Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
Battu Pedda Jangaiah And Ors. vs The Joint Collector on 30 April, 1993
Equivalent citations: 1993(2)ALT505
Author: Syed Shah Mohammed Quadri
Bench: Syed Shah Mohammed Quadri
ORDER Syed Shah Mohammed Quadri, J.
1. These fifteen cases, out of which nine are Civil Revision Petitions and six are Writ Petitions, arise out of the same facts and raise some questions of law. Therefore, they are heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment.
2. To appreciate the questions involved in these cases, it would suffice to refer the facts in C.R.P. 3100 of 1989. In this case, a sale deed was executed by one K. Suguna Devi, wife of Madhusudhan Reddy in favour of Amboji Pentaiah in respect of an extent of Ac.10.00 of land in Pulmamidi village. Pursuant to the sale deed, the possession of the land was delivered to the vendee therein. Under Section 50-B of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 (for short 'the Act'), the parties to the sale deed filed applications before the revenue authorities for validation of sale. The case was also noted in what is called as 'call book'. The Tahsildar, Ibrahimpatnam issued validation certificate under the said Section on 21-12-1974. It appears that against the said order of the Tahsildar, an appeal was filed by the Special Tahsildar and Authorised Officer (Land Reforms), R.R.District before the Joint Collector, R.R.District in December, 1987. But that appeal was dismissed on 26-12-1988. Thereafter the Joint Collector issued show cause notice purporting to exercise revisionary power under Sub-section (4) of Section 50-B of the Act to the vendor and the vendee to show cause as to why the certificate should not be cancelled. They filed their objections. After considering the objections the Joint Collector, R.R. District allowed the revision and set aside the certificate granted by the Tahsildar on 21-12-1974, by his order in case No. E4/5402/1989 dt. September, 11,1989. It is the validity of that order which is challenged in the revision. In the other cases also, similar orders were passed which are the subject matter of the above cases.
3. Sri A. Pulla Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioners in the C.R.Ps., contends that the exercise of revisionary power suo motu after a period of about 13-15 years is wholly arbitrary and illegal and that therefore the impugned orders are liable to be set aside. He further contends that the Joint Collector proceeded on an erroneous basis that the land belonging to one K. Ramachandra Reddy was transferred in the name of various persons whereas from the sale deeds it is clear that various persons have executed the sale deeds and Ramachandra Reddy alone was not the vendor. It is also pointed out that the Joint Collector gravely erred in holding that as the possession of the land under the sale deeds in question was handed over in 1965 but not in 1961, therefore, the validation proceedings were illegal.
4. Sri K. Prathap Reddy, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in writ petitions, adopts the argument advanced by Sri A. Pulla Reddy.
5. Sri Nagaseshaiah, learned Government Pleader for Revenue, contends that the suo motu power of revision has to be exercised in accordance with the public policy for effective implementation of the ceiling on the agricultural land and the equitable distribution of land. The Joint Collector exercised suo motu power under Sub-section (4) of Section 50-B of the Act which is wholly justified as Sub-section (4) of Section 50-B, does not prescribe the period of limitation for the exercise of suo motu power. The concept of reasonable time cannot be imported in to the said provision, as such, the exercise of power even though after fifteen years, is valid and justified. It is also argued that as the Authorised Officer filed appeal before the Joint Collector, R.R. District there was delay in invoking the suo motu jurisdiction. The learned Government Pleader prays that the C.R.Ps. and the writ petitions be dismissed.
6. In view of the contentions of the learned counsel, two questions arise for consideration, viz., (1) Whether exercise of suo motu power under Sub-section (4) of Section 50-B of the Act has to be within the reasonable period when under the said provision it can be exercised at any time.
(2) Whether the order of the Joint Collector cancelling the validation certificates, is correct in law.
7. In Telangana area of the State, there has been in vogue the practice of executing the sale deeds on plain papers to record the transactions of sale. This was so common that the Legislature had taken note of this fact and by Act 6 of 1964 inserted Section 50-B in the Act. The Section originally provided a period of one year for validation of the sale deeds which was later extended to three years by Act 11 of 1965. Again by Act 12 of 1967, the period was extended to four years and later to six years by Act 19 of 1968. Later by Act 2 of 1969, Sub-section (1) was substituted and a proviso was added to Sub-section (2). Sub-sectiion (4) of said Section with which we are now concerned, was inserted by Act 2 of 1969. It would be useful to set out the same here.
"(4) The Collector may, suo motu at any time, call for and examine the record relating to any certificate issued or proceedings taken by the Tahsildar under this Section for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of such certificate or as to the regularity of such proceedings and pass such order in relation thereto as he may think fit: Provided that no order adversely affecting any person shall be passed under this Sub-section unless such person has had an opportunity of making his representation thereto."
8. Sub-section (4) confers power on the Collector to call for and examine the record relating to any certificate issued or proceedings taken by the Tahsildar. The suo motu power can be exercised at any time for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of such proceedings and such order in relation thereto can be passed as he may think bit. No order adversely affecting any person shall be passed under this Sub-section, unless such person has had an opportunity of making his representation thereto.
9. In the instant case, the Joint Collector issued show cause notice and thus the opportunity required to be given was provided. The controversy is with regard to the limitation within which the power can be exercised. Whereas the learned counsel for the petitioners contends that the power has to be exercised within a reasonable time, the learned Government Pleader argues that when the legislature did not provide for any time limit, the Court cannot import that the power should be exercised within a reasonable time.
10. I shall now refer to the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the parties.
11. In Bombay Gas Co. v. Gopal Bhiva, , the question before the Supreme Court was whether an application under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act for wages has to be filed within the period of limitation prescribed under Article 185 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The Supreme Court observed that where the legislature has made no provision for limitation, it would not be. open to the Court to introduce any such limitation on grounds of fairness or justice. The question whether the claim should be filed within a reasonable time where no period of limitation is prescribed, was neither argued nor decided by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court laid down that the provisions of the Limitation Act cannot be imported when no period of limitation is provided.
12. In M.R. Patel v. State of Bihar, the question before the Supreme Court was whether the Board of Revenue could exercise suo motu power of revision under Bihar and Excise Act for admitting the revision. The period of limitation prescribed for filing the revision was one month. Against the order of the Collector, dated December, 7, 1956, the revision was filed on January, 9,1957. That was entertained by the Board of Revenue. It was held that for exercising the suo motu power of revisions, no period of limitation was prescribed, so in a case where the Board exercised this power of revision no question of limitation would arise, particularly in view of the fact that the Board held that the order under revision was a fit case for interference even after expiry of ordinary period of limitation. In this case also, the question of exercising suo motu power within reaonsable time was not considered by the Supreme Court.
13. In Swastik Oil Mills v. H.B. Munshi, the question of exercise of revisionary power under Bombay Sales Tax Act fell for consideration of the Supreme Court. It was argued that for exercise of suo motu power conferred under Section 22 of Act of 1946 or under Section 31 of Act of 1953, no period of limitation was provided and that limitation of reasonable time must be implied in the Section. Their Lordships rejected that contention holding that they were not prepared to accept that any such limitation must be necessarily read in the two Acts.
14. The last mentioned judgment of the Supreme Court was considered by a Division Bench of this Court in Kodanda Rao v. Government of A.P., 1981 (2) ALT 280. The Bench held after referring to the judgment of the Supreme Court, that therein it was laid down that no period of limitation could be imposed for the exercise of revisional power but not that the suo motu power could be exercised at any time. That point did not arise specifically in the case as it arose in State of Gujarat v. Patel Raghav Natha and Ors., . The Supreme Court therein held that the power of the Commissioner must be exercised within reasonable time and the reasonable time must be determined by the facts of the case and the nature of the order.
15. In P. Narasimha Reddy v. State of A.P., 1989 (2) ALT 700, a Division Bench of this Court to which I was also a member, dealt with a case of exercising suo motu power by the Joint Collector after two and half years. The Division Bench interpreted the expression 'at any time ' used in Sub-section (4) of Section 50-B of the Act to mean 'reasonably' and held that the power must be exercised within a reasonable time and the expression did not clothe the authorities to exercise the power at any time they liked even after the expiry of a long period; if the power is exercised after the lapse of a long time the persons might not find evidence to support their contentions and settled rights might get unsettled and that an absolute discretion to exercise the power at any point of time could not therefore be sustained merely on the ground that the Section contained the words 'at any time'. What could be 'reasonable time' is a question of fact which has to be decided on the facts and in the circumstances of each case. In that case, the power was exercised after 2 1/2 years after issuing of the certificate by the Tahsildar and that was held to be within the reasonable time.
16. From the above discussion, it follows that where statute provides for suo motu power of revision without prescribing any period of limitation the power must be exercised within a reasonable time and that what is 'reasonable time' has to be determined on the facts of each case. In the instant case, the Tahsildar, Ibrahimpatnam issued validation certificates under Section 50-B of the Act on 21-12-1974 and that order was questioned in appeal in December, 1987, but the appeal dismissed in December, 1988. Thereafter show cause notice was issued by the Joint Collector on 27-4-1989. Thus the power is exercised after about fourteen years and eight months. In other cases, the power is exercised after 13 to 15 years. There can hardly be any doubt that the object of exercise of power of suo motu revision is laudable. To implement the public policy of equitable distribution of the lands by effectively enforcing the provisions of the Land Ceiling Act, it is necessary to check the misuse of Section 50-B of the Act successfully, but for this reason can the authorities be permitted to rake up the stale cases? In my view the answer to this question is in the negative. The laudable object justifies conferring the power of suo motu revision, but exercise of this power has to be reasonable, not capricious or arbitrary. If the authorities are allowed to exercise this power after about fourteen years, it would be nothing short of arbitrary exercise of power.
17. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, I hold that the exercise of suo motu power of revision under Sub-section (4) of Section 50-B of the Act in these cases after a lapse of more than twelve years, can by no stretch of imagination be said to be within a reasonable period. Therefore, the exercise of power is arbitray and illegal. The first point is, accordingly, answered.
18. Now coming to the second point, it has already been pointed out above, the period of validation was extended from time to time from 31-3-1972. The Joint Collector recorded a finding of fact that the possession of the land in question was given in 1965, but however held that as the possession was not transferred to the vendee on or before 21-2-1961, and the application for validation was made on 24-3-1972, the validation certificate is illegal. Admittedly the application was made within the extended time. The transaction of sale which was validated, was entered into in 1965 and pursuant to it possession was also given in 1965, as such validation certificate cannot be held to be bad in law. For these reasons the orders questioned in the C.R.Ps. and the W.Ps. cannot be sustained even on merits.
19. In the result the orders assailed in the above Civil Revision Petitions are set aside and the orders impugned in the Writ Petitions are quashed and the C.R.Ps and W.Ps. are accordingly allowed; but in the circumstances of the cases without costs.