Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi
Rakesh Bahadur vs M/O Personnel,Public Grievances And ... on 10 March, 2026
Central Administrative Tribunal
Principal Bench, New Delhi
(Nainital Circuit Sitting)
O.A. No.31/2015
Order reserved on: 19.02.2026
Order pronounced on: 10.03.2026
Hon'ble Mr. Ajay Pratap Singh, Member (J)
Hon'ble Mr. Rajinder Kashyap, Member (A)
Rakesh Bahadur,
S/o Late Onkar Bahadur
Village Datgalya,
ParganaPali,
P.O. Kalika,
Tehsil Ranikhet,
Distt. Almora,
Uttarakhand.
...Applicant
(By Advocate: Shri Kailash Vasdev, Senior Advocate, assisted by
Shri S.K. Shandilya)
VERSUS
1. Union of India
Through its Secretary
Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances & Pension
Department of Personnel and Training
New Delhi 110001.
2. Government of Uttar Pradesh
Through its Chief Secretary
Lal Bahadur Shastri Bhawan
Uttar Pradesh Secretariat, Lucknow.
...Respondents
(By Advocates: Shri K.P. Singh for R-2 and Shri T.C. Aggarwal for R-1)
Digitally signed by NEETU
NEETU SHARMA
Date: 2026.03.12
SHARMA 11:47:02
+05'30'
Item No.37 2 OA No.31/2015
ORDER
Hon'ble Mr. Rajinder Kashyap, Member (A):
By filing the instant OA under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, the applicant has prayed for the following reliefs:-
"a) Set aside the Inquiry Report dated 06.01.2010 being against the accepted principles of law and also in view of the fact that the respondents have slept over the matter of disposing of the representation of the Applicant for almost 5 years;
b) Pass any further order(s) as this Hon'ble Tribunal may deem just and appropriate in the facts and circumstances of the present case."
2. Pursuant to notice, respondents have filed their replies. The applicant has also filed his rejoinder. The applicant has also filed his written synopsis on 19.2.2026.
FACTS OF THE CASE
3. Learned counsel for the applicant argued that in the present OA, the applicant is assailing the Inquiry Report dated 06.01.2010 passed by the Inquiring Authority vide which returned the findings that the charges levelled against the applicant are proved and subsequent inaction on the part of the respondents in disposing of the representation dated 11.06.2010 of the applicant in which the applicant pleaded that the said inquiry was conducted contrary to and in negation of the principles of natural justice. 3.1 With regard to the facts of the case, the learned counsel submitted that the applicant was selected and appointed to the Indian Administrative Service in 1979 and allocated to the UP cadre. In the year, 1992, the applicant was posted with Digitally signed by NEETU NEETU SHARMA Date: 2026.03.12 SHARMA 11:47:02 +05'30' Doordarshan as Deputy Director General.
Item No.37 3 OA No.31/20153.2 It is further submitted that vide letter No.G-17011/2/98-FAS dated 24.08.1998 with regard to delegation of financial powers under Prasar Bharati Act 1990 as amended from time to time was issued (at pages 32 to 38 of the paperbook and in furtherance of the same, it was decided inter alia as follows:-
"To authorise E-in-Chief, ADG [A], and all DDG'S to exercise all Administrative & Financial Powers on behalf of DG in their respective area of functions. However, enhanced powers are delegated as per the Annexures indicated against each.
(i) Power to approve the Scheme/projects by Annexure-I Chairing the SFC meeting
(ii) Powers to approve expending Sanctions in Annexure-II respect of approved Schemes (Expenditure for works, Equipment.)
(iii) Powers to approve procurement of Annexure-III Equipments/spares, etc./F.E. Release
(iv) Programme related powers Annexure-IV It has also been decided that ADG [A] shall continue to exercise all Financial & Administrative Powers of DG as delegated to him vide DG:
Doordarshan Order No.G-17012/86-FAC (Pt.) dated 11.1.1988, extending the delegation in respect of the following two additional powers with immediate effect.
(a) Hospitality/Entertainment grant.
(b) Air travel by Non-officials and Non-Entitled Officials.
The delegation would, however, be without prejudice to the exercise of Administrative & Financial powers delegated to the subordinate officers vide OM No.G17011/15/89-FAC dated 3.9.1992 and other orders issued from time to time.
The above mentioned powers shall be exercised with the express concurrence of IFA subject to the condition that Budget Provision is available and subject to the observance of relevant rules/instructions, and such other general or special order/instructions issued by the Government/Board from time to time."
3.3 Further, vide a circular No.30, Prasar Bharati altered the transfer of Banking Free Connected Time (FCT). In case of continuing programmes and in case of programmes which went off the air in the last one year. Further, on the utilizing of the Banking on 8.2.1999, it was decided to utilize 100% FCT from the programmes (1) Ek Taar Babu Gaan; (2) Karnkaniali on the same Digitally signed by NEETU NEETU SHARMA Date: 2026.03.12 SHARMA 11:47:02 +05'30' channel.
Item No.37 4 OA No.31/20153.4 Learned counsel also submitted that in January 2004, Prasar Bharti in reply to Public Account Committee (PCA) questionnaire in para 2 of the Report of CAG of India stated that "with the advent of sponsored programmes the concept of banking of FCT was allowed. Not only on several occasions banking cap has been increased, cross programme transfer of FCT has also been allowed i.e. from one programme to another and also on occasions cross channel transfer to another and also on occasions cross channel transfer of banking FCT has also been permitted, on pro rata basis as these decisions entailed no loss to Doordarshan and did not have any financial implications to Doordarshan." 3.5 Learned counsel also submitted that in 2007-2008, the applicant was repatriated to UP cade and being a Senior Officer was being considered for higher promotion and career promotion. However, on 5.2.2008 (Annexure A-2 {colly}) (dated is 5-2-2007 stamp impassioned bearing a different date) a Memorandum was issued to the applicant under Rule 8 of the AIS (D&A) Rules, 1969 whereby major penalty proceedings were proposed to be initiated against him, which consists of Memorandum of Charge, the Statement of Article of Charge, Statement of imputation of misconduct or misbehaviour in support of each article of charge, the list of documents in support of the article of charge and a list of witnesses were also annexed. The charge levelled against the applicant is reproduced as under:-
"Shri Rakesh Bahaur, IAS (UP:79) while functioning as Deputy Director General Commercial & Sales) in Doordarshan, allowed the transfer of Free Time (FCT) in January-February, 1999, for programme Digitally signed by NEETU NEETU SHARMA Date: 2026.03.12 SHARMA 11:47:02 +05'30' KANKANJALJ" by deviating from the guidelines in the rate card applicable at that time without the approval of the Competent Item No.37 5 OA No.31/2015 Authority. In respect of the sponsored programme "KANKANJALP produced by M/s. Unifocus Company Pvt. Ltd., Kollkata for DDK, Kolkata during January-February, 1999, he approved the transfer of the banked FCT of the programme "EK TAAN BAHUGAAN" produced by the same producer which was telecast on single metro from DDK, Kolkata and which had gone off the air at that time, to the programme " KANKANJALI" without authority, resulting in undue benefit to the to the producer and consequential loss to Doordarshan.
By his above act, Shri Rakesh Bahadur has failed to maintain absolute integrity, exhibited lack of devotion to duty and acted in a manner unbecoming of a Government servant, thereby, contravening the provisions of Rule 3(1) All India Services (Conduct) Rules, 1968."
3.6 Learned counsel further submitted that the applicant submitted his reply dated 5.3.2008 (Annexure A-3) to the aforesaid Memorandum of charge refuting the allegations and the charge made in the said Memorandum. Thereafter on 19.1.2009, the DA appointed one Shri Ashok Kumar (Commissioner for Departmental Enquiries) as Inquiring Authority to inquire into the aforesaid article of charge levelled against the applicant as also one Shri Vadivazagan, Deputy Director (Engg.), DG Doordarshan was appointed as the Presenting Officer. Thus, from 16.02.2009, the inquiry proceedings commenced against the applicant. On 4.5.2009, the Presiding Officer informed the applicant that certain relevant documents were being made available to him for inspection up till 20.5.2009. Thereafter, on 22.6.2009, Inquiry Authority allowed list of 7 defence documents and 3 defence witnesses submitted by the applicant. The PO was directed to provide inspection/certified copies of the permitted defence documents to the applicant latest by 30.06.2009 and send compliance. Further, in case of non-availability, it was ordered that a certificate to that effect be obtained and provided to the applicant Digitally signed by NEETU NEETU SHARMA Date: 2026.03.12 SHARMA 11:47:02 +05'30' and Inquiring Authority. However, on 27.07.2009, the applicant Item No.37 6 OA No.31/2015 wrote to the Inquiring Authority that the defence documents were not made available to him till date and the applicant also submitted a list of three more documents required for defence. Thereafter, on 29.9.2009, the applicant sent a request for postponing the hearing fixed on 07.10.2009 due to a personal medical exigency and the matter was adjourned to 16.11.2009.
3.7 Learned counsel further submitted that on 16.11.2009, the applicant could not appear as notice of hearing was received by the applicant on 17.11.2009. However, on 16.11.2009, the prosecution case was taken up and four prosecution documents were taken on record and marked. The prosecution did not list any prosecution witnesses nor produced any during the regular hearing. On the consent of the PO, the prosecution case was closed and the next date of hearing was fixed for 02.12.2009. It is the case of the applicant that no notice in respect of the hearing of 02.12.2009 was received by him. No opportunity for oral hearing was granted to the applicant. The PO and applicant submitted their written briefs. On 5.1.2010, the Inquiring Authority submitted his report holding that the charge framed against the applicant was 'proved'. The said report dated 5.1.2010 (Annexure A-1) was sent to the applicant vide letter dated 6.5.2010 (Annexure A-5). Being aggrieved by the said IO's report, the applicant submitted his representation dated 11.06.2010 (Annexure A-6 {colly}). However, when despite a lapse of about five years (at the time of filing of the OA), the representation of the applicant has not been decided by Digitally signed by NEETU NEETU SHARMA Date: 2026.03.12 SHARMA 11:47:02 +05'30' the respondents, the applicant had filed this OA seeking the relief Item No.37 7 OA No.31/2015 as quoted above. During the pendency of this OA the applicant retired from his services on 31.5.2016.
4. In support of the claim of the applicant, learned counsel mainly argued as under:-
4.1 The said Inquiry Report is baseless and untenable and merits to be set aside;
4.2 No oral hearing was accorded to the applicant by the Inquiring Authority despite having accepted in the report that the notice for 16.11.2009 hearing was received by the applicant on 17.11.2009;
4.3 Even the notice for hearing on 2.12.2009 was not served upon the applicant and the purported letter of respondents is itself of 04.12.2009, i.e., post the date of hearing;
4.4 It is manifests that the applicant has been trapped by the respondents even during the inquiry proceedings;
4.5 the general principle of a departmental inquiry is that the charges are required to be proved by the prosecution in order to hold the delinquent guilty. It is stated that the prosecution has at first place produced no witness nor has produced any other material to prove the charge levelled against the applicant;
4.6 the charge is stale and accentuated with malice intention to harass the applicant. It is stated that the charge sheet was issued on 5.2.2008 for the alleged misconduct of the applicant during January-February 1999 and the prosecution has not explained for NEETU Digitally signed by NEETU SHARMA Date: 2026.03.12 SHARMA 11:47:02 +05'30' the delay in charge-sheet.Item No.37 8 OA No.31/2015
4.7 Learned counsel argued that on the contrary the Prasar Bharti in January 2004 in reply to the PAC questionnaire in para 2 of the Report of CAT of India has taken a stand that "with the advent of sponsored programmes the concept of banking of FCT was allowed.
Not only on several occasions banking cap has been increased, cross programme transfer of FCT has also been allowed i.e. from one programme to another and also on occasions cross channel transfer to another and also on occasions cross channel transfer of banking FCT has also been permitted, on pro rata basis as these decisions entailed no loss to Doordarshan and did not have any financial implications to Doordarshan.";
4.8 the respondents have shown their vindictive attitude towards the applicant in not disposing of his representation; 4.9 with regard to the finding of the Inquiring Authority that the applicant has no power to issue approval for transfer of banked FCT or that he acted without authority is otherwise not sustainable and perverse being contrary to records;
4.10 the applicant due to inaction on the part of the respondents is suffering mentally as well as career wise, although during the pendency of this OA, the applicant stood retired on 31.5.2016; and 4.11 the impugned IO's report is based on no evidence.
5. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents by referring to the reply submitted on behalf of the respondents, submitted that Digitally signed by NEETU NEETU SHARMA Date: 2026.03.12 SHARMA 11:47:02 +05'30' the applicant served as Deputy Director General (Commercialand Item No.37 9 OA No.31/2015 Sales), Directorate General, Prasar Bharati, New Delhi, during the years 1996 to 1999.On receipt ofseveral complaints regarding irregularities in sanctioningprogrammes at DDK, Kolkata, a preliminary enquiry was conductedby Sh. S. S. C. Tiwary, the then Director (BP&L), M/o Information &Broadcasting. Based on the findings of the said enquiry, cases against14 officers of DDK, Kolakata/Prasar Bharati, including the applicant, were processed by M/o I&B. Further, during this tenure, certain alleged irregularities were attributed to the applicant, leading to registration of Case No.RC0102003A0024 by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI). Pursuant to itsinvestigation, the CBI recommended both prosecution and initiation of Regular Departmental Proceedings against the applicant. Sanction forprosecution was granted on 29.03.2007.The CBI filed Charge Sheet w/s 120B read with 420 of IPC and Sec13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the PC Act against the applicant and others on 18.06.2007 in the court of learned First Special Judge, Alipore, Kolkata. Vide Judgment/Order dated 11.09.2019 passed by the learned Judge, CBI Court No. 1, Alipore has discharged the accused person namely, Sh. Rakesh Bahadur (Applicant) from both the cases. Being aggrieved by the said Judgement/Order, CBI has filed Criminal Revisions vide CRRNo.2519/2021 and CRR No. 2523/2021 before the Hon'ble High Court, Kolkata which are pending.
5. Learned counsel also submitted that in the instant case, the Digitally signed by NEETU NEETU SHARMA Date: 2026.03.12 SHARMA 11:47:02 +05'30' CVC tendered its first stage advice dated28.01.2002 for initiation Item No.37 10 OA No.31/2015 of major penalty proceedings against the applicant. The disciplinary proceedings for major penalty were initiated against the applicant under Rule 8 of the All India Services (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1969 vide Charge Memorandum No. 106/13/2004- AVD-Idated 05.02.2008 with the approval of the Disciplinary Authority. The Articles of Charge were framed against the applicant, as quoted above. On denial of Article of Charge by the applicant vide his letter dated 05.03.2008, Shri Ashok Kumar, Commissioner for Departmental Inquiries, CVC was appointed as Inquiring Authority to inquire into the charge framed against the Applicant vide DoPT's Order dated 19.01.2009 and Shri S. Vadivazagan, Deputy Director (Engg.), DG, Doordarshan, Prasar Bharati was appointed as Presenting Officer vide another Order dated 19.01.2009.That the Inquiry Officer, vide his letter dated 06.01.2010, submitted his report, holding the Article of Charge against the applicant as 'proved'. The CVC vide O.M. dated 03.05.2010 advised imposition of suitable major penalty on the applicant. The matter was examined after taking into account the material facts of the case viz., written statement of defence of the applicant, Inquiry Report, submissions/contentions of the applicant on the IO's report and comments of Ministry of I&B and a proposal to impose a suitable major penalty on the CO was submitted on 25.10.2012. Thereafter, the then Secretary (P) vide note dated 02.11.2012 observed that on analysis of the case by US (AVD-I), DoP&T findings appear to be diametrically opposite to Digitally signed by NEETU NEETU SHARMA those of Doordarshan and desired to call for clear views of Ministry Date: 2026.03.12 SHARMA 11:47:02 +05'30' Item No.37 11 OA No.31/2015 of I&B on each of the points raised by the applicant in his defence. Accordingly, requisite comments of I&B were called for vide letter dated 09.11.2012 followed by reminders dated 31.07.2013, 17.01.2014, 20.03.2014, 11.06.2014, 25.08.2014, 24.12.2014, 03.02.2015, 19.02.2015 and 26.03.2015. The requisite comments of I&B were received on 29.05.2015.
5.1 Learned counsel also submitted that after examination of material facts of the case, including defence submitted by the applicant and the comments furnished thereon by M/o I& B, a proposal to submit the case to the competent authority for a tentative approval was put up on 15.07.2015. However, in the meantime, DoP&T received an Order dated 17.06.2015 passed by Allahabad Bench of this Tribunal in the instant case filed by the applicant, wherein further operation and effect of the disciplinary proceedings initiated vide Charge Sheet dated 05.02.2008 were stayed. Thus, the DoP&T decided to keep the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the applicant in abeyance in the light of the aforesaid Order dated 17.06.2015 passed by this Tribunal. 5.2 Learned counsel argued that by way of the instant OA, the applicant has sought relief for set aside of the Inquiry Report dated 06.01.2010, which is not sustainable in the eyes of law and facts on record, as the Inquiry Report dated 06.01.2010 has been submitted by the Inquiring Authority after following due procedure and findings are based on evidence on record. Further, in his Inquiry Report, the Inquiring Authority has mentioned that a list NEETU SHARMA Digitally signed by NEETU SHARMA Date: 2026.03.12 11:47:02 +05'30' of 7 defence documents and 3 defence witnesses was received from Item No.37 12 OA No.31/2015 the applicant vide his letter dated 18.06.2009 and the same were allowed being relevant to the case. Further, the said Inquiry Report indicates that the regular hearing which fixed on 07.10.2009 was postponed on the request of the applicant. The next date of regular hearing was fixed on 16.11.2009. The Inquiring Authority has mentioned in the endorsement of his Order Sheet dated 07.10.2009 to DoP&T that the Order Sheet sent to the postal address of the applicant was received undelivered. Hence, the Inquiring Authority requested DoP&T to deliver the said Order Sheet to the applicant with instructions to attend the regular hearing to be held on 16.11.2009. Accordingly, DoP&T vide letter dated 09.11.2009 sent a copy of the Order Sheet dated 07.10.2009 to the applicant on his postal address given in the Right to Information Act, 2005 application and through the Chief Secretary, Government of U.P. 5.3 In respect of contention of the applicant that the prosecution neither listed any prosecution witness nor produced during the regular hearing, learned counsel submitted that the Inquiring Authority in his inquiry report has mentioned that a list of 7 defence documents and 3 defence witnesses was received from the applicant vide his letter dated 18.06.2009 and the same were allowed being relevant to the case. Further, as regards the contention of the applicant for fixing next date of regular hearing after 15.01.2010, which was not acceded to by the Inquiring Authority, learned counsel submitted that the Inquiring Authority Digitally signed by NEETU NEETU SHARMA Date: 2026.03.12 SHARMA 11:47:02 +05'30' has mentioned in the Inquiry Report that as the notices were Item No.37 13 OA No.31/2015 already sent to the PO/CO and the defence witnesses, and sufficient opportunity has been given to the applicant to attend the hearings, it was not considered desirable to postpone the regular hearing. Further, the applicant did not attend the regular hearing on 02.12.2009 and it seems that the applicant had requested for postponement to some other date. The Inquiring Authority has also mentioned in his Inquiry Report that as sufficient opportunities have already been given to the applicant in this case and the inquiry cannot be kept pending infinitum, the proceedings were conducted ex-parte.
5.4 Learned counsel also submitted that the Inquiring Authority has every right to accede to or deny the request made by the charged officer in disciplinary proceedings cases. However, it cannot be ruled out that the applicant did not co-operate with the inquiry proceedings in the case and kept on making request for postponement of the dates of regular hearing (fixed by the Inquiring Authority) on one pretext or the other.
5.5 As regards the contention of the applicant that despite lapse of around 5 years, the representation of the applicant has not been decided, learned counsel submitted that the representation dated 11.06.2010 was examined in DoP&T and after analysis of the case it was decided to seek comments of Ministry of I&B on the defence submitted by the applicant in his representation dated 11.06.2010. Initially, an OM dated 15.09.2010 was issued in this regard to M/o I &B. Subsequently, a number of reminders were issued to M/o NEETU SHARMA Digitally signed by NEETU SHARMA Date: 2026.03.12 11:47:02 +05'30' Item No.37 14 OA No.31/2015 I&B. The requisite comments were received from M/o I&B on 29.05.2015.
5.6 Learned counsel also submitted that so far as submission of the applicant that his subordinate officer having similar charges have been exonerated by C.V.C. and he has been wrongly/falsely implicated in the matter is concerned, Sh. Anurag Mishra, the then Controller of Sales and Sh. Shashank Narayan, the then Assistant Controller of Sales, Doordarshan have been exonerated by M/o I&B based on their exoneration by CBI Court. However, CBI has filed Criminal Revisions vide CRR No. 2519/2021 and CRR No.2523/2021 before the Hon'ble High Court, Kolkata against the exoneration which are pending. Further, it is submitted that the learned CBI Court in RC-19(A)/2001/ACB-Kol vide Order dated 11.09.2019 observed, inter-alia," that I have gone through the Rate Card of Doordarshan and while I go through the same I do not find any such clause that all the provisions are mandatory and any violation thereof would come within the meaning of offence and shall be punished. In such scenario if I consider the allegations of CBI against accused persons I find that accused Shashank Narayan, Anurag Mishra and Rakesh Bahadur whatever did during their tenure of service in their respective position, Doordarshan Kendra, New Delhi they did the same in course of their official business maintaining all formalities. From this point of view it cannot be said that accused Shashank Narayan, Anurag Mishra and Rakesh Bahadur by violating provisions of Rate Card made criminal Digitally signed by NEETU NEETU SHARMA Date: 2026.03.12 SHARMA 11:47:02 +05'30' Item No.37 15 OA No.31/2015 conspiracy and have given advantage to accused Ramesh Gandhi...."
5.7 Learned counsel further submitted that the Hon'ble CBI Court in RCCAA2003A0024 vide Order dated 11.09.2019 observed, inter- alia, that "......As such either by the definition of offence of Cr. P. C. or General Clauses Act it is to be shown that accused persons did any act or omission punishable by law for the time being in force. Now questions come whether the violation of official rules and regulations come within the purview of the definition of offence punishable by law. In this particular case the main allegation accused persons are that they had violated the provision of Rate Card of Doordarshan and thereby they had given benefit to accused Ramesh Gandhi in furtherance of criminal conspiracy. I have gone through the Rate Card of Doordarshan and while I go through the same I do not find any such clause that all the provisions are mandatory and any violation thereof would come within the meaning of offence and shall be punished. In such scenario if I consider the allegation of CBI against accused persons I find that accused Shashank Narayan, Anurag Mishra, Rakesh Bahadur and R. N. Chakroborty whatever did during their tenure of service in their respective positions, Doordarshan Kendra, New Delhi they did the same in course of their official business maintaining all formalities. From this point of view it cannot be said that accused Shashank Narayan, Anurag Mishra, Rakesh Bahadur and R N Chakroborty by violating the provisions of Rate Card made criminal conspiracy and Digitally signed by NEETU NEETU SHARMA Date: 2026.03.12 SHARMA 11:47:02 +05'30' has given advantage to accused Ramesh Gandhi..." Thus, it may be Item No.37 16 OA No.31/2015 observed that the Hon'ble CBI Court did not held that the provisions of the Doordarshan's Rate Card were not violated but held that the said violation did not amount to criminal conspiracy. Learned counsel also submitted that the violation of Doordarshan's Rate Card is the basis for Departmental Proceedings. Learned counsel also submitted that DoP&T's Guidelines No.11012/6/2007-Estt.(A-III) dated 21.07.2016 regarding simultaneous action of prosecution and initiation of departmental proceedings, provide as under:
"....The issue was explained in the following words by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the following words in Ajit Kumar Nag v GM, (P), Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., (2005) 7 SCC 764: Acquittal by a criminal court would not debar an employer from exercising power in accordance with Rules and Regulations in force. The two proceedings criminal and departmental are entirely different. They operate in different fields and have different objectives. Whereas the object of criminal trial is to inflict appropriate punishment on offender, the purpose of enquiry proceedings to deal with the delinquent departmentally and to impose penalty in accordance with service Rules. In a criminal trial, incriminating statement made by the accused in certain circumstances or before certain officers is totally inadmissible in evidence. Such strict rules of evidence and procedure would not apply to departmental proceedings. The degree of proof which is necessary to order a conviction is different from the degree of proof necessary to record the commission of delinquency. The rule relating to appreciation of evidence in the two proceedings is also not similar. In criminal law, burden of proof is on the prosecution and unless the prosecution is able to prove the guilt of the accused 'beyond reasonable doubt, he cannot be convicted by a court of law. In departmental enquiry, on the other hand, penalty can imposed on the delinquent officer on a finding recorded on the basis of' preponderance of probability'. Acquittal of the appellant by a Judicial Magistrate, therefore, does not ipso facto absolve him from the liability under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Corporation. 8. The judgement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in G.M. Tank vs State of Gujarat (2006) 5 SCC 446 has reaffirmed the principles laid down in R.P.Kapur (supra). In G.M. Tank case, Court observed that there was not an iota of evidence against the appellant to hold that he was guilty. As the criminal case and the departmental proceedings were based on identical set of facts and evidence, the Court set aside the penalty imposed in the departmental inquiry also.
Ratio in the G.M. Tank judgement should not be misconstrued to mean that no departmental proceedings are permissible in all cases of acquittal or that in such cases the penalty already NEETU SHARMA SHARMA imposed would have to be set aside. What the Hon'ble Court has Digitally signed by NEETU Date: 2026.03.12 11:47:02 held that is no departmental inquiry would be permissible when +05'30' Item No.37 17 OA No.31/2015 the evidence clearly establishes that no charge against the Government servant may be made out."
(emphasis supplied) 5.8 Learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that the applicant placed reliance on Reply to PAC Questionnaire by Doordarshan dated801.2004 and Action Taken Note on C&AG Para dated 15.12.2006. However, he submitted that M/o I&B vide O.M. No. C-13011/31/2001-Vig. dated 29.05.2015 provided the following comments with the approval of the competent authority:
a) By 100% transfer of Banked FCT, possibility of earning by Doordarshan through Additional Spot Buys (ASBs) at higher rates by the Producer was lost, whereas, Producer gain substantially through transfer of FCT from a programme which was off the air to high viewer ship programme. Thus notional loss of revenue by Doordarshan and gain to the Producer is obvious.
b) Time taken in the matter is procedural only. The applicant was working in Prasar Bharati, his Cadre Controlling Authority is in DoP&T, case is being co-ordinated by M/o I&B, whereas, irregularities pertain to DDK, Kolkata.
There were 14 officers including the applicant whose cases were processed. Since, some officers were on the verge of retirement their cases were taken on priority. In addition, due to very technical nature of charges, interpretation of Rules/ Guidelines/Rate Card preparation of charge-sheet etc. took time. Charge-sheet could not be issued on the basis of bare awareness off acts.
c) The reply given to the Audit Para No. 2.3.4 was prepared on the basis of clarifications given by the DCS Wing of Doordarshan. M/o I&B only forwarded the stand taken by DG, DD to PAC that increase in banking cap did not entail Digitally signed by NEETU NEETU SHARMA Date: 2026.03.12 SHARMA 11:47:02 +05'30' any loss to Doordarshan. It would not be correct to say Item No.37 18 OA No.31/2015 that Ministry confirmed the statement made by DG, DD. Loss of revenue is obvious, because by 100% transfer of FCT, possibility of earning by DD through Additional Spot Buys (ASBs) at higher rates was lost, whereas, Producer gained substantially through transfer of FCT.
d) Prevalence of such practices in DD is no excuse of wrongdoing. It only points to wide spread irregularities being committed in DD and for which the Applicant was also responsible alongwith others.
e) Since the post of DG, DD was vacant during 19.01.96 to 31.12.2001, the powers of DG were to be delegated either upwards or downward i.e. to DDGs or CEO. The Order dated 24.08.1998 could be seen in the light of this fact. With the issuing of Order dated 24.08.1998, CEO's Order dated 17.02.1998 which was a sort of interim order, had already got superseded.
f) As per Order dated 24.08.1998, although other powers were available to be exercised by the DDGs, delegation of enhanced powers were made as per Annexure I to IV of the Order dated 24.08.1998. In Annexure IV, it could be seen that existing powers were with DG out of which some of the powers were delegated to DDGs under the heading Proposed Delegation/Authority. Whereas powers to relax the Norms/Guidelines/Rate Card etc. were delegated to the CEO. There is no reason to believe that the Order dated 24.08.1998 was not a working order or was a proposal only. A thorough perusal of Order dated 24.8.98 which was signed by the then DDG(F), makes it clear that it was a working order. The delegation of powers through Clause 10.69 of 0.M. No. G-17017/15S/89-FAS dated 03.09.92 was with regard to commercial services and not with Digitally signed by NEETU regard to telecast/marketing of programmes (Royalty NEETU SHARMA Date: 2026.03.12 based, Commissioned and Sponsored).
SHARMA 11:47:02 +05'30' Item No.37 19 OA No.31/2015
g) Therefore approval given by the Applicant for 100% transfer of FCT were in violation of the Circular No.30 dated 30.11.98 and Order dated 24.8.98. 100% FCT was transferred from an off the air programme to a programme which was not a Minimum Guarantee (MG) programme. Approval of CEO was not taken for the purpose which was violation of Order dated 24.08.98.
h) Applicant being a very senior officer and holding a very responsible post was not supposed to merely endorse the proposal initiated by a junior officer. The applicant cannot escape from his responsibility to take utmost care while considering a proposal.
5.9 Learned counsel for the applicant also submitted that the applicant being one of the officers who were involved in the formulation of the Rate Card of 1996-1997, knew very well about the provisions in the Rate Card.
5.10 Learned counsel also submitted that the learned CBI Court have exonerated the applicant and his subordinates from criminal conspiracy with the Producer. The departmental proceedings are for violation of Doordarshan's Rate Card thereby causing loss to Doordarshan and consequent benefit to a private producer. In view of the position brought out in Paras 5(iv) and (v), departmental action is permissible in the instant case. 5.11 In support of the claim of the respondents, learned counsel for the respondents placed reliance on the following judgments:-
(i) State of Punjab and others vs. Chaman Lal Goyal, Digitally signed by NEETU NEETU SHARMA Date: 2026.03.12 SHARMA 11:47:02 +05'30' reported in 1995 (2) SCC 570;Item No.37 20 OA No.31/2015
(ii) The Managing Director, Madras Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board and another vs. R. Rajan and others, reported in 1996 (1) SCC 338;
(iii) Anant R. Kulkarni vs. Y.P. Education Society and others, reported in (2013) 6 SCC 515; and
(iv) S. Janaki Iyer vs. Union of India and others, reported in (2025) 8 SCC 696.
5.12 Lastly, learned counsel prayed that the Inquiry Report dated 06.01.2010 as has been submitted by the Inquiring Authority after following due procedure under the All India Services (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1969 and findings are based on evidence on record. Sufficient opportunity has been provided to the applicant to defend himself. Hence, the instant OA is devoid of merit and liable to be dismissed by this Tribunal and the stay on the Departmental Proceedings, which are in final stages, may also be vacated so that the same may be concluded in the interest of justice.
ANALYSIS
6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have carefully perused the pleadings as well as the judgments on which reliance has been placed by the parties.
7. The applicant was working as DDG (Commercial & Sales), Directorate General, Prasar Bharati, New Delhi for the period from 1996-1999. A case was instituted by the CBI at the behest of concerned department vide Case No.RC0102003A0024 against NEETU Digitally signed by NEETU SHARMA Date: 2026.03.12 SHARMA 11:47:02 +05'30' some persons, including the applicant. Sanction for prosecution Item No.37 21 OA No.31/2015 was granted on 29.03.2007 and the chargesheet was filed in the matter on 18.06.2007. The learned First Special Judge, Alipore, Kolkata pronounced the judgment on 11.09.2009. The applicant was discharged in the matter. The respondents have filed a Criminal Revision vide CRR No.2519/2021 and CRR No.2523/2021 before the Hon'ble High Court of Kolkata which is pending there. The major penalty proceedings were also initiated against the applicant under Rule 8 of the All India Services (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1969 vide charge Memorandum dated 5.2.2008 (as also mentioned by the respondents in their affidavit). The inquiry was conducted by the Commissioner for Departmental Inquiries, CVC. The Inquiry Officer submitted his report on 06.01.2010 holding the article of charge levelled against the applicant as 'proved'. The CVC vide their advise dated 3.5.2010 advised for imposition of suitable penalty upon the applicant. The applicant has challenged the Inquiry Report dated 06.01.2010 in the present OA and has prayed for setting aside the same on the ground that he had submitted his reply to the said Inquiry report on 11.06.2010. However, despite the submission of the said reply, the respondents failed to take any further action in the matter, and the disciplinary proceedings remained pending for a final decision for about five years up to the filing of the present OA.
8. This matter was heard by this Tribunal and vide Order dated 17.6.2015, this Tribunal, as an interim measure, stayed the operation and effect of the said disciplinary proceedings, the Digitally signed by NEETU NEETU SHARMA Date: 2026.03.12 SHARMA 11:47:02 +05'30' relevant portion of the said Order reads as under:- Item No.37 22 OA No.31/2015
"In the meantime, the further operation and effect of the disciplinary proceedings initiated vide memo dated 5.2.2007 would remain stayed till next date of hearing."
8.1 The said interim order is continuing till date.
9. Keeping in view the submissions advanced by the respective parties and the overall facts and circumstances of the present case, the short question that arises for consideration is whether, at this stage, the Inquiry Officer's report dated 06.01.2010 is liable to be quashed merely on the ground of delay on the part of the respondents in taking a decision on the applicant's reply to the said report?
10. At the outset, we observe that it is settled law that mere delay in conclusion of disciplinary proceedings, by itself, does not vitiate the proceedings, unless the delinquent employee is able to demonstrate that such delay has caused serious prejudice to his defence. In the present case, the applicant has challenged the Inquiry Officer's report dated 06.01.2010 primarily on the ground that although he submitted his reply to the said report on 11.06.2010, the respondents did not take a final decision for nearly about five years or till date. However, the applicant has not demonstrated as to how the alleged delay has caused any specific prejudice to him or has impaired his defence in the disciplinary proceedings.
10.1 It is trite law that an Inquiry Officer's report is only a step in the disciplinary process and not a final order, and ordinarily Digitally signed by NEETU NEETU SHARMA courts or tribunals should be slow to interfere at such an Date: 2026.03.12 SHARMA 11:47:02 +05'30' Item No.37 23 OA No.31/2015 intermediate stage. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Kunisetty Satyanarayana, reported in 2006 (12) SCC 28, held that ordinarily no writ or judicial interference lies against a show cause notice or an inquiry report, as these are merely steps in the disciplinary process and do not by themselves give rise to any cause of action unless they culminate in a final order affecting the rights of the employee. The relevant portion of the said judgment reads as under:-
"13. It is well settled by a series of decisions of this Court that ordinarily no writ lies against a charge-sheet or show-cause notice vide Executive Engineer, Bihar State Housing Board v. Ramesh Kumar Singh [(1996) 1 SCC 327 : JT (1995) 8 SC 331] , Special Director v. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse [(2004) 3 SCC 440 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 826 : AIR 2004 SC 1467] , Ulagappa v. Divisional Commr., Mysore [(2001) 10 SCC 639] , State of U.P. v. Brahm Datt Sharma [(1987) 2 SCC 179 : (1987) 3 ATC 319 : AIR 1987 SC 943] , etc.
14. The reason why ordinarily a writ petition should not be entertained against a mere show-cause notice or charge-sheet is that at that stage the writ petition may be held to be premature. A mere charge-sheet or show-cause notice does not give rise to any cause of action, because it does not amount to an adverse order which affects the rights of any party unless the same has been issued by a person having no jurisdiction to do so. It is quite possible that after considering the reply to the show-cause notice or after holding an enquiry the authority concerned may drop the proceedings and/or hold that the charges are not established. It is well settled that a writ petition lies when some right of any party is infringed. A mere show-cause notice or charge-sheet does not infringe the right of anyone. It is only when a final order imposing some punishment or otherwise adversely affecting a party is passed, that the said party can be said to have any grievance.
15. Writ jurisdiction is discretionary jurisdiction and hence such discretion under Article 226 should not ordinarily be exercised by quashing a show-cause notice or charge-sheet.
16. No doubt, in some very rare and exceptional cases the High Court can quash a charge-sheet or show-cause notice if it is found to be wholly without jurisdiction or for some other reason if it is wholly illegal. However, ordinarily the High Court should not interfere in such a matter."
10.2 Similarly, in State of Andhra Pradesh v. N. Digitally signed by NEETU NEETU SHARMA Date: 2026.03.12 SHARMA 11:47:02 Radhakishan, reported in 1998 (4) SCC 154, the Hon'ble Supreme +05'30' Item No.37 24 OA No.31/2015 Court observed that delay in disciplinary proceedings cannot be a ground to quash the proceedings unless the delay is unexplained and has caused prejudice to the delinquent employee. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further held that each case must be examined on its own facts and circumstances. The relevant portion of which reads as under:
"19. It is not possible to lay down any predetermined principles applicable to all cases and in all situations where there is delay in concluding the disciplinary proceedings. Whether on that ground the disciplinary proceedings are to be terminated each case has to be examined on the facts and circumstances in that case. The essence of the matter is that the court has to take into consideration all the relevant factors and to balance and weigh them to determine if it is in the interest of clean and honest administration that the disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to terminate after delay particularly when the delay is abnormal and there is no explanation for the delay. The delinquent employee has a right that disciplinary proceedings against him are concluded expeditiously and he is not made to undergo mental agony and also monetary loss when these are unnecessarily prolonged without any fault on his part in delaying the proceedings. In considering whether the delay has vitiated the disciplinary proceedings the court has to consider the nature of charge, its complexity and on what account the delay has occurred. If the delay is unexplained prejudice to the delinquent employee is writ large on the face of it. It could also be seen as to how much the disciplinary authority is serious in pursuing the charges against its employee. It is the basic principle of administrative justice that an officer entrusted with a particular job has to perform his duties honestly, efficiently and in accordance with the rules. If he deviates from this path he is to suffer a penalty prescribed. Normally, disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to take their course as per relevant rules but then delay defeats justice. Delay causes prejudice to the charged officer unless it can be shown that he is to blame for the delay or when there is proper explanation for the delay in conducting the disciplinary proceedings. Ultimately, the court is to balance these two diverse considerations."
11. In the present case, the applicant has not shown any material prejudice suffered due to the alleged delay in consideration of his reply to the Inquiry Officer's report. Moreover, the disciplinary proceedings had not culminated in a final order at the time of filing of the present OA. Therefore, interference by this Tribunal at this intermediate stage would amount to premature judicial Digitally signed by NEETU NEETU SHARMA Date: 2026.03.12 SHARMA 11:47:02 +05'30' Item No.37 25 OA No.31/2015 intervention in an ongoing disciplinary process, which is impermissible in law.
12. The contentions of the applicant regarding the inquiry having been conducted in an unfair, biased and partial manner, as well as other issues relating to the conduct of the inquiry proceedings, are matters which would have been appropriately be raised by him in his representation against the Inquiry Officer's report submitted before the Disciplinary Authority or the same have been raised by the applicant in his aforesaid representation. At this stage, this Tribunal does not deem it appropriate to render any conclusive or authoritative findings on such issues, as the same fall exclusively within the domain of the Disciplinary Authority, who is required to consider the said representation of the applicant and thereafter take an independent and reasoned decision in accordance with law and rules on the subject. It is well settled that the Inquiry Officer's report is only a recommendatory step in the disciplinary process, and the Disciplinary Authority is the final fact-finding authority, which has the power either to agree or disagree with the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer after considering the representation of the delinquent employee. Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kunisetty Satyanarayana (supra) held that courts and tribunals should ordinarily refrain from interfering at an intermediate stage of disciplinary proceedings, as the delinquent employee has adequate opportunity to raise all objections before the competent authority during the course of the proceedings. Digitally signed by NEETU
NEETU SHARMA Date: 2026.03.12 SHARMA 11:47:02 +05'30' Item No.37 26 OA No.31/2015 13. The principal grievance of the applicant is that his
representation dated 11.06.2010, submitted against the Inquiry Officer's report dated 06.01.2010, has so far not been decided by the Disciplinary Authority and that the disciplinary proceedings have remained pending for a considerable period of time. On this ground, the learned senior counsel appearing for the applicant has contended that the proceedings are vitiated by delay and, accordingly, the applicant has filed the present OA on 10.06.2015. 13.1 Although the grievance of the applicant regarding delay in consideration of his representation appears to have some substance, however, it is equally well settled that the final decision on such representation squarely falls within the domain of the Disciplinary Authority, who is required to examine the findings of the Inquiry Officer as well as the representation of the charged officer before arriving at a final conclusion in the disciplinary proceedings. In the present case, the respondents have explained in their counter affidavit that comments from the Ministry of I& B were received only on 29.05.2015, despite continuous follow-up at the highest level. It has further been stated that soon thereafter the present litigation came to be instituted by the applicant, and this Tribunal, by way of an interim order dated 17.06.2015, stayed the departmental proceedings, in which interim protection continues to remain in operation till date. Consequently, the respondents have been restrained from proceeding further with the matter. 13.2 NEETU SHARMA Digitally signed by NEETU SHARMA Date: 2026.03.12 11:47:02 +05'30' It is a settled principle of law that delay in disciplinary proceedings cannot be examined in isolation without considering Item No.37 27 OA No.31/2015 the reasons for such delay and the surrounding circumstances, including any judicial orders operating in the field. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. N. Radhakishan (supra) held that while considering the effect of delay in disciplinary proceedings, the court must balance the interests of the employee with the requirement of maintaining administrative discipline, and the proceedings cannot be quashed merely on account of delay unless the same has caused demonstrable prejudice to the delinquent employee. In the facts of the present case, it is evident that the disciplinary proceedings could not be taken to their logical conclusion, inter alia, on account of the interim order passed by this Tribunal staying the proceedings. Therefore, the delay in taking a final decision on the applicant's representation cannot, by itself, be a sufficient ground to invalidate the disciplinary proceedings at this stage.
14. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Ajit Kumar Nag v G M, (P), Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. (supra) has held that the two proceedings criminal and departmental are entirely different. In criminal law, burden of proof is on the prosecution and unless the prosecution is able to prove the guilt of the accused 'beyond reasonable doubt, he cannot be convicted by a court of law. In departmental enquiry, on the other hand, penalty can be imposed on the delinquent officer on a finding recorded on the basis of 'preponderance of probability'. The ratio in the matter of G.M. Tank (supra) should not be misconstrued to mean that no departmental proceedings are permissible in all cases of acquittal or that in such cases Digitally signed by NEETU NEETU SHARMA the penalty already imposed would have to be set aside. What the Hon'ble Date: 2026.03.12 SHARMA 11:47:02 +05'30' Item No.37 28 OA No.31/2015 Supreme Court has held that no departmental inquiry would be permissible when the evidence clearly establishes that no charge against the Government servant may be made out. In so far as this case is concerned, that stage has not so far been arrived as disciplinary authority is yet to take a decision on the said IO's report as well as on the aforesaid representation submitted by the applicant.
15. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the applicant also contended that Prasar Bharati, which functions under the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, has submitted before the Public Accounts Committee that no loss of revenue has been caused to the Government. Thus, learned senior counsel argued that the applicant has already been acquitted in the criminal case registered by the Central Bureau of Investigation, and therefore, the charges levelled against him in the departmental proceedings do not survive. On the strength of the aforesaid submissions, learned Senior Counsel urged that the Inquiry Officer's report deserves to be set aside at this stage. We observe that the Disciplinary Authority is yet to take a final decision in the matter. As noted above, the comments of the Ministry of I&B were received only on 29.05.2015, whereas the applicant instituted the present OA before this Tribunal on 10.06.2015, i.e., within a short span of about 12 days from the receipt of the said comments from the Ministry of I&B. Consequently, the Disciplinary Authority did not have adequate time to consider the said comments and take an appropriate decision in the matter and the fact that this Tribunal vide interim order dated 17.06.2015 stayed the operation and effect of the departmental proceedings and the said interim protection is still continuing in favour of the applicant.
NEETU Digitally signed by NEETU SHARMA Date: 2026.03.12 SHARMA 11:47:02 +05'30' Item No.37 29 OA No.31/2015
16. At this stage, it is apt to note that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Anand K. Kulkarni (supra) has held as under:-
"14. The court/tribunal should not generally set aside the departmental enquiry, and quash the charges on the ground of delay in initiation of disciplinary proceedings, as such a power is dehors the limits of judicial review. In the event that the court/tribunal exercises such power, it exceeds its power of judicial review at the very threshold. Therefore, a charge- sheet or show-cause notice, issued in the course of disciplinary proceedings, cannot ordinarily be quashed by the court. The same principle is applicable in relation to there being a delay in conclusion of disciplinary proceedings. The facts and circumstances of the case in question must be carefully examined taking into consideration the gravity/magnitude of the charges involved therein. The court has to consider the seriousness and magnitude of the charges and while doing so the court must weigh all the facts, both for and against the delinquent officers and come to the conclusion which is just and proper considering the circumstances involved. The essence of the matter is that the court must take into consideration all relevant facts, and balance and weigh the same, so as to determine, if it is in fact in the interest of clean and honest administration that the said proceedings are allowed to be terminated only on the ground of delay in their conclusion. (Vide State of U.P. v. Brahm Datt Sharma [(1987) 2 SCC 179 : (1987) 3 ATC 319 : AIR 1987 SC 943] , State of M.P. v. Bani Singh [1990 Supp SCC 738 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 638 : (1991) 16 ATC 514 : AIR 1990 SC 1308] , State of Punjab v. Chaman Lal Goyal [(1995) 2 SCC 570 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 541 :
(1995) 29 ATC 546] , State of A.P. v. N. Radhakishan [(1998) 4 SCC 154 :
1998 SCC (L&S) 1044 : AIR 1998 SC 1833] , M.V. Bijlani v. Union of India [(2006) 5 SCC 88 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 919 : AIR 2006 SC 3475] , Union of India v. Kunisetty Satyanarayana [(2006) 12 SCC 28 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 304 : AIR 2007 SC 906] , Ministry of Defence v. Prabhash Chandra Mirdha [(2012) 11 SCC 565 : (2013) 1 SCC (L&S) 121 : AIR 2012 SC 2250] and LIC v. A. Masilamani [(2013) 6 SCC 530 : JT (2012) 11 SC 533].)"
16.1 Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of The Managing Director, Madras Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board and another vs. R. Rajan and others (supra) observed as follows:-
"4. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petitions on the ground that no interference is called for at that stage of the disciplinary proceedings but observed at the same time that "even if the charges are held proved against the petitioners, the punishment of dismissal from service shall not be imposed on the petitioners in the light of the statement made on behalf of the respondents". (In the above extract, the expression 'petitioners' means the writ petitions who are respondents in these appeals and the expression 'respondents' means the appellants herein.) .....
NEETU SHARMA
8. While we agree that expression of any opinion on the question of Digitally signed by NEETU powers of the Managing Director, the Board or the Government in the Date: 2026.03.12 SHARMA 11:47:02 +05'30' matter of imposition of penalties under the regulations was unnecessary at this stage, we are of the opinion that the Board cannot Item No.37 30 OA No.31/2015 complain of it when it itself has invited the decision of the Division Bench on the said question. On our part, we refuse to make any pronouncement on such an academic question at this stage and leave it open. Accordingly, we dismiss these appeals without expressing any opinion on the correctness or otherwise of the holding of the Division Bench with respect to the powers of the Managing Director, the Board or the Government in the matter of imposition of punishments/penalties upon the respondents under the aforesaid regulations. We only affirm the view of the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench that at this stage of the disciplinary proceedings, no interference is warranted by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution."
16.2 Further the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab and others vs. Chaman Lal Goyal (supra) ruled as under: -
"13. The High Court has relied upon the decision of this Court in State of M.P. v. Bani Singh [1990 Supp SCC 738 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 638 : (1991) 16 ATC 514] on the question of delay. That was a case where the charges were served and disciplinary enquiry sought to be initiated after a lapse of twelve years from the alleged irregularities. From the report of the judgment, the nature of the charges concerned therein also do not appear. We do not know whether the charges there were grave as in this case. Probably, they were not. There is another distinguishing feature in the case before us: by the date of the judgment of High Court, the major part of the enquiry was over. This is also a circumstance going into the scales while weighing the factors for and against. As stated hereinabove, wherever delay is put forward as a ground for quashing the charges, the court has to weigh all the factors, both for and against the delinquent officer and come to a conclusion which is just and proper in the circumstances. In the circumstances, the principle of the said decision cannot help the respondent.
14. The appeal is allowed in the above terms. No costs."
16.3 The Hon'ble Supreme Court also in the case of S. Janaki Iyer vs. Union of India and others (supra) held as under:-
"14. The appellant submitted a detailed representation dated 9-4- 2001 disputing and challenging the findings of the enquiry officer that the transfer qua the appellant was fake whereas that of the others were genuine. The aspect with regard to the other findings was also challenged, taking the plea of non-compliance of the statutory rules as also the aspect of the conclusion drawn by the enquiry officer not connecting her with the procurement of the said transfer order which was alleged to be fake. The said representation was duly considered by the disciplinary authority but was not accepted rather the disciplinary authority proceeded to hold the appellant guilty of the charges which she was called upon to face in the departmental NEETU SHARMA enquiry and passed the punishment of dismissal from service vide Digitally signed by NEETU Date: 2026.03.12 SHARMA order dated 16-11-2001.
11:47:02 +05'30' ......Item No.37 31 OA No.31/2015
27. Similar is the position with regard to the plea of prolongation of the inquiry for 9 years in concluding the same. The explanation as has been given by the respondents with regard to the time consumed during the inquiry is fully justified as it had to be and actually was held at different places on different occasions as the matter related to different stations pertaining to the transfer orders of eleven teachers which were in question. The availability of the relevant documents and other aspects including the witnesses so posted, etc. at different stations is also taken as a ground in explanation. It is not the case of the appellant that she was not provided with appropriate subsistence allowances or facilities for attending the inquiry proceedings which would have in any manner caused hindrance or difficulty to participate in or attend the same.
28. Mere delay during the inquiry proceedings, when it is explained with regard to the time taken for the inquiry to conclude and that too justifying the same with no prejudice having been caused, cannot be made the basis for vitiating the departmental proceedings. Inordinate or unexplained delay in the departmental proceedings may be a justifiable ground if tampered with prejudice having been established to have been caused to the delinquent employee in the said process for interference by the Court. In the present case, the same is absent and therefore the said plea of delay fails."
17. The legal principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Anand K. Kulkarni v. Y.P. Education Society, Managing Director, Madras Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. R. Rajan, State of Punjab v. Chaman Lal Goyal, and S. Janaki Iyer v. Union of India (supra) consistently emphasize that courts or tribunals should ordinarily refrain from interfering with disciplinary proceedings at the initial or intermediate stages, including quashing charge-sheets or inquiries merely on the ground of delay. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that delay in initiation or conclusion of disciplinary proceedings does not automatically vitiate the proceedings; rather, the facts and circumstances of each case, including the gravity and seriousness of the charges, must be carefully examined. Interference is warranted only where the delay is inordinate, unexplained, and Digitally signed by NEETU NEETU SHARMA results in demonstrable prejudice to the delinquent employee. If Date: 2026.03.12 SHARMA 11:47:02 +05'30' Item No.37 32 OA No.31/2015 the delay is reasonably explained and no prejudice is shown to have been caused, the disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to continue in the interest of maintaining clean and honest administration. In this case, the respondents have demonstrated that on analysis of the case by the respondent No.1, it found it appropriate to call for the comments of Ministry of I&B on the relevant points raised by the applicant in his defence. The comments of Ministry of Information and Broadcasting were called on 09.11.2012 which were received only on 29.05.2015 despite many reminders, the details of which is given in para 5 above. Thereafter, within 12 days, the applicant instituted the present OA before this Tribunal on 10.06.2015. This Tribunal vide interim order dated 17.06.2015 stayed the operation and effect of the departmental proceedings and the said interim protection is still continuing in favour of the applicant. We agree with the argument of the applicant that too long time has been taken by the respondent to decide his representation, however, it is also a fact that reply of concerned Ministry at last was received and thereafter the applicant has filed this Original Application merely after 12 days and is seeking of quashing of Inquiry Report. We hold that in the above sequence of event, the Disciplinary Authority did not have adequate time to consider the said comments of Ministry of I&B and was in a position to take an appropriate decision in the matter. In the background of these events, we are of the considered view that at this juncture, there are no grounds to set aside the Inquiry Report and the question in para 9 above is answered against the applicant. Digitally signed by NEETU
NEETU SHARMA Date: 2026.03.12 SHARMA 11:47:02 +05'30' Item No.37 33 OA No.31/2015
18. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case and for the reasons recorded hereinabove, the present OA is disposed of with the following directions: -
(i) The respondents are directed to consider and decide the representation dated 11.06.2010 submitted by the applicant against the Inquiry Officer's report dated 06.01.2010, strictly in accordance with the applicable rules and the law governing the field, and to pass a reasoned and speaking order thereon within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order; and
(ii) It is further observed that in the event the applicant remains aggrieved by the decision so taken by the respondents on his aforesaid representation, it shall be open to him to avail such remedies as may be available to him under the rules and in accordance with law, if so advised.
19. As the present OA is disposed of with the aforesaid directions, the interim order granted by this Tribunal on 17.06.2015 shall stand vacated.
20. There shall be no order as to costs.
21. Pending MA(s), if any, shall stand disposed of accordingly.
(Rajinder Kashyap) (Ajay Pratap Singh)
Member (A) Member (J)
/ravi/
Digitally signed by NEETU
NEETU SHARMA
Date: 2026.03.12
SHARMA 11:47:02
+05'30'