999 at Exhibit 378. Public notices were issued by the Court on 06.10.1999, 12.10.1999 and 12.01.2000. In the meantime, on 14.12.1999, the learned trial Judge passed order below Exhibit-378 requesting Mr. A. R. Deshpande, receiver to file his report in regard to payment of debts of the creditors in the matter along with income received by him from the properties under his control and management. Pursuant to that order, Mr. A. R. Deshpande submitted his report dated 31.12.1999 at Exhibit-400 wherein he made reference to the purshis dated 18.08.1992 at Exhibit- 354 given by him. On 15.11.1999, the auction purchaser filed application at Exhibit-396. On 07.01.2000, the auction purchaser filed application at Exhibit-404. By judgment and order dated 28.01.2000, the learned trial Judge allowed the application at Exhibit-378 on two 15/70 ::: Downloaded on - 27/08/2013 20:31:37 ::: SA1208_04.doc grounds. The first ground was that the receiver had given purshis dated 18.08.1992 at Exhibit-354 and purshis dated 31.12.1999 at Exhibit-400.
The learned trial Judge observed as under:
"Considering this report, I think that the debts of all the creditors are paid and now the property of petitioner / insolvent cannot be kept in abeyance for the purpose of this petition."
21. The other ground given by the learned trial Judge was that the creditors did not raise objections to the application at Exhibit-378 after service of public notice. After allowing the application Exhibit-378, the learned trial Judge passed separate order on 28.01.2000 below Exhibit-1 in insolvency application No.12 of 1959 which reads as under:
ig ORDER Exhibit 378 to file this petition is allowed. There are no dues or debts of creditors. Hence, in the light of order on Exhibit-378, this Petition is dismissed as satisfied. The petitioners do not disturb the possession of tenants in some properties unless seek relief from competent authority. No order of costs.
Sd/-
Civil Judge, Senior Division 28.01.2000
22. The learned trial Judge rejected the application dated 07.01.2000 at Exhibit-404 made by the auction purchaser substantially on the same grounds on which application at Exhibit-378 was allowed. The learned trial Judge also rejected the application at Exhibit-396 made by the auction purchaser in the light of the order passed on Exhibit-404. In other words, the applications at Exhibits 396 and 404 made by the auction purchaser were rejected on the same grounds on which application at Exhibit-378 was allowed.
23. Aggrieved by decisions dated 28.01.2000 of the trial Court below Exhibits 1, 378, 396 and 404 passed in Insolvency Petition No.12 of 1959, the auction purchaser preferred Civil Appeal No.131 of 2000. By 16/70 ::: Downloaded on - 27/08/2013 20:31:37 ::: SA1208_04.doc the impugned judgment and order dated 26.07.2004, the learned District Judge dismissed the appeal. The auction purchaser has preferred second appeal against the orders dated 28.01.2000 passed by the learned trial Judge dismissing his applications at Exhibits 396 and 404 passed by the Courts below. The auction purchaser has also instituted Civil Revision Application No.90 of 2005 challenging the order passed by the Courts below allowing application at Exhibit-378.
24. Mr. Joshi raised preliminary objection as regards the locus standii of the auction purchaser to participate in the proceedings under the Insolvency Act. He submitted that the auction purchaser is a stranger to the insolvency proceedings under the Insolvency Act. Only the debtor, creditor, receiver can participate in the proceedings and if any order adverse to their interest is passed, the same can be challenged only by the debtor, creditor, receiver. In other words, the auction purchaser has no locus standii to challenge the proceedings or orders passed by the Insolvency Court. If at all, the auction purchaser wants to establish his rights, he has to adopt independent proceedings including institution of a separate suit. The proceedings of annulment are essential between the debtor, creditor, receiver. The auction purchaser has no right to challenge those proceedings.
25. In support of this submission, Mr. Joshi relied upon the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Official Receiver of Ramanathapuram Vs. P L S L Chellappa Chettiar, 1951 LawSuit (Mad.) 29 and in particular paragraphs 3 and 4 thereof. He submitted that so long as the sale is not confirmed, no right, title and interest is accrued in favour of the auction purchaser. If the auction purchaser has suffered some disappointment or his expectations have not been realised as a result of the decision or an order of the insolvency Court, he cannot 17/70 ::: Downloaded on - 27/08/2013 20:31:37 ::: SA1208_04.doc claim to be an aggrieved person. He also relied upon the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Lalchand Vs. Tuljaram, AIR 1942 Bombay 27.
26. On the other hand, Ms Gaidhani relied upon the following decisions:
(i) Namdeo Vishwanath Vs. Umbaosingh Sadhuram, (1968) 70 Bombay Law Reporter 646 and in particular paragraph 11 thereof to contend that in the present case, the auction purchaser has suffered a legal grievance, a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him something or wrongly refused him something or wrongly affected his title to something;
(ii) Gulab Chand Prasad Vs. Lachuman Sah, AIR 1955 Patna 413, and in particular paragraph 13 thereof to contend that the claim of the third party can be considered under Section 4 of the Insolvency Act;
(iii)Dwarka Prasad Vs. Mt. Sunder, AIR 1935 Allahabad 546 to contend that the Court cannot order delivery of possession without considering question of title;
(iv)Fool Kumari Dasi Vs. Khirod Chandra Das Gupta, AIR 1927 Cal. 474 to contend that under Section 4 of the Insolvency Act, the Court has jurisdiction to decide questions of title as between an official assignee and a stranger with reference to the property which is claimed by the stranger as his.
27. In my opinion, the submission advanced by Ms Gaidhani deserves acceptance for more than one reason. In the first place, while deciding the appeal, the learned District Judge has specifically recorded a finding in paragraph 27 of the impugned order to the effect that the auction 18/70 ::: Downloaded on - 27/08/2013 20:31:38 ::: SA1208_04.doc purchaser has locus standii to file the appeal. Secondly, the insolvent had filed application under Section 68 of the Insolvency Act on 28.08.1969 at Exhibit-191 challenging the actions of the receiver in conducting the auction and accepting the highest bid of the auction purchaser. In that proceeding, the insolvent has impleaded the auction purchaser as party respondent No.10. Thirdly, the insolvent made application on 03.09.1969 at Exhibit-192 and prayed that till the decision of the applications at Exhibits-173 and 191, the sale may not be confirmed.
28. On that application, the learned trial Judge passed order on 03.09.1969 to the effect that sale not to be confirmed till the applications at Exhibits-173 and 191 are heard and decided. Fourthly, Section 75 of the Insolvency Act provides that the debtor, any creditor, the receiver or any other person aggrieved by a decision come to or an order made in exercise of insolvency jurisdiction of a Court, subordinate to a district court, may appeal to the District Court and the order of the District Court upon such appeal shall be final. The first proviso thereof lays down that the High Court, for the purposes of satisfying itself with an order made in any appeal decided by the District Court, was according to law, may call for the case and pass such order with respect thereto as it thinks fit. The second proviso further lays down that any such person aggrieved by a decision of the District Court on appeal from a decision of a subordinate Court under Section 4 may appeal to the High Court on any of the grounds mentioned in sub-section (1) of Section 100 of the C.P.C.
29. In the case of Official Receiver of Ramanathapuram (supra), the Full Bench of the Madras High Court considered the decision in In Ex parte Sidebotham, (1880) 14 Ch.D.458 wherein James L.J. said, "A 'person aggrieved' must be a man who has suffered a legal grievance, a 19/70 ::: Downloaded on - 27/08/2013 20:31:38 ::: SA1208_04.doc man against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongly deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him something, or wrongfully affected his title to something." In the case of Namdeo Vishwanath (supra), the learned Single Judge of this Court also considered that decision in paragraph 12. In the present case, the auction purchaser has suffered a legal grievance, against whom order has been passed on 03.09.1969 depriving him of confirmation of sale. I, therefore, do not find any merit in the submission of Mr. Joshi that auction purchaser has no locus standii either to participate in the proceedings before the insolvency Court or to challenge the orders of the insolvency Court.
30. In support of the Second Appeal and Civil Revision Application, Ms Gaidhani submitted that the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 (for short 'Limitation Act') apply to appeals and applications under the Insolvency Act. By order dated 14.10.1961, the learned trial Judge adjudged Mr. Ture as an insolvent. He, however, made application at Exhibit-173 on 04.08.1969 i.e. to say after eight years. That apart, the application at Exhibit-378 was made by respondent Nos.1 to 8 on 06.10.1999 i.e. to say almost after 30 years from the date of filing of the application at Exhibit-173. She, therefore, submitted that the Courts below ought to have dismissed applications at exhibits-173 and 378 being barred by limitation. She further submitted that the Courts below committed serious error in allowing application at Exhibit-378 by holding that the insolvent and respondent Nos.1 to 8 have satisfied all the debts of the creditors. She submitted that the said finding is clearly contrary to the material on record.
31. She submitted that the insolvent filed application at Exhibit-173 on 04.08.1969. He also filed application at Exhibit-191 on 28.08.1969. He, however, did not lead any evidence in support of these applications 20/70 ::: Downloaded on - 27/08/2013 20:31:39 ::: SA1208_04.doc after obtaining order dated 03.09.1969 below Exhibit-192. Till date, these applications are not decided by the trial Court. She submitted that in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, these applications may be decided by this Court and the same are liable to be dismissed.
She submitted that the Courts below committed serious error in dismissing the applications at exhibits-396 and 404 made by the auction purchaser. She submitted that the receiver had conducted the auction in accordance with law. She submitted that in view of the orders dated 22.10.1969 below Exhibit-148 passed by the learned trial Judge and dated 29.04.1971 passed by the learned Joint Judge, Nashik in Civil Appeal No.107 of 2000, the Courts below committed serious error in holding that in view of the orders of the Tenancy Court, that have been affirmed by this Court, Mr. Gaikwad is a tenant of the suit land. Ms Gaidhani contended that the Courts below have not properly considered and applied the provisions of Sections 28, 37 and 56 of the Insolvency Act. She also submitted that the insolvent, respondent Nos.1 to 8 on one hand and the tenant on the other did not disclose order dated 22.10.1969 passed by the learned trial Judge below Exhibit-148 as also the judgment and order dated 29.04.1971 passed by the learned Joint Judge in Civil Appeal No.107 of 1970 before the tenancy authorities. These orders were relevant and material and non-disclosure of these orders was with a view to obtaining an advantage which amounts to fraud on the Court and consequently, these orders were invalid. In support of her submissions, she relied upon several decisions to which reference will be made at an appropriate place / stage. She, therefore, prayed that the Second Appeal as also the Civil Revision Application deserve to be allowed.
32. Per contra, Mr. Joshi supported the impugned orders. He submitted that the Second Appeal does not involve any substantial question of law. The Courts below have concurrently recorded the 21/70 ::: Downloaded on - 27/08/2013 20:31:39 ::: SA1208_04.doc findings in favour of respondent Nos.1 to 8. These findings are purely findings of facts, and therefore, no case is made out for exercising powers under Section 100 of the C.P.C. as also Section 75 of the Insolvency Act. He further submitted that the auction purchaser did not raise a plea of limitation while opposing the application at Exhibit-378. The issue of limitation is a mixed question of law and fact, and the same cannot be allowed to be raised for the first time in appeal.
33. Mr. Joshi further submitted that the learned District Judge has rightly construed and applied Sections 28 and 56 of the Insolvency Act and rightly held that the suit land never vested in the receiver and the sale was not confirmed. The amount of auction purchase was not utilized for discharging any of the debts and the said amount is kept in the fixed deposits. Unless and until, the sale is confirmed, the rights of the auction purchaser are not crystallized. In any case, receiver was not in actual possession and / or in control and / or having control over the suit land. In the tenancy proceedings, Mr. Vitthal Bhikaji Gaikwad was declared as a tenant by the tenancy authorities. The said decisions were affirmed by this Court.
34. Mr. Karnik on behalf of the tenant supported the impugned orders. He reiterated the submissions that were advanced before the Courts below. He submitted that the receiver had instituted Regular Civil Suit No.253 of 1978 against Mr. Gaikwad for recovery of possession. In that Suit, prayer was made for referring the issue of tenancy to the Tenancy Court. The learned trial Judge declined to refer the issue of tenancy to the tenancy authorities. Aggrieved by the order dated 01.02.1985, Mr. Gaikwad preferred Civil Revision Application No.405 of 1985 in this Court. By order dated 21.08.1986, this Court set aside the order of the trial Court and referred the issue of tenancy to the tenancy authorities.
22/70 ::: Downloaded on - 27/08/2013 20:31:40 :::SA1208_04.doc By order dated 20.04.1987, Tahsildar, Nashik allowed tenancy case No.29 of 1975 filed by Mr. Gaikwad under Section 70(b) of the Tenancy Act and declared that Mr. Gaikwad is the tenant. The said order was confirmed by the Sub-Divisional Officer on 29.09.1988 and the revision preferred by respondent Nos.1 to 8 was dismissed by Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal (for short 'M.R.T.') on 16.03.1990. Respondent Nos.1 to 8 preferred Writ Petition No. 1543 of 1990 in this Court. By order dated 27.03.1991, the Petition was dismissed. He, therefore, submitted that in any case, the auction purchaser is not entitled to recover possession of the suit land from Mr. Gaikwad.
35. I have considered the rival submissions made by the learned Counsel appearing for the parties. I have also carefully perused the material on record as well as the original record. In view of the rival submissions made by the learned Counsel appearing for the parties, following points arise for my consideration:
(a) Whether the provisions of the Limitation Act apply to the applications filed under the Insolvency Act? If answer is in affirmative, whether the applications at exhibits 173 and 378 made by the insolvent and respondent Nos.1 to 8 were filed within the prescribed period of limitation?
(b) Assuming that provisions of Limitation Act do not apply, and consequently, the applications at Exhibits-173 and 378 were not barred by limitation, whether the Courts below were justified in dismissing the insolvency application No.12 of 1959 (Exhibit-1) and allowing application at Exhibit-378 by holding that the insolvent and respondent Nos.1 to 8 have satisfied debts of all the creditors?
(c) Whether the applications at exhibits-173 and 191 are liable to be dismissed?23/70 ::: Downloaded on - 27/08/2013 20:31:40 :::
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(d) Whether the auction held on various dates was validly conducted by the receiver?
(e) Whether the Courts below were justified in dismissing the applications at exhibits 396 and 404 made by the auction purchaser?
(f) Whether the order dated 22.10.1969 passed by the learned trial Judge below Exhibit-148 and affirmed by the learned Joint Judge on 29.04.1971 in Civil Appeal No.107 of 1970 having attained finality, it was open to Mr. Gaikwad to contend that he is a tenant in the suit land?
36. My findings to the above points are as under:
(a) Affirmative. Applications at Exhibit-173 and 378 are filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation.
(b) Negative.
(c) Affirmative.
(d) Affirmative.
(e) Negative.
(f) Negative.
37. The controversy raised in these proceedings can be divided in three parts. Firstly, between the auction purchaser on one hand and the insolvent and respondent Nos.1 to 8 on the other. Secondly, between the auction purchaser and the tenant. Thirdly, between the insolvent and respondent Nos.1 to 8 on one hand and the creditors on the other. The auction purchaser is really not concerned with the controversy between the insolvent and respondent Nos.1 to 8 and their creditors. He participated in the auction held in pursuance of the Court's order dated 07.04.1969.24/70 ::: Downloaded on - 27/08/2013 20:31:41 :::
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38. Before I consider the rival submissions, it is necessary to consider the scheme of the Insolvency Act. Sections 4 and 5 read as under:
4. Power of Court to decide all questions arising in insolvency.- (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Court shall have full power to decide all questions whether of title or priority, or of any nature whatsoever, and whether involving matters of law or of fact, which may arise in any case of insolvency coming within the cognizance of the Court, or which the Court may deem it expedient or necessary to decide for the purpose of doing complete justice or making a complete distribution of property in any such case.
(2) Subject to the provisions of this Act and notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, every such decision shall be final and binding for all purposes as between, on the one hand, the debtor and the debtor's estate and, on the other hand, all claimants against him or it and all persons claiming through or under them or any of them.
(3) Where the Court does not deem it expedient or necessary to decide any question of the nature referred to in sub- section (1), but has reason to believe that the debtor has a saleable interest in any property, the Court may without further inquiry sell such interest in such manner and subject to such conditions as it may think fit.
5. General powers of Courts.-(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Court, in regard to proceedings under this Act, shall have the same powers and shall follow the same procedure as it has and follows in the exercise of original civil jurisdiction.
(2) Subject as aforesaid, High Courts and District Courts, in regard to proceedings under this Act in Courts subordinate to them shall have the same powers and shall follow the same procedure as they respectively have and follow in regard to civil suits.
39. Perusal of Section 4(1) shows that subject to the provisions of the Insolvency Act, the Court shall have full power to decide all questions whether of title or priority, or of any nature whatsoever, and whether involving matters of law or of fact, which may arise in any case of insolvency coming within the cognizance of the Court, or which the Court may deem it expedient or necessary to decide for the purpose of doing complete justice or making a complete distribution of property in 25/70 ::: Downloaded on - 27/08/2013 20:31:41 ::: SA1208_04.doc any such case.
40. Section 4(2) lays down that subject to the provisions of the Insolvency Act and notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, every such decision shall be final and binding for all purposes as between, on the one hand, the debtor and the debtor's estate and, on the other hand, all claimants against him or it and all persons claiming through or under them or any of them.
41. Section 17 provides that if a debtor by or against whom an insolvency petition has been presented dies, the proceedings in the matter shall, unless the Court otherwise orders, be continued so far as may be necessary for the realization and distribution of the property of the debtor.
42. Section 27(1) provides that if the Court does not dismiss the petition, it shall make an order of adjudication, and shall specify in such order the period within which the debtor shall apply for his discharge. Sub-section (2) thereof further provides that the Court may, if sufficient cause is shown, extend the period within which the debtor shall apply for his discharge, and in that case shall publish notice of the order in such manner as it thinks fit.
43. Section 28 lays down the effect of an order of adjudication. Sub- section (1) provides that on making of an order of adjudication, the insolvent shall aid to the utmost of his power in the realisation of his property and the distribution of the proceeds amongst other creditors. Sub-section (2) provides that on the making of an order of adjudication, the whole of the property of the insolvent shall vest in the Court or in a receiver and shall become divisible among the creditors, and thereafter, 26/70 ::: Downloaded on - 27/08/2013 20:31:42 ::: SA1208_04.doc except as provided by the Act, no creditor to whom the insolvent is indebted in respect of any debt provable under the Act shall during the pendency of the insolvency proceedings have any remedy against the property of the insolvent in respect of the debt, or commence any suit or other legal proceeding, except with the leave of the Court and on such terms as the Court may impose. Sub-section (7) thereof lays down that an order of adjudication shall relate back to, and take effect from the date of the presentation of the petition on which it is made.
44. Sections 35 and 37 read as under:
"35. Power to annul adjudication of insolvency. - Where, in the opinion of the Court, a debtor ought not to have been adjudged insolvent or where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that the debts of the insolvent have been paid in full, the Court shall, on the application of the debtor, or of any other person interested, by order in writing, annul the adjudication (and the Court may, of its own motion or on an application made by the Receiver or any creditor, annul any adjudication made on the petition of a debtor who was, by reason of the provisions of sub-
Section (2) of Section 10, not entitled to present such petition.
37. Proceedings on annulment.- (1) Where an adjudication is annulled, all sales and dispositions of property and payments duly made, and all acts therefore done, by the Court or receiver, shall be valid; but, subject as aforesaid, the property of the debtor, who was adjudged insolvent, shall vest in such person as the Court may appoint, or, in default of any such appointment, shall revert to the debtor to the extent of this right or interest therein on such conditions (if any) as the Court may, by order in writing, declare. (2) Notice of every order annulling an adjudication shall be published in the Official Gazette and in such other manner as may be prescribed. "
45. Section 43(1) lays down that if the debtor does not apply for an order of discharge within the period specified by the Court, the Court may annul the order of adjudication or make such other order as it may think fit, and if the adjudication is so annulled, the provisions of section 37 shall apply.
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46. Section 56 provides that the Court may, at the time of the order of adjudication or at any time afterwards, appoint a receiver for the property of the insolvent, and such property shall thereupon vest in such receiver.
47. Section 59(a) lays down that subject to the provisions of the Act, the receiver shall, with all convenient speed, realize the property of the debtor and distribute dividends among the creditors entitled thereto and for that purpose may sell all or any part of the property of the insolvent. Section 78 of the Insolvency Act provides that provisions of Sections 5 and 12 of the Limitation Act shall apply to appeals and applications under the Insolvency Act.
Point (a) Whether the provisions of the Limitation Act apply to the applications filed under the Insolvency Act? If answer is in affirmative, whether the applications at exhibits 173 and 378 made by the insolvent and respondent Nos.1 to 8 were filed within the prescribed period of limitation?
48. The insolvent and the respondent Nos.1 to 8 had made application on 04.08.1969 and 06.10.1999 at exhibits-173 and 378 respectively, under Section 35 of the Insolvency Act.
49. Perusal of Section 35 shows that power is conferred upon the Court to annul adjudication of insolvency in the following circumstances:
(i) where in the opinion of the Court, a debtor ought not to have been adjudged insolvent; or (ii) where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that the debts of the insolvent have been paid in full, the Court shall, on the application of the debtor or of any other person interested, by order in writing annul the adjudication.28/70 ::: Downloaded on - 27/08/2013 20:31:43 :::
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50. In the present case, it is nobody's case that the Court had wrongly adjudged Mr. Ture as an insolvent. In other words, the present case does not fall in the first category. It is common ground that the present case falls in the second category, namely, where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that the debts of the insolvent have been paid in full and accordingly applications at exhibits-173 and 378 were made by the insolvent and the respondent Nos.1 to 8 respectively. It is also common ground that Section 10(2) is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. The conjoint reading of Sections 35 and 78 shows that the provisions of the Limitation Act are applicable to such applications. The learned District Judge in paragraph 21 of the impugned order however held that Section 35 does not provide for any time-limit for filing application for annulment. In my opinion, the said finding is clearly contrary to Section 78 of the Insolvency Act.
51. In the present case, Mr. Ture had filed insolvency application No.12 of 1959 on 17.08.1959. He was adjudged as an insolvent on 14.10.1961. He was directed to apply for his discharge within a period of six months. Admittedly, within a period of six months, he did not apply for his discharge. He also did not apply for extension of the period within which he could have applied for his discharge as per Section 27(2) of the Insolvency Act. The insolvent made an application at Exhibit-173 on 04.08.1969 under Section 35 of the Insolvency Act on the ground that he had satisfied all the dues of the creditors and for staying the auction. The insolvent died on 03.12.1985. The insolvent neither led any evidence nor pressed that application during his life time. Respondent Nos.1 to 8 filed application at Exhibit-378 on 06.10.1999. Ms Gaidhani submitted that both these applications were filed after the prescribed period of limitation under Article 137 of the Limitation Act. In support of this submission, she relied upon the following decisions:
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(i) Gajraj Singh Vs. Official Receiver, Bulandshahr, AIR 1984 Allahabad 224;
(ii)Hari Narain Vs. Subhash Chander, AIR 1985 Punjab and Haryana 211.
52. Mr. Joshi submitted that Article 137 of the Limitation Act does not apply to the applications under the Insolvency Act. In support of this submission he relied upon the following decisions:
(i) Ambabai Vs. H. R. Dani, AIR 1948 Nagpur 367; and
(ii)Town Municipal Council, Athani Vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Hubli, AIR 1969 SC 1335.
53. Mr. Joshi further submitted that the auction purchaser has not raised this plea in the trial Court. The issue of limitation is a mixed question of law and fact and the same cannot be allowed to be raised for the first time in appeal. In support of his submissions, he relied upon the following decisions:
(i) Banarasi Das Vs. Kanshi Ram, AIR 1963 SC 1165 to contend that the question of limitation raised for the first time in the Courts of arguments in the second appeal cannot be allowed to be raised for the first time at this Stage;
(ii) State Bank of India Vs. Brij Mohan Lal, AIR 1963 SC 1165 to contend that the question of limitation being a mixed question of law and fact, is not canvassable for the first time in appeal, unless all facts needed are present on record;
(iii) Syed Abdul Latif Vs. Kundo Mal, AIR 1972 Rajasthan 284 to contend that question of limitation is a mixed question of law and fact;
(iv) Vimal G.Jain Vs. Vertex Financial Services Pvt Ltd, 2007(5) Bom C.R. 478 to contend that objection as to bar of limitation has to be raised at an earlier opportunity failing which, it will be deemed to have been waived;30/70 ::: Downloaded on - 27/08/2013 20:31:44 :::
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(v) Ramesh B Desai Vs Bipin Vadilal Mehta, 2006(5) Bom.C.R. 574 (SC) to contend that plea of limitation cannot be decided on as abstract principle of law divorced from facts. To ascertain starting point of limitation evidence is required to be recorded and it is a pure question of fact; and
(vi) Girja Kumar Vs. State of Himchal Pradesh, AIR 2008 SC 491 to contend that Plea of limitation cannot be raised in First Appeal/Second Appeal/Revision unless it is specifically raised in the trial Court and issue as regards limitation is framed.
54. In the case of Gajraj Singh (supra), the learned Single Judge of Allahabad High Court referred to the decisions of the Apex Court in the case of Town Municipal Council, Athani (supra) as also Kerala State Electricity Board Vs. T. P. Kunhaliumma, (1976) 4 SCC 634. The Apex Court in the case of Kerala State Electricity Board (supra) departed from the view taken in Town Municipal Council, Athani (supra). In the case of Hari Narain (supra), the Division Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court also referred to the judgments of the Apex Court in Kerala State Electricity Board (supra) and Town Municipal Council, Athani (supra). The Division Bench quoted the finding of the Apex Court in the case of Kerala State Electricity Board, which is to the following effect:
"The conclusion we reach is that Article 137 of the 1963, Limitation Act will apply to any petition or application filed under any Act to a Civil Court. With respect, we differ from the view taken by the two Judges Bench of this Court in Athani Municipal Council case, AIR 1969 SC 1335 and hold that Art.137 of the 1963, Limitation Act is not confined to application contemplated by or under the Code of Civil Procedure. The petition in the present case was to the District Judge as a Court. The petition was one contemplated by the Telegraph Act for judicial decision. The petition is an application falling within the scope of Art.137 of the 1963 Act."31/70 ::: Downloaded on - 27/08/2013 20:31:44 :::
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55. In view of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Kerala State Electricity Board (supra), I am of the opinion that Article 137 will apply to any petition or application filed under any Act to the Civil Court. The application need not be under C.P.C. for that matter.
The reliance placed by Mr. Joshi on the decision of Ambabai (supra) does not advance his case any further. The judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Town Municipal Council, Athani (supra) was, with respect, differed in the subsequent decision by the Apex Court in the case of Kerala State Electricity Board (supra). The conclusion, therefore, is inevitable. The provisions of the Limitation Act are applicable to the applications and appeals filed under the Insolvency Act.
56. Perusal of the application at Exhibit-1 namely Insolvency Application No.12 of 1959, application at Exhibit-173 and application at Exhibit-378 apparently shows that auction purchaser was not impleaded as a party respondent therein. There was, therefore, no occasion for the auction purchaser to raise plea of limitation before the trial Court. However, while filing appeal against decisions of the trial Court dated 28.01.2000, the auction purchaser has taken this ground in paragraph 34 of the appeal memo. That apart, under Section 3 of the Limitation Act, every application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as defence. In other words, duty is cast upon the court to dismiss the application made after the prescribed period although defence based on limitation was not set up. I, therefore, do not find merit in the submissions of Mr. Joshi that since the auction purchaser did not raise this plea in the trial Court, he is precluded from raising that plea in the appeal.
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57. In view of the above discussion, in my opinion, the reliance placed by Mr. Joshi on the decisions of Banarasi Das (supra), State Bank of India (supra), Syed Abdul Latif (supra), Vimal G. Jain (supra), Ramesh B. Desai (supra) and Girja Kumar (supra) does not advance the case of the insolvent.
58. The next question is whether application at exhibits-173 and 378 were filed within the prescribed period of limitation. As noted earlier, on 14.10.1961, the Court adjudged Mr. Ture as insolvent.
Admittedly, he did not make application for discharge under Section 27 within six months from the date of the order. He also did not apply for extension of the period stipulated in the order dated 14.10.1961. The insolvent made application at Exhibit-173 on 04.08.1969 alleging that he had satisfied all the dues of the creditors. As noted earlier, Article 137 of the Limitation Act prescribes the period of limitation of three years from the date when the right to apply accrues.
59. Perusal of application at Exhibit-173 shows that the insolvent has not given particulars as to when he had allegedly satisfied all the dues of the creditors. He had also not asserted as to when the the last payment was made so as to compute period of three years from the date when the right to apply accrues. It was within his knowledge as to when last payment was made. In my opinion, it was the bounden duty of the insolvent to give better particulars so as to ascertain when the right to apply accrued to him under Section 35 of the Insolvency Act. The insolvent died on 03.12.1985. That apart, during his lifetime, the insolvent did not press his application. Even respondent Nos.1 to 8 did not take any steps immediately thereafter. Initially, the application was made under Section 14 of the Insolvency Act on 13.03.1992 at Exhibit-
341. That was rejected by the learned trial Judge on 19.02.1994.
33/70 ::: Downloaded on - 27/08/2013 20:31:45 :::SA1208_04.doc Aggrieved by this decision, respondent Nos.1 to 8 approached the learned District Judge. Respondent Nos.1 to 8 were allowed to withdraw the appeal and were granted liberty to file application for annulment on 16.09.1999. In pursuance thereof, respondent Nos.1 to 8 filed application at Exhibit-378 on 06.10.1999 for annulment of the insolvency proceedings. The said application is preferred under Section 35 of the Insolvency Act. Even in this application, no details are furnished as to when the right to apply accrued. I am, therefore, of the opinion that even this application was not filed within the prescribed period of limitation.
60. Mr. Joshi, however, submitted that plea of limitation cannot be decided on an abstract principle of law divorced from the facts to ascertain starting point of limitation, evidence is required to be recorded and it is a pure question of fact. He relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Ramesh B. Desai (supra). In that case, appellants before the Apex Court instituted Company Petition No.35 of 1988 before the High Court of Gujarat on 10.11.1987. Nearly after 8 years on 20.03.1995, Application No.113 of 1995 was filed by respondent Nos.2 and 3 in the Company Petition praying that the Company Petition may be dismissed as barred by limitation without going into the merits of the petition.
61. The appellants filed detailed reply contending that respondent Nos.2 and 3 in the Company Petition had filed their detailed affidavit and reply on 22.03.1988 and the company also filed reply on that date. After considering the objections, the learned Company Judge admitted petition on 24.06.1988. The learned Company Judge had fixed the Company Petition for final hearing by order dated 17.02.1995. It was also asserted that the respondents had committed serious fraud on the shareholders and also on the company. Whether there is a fraud 34/70 ::: Downloaded on - 27/08/2013 20:31:46 ::: SA1208_04.doc committed or not or whether in the circumstances of the case, delay can be condoned or not and what is the point of time for commencement of limitation are questions of fact, and such questions cannot be tried as preliminary issues as they require evidence. It was further asserted that the question of limitation involved in the petition is not a pure question of law as the same had to be decided on the basis of fraud which will be question of fact and the Company Court will have to decide whether the petitioners in the company petition had got knowledge of the fraud, if so, at what stage. This being a purely factual matter could not be decided as a preliminary issue as the whole matter had to be heard. That apart, there being clear averment of fraud in the company petition, under law, the limitation would start running only from the date the fraud was discovered. The learned Company Judge allowed Company Application No.113 of 1995 and dismissed the company petition. The appellants preferred an appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court and the same was dismissed. In paragraph 16 of the report, it was observed that a plea of limitation cannot be decided as an abstract principle of law divorced from facts as in every case, the starting point of limitation has to be ascertained, which is entirely question of fact. There is no dispute with this proposition of law. In paragraph 23, the Apex Court considered Section 17 of the Limitation Act and in paragraph 24 held that the case is covered by Section 17(1)(a) of the Limitation Act.
62. The question is whether the insolvent and respondent Nos.1 to 8 had given any particulars at all in applications at exhibits 173 and 378. Perusal of these applications clearly shows that no details as to on what date, the insolvent and for that matter respondent Nos.1 to 8 had satisfied the debts of all the creditors. The said fact was very much within their knowledge. Unless there is pleading to that effect, no amount of evidence can be led. In view thereof, the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Ramesh B. Desai (supra) does not advance 35/70 ::: Downloaded on - 27/08/2013 20:31:46 ::: SA1208_04.doc the case of respondent Nos.1 to 8.
63. Having regard to the assertions made in the applications at exhibits 173 and 378, I am clearly of the opinion that since both the applications lack the basic particulars, it cannot be said that the said applications were filed within the prescribed period of limitation. In view of the above discussion, my finding on point (a) is that the provisions of the Limitation Act apply to the applications under the Insolvency Act and the applications at exhibits-173 and 378 were filed after the prescribed period of limitation.
Point (b) Assuming that provisions of Limitation Act do not apply, and consequently, the applications at exhibits 173 and 378 were not barred by limitation, whether the Courts below were justified in dismissing the insolvency application No.12 of 1959 (Exhibit-1) and allowing application at Exhibit-378 by holding that the insolvent and respondent Nos.1 to 8 have satisfied debts of all the creditors?
64. I assume in favour of the insolvent and respondent nos 1 to 8 and proceed on the premise that the Limitation Act does not apply to the applications made by them under Section 35 of the Insolvency Act, and therefore, they were not barred by limitation. The question that still remains is whether the Courts below were justified in dismissing insolvency application No.12 of 1959 (Exhibit-1) and allowing application (Exhibit-378) by holding that the insolvent and respondent Nos.1 to 8 have satisfied all the debts of the creditors. In order to appreciate this controversy, it is necessary to consider the findings recorded by the Courts below on this aspect. The learned trial Judge allowed application on two grounds. Firstly, receiver Mr. A. R. Deshpande had earlier given purshis at Exhibit-354 on 18.08.1992 and subsequently, in pursuance of the order dated 36/70 ::: Downloaded on - 27/08/2013 20:31:47 ::: SA1208_04.doc 14.12.1999, Mr. Deshpande submitted purshis dated 31.12.1999 at Exhibit-400. The learned trial Judge observed as under:
"Considering this report, I think that the debts of all the creditors are paid and now the property of the petitioners insolvent cannot be kept in abeyance for the purpose of this petition."
65. Perusal of purshis dated 18.08.1992 at Exhibit-354 shows that Mr. Deshpande had set out that it is not possible for him to work as receiver, and therefore, he tenders resignation. It was further stated that he may be discharged as a receiver and that he has not recovered any amount. Perusal of purshis dated 31.12.1999 at Exhibit-400 shows that he has not recovered any amount as receiver and he has also not received any remuneration. Neither any amount is deposited with him nor he is liable to pay any amount. Perusal of purshis at exhibits-354 and 400 does not even remotely indicate that the receiver has given report to the effect that debts of the creditors were satisfied by the insolvent. It is also material to note that in the order dated 19.02.1994 while rejecting the application made by the respondent Nos.1 to 8 on 13.03.1992 at Exhibit-341, the learned trial Judge observed that admittedly the court receiver has not placed any purshis on record of the case whether all the claims of the decree holder have been satisfied. No evidence is laid in application at Exhibit-173 by insolvent. Equally, no evidence is laid in application at Exhibit-378 by respondent Nos.1 to 8. In view thereof, I am clearly of the opinion that the learned trial Judge has factually committed errors while arriving at the conclusion on the basis of the reports of the receiver that debts of all the creditors were paid by the insolvent and respondent Nos.1 to 8. The said finding is clearly perverse and based on no evidence.
66. As far as the other ground that the creditors had not objected to 37/70 ::: Downloaded on - 27/08/2013 20:31:47 ::: SA1208_04.doc Exhibit-378 is concerned, the same is also factually incorrect. As noted earlier, respondent Nos.1 to 8 filed application on 06.10.1999 at Exhibit-
378. Public notices were issued by the Court on 06.10.1999, 12.10.1999 and 12.01.2000. As many as four creditors namely (i) Radhamohan, (ii) Madhavgovind, (iii) Vasudeo and (iv) Phoolabai Hiralal Agarwal jointly filed application on 10.01.2000 contending inter alia that deceased Hiralal Nandlal Agarwal had instituted Regular Civil Suit No. 399 of 1953 against the insolvent and the suit was decreed. Till date, the insolvent had not satisfied the decree and the said amount is outstanding. In other words, the finding recorded by the learned trial Judge that no creditor objected to the application made by respondent Nos.1 to 8 at Exhibit-378 is factually incorrect. That apart, when the insolvent made application at Exhibit-173 on 04.08.1969, the said application was also objected by the creditors namely (i) Mr. P. K. Chordia by filing reply dated 04.09.1969 at Exhibit-193; (ii) Ms Geetabai Meghraj Sancheti by filing reply dated 08.09.1969 at Exhibit-195; and (iii) Fakira Tukaram Sope by filing reply dated 21.09.1969 at Exhibit-206. Thus, this finding is also perverse and contrary to the material on record.
67. The findings recorded by the learned trial Judge were affirmed by the learned District Judge. In paragraph 20, the learned District Judge observed that no creditor came forward informing the Court that any debt is outstanding against the insolvent. It was further observed that the learned trial Judge considered this submission as sufficient proof to come to the conclusion that no debt as mentioned in the insolvency petition is outstanding against the insolvent. Since no debtor came forward opposing the application for annulment, the Court was not required to probe further into the matter. Considering this, the learned District Judge observed that it appeared that while deciding application at Exhibit 378, it is established by respondent Nos.1 to 8 that the debts 38/70 ::: Downloaded on - 27/08/2013 20:31:48 ::: SA1208_04.doc of the insolvent have been paid in full and that while passing the order of annulment, the Court appeared to have properly followed the procedure laid down under Section 35 of the Insolvency Act. For the selfsame reasons, I am of the opinion that the findings recorded by the learned District Judge are clearly contrary to the material on record and the same are perverse being based on no evidence. Section 35 of the Insolvency Act, extracted hereinabove, lays down that where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that all debts of the insolvent have been paid in full, etc... There is no material produced by the insolvent and respondent Nos.1 to 8 either in application under Exhibit-173 or application at Exhibit-378 to substantiate that they have satisfied debts of all the creditors. There is absolutely no evidence worth the name to uphold the findings recorded by the court below.
68. It is at this juncture relevant to consider the decision of the learned Single Judge of Mysore High Court in the case of Jabbarchand Vs. Mrs. C. Oliver, AIR 1965 Mysore 117. The learned Single Judge considered the decision of this Court in the case of Re Shivlal Rathi, 40 Ind. Case 207 : AIR 1917 Bom 239 (2) wherein this Court considered the meaning of the words 'payment in full' occurring in Section 21 of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, which corresponds to Section 35 of the Insolvency Act and it was observed as under:
"Payment must be in cash in full of the claims and the insolvent cannot escape the result of the adjudicating order and prevent the Court from enquiring fully into his affairs, by adjusting his claims and getting creditors to accept less than what they considered due to them, nor by thus getting a receipt in full, can he then contend that his debts have been paid in full, and the adjudication should be annulled."
It, therefore, follows that the words 'paid in full' occurring in Section 35 mean payment of the full amount as the creditor would be entitled to, as if no order of adjudication had been passed against the debtors. Ranking, J. took the same view in In Re A. A. Haile, ILR 47 Cal. 914 : AIR 1920 Cal 684. His Lordship held that, "The insolvent cannot bring himself within the language of Section 21 of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act unless he 39/70 ::: Downloaded on - 27/08/2013 20:31:49 ::: SA1208_04.doc satisfied me that he has paid to the creditor, being a creditor in respect of a debt which was proved, such sum as would have been a complete discharge to him in respect of that debt, had "there been no bankruptcy at all.
Under Section 21, the position is that an insolvent is entitled to claim a right which the Section gives him, if it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that the debts of the insolvent are paid in full.
But such a person coming to the Court in the middle of a pending bankruptcy and asking the Court to determine his bankruptcy must show, independently of any rights given to him by the Bankruptcy Act altogether. He is asking the Court to bring the bankruptcy to a sudden stop because it is no longer necessary. In my opinion, the only person who is in that position is the person who made such a payment as could be pleaded between two ordinary parties as amounting to a complete discharge of the debt."
It is clear from these observations that a person who seeks to set aside an adjudication altogether, must show that independently of the insolvency, he had cleared off his debts and satisfied the creditor in full. The Oudh High Court considered the meaning of these words occurring in Section 35 in Pat Ram Vs. Mt. Sukhdel, AIR 1947 Oudh 202 and pronounced as follows:
"If the insolvent applies for the indulgence which S.35 gives him, namely to be relegated to the original position as if he has not been adjudicated, it is clear that he must pay what he would have had to pay, had the proceedings in bankruptcy not intervened. Under Section 35, the onus is on him to establish that independently of the Bankruptcy Law he has satisfied his debts in their entirety."
69. Perusal of the extracted portion herein above shows that the words 'paid in full' occurring in Section 35 mean payment of the full amount as the creditor would be entitled to, as if no order of adjudication had been passed against the debtors. The insolvent cannot bring himself within the language of Section 35 unless he satisfies the Court that he has paid to the creditor in respect of a debt which was proved, such sum as would have been a complete discharge to him in respect of that debt, had "there been no bankruptcy at all". Under Section 35, the position is that an insolvent is entitled to claim as a right which the Section gives him, if it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that the debts of the insolvent are paid in full. It is clear from these observations that a person who 40/70 ::: Downloaded on - 27/08/2013 20:31:49 ::: SA1208_04.doc seeks to set aside an adjudication altogether, must show that independently of the insolvency, he has cleared off the debts and satisfied the creditor in full. Under Section 35, the onus is on him to establish that independently of insolvency, he has satisfied his debts in their entirety. In view of the above discussion, my finding on point (b) is in the negative.
Point (c) Whether the applications at exhibits-173 and 191 are liable to be dismissed?
70. In order to consider this point, it is necessary to bear in mind that the insolvent made application at Exhibit-173 on 04.08.1969 under Section 35 of the Act. The said application was opposed by creditors namely, (i) Mr. P. K. Chordia by filing reply dated 04.09.1969 at Exhibit-193; (ii) Ms Geetabai Meghraj Sancheti by filing reply dated 08.09.1969 at Exhibit-195; and (iii) Fakira Tukaram Sope by filing reply dated 21.09.1969 at Exhibit-206. Perusal of Exhibit-173 shows that the case made out therein is two-fold: (1) that the outstanding debt may be adjusted from the amount deposited / recovered by the receiver and (2) no debt is outstanding. In other words, it is not the case of payment of debts in full but either adjustment of debts or that no debt is outstanding. For example, insofar as creditor Ms Geetabai Sancheti is concerned, the outstanding debt was Rs.1480/- and the case of the insolvent is that he had deposited gold ornament with the said creditor and the market value was around Rs.1,400/-. If the adjustment is made, then there won't be any dues of the said creditor. As against this, perusal of the reply filed by Ms Geetabai Sancheti shows that she had denied the insolvent depositing gold ornament with her and she also denied rest of the contentions.
71. The insolvent also filed application dated 28.08.1969 at Exhibit-
41/70 ::: Downloaded on - 27/08/2013 20:31:50 :::SA1208_04.doc 191 under Section 68 of the Insolvency Act challenging the acts of the receiver in conducting the auction on 08.08.1969 and accepting the highest bid of Rs.16,601/- of the auction purchaser. That application was also opposed by the creditors namely (i) Mr. P. K. Chordia by filing reply dated 13.10.1969 at Exhibit 212, (ii) Mr. Fakira Tukaram Sope by filing reply dated 21.09.1969 at Exhibit 206, (iii) auction purchaser by filing reply dated 31.10.1969 at Exhibit 221 and (iv) receiver by filing reply dated 31.10.1969 at Exhibit 222. A case made out by the insolvent therein is that the market value of the suit land is Rs.50,000/-. Perusal of the reply filed by the creditors as also receiver shows that the said contention was specifically denied by them. It was their case that the suit land is an agricultural land. However, the insolvent has arrived at the market value of Rs.50,000/- on the basis that it is a non-agricultural land and after laying plots therein it will fetch Rs.50,000/-. Having regard to the fact that the suit land is an agricultural land, the assumption made by the insolvent was wholly improper.
72. The insolvent made application on 03.09.1969 at Exhibit-192 and on that application, the learned trial Judge passed order on the same day to the effect that sale not to be confirmed till applications at exhibits-173 and 191 are heard and decided. The insolvent did not lead evidence substantiating assertions made either in Exhibit-173 or 191. Though the applications were made in the year 1969, till the death of the insolvent on 03.12.1985, the insolvent did not make any attempt to lead the evidence. This assumes importance as if the insolvent had really satisfied debts of all the creditors, there was no reason for him not to lead evidence and substantiate his claim. Admittedly, these applications are not decided by the trial Court till date. Even respondent Nos.1 to 8 did not lead any evidence. I have two options before me. First, to direct the trial Court to decide these applications in a time bound manner. The 42/70 ::: Downloaded on - 27/08/2013 20:31:50 ::: SA1208_04.doc other option is that I should decide these applications. In view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case, I deem it appropriate to decide these applications. The reasons that weighed with me are as under:
I. I have already dealt with the assertions made in exhibits-173 and 191 by the insolvent and the fact that no evidence was led. Even respondent Nos.1 to 8 did not make any attempt to lead the evidence.
After nearly 40 years, I do not deem it fit to permit the respondent Nos.1 to 8 to lead evidence. If at this stage, I permit them to lead evidence, it will amount to putting premium on the wrongdoer.
II. Because of passage of time, there is every possibility of both the oral as well as documentary evidence having been lost.
III. Section 4 of the Insolvency Act empowers the Insolvency Court to decide all questions whether of title or any nature whatsoever and whether involving matters of law or of fact which may arise in any case insolvency coming within the cognizance of the Court, or which the Court may deem it expedient or necessary to decide for the purpose of doing complete justice or making a complete distribution of property in any such case. Section 5 provides that subject to the provisions of the Insolvency Act, the Court, in regard to proceedings under the Insolvency Act, shall have the same powers and shall follow the same procedure as it has and follows in the exercise of original civil jurisdiction. Sub- section (2) thereof lays down that High Court, in regard to the proceedings under the Insolvency Act in Courts subordinate to them, shall have the same powers and shall follow the same procedure as they respectively have and follow in regard to civil suits. Section 107(2) of the C.P.C. provides that the Appellate Court shall have the same powers 43/70 ::: Downloaded on - 27/08/2013 20:31:51 ::: SA1208_04.doc and shall perform as nearly as may be the same duties as are conferred and imposed by the C.P.C. on Courts of original jurisdiction in respect of the suits instituted therein. The conjoint reading of Sections 4 and 5 of the Insolvency Act and Section 107(2) of the C.P.C. leads to the conclusion that High Court has same powers as are conferred by the C.P.C. on Courts of original jurisdiction in respect of the suits instituted therein and such power can be exercised by the Appellate Court as "nearly as may be" exercised by the trial Court under the C.P.C. Thus, the powers of the High Court, unless stated otherwise in the governing statute, namely, in the present case, Insolvency Act are co-extensive with those original authorities namely the trial Court. It has been laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Vasant Ganesh Damle Vs. Shrikant Trimbak Datar, (2002) 4 SCC 183 that if the powers conferred by the trial Court are under a specified statute and not under the C.P.C, it has to be ascertained as to whether such a power was intended to be exercised by the appellate court as well. Such a position can be ascertained by having reference to the specified law by keeping in mind the legislative intention of conferment of power on the appellate court either expressly or by necessary implication. At this stage, after nearly 40 years if I direct the trial Court to decide these applications, it would be travesty of justice. Having regard to the legislative intention and Sections 4 and 5 of the Insolvency Act read with Section 107(2) of the C.P.C, I deemed it appropriate to decide the applications at Exhibits 173 and 191.
IV. As I am inclined to permit respondent Nos.1 to 8 to establish their case before the receiver that all the dues of the creditors are satisfied, notwithstanding dismissal of applications at exhibits-173 and 378, this is not a fit case to permit them to lead evidence in the trial Court particularly when they did not avail opportunity and made any attempt to substantiate their case.
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73. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, I come to the conclusion that the insolvent as also respondent Nos.1 to 8 have not substantiated their case in applications at exhibits-173 and 191 and the same are liable to be dismissed. In view of the dismissal of these applications, the order dated 03.09.1969 below Exhibit-192 stands quashed and set aside. The application at Exhibit-192 stands dismissed. It is expressly made clear that notwithstanding dismissal of applications at exhibits-173 and 378, respondent Nos.1 to 8 are not precluded from establishing before the receiver that all the dues of the creditors are satisfied. Likewise, the creditors are at liberty to contest that claim. Point No.(c) is answered in the affirmative.
Point (d) Whether the auction held on various dates was validly conducted by the receiver?
74. In order to consider this question, it is necessary to find out whether the receiver has conducted the auction in accordance with law.
On 18.08.1964, the insolvent gave application / purshis at Exhibit-84 giving his no objection for selling the suit land. On the application dated 18.02.1969 made by one of the creditors of insolvent Mr. P. K. Chordia at Exhibit-141, the learned trial Judge passed order on 07.04.1969 directing the receiver to sell the suit land in public auction. As per the order dated 07.04.1969, the auction was held on 19.07.1969. Perusal of the report dated 09.08.1969 made by the receiver at Exhibit-177 shows that the Panchas had fixed value of the suit land at Rs.3,300/-.
75. The auction was conducted between 4.00 p.m. and 5.30 p.m. on 19.07.1969. Several bids were made before the receiver and the auction purchaser was the highest bidder. He had offered Rs.16,601/-. Receiver completed two rounds and made it clear to the participants that he will place the report before the Court on 21.07.1969 so as to solicit the orders 45/70 ::: Downloaded on - 27/08/2013 20:31:52 ::: SA1208_04.doc of the Court on his report as to whether the price offered by the highest bidder is adequate or not and thereafter, he will complete the third round.
Receiver made it clear to the auction purchaser that after the Court accepts the auction, he will have to deposit 25% of his bid amount in the Court forthwith. Receiver also recorded that since the bid offered by the purchaser was five times more than the amount mentioned in the Panchnama, he solicited orders of the Court for confirming the sale in favour of the highest bidder. On 21.07.1969, the auction was postponed to 24.07.1969 as the Court adjourned hearing of the receiver's report dated 21.07.1969 to 24.07.1969. On 24.07.1969, the auction was postponed to 28.07.1969. On 28.07.1969, the auction was postponed to 05.08.1969.
76. On 05.08.1969, the insolvent made application to the receiver for staying the auction. The receiver passed order to the effect that the insolvent did not produce a receipt from the Court that he has fully satisfied debts of all the creditors. No stay is received from the Court.
He directed the insolvent to approach the Court for stay and time to bring stay was granted till 08.08.1969. The auction was adjourned to 08.08.1969. The insolvent gave application on 06.08.1969 at Exhibit-
174 before the Court for staying the auction. On 08.08.1969, the insolvent made another application before the receiver for staying the auction for the period of 15 days. Receiver rejected the application on the same day by observing that no stay order is brought from the Court inspite of the directions. The matter is adjourned from time to time and sufficient opportunity was given to the insolvent. Under the circumstances, the application was rejected and the sale was ordered to continue.
77. On 08.08.1969, the receiver completed the third round and as the 46/70 ::: Downloaded on - 27/08/2013 20:31:53 ::: SA1208_04.doc insolvent did not bring any order from the Court, he accepted the highest bid of auction purchaser of Rs.16,601/-. Auction purchaser also deposited the entire amount with the receiver on the same day, who in turn, deposited that amount in Court on 09.08.1969. The report further recites that he has completed the auction and solicited the orders of the Court for confirming the sale. It is also material to note that even Mr. Gaikwad and his wife participated in the auction held on 19.07.1969.
He also gave application for staying the auction on the ground that he is a tenant in the suit land. The receiver declined to stay the auction as there was neither any valid reason nor any order of the Court prohibiting him from conducting the auction. The insolvent also made application on 11.08.1969 at Exhibit-178 before the Court requesting it not to confirm the sale. On 28.08.1969, the insolvent filed application at Exhibit-191 under Section 68 of the Insolvency Act challenging the acts of the receiver in conducting auction on 08.08.1969 and accepting the highest bid of Rs.16,601/- of the auction purchaser.
78. On 03.09.1969, insolvent made another application at Exhibit-
192. By order dated 03.09.1969, the learned trial Judge passed order to the effect that sale not to be confirmed till applications at exhibits-173 and 191 are heard and decided. Thus, the perusal of record clearly shows that insolvent made several unsuccessful attempts in staying the auction as also for not confirming the sale. Eventually, he succeeded in ensuring that the sale is not confirmed in view of the order dated 03.09.1969. The net result as of today is that the application at Exhibit- 173 and application at Exhibit-191 are not decided. With the result, the sale is not confirmed till date. After carefully considering the material on record as also the report dated 09.08.1969 made by the receiver at Exhibit-177, I am more than satisfied that the auction conducted by the receiver was in accordance in law. Several opportunities were given to the insolvent for obtaining stay from the Court. However, despite giving 47/70 ::: Downloaded on - 27/08/2013 20:31:53 ::: SA1208_04.doc opportunities to the insolvent, he did not obtain stay from the Court. The auction so conducted by the receiver cannot be faulted on any ground. Point (d) is answered accordingly.
Point (e) Whether the Courts below were justified in dismissing the applications at exhibits 396 and 404 made by the auction purchaser?
79. As noted earlier, Shri Roopsing Ture filed Insolvency application No.12 of 1959 before the learned trial Judge on 17.8.1959 for adjudicating him as an insolvent. On 14.10.1961 the learned trial Judge adjudged Mr Ture as an insolvent and appointed receiver on his property. Section 28 of the Insolvency Act lays down the effect of an order of adjudication. Sub section (1) provides that on the making of an order of adjudication, the insolvent shall aid to the utmost of his power in the realisation of his property and the distribution of the proceeds among his creditors. Sub section(2) lays down that on the making of an order of adjudication, the whole of the property of the insolvent shall vest in the Court or in a receiver. Section 56 provides for appointment of receiver. Sub section (1) lays down that the Court may, at the time of the order of adjudication, or at any time afterwards, appoint a receiver for the property of the insolvent, and such property shall thereupon vest in such receiver. Section 59 deals with duties and powers of receiver and provides that subject to the provisions of the Insolvency Act, the receiver shall, with all convenient speed, realize the property of the debtor and distribute dividends among the creditors entitled thereto, and for that purpose may (a) sell all or any part of the property of the insolvent.
80. On 12.2.1965 receiver made report at Exhibit-91 setting out therein that the suit land was attached by the Court. That apart, in the application dated 18.2.1969 at Exhibit 141, Mr P.K.Chodia (one of the 48/70 ::: Downloaded on - 27/08/2013 20:31:54 ::: SA1208_04.doc creditors) asserted that in Special Darkhast No.43 of 1960 filed by him against insolvent for execution of money decree, the suit land is attached. On that application the learned trial Judge passed order on 7.4.1969 and directed the receiver to sell the suit land in public auction.
In pursuance thereof, the receiver proceeded to sell the suit land in auction. While answering point no.(d) I have already held that the auction was validly conducted by the receiver.
81. The Courts below allowed the application at Exhibit 378 made by the insolvent and for the reasons recorded therein rejected the applications at Exhibits 396 and 404 made by the auction purchaser. I have already held that the orders passed by the courts below application at Exhibit-378 are totally unsustainable and as such, are liable to be quashed and set aside. I have also held that the auction conducted by the receiver is in accordance with law. In view thereof, in my opinion, the Courts were not justified in dismissing the applications at exhibits-396 and 404 made by the auction purchaser.
Point (e) is answered accordingly.
Point (f) Whether the order dated 22.10.1969 passed by the learned trial Judge below Exhibit-148 and affirmed by the learned Joint Judge on 29.04.1971 in Civil Appeal No.107 of 1970 having attained finality, it was open to Mr. Gaikwad to contend that he is a tenant in the suit land?
82. Mr. Karnik, however, submitted that Vitthal Bhikaji Gaikwad was declared as tenant in proceedings initiated under Section 70(b) of the Tenancy Act. By order dated 28.04.1987, the Tahsildar, Nashik allowed the application being tenancy case No.25 of 1979 filed under Section 70(b) of the Tenancy Act and declared that Mr. Gaikwad is the tenant of the suit land since the year 1959-1960. The said order was confirmed in appeal by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Nashik, Sub-Division Nashik on 49/70 ::: Downloaded on - 27/08/2013 20:31:54 ::: SA1208_04.doc 29.09.1988. The appeal preferred by respondent Nos.1 to 8 was dismissed. Aggrieved by this decision, respondent Nos.1 to 8 preferred revision application before M.R.T. The revision application was dismissed by M.R.T. on 16.03.1990. Respondent Nos.1 to 8 preferred Writ Petition No.1543 of 1990 in this Court. By order dated 27.03.1991, Writ Petition was dismissed. Thus, the tenancy authorities under the Tenancy Act have declared that Mr. Gaikwad is a tenant of the suit land and the said decisions are confirmed by this Court. He, therefore, submitted that in any case, the auction purchaser is not entitled to possession of the suit land.
83. Mr. Karnik further submitted that the learned District Judge has considered the provisions of the Tenancy Act and in particular Section
85. The learned District Judge rightly observed in paragraph 30 that while deciding the application at Exhibit-148 made by Mr. Gaikwad, the learned trial Judge had made an unauthorized entry over the territory of law in respect of which his jurisdiction is barred. In view of Section 85 of the Tenancy Act, no Civil Court has jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question including a question whether a person is or was at any time in the past a tenant, etc. In paragraph 32, the learned District Judge referred to the proceedings under the Tenancy Act and the decision of this Court in Writ Petition No.1543 of 1990. The learned District Judge also referred to Regular Civil Suit No.252 of 1978 instituted by the Receiver against Mr. Gaikwad for recovery of the possession of the suit land. In that Suit, the application was made for referring the issue of tenancy to the Tenancy Court. The learned trial Judge refused to refer that issue. Aggrieved by that order, Mr. Gaikwad preferred Civil Revision Application No.405 of 1985. The same was decided by this Court on 21.08.1986 and the order of the learned trial Judge was set aside and the issue was referred to the tenancy authorities. In pursuance thereof, the tenancy authorities concluded that Mr. 50/70 ::: Downloaded on - 27/08/2013 20:31:55 ::: SA1208_04.doc Gaikwad is a tenant. Mr. Karnik therefore, submitted that the auction purchaser is not entitled to possession of the suit land.
84. Before I consider the submissions advanced by Mr. Karnik, it is necessary to make a brief reference to the provisions of the Insolvency Act and Tenancy Act, so far as they are relevant. Perusal of Section 4(1) shows that subject to the provisions of the Insolvency Act, the Court shall have full power to decide all questions whether of title or priority, or of any nature whatsoever, and whether involving matters of law or of fact, which may arise in any case of insolvency coming within the cognizance of the Court, or which the Court may deem it expedient or necessary to decide for the purpose of doing complete justice or making a complete distribution of property in any such case.
85. Section 4(2) lays down that subject to the provisions of the Insolvency Act and notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, every such decision shall be final and binding for all purposes as between, on the one hand, the debtor and the debtor's estate and, on the other hand, all claimants against him or it and all persons claiming through or under them or any of them. In the present case, Mr. Gaikwad claims to have been inducted by the insolvent prior to 17.08.1959 when the insolvent had filed application being insolvency application No.12 of 1959 for adjudicating him as an insolvent. In other words, Mr. Gaikwad claims through insolvent or under him. Section 70 deals with the duties of Mamlatdar. One of the duties under clause (b) is to decide whether a person is, or was at any time in the past a tenant or a protected tenant or a permanent tenant. It is, therefore, necessary to find out whether Mr Gaikwad was/is a tenant or a protected tenant or a permanent tenant. Section 2(10A), Section 2(14) and 2(18) defined the expressions "permanent tenant", "protected 51/70 ::: Downloaded on - 27/08/2013 20:31:55 ::: SA1208_04.doc tenant" and "tenant" respectively and read as under:
"2. Definitions.- In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context, (10A) "permanent tenant" means a person-
(a) who immediately before the commencement of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Amendment) Act, 1955 (hereinafter called "the Amending Act, 1955"),-
(i) holds land as mulgenidar or mirasdar; or
(ii) by custom, agreement, or the decree or order of a
Court holds the land on lease permanently; or
(b) the commencement or duration of whose tenancy cannot
satisfactorily be proved by reason of antiquity; and includes a tenant whose name or the name of whose predecessor-in-title has been entered in the record of rights or in any public record or in any other revenue record as a permanent tenant immediately before the commencement of the Amending Act, 1955;
(14) "Protected tenant" means person who is recognised to be a protected tenant under Section 4A;
(18) "Tenant" means a person who holds land on lease and include-
(a) a person who is deemed to be a tenant under section 4;
(b) a person who is a protected tenant; and
(c) a person who is a permanent tenant;
and the word "landlord" shall be construed accordingly; "
86. Section 4 lays down that a person lawfully cultivating any land belonging to another persons shall be deemed to be a tenant if such land is not cultivated personally by the owner, etc. Section 4A lays down that for the purposes of the Tenancy Act, a person shall be recognized to be a protected tenant, if such person has been deemed to be a protected tenant under Sections 3, 3A and 4 of the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939. Section 3 of the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939 provides that a tenant shall be deemed to be a protected tenant in respect of any land if he has held such land continuously for a period of not less than six years immediately preceding either - (i) the first day of January, 1938, or (ii) the first day of January, 1945; and he has cultivated such land personally during the aforesaid period.
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87. Section 3A lays down that every tenant shall, from the eighth day of November 1947 shall be deemed to be a protected tenant for the purposes of Act of 1939. Section 4 lays down that every tenant shall be deemed to be a protected tenant for the purposes of Act of 1939, if he (a) held any land and cultivated it personally continuously for a period of not less than six years immediately preceding the first day of April 1937 and was evicted from such land on or after such date otherwise than by order of a competent authority on any grounds specified in Section 14 of the Act of 1939; (b) held any land and cultivated it personally continuously for a period of not less than six years immediately preceding the first day of April 1944 an was evicted from such land on or after such date otherwise than by order of a competent authority on any of grounds specified in section 14 of the Act of 1939. It is material to note that at no stage, Mr. Gaikwad came out with the case covered by Sections 3, 3A and 4 of the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939.
88. Section 32 of the Tenancy Act provides that on the first day of April 1957 (the tillers day), every tenant shall, subject to the other provisions of that Section and the provisions of the next succeeding sections, be deemed to have purchased from his landlord, free of all encumbrances subsisting thereon on the same day, the land held by him as tenant. Section 32G lays down that as soon as may be after the tillers' day, the Tribunal shall publish or cause to be published a public notice in the prescribed form in each village within its jurisdiction calling upon all tenants who under Section 32 are deemed to have purchased the land among others and follow the procedure prescribed under sub-section (2) of Section 32G onwards. Section 32-O lays down that in respect of any tenancy created after the tillers' day by a landlord, not being a serving member of the armed forces, notwithstanding any agreement or usage to the contrary, a tenant cultivating personally shall be entitled within one 53/70 ::: Downloaded on - 27/08/2013 20:31:56 ::: SA1208_04.doc year from the commencement of such tenancy to purchase from the landlord the land held by him or such part thereof as will raise the holding of the tenant to the ceiling area.
89. Section 43-C lays down that nothing in sections 31 to 32R (both inclusive), 33A, 33B, 33C and 43 shall apply to the lands in the area within the limits of a municipal borough constituted under the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925. Section 85 lays down that no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question including a question whether a person is or was at any time in the past a tenant, etc. Section 85A lays down that if any suit instituted in any Civil Court involves any issues which are required to be settled, decided or dealt with by any authority competent to settle, decide or deal with such issues under the Tenancy Act, the Civil Court shall stay the suit and refer such issues to such competent authority for determination.
90. As noted earlier, Mr. Gaikwad made application on 22.04.1969 at Exhibit-148 expressing his intention to purchase the suit land. It was asserted that he was inducted as a tenant under the provisions of the Tenancy Act and he has a preferential right to purchase the suit land being the tenant. In the application, Mr. Gaikwad came with the case that he was inducted as a tenant since many years. However, in the 7/12 extract, his name was recorded as tenant for the year 1963-1964 and that he was paying yearly rent of Rs.25/- to the Receiver Mr. R. M. Dhakne who in turn had issued receipts to him. The earlier Receiver Mr. M. N. Bhagwat, Advocate issued notice to him calling upon him to indicate whether he is ready and willing to purchase the suit land. He had orally expressed his willingness to purchase the suit land. Since the suit land is to be sold in auction and he being a tenant has a preferential right under the Tenancy Act to purchase the suit land. Mr. Gaikwad expressed 54/70 ::: Downloaded on - 27/08/2013 20:31:57 ::: SA1208_04.doc readiness and willingness to pay the price for purchasing the suit land.
91. The said application was rejected by the learned trial Judge on 22.10.1969. While rejecting the application, the learned trial Judge examined the material on record and found that Mr. Gaikwad had produced the 7/12 extract for the year 1968-69 only and receipt about the payment of rent to the Receiver dated 03.03.1969. In paragraph 9, the learned trial Judge observed that if really Mr. Gaikwad was cultivating the land as a tenant for the long time before the year 1963- 1964, there was no reason why he could not produce the 7/12 extract of the land for the said period. The receipt about the payment of rent given by the Receiver to Mr. Gaikawd itself showed that he has been cultivating the land for and on behalf of the Receiver. There was nothing on record to show that he was cultivating the land as tenant of the insolvent. Adjudication order was made on 14.10.1961 and the Receiver of the properties of the insolvent was appointed vide Exhibit-
49. Mr. Gaikwad was cultivating the land after the Receiver was appointed. Obviously, therefore, Mr. Gaikwad was tenant of the land after adjudication order was made and the Receiver of the property of the insolvent was appointed. The land obviously vested with the Receiver after the Receiver was appointed.
92. The learned trial Judge also found that the suit land is situated within the municipal limits of Nashik Municipal Council. In view of the provisions of Section 43C of the Tenancy Act, nothing in Sections 31 to 32-R of the Tenancy Act will apply to the land in question. The learned trial Judge also considered the contention raised on behalf of Mr. Gaikwad that he became new tenant of the land after the tillers' day and therefore, he has right to purchase the land under Section 32-O of the Tenancy Act. The learned trial Judge rejected that contention on the 55/70 ::: Downloaded on - 27/08/2013 20:31:57 ::: SA1208_04.doc ground that even presuming for the sake of arguments that Mr. Gaikwad is a new tenant, his tenancy having been created after the tillers' day, he, therefore, had a right to purchase the land in question and even then this right has to be exercised within a period given in Section 32-O. Admittedly, Mr. Gaikwad did not exercise the right to purchase the land alleged to be given to him under Section 32-O of the Tenancy Act. Consistent with these findings, the learned trial Judge rejected his application. Aggrieved by that decision, Mr. Gaikwad preferred Civil Appeal No.107 of 1970 before the learned Joint Judge of Nashik. By order dated 29.04.1971, the learned Joint Judge dismissed the appeal. In paragraph 7, it was observed that even though Mr. Gaikwad averred in his application that he was inducted on the land by the insolvent several years prior to 1963-64, he had not led any evidence to substantiate the contention that he was cultivating the land any time before 1963-1964. Insolvent had filed application on 17.08.1959 and the order of adjudication was passed on 14.10.1961. Hence, by virtue of Section 28 of the Insolvency Act, all the property including the land in question belonging to the insolvent vested in the Receiver and insolvent had no right to create any tenancy in respect of the land in question after the order of adjudication was passed.
93. It was further observed that the alleged tenancy of Mr. Gaikwad is prima facie illegal and is not binding on the Receiver. In view of this clear position, it was not necessary to refer the question about the tenancy to the Tenancy Court. In paragraph 8, the learned Joint Judge observed that there was documentary evidence to show that Mr. Gaikwad had accepted the position he is not a tenant of the land in question but is cultivating the land on behalf of the Receiver. This position could be seen from the receipt Exhibit-170/2. In that receipt, it was not mentioned that the amount of Rs.25/- received by the Receiver 56/70 ::: Downloaded on - 27/08/2013 20:31:58 ::: SA1208_04.doc from Mr. Gaikwad was towards rent and it was specifically mentioned therein that it was towards damages for use and occupation. It was observed that the learned trial Judge was, therefore, perfectly right in holding that Mr. Gaikwad was not a tenant and there was no question of he is having preferential right of purchasing the land. In paragraph 9, it was observed that admittedly, the suit land is situated within the municipal limits of Nashik Municipal Council. In view of Section 43-C of the Tenancy Act, nothing in Sections 31 to 32R is applicable to the land in question. The learned Joint Judge accordingly dismissed the Appeal preferred by Mr. Gaikwad. No material is brought on record to indicate that aggrieved by these decisions, Mr. Gaikwad had carried the matter any further. In other words, the orders dated 22.10.1969 passed by the learned trial Judge and 29.04.1971 passed by the learned Joint Judge, Nashik have attained finality.
94. The learned District Judge in paragraph 30 has recorded a finding that while deciding application at Exhibit-148, the learned trial Judge appeared to have made an unauthorized entry over the territory of law in respect of which his jurisdiction was barred while passing order below Exhibit-148. The learned District Judge thereafter referred to Section 85 of the Tenancy Act as also decisions rendered by the tenancy authorities under the Tenancy Act and the order passed by this Court in Writ Petition No.1543 of 1990 and came to the conclusion that Mr. Gaikwad was declared as a tenant.
95. In my opinion, the learned District Judge has failed to appreciate the provisions of Section 4 of the Insolvency Act as also the findings recorded by the tenancy authorities and in particular the findings of the Sub-Divisional Officer, Nashik so also the findings recorded by the learned trial Judge on 22.10.1969 and the learned Joint Judge on 57/70 ::: Downloaded on - 27/08/2013 20:31:58 ::: SA1208_04.doc 29.04.1971. Section 4(1) of the Insolvency Act deals with power of the Court to decide all questions arising in insolvency. It lays down that subject to the provisions of the Insolvency Act, the Court shall have full power to decide all questions whether of title or priority, or of any nature whatsoever, and whether involving matters of law or of fact, which may arise in any case of insolvency coming within the cognizance of the Court, or which the Court may deem it expedient or necessary to decide for the purpose of doing complete justice or making a complete distribution of property in any such case. Section 4(2) lays down that subject to the provisions of the Insolvency Act and notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, every such decision shall be final and binding for all purposes as between, on the one hand, the debtor and the debtor's estate and, on the other hand, all claimants against him or it and all persons claiming through or under them or any of them.
96. Section 4(1) therefore, invests full power on the Court, subject to the provisions of the Insolvency Act, to decide all questions whether of title or priority or of any nature whatsoever including issue of tenancy and whether involving the matters of law or of fact, which may arise in any case of insolvency coming within the cognizance of Court or which the Court may deem it expedient or necessary to decide for the purpose of doing complete justice or making a complete distribution of property in any such case. Article 142 of the Constitution of India provides that the Supreme Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction may pass such decree or make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it. In other words, the powers conferred on the Court under Section 4(1) of the Insolvency Act are somewhat analogous to the powers conferred on the Apex Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. No other provision under the 58/70 ::: Downloaded on - 27/08/2013 20:31:59 ::: SA1208_04.doc Insolvency Act is pointed out to me which curtails powers of the Court under Section 4 of the Insolvency Act.
97. Sub-section (2) thereof provides that subject to the provisions of the Insolvency Act and notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, every such decision shall be final and binding for all purposes as between, on the one hand, the debtor and the debtor's estate and, on the other hand, all claimants against him or it and all persons claiming through or under them or any of them. In my opinion, Section 4 provides that the Court in exercise of its jurisdiction may make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice. The technicalities cannot stand in the way of rendering complete justice to the parties. Even the provisions of the Tenancy Act, referred hereinabove, do not have the non-obstante clause, namely, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force.
98. In the present case, Mr. Gaikwad made application at Exhibit-148 claiming tenancy and called upon the Court to decide his application. The Court deemed it expedient to decide that application and with a view to doing complete justice decided that application. Mr. Gaikwad claimed tenancy from the insolvent. In other words, he is a person claiming through or under the insolvent. The decisions rendered by the Courts below on 22.10.1969 and 29.04.1971, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, are final and binding for all purposes as between the insolvent on one hand and Mr. Gaikwad on the other. On the date of passing of the orders by the Courts below, the Tenancy Act was admittedly in force. In other words, notwithstanding anything contained in Tenancy Act, the decisions rendered by the Courts below, having attained finality, are binding on 59/70 ::: Downloaded on - 27/08/2013 20:31:59 ::: SA1208_04.doc both, the insolvent and Mr. Gaikwad.
99. In view of the above discussion, I am of the opinion that the learned District Judge has failed to appreciate the powers conferred by Section 4 on the Court. Apart from that, Mr. Gaikwad has not made out a case of 'permanent tenant' under Section 2(10A) as also 'protected tenant' under Section 2(14) read with Section 4-A of the Tenancy Act.
Mr. Gaikwad has also not made out the case of a protected tenant as per Section 4A of the Tenancy Act read with Sections 3, 3A and 4 of the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939. Mr. Gaikwad was not cultivating the suit land lawfully and therefore, cannot claim to be a deemed tenant as per Section 4 of the Tenancy Act. No material is produced on record to substantiate that Mr. Gaikwad is either a protected tenant or a permanent tenant or a deemed tenant etc. In short, Mr. Gaikwad has failed to establish that he is tenant as per Section 2(18) of the Tenancy Act.
100. Mr. Karnik submitted that at any rate, the tenancy authorities under the Tenancy Act and this Court have held that Mr. Gaikwad is a tenant. I have carefully perused the decisions rendered by the tenancy authorities. Mr. Gaikwad made application under Section 70(b) of the Tenancy Act on 06.12.1979. In that application, he claimed that he is tenant in the suit land since the year 1959-1960 and he was inducted in the suit land before 17.08.1959 on which date, insolvent made application No.12 of 1959 in the Civil Court, Nashik.
101. On 14.12.1982, his statement was recorded wherein he came out with the case that the insolvent and his sister-in-law had leased out the suit land on the basis of crop share. In the statement, he asserted that he had paid the crop share for the year 1959-60, 1960-61 and 1961-62 to the landlord. Mr. Gaikwad also examined Mr. Pandurang Rangu Kharate claiming to be his servant on monthly basis. Mr. Gaikwad had 60/70 ::: Downloaded on - 27/08/2013 20:32:00 ::: SA1208_04.doc produced irrigation water pass for the year 1973-74 and for the year 1962. Mr. Gaikwad also produced receipt of payment of rent to the court Receiver. Mr. Gaikwad's name was recorded for the first time in the 7/12 extract during the year 1963-64 and for the prior years, he cultivated on the basis of labour wages. Statement of Mr. Kharate was recorded on 09.02.1985. He stated that he had carried the wheat and bajra crop in the bullock-cart to the house of the insolvent in the years 1960, 1961 and 1962. As against this, insolvent in his statement stated that the suit land is in possession of the Receiver and that there was an attachment of the Civil Court and he was prohibited from any type of alienation. He further admitted that he had obtained the possession from the previous tenant Mr. Dhawlu Dharma in the year 1958-1959, and thereafter, he has not cultivated the suit land. He could not state as to when the receiver had taken possession of the suit land. Receiver Mr. Deshpande, who was made party, was examined. He stated that his appointment was made by the Civil Court in the year 1972 and that Mr. Gaikwad is in possession of the suit land unauthorizedly. He had instituted Regular Civil Suit No.252 of 1978 in the Civil Court for possession. In paragraph 9, the Tahsildar observed that the receiver Mr. Deshpande has failed to produce his written arguments and additional evidence, if any, despite reminders sent to him by registered posts.
102. The Tahsildar, on the material placed before him, found that in the crop cultivation column of 7/12 extracts of the year 1959-60 and 1960- 61 show as "खुद્द मजुरीने " in pencil and for the year 1961-62 in ink. In other words, 7/12 extracts for these years clearly showed that insolvent was cultivating the suit land. The Tahsildar however, considered the statement of insolvent that he was not cultivating the suit land, and disbelieved the entries in favour of the insolvent. In other words, the Tahsildar disbelieved the documentary evidence and gave weightage to 61/70 ::: Downloaded on - 27/08/2013 20:32:00 ::: SA1208_04.doc the oral statement of the insolvent that he has not cultivating the suit land. The Tahsildar eventually allowed the application on 28.04.1987 and held that Mr. Gaikwad is a tenant. Aggrieved by this decision, respondent Nos.1 to 8 preferred appeal before the Sub-Divisional Officer. The appeal was dismissed on 29.09.1988. In the course of judgment, the Sub-Divisional Officer observed that the insolvency proceedings are not of much relevance for deciding whether the Tahsildar rightly declared Mr. Gaikwad as a lawful tenant or not. The decision of the Sub-Divisional Officer was confirmed by M.R.T. on 16.03.1990. Aggrieved by these decisions, respondent Nos.1 to 8 preferred Writ Petition No.1543 of 1990 which was dismissed on 27.03.1991 by passing following order:
" Coram: Puranik, J.
Heard Mr. Sawant for the petitioner.
Mr. Shastri for the respondent.
Perused the judgments impugned. The Tahsildar upon facts declared the respondent to be the tenant of the suit land since 1987. The appeal Court confirmed the findings. The revenue tribunal also affirmed the findings. No reason to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact.
Rejected.
27.03.1991"
103. Perusal of the orders passed by the tenancy authorities shows that the orders passed by the Insolvency Court on 22.10.1969 below Exhibit- 148 and by the learned Joint Judge on 29.04.1971 in Civil Appeal No.107 of 1970 were not referred at all. In fact, the Sub-Divisional Officer, Nashik, during the course of his judgment observed that the insolvency proceedings are not relevant for deciding whether Mr. Gaikwad is tenant or not. Mr. Deshpande was appointed as receiver in the year 1972 that is to say after the orders dated 22.10.1969 and 29.04.1971 passed by the trial Court and the appellate Court respectively. All that he deposed was that Mr. Gaikwad is in possession 62/70 ::: Downloaded on - 27/08/2013 20:32:01 ::: SA1208_04.doc of the suit land unauthorisedly. He however failed to produce additional evidence. In my opinion, the orders dated 22.10.1969 and 29.04.1971 were relevant and material. However, it is apparent that these orders were not produced before the tenancy authorities by the insolvent and also the tenant with a view to obtaining advantage. Mr. Joshi and Mr. Karnik could not point out that these orders were produced before the tenancy authorities. In my opinion, it clearly amounts to fraud on Court.
The orders obtained from the tenancy authorities by non-disclosure of the orders of the insolvency Court amounted to fraud on the Court and are, therefore, nullity and non est. In the case of S. P. Chengalvaraya Naidu Vs. Jagannath, (1994) 1 SCC 1, the Apex Court observed in paragraph 1 as under:
"Fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal"
observed Chief Justice Edward Coke of England about three centuries ago. It is the settled proposition of law that a judgment or decree obtained by playing fraud on the court is a nullity and non est in the eyes of law. Such a judgment / decree - by the first court or by the highest court - has to be treated as a nullity by every court, whether superior or inferior. It can be challenged in any court even in collateral proceedings."
104. In that case, respondent was working as a clerk with one Chunilal Sowcar. He had obtained decree against the appellants. In execution of that decree, the respondent had purchased at court sale, the properties belonging to the appellants, on behalf of the said Chunilal. Later, by a registered deed, the respondent relinquished all his rights in the property in favour of the said Chunilal. Without disclosing this fact, respondent instituted Suit for partition of property and obtained a preliminary decree. Thereafter he filed application for final decree. It was only at that stage, the appellants came to know about the release deed. The application was, therefore, challenged on the ground of non-disclosure of vital document which vitiated the proceeding and the preliminary decree was obtained by playing fraud on Court and was a nullity. In 63/70 ::: Downloaded on - 27/08/2013 20:32:02 ::: SA1208_04.doc paragraph 5, the Apex Court observed as under:
"5. ...The principle of "finality of litigation" cannot be pressed to the extent of such an absurdity that it becomes an engine of fraud in the hands of dishonest litigants. The courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the court, must come with clean hands. We are constrained to say that more often than not, process of the court is being abused. Property-grabbers, tax-evaders, bank-loan-dodgers and other unscrupulous persons from all walks of life find the court-process a convenient lever to retain the illegal gains indefinitely. We have no hesitation to say that a person, who's case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the court. He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation."
105. In my opinion, the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of S. P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (supra) applies on all fours to the facts of the present case. The learned Single Judge of this Court rejected the Writ Petition on the ground that there was no reason to interfere with concurrent findings of fact. As I have already held that the orders of the tenancy authorities are nullity and non est, the tenant cannot claim that he continues to remain in possession in view of the categorical findings recorded by the Insolvency Court in the orders dated 22.06.1969 and 29.04.1971.
106. In my opinion, the tenancy proceedings were clearly collusive between Mr. Gaikwad and the insolvent. As noted earlier, while rejecting the application at Exhibit-148, the insolvency Court recorded a finding that Mr. Gaikwad was cultivating the suit land after Receiver was appointed on 14.10.1961 and the suit land vested with the Receiver. If that be so, insolvent had no authority to induct Mr. Gaikwad as a tenant. The suit land was also attached by the court. The courts below also considered Section 43-C of the Tenancy Act and the admitted fact of suit land being situated within the municipal limits of Nashik Municipal Council. Perusal of the orders passed by the Courts below and the order passed by the tenancy authorities also show that Mr. Gaikwad went on 64/70 ::: Downloaded on - 27/08/2013 20:32:02 ::: SA1208_04.doc changing his stand. In my opinion, the tenancy proceedings were clearly collusive between the insolvent and Mr. Gaikwad. It is also material to note that instead of challenging orders dated 22.10.1969 and 29.04.1971, Mr. Gaikwad filed application under Section 70(b) of the Tenancy Act on 06.12.1979.
107. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, having regard to the decision of the trial Court dated 22.10.1969 below Exhibit 148 and the decision dated 29.04.1971 of the learned Joint Judge in Civil Appeal No.107 of 1970, and having further due regard to Section 4 of the Insolvency Act, in my opinion, Mr. Gaikwad cannot claim to be tenant of the suit land and he cannot be said to be a person lawfully cultivating the suit land. He is in unauthorized occupation of the suit land having no right, title and interest therein. This is more so when notwithstanding the claim made by Mr. Gaikwad that he is a tenant as on tillers day (Section 32-G); tenant after tillers day (Section 32-O) and a person lawfully cultivating the suit land [Section 70(b)], he participated in the auction.
108. Apart from that, the findings recorded in the orders dated 22.10.1969 and 29.04.1971 will operate as res judicata in the tenancy proceedings initiated by Mr. Gaikwad by filing application under Section 70(b) of the Tenancy Act as the findings recorded in the orders dated 22.10.1969 and 29.04.1971 were rendered by the courts of competent jurisdiction.
109. Mr. Joshi and Mr. Karnik submitted that the Courts below have concurrently dismissed the applications at Exhibits 396 and 404 made by the auction purchaser against which the present Second Appeal is preferred. No case for exercising power under Section 100 of the C.P.C. is made out as the Second Appeal does not involve any substantial 65/70 ::: Downloaded on - 27/08/2013 20:32:03 ::: SA1208_04.doc question of law. The findings recorded by the Courts below are purely the findings of facts. Mr. Joshi further submitted that the Courts below have allowed the application at Exhibit-378 made by respondent Nos.1 to 8, and therefore, no case is made out for exercising power under Section 75 of the Insolvency Act.
110. I have already held that the insolvent has not proved that he had satisfied all the debts of the creditors and that the insolvent is not entitled to annulment of insolvency. Mr. Gaikwad, who claims to be tenant, is not a tenant of the suit land and was unauthorizedly inducted by the insolvent. There was clearly collusion between the insolvent on the one hand and Mr. Gaikwad on the other. In the case of Union of India Vs. Ibrahim Uddin, (2012) 8 SCC 148, the Apex Court considered various judgments. In paragraphs 68 and 70, it was observed as under:
"68. In Jai Singh Vs. Shakuntala, this Court held that it is permissible to interfere even on question of fact but it may be only in "very exceptional cases and on extreme perversity that the authority to examine the same in extenso stands permissible- it is a rarity rather than a regularity and thus in fine it can be safely concluded that while there is no prohibition as such, but the power to scrutiny can only be had in very exceptional circumstances and upon proper circumspection".
70. There may be exceptional circumstances where the High Court is compelled to interfere, notwithstanding the limitation imposed by the wording of Section 100 CPC. It may be necessary to do so for the reason that after all the purpose of the establishment of courts of justice is to render justice between the parties, though the High Court is bound to act with circumspection while exercising such jurisdiction. In second appeal, the Court frames the substantial question of law at the time of admission of the appeal and the Court is required to answer all the said questions unless the appeal is finally decided on one or two of those questions or the Court comes to the conclusion that the questions(s) framed could not be the substantial question(s) of law. There is no prohibition in law to frame the additional substantial question of law if the need so arises at the time of the final hearing of the appeal."
111. In my opinion, the present case falls in the criteria laid down by 66/70 ::: Downloaded on - 27/08/2013 20:32:03 ::: SA1208_04.doc the Apex Court in the case of Jaisingh Vs. Shakuntala (2002) 3 SCC
634. There are exceptional circumstances in the present case where this Court is compelled to interfere, notwithstanding the limitation imposed by Section 100 of the C.P.C. It is also necessary to do so for the reason that after all the purpose of the establishing the Courts of justice is to render justice between the parties. The exceptional circumstances in the present case are that on 14.10.1961, the trial Court adjudicated Mr. Ture as insolvent and appointed Court Receiver on his properties. Perusal of insolvency application No.12 of 1959 (Exhibit-1) and in particular Schedule B thereof shows that the suit land is referred therein. In other words, the Receiver was also appointed in respect of the suit land by order dated 14.10.1961. The learned trial Judge in his order dated 22.10.1969 below Exhibit-148 has elaborately considered the evidence on record and has recorded a categorical finding that Mr. Gaikwad was inducted as tenant unauthorizedly by the insolvent after the Receiver was appointed and the property vested in the Receiver.
112. On 18.08.1964, insolvent gave his no objection for selling the suit land. In pursuance of the application dated 18.02.1969 made by one of the creditors Mr. P. K. Chordia, the learned trial Judge passed order on 07.04.1969 directing the Receiver to sell the suit land in auction. The auction was conducted on various dates when all attempts were made by the insolvent to stay the auction proceedings. Though the Receiver gave ample opportunity to the insolvent to obtain the stay from the Civil Court, he could not secure the stay order. At the same time, he also did not bring any material on record to indicate that he had satisfied all the debts of the creditors. Having failed in obtaining the stay in auction proceedings, on 28.08.1969, the insolvent made application under Section 68 of the Insolvency Act at Exhibit 191 for canceling the auction as also not to confirm the sale. The insolvent thereafter made 67/70 ::: Downloaded on - 27/08/2013 20:32:04 ::: SA1208_04.doc application at Exhibit-192 on 03.09.1969. On that application, the learned trial Judge passed order to the effect that sale not to be confirmed till the applications at Exhibits 173 and 191 are heard and decided. It is common ground that the application at Exhibits 173 and 191 were not decided till date with the result the sale in favour of the auction purchaser is not confirmed though he had deposited the entire amount on 08.08.1969. Out of that amount, on 17.03.1970, amount of Rs.400/- as remuneration was paid to the Receiver for rendering services. Neither the insolvent nor respondent Nos.1 to 8 had brought any material on record to indicate that they have satisfied all the debts of the creditors. The impugned orders are perverse as the findings recorded are contrary to the material on record. In my opinion, in view of the exceptional circumstances, this is a fit case for exercising powers both under Section 100 of the C.P.C. as also Section 75 of the Insolvency Act, particularly when the findings recorded by the Courts below, with respect, are not supported by the evidence on record. On the contrary, the findings recorded by the Courts below are contrary to the material on record.
113. From the facts and circumstances of the present case, several disturbing features have emerged. Firstly, applications dated 04.08.1969 and 28.08.1969 at exhibits 173 and 191 respectively were not decided by the trial Court. The trial Court ought to have decided these applications promptly, particularly when by order dated 03.09.1969 below exhibit- 192, the learned trial Judge passed order to the effect that the sale shall not be confirmed till these applications are heard and decided. As noted earlier, the auction purchaser is not concerned with the controversy between the insolvent and respondent Nos.1 to 8 on one hand and their creditors on the other. He participated in auction held in pursuance of the Court's order dated 07.04.1969. Secondly, the learned trial Judge 68/70 ::: Downloaded on - 27/08/2013 20:32:05 ::: SA1208_04.doc failed to appreciated that by not deciding applications at exhibits 173 and 191, it has caused serious prejudice to the auction purchaser when he is not at all at fault. I record my displeasure in the manner in which the trial Court conducted the proceedings. Thirdly, the manner in which the Courts below have decided the application at exhibit-378. The findings recorded by the Courts below, with respect, are not supported by the evidence on record. On the contrary, the findings recorded by the Courts below are contrary to the material on record.
114. I would also like to place on record the valuable assistance rendered by Ms Gaidhani appearing on behalf of the auction purchaser, S/Shri P. N. Joshi and R. M. Haridas for respondent Nos.1 to 8 and Shri M. S. Karnik and his instructing Advocates S/Shri Gite and Inamdar for the tenant.
115. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, Second Appeal as also Civil Revision Application succeed and the same are allowed in the following terms:
(1) The impugned orders dated 28.01.2000 passed by the learned trial Judge below Exhibits-1, 378, 396 and 404 in insolvency petition No.12 of 1959 and the judgment and decree dated 26.07.2004 passed by the learned Second Ad-hoc Additional District Judge, Nashik in Civil Appeal No. 131 of 2000 are quashed and set aside;
(2) The applications at exhibits 173 and 191 made by the insolvent as also the application at Exhibit 378 made by respondent Nos.1 to 8 are hereby dismissed. The order dated 03.09.1969 below Exhibit- 192 is quashed and set aside. The application at Exhibit-192 stands dismissed;
(3) The applications at Exhibits-396 and 404 made by the auction 69/70 ::: Downloaded on - 27/08/2013 20:32:05 ::: SA1208_04.doc purchaser are hereby allowed;
(4) The Insolvency Application No.12 of 1959 (Exhibit-1) is restored to the file of the learned trial Judge. The learned trial Judge is directed to appoint receiver to distribute the amount of Rs.16,201/- together with interest accrued thereon among the creditors and submit a report to the Court indicating whether the debts are satisfied or not. It is expressly made clear that notwithstanding dismissal of applications at exhibits- 173 and 378, respondent Nos.1 to 8 are not precluded from establishing before the receiver that all the dues of the creditors are satisfied. Likewise, the creditors are at liberty to contest that claim. If the debts are satisfied, the learned trial Judge shall pass order about payment of remuneration to the receivers that were appointed from time to time as also shall pass appropriate order on Exhibit-1. If debts are still outstanding, the learned trial Judge shall continue the proceedings so far as may be necessary for the realization and distribution of the property of the insolvent by continuing the receiver so appointed;
(5) In view of the conduct of the insolvent as also of respondent Nos.1 to 8 on one hand and the tenant on the other, in my opinion, this is a fit case for imposing costs of Rs.20,000/- on respondent Nos.1 to 8 and Rs.10,000/- on the tenant namely respondent Nos.9A to 9F;
(6) Order accordingly.
(R. G. KETKAR, J.) Minal Parab 70/70 ::: Downloaded on - 27/08/2013 20:32:05 :::