Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur
Deepak Jain S/O Late Shree Tara Chand ... vs State Of Rajasthan on 26 November, 2025
Author: Anand Sharma
Bench: Anand Sharma
[2025:RJ-JP:46822]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous (Petition) No.3981/2019
Deepak Jain S/o Late Shree Tara Chand Jain, aged about 44
Years, R/o D-22, Luvkush Marg, Hanuman Nagar D-Block,
Vaishali Nagar, Jaipur, Rajasthan.
----Petitioner
Versus
1. State of Rajasthan through P.P.
----Respondent
2. Jaipur Development Authority, Jaipur, Jawahar Lal Nehru Marg, Jaipur, through its Secretary.
----Complainant/Respondent
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Pankaj Gupta with
Mr. Harshit Bhatt
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Manvendra Singh Shekhawat, PP
Mr. Ishan Kumawat for J.D.A.
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANAND SHARMA
Order
RESERVED ON :: 19.11.2025
PRONOUNCED ON :: 26.11.2025
1. By way of filing this criminal miscellaneous petition, the petitioner has challenged order dated 23.04.2015 passed by the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate No.1, Jaipur Development Authority, Jaipur, whereby cognizance for offences under Section 31(1) & 32(7) of Jaipur Development Authority Act, 1982 (for short, 'the Act of 1982') has been taken against him.
2. Petitioner has also assailed order dated 27.04.2019 passed by the Court of Additional District & Sessions Judge, No.9, Jaipur Metropolitan, whereby revision petition filed by the (Uploaded on 27/11/2025 at 03:26:54 PM) (Downloaded on 27/11/2025 at 06:19:48 PM) [2025:RJ-JP:46822] (2 of 11) [CRLMP-3981/2019] petitioner against cognizance order dated 23.04.2015 has been dismissed.
3. It is submitted that Sidhi Vinayak Buildestate Private Limited is a company incorporated under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956. Petitioner was inducted as one of the Director of the said company on 24.01.2001 and he resigned as Director of the company w.e.f., 16.08.2001. Copy of the Form No.32 submitted in the office of Assistant Registrar of company has been placed on record by the petitioner to prove that after 16.08.2001, he ceased to be Directer of above company.
4. It is also submitted that while petitioner was Director of the company for a limited period between 24.01.2001 to 16.08.2001, plot of land bearing No.B-7, Central Spine, Vidhyadhar Nagar, Jaipur was owned by the above company and lease deed dated 13.07.2001 was issued by the Jaipur Development Authority (for short, 'JDA') in favour of the aforesaid company and name of the petitioner was mentioned in the lease deed only in the capacity of Director of the above company. It is reiterated that after resignation of the petitioner as Director of the above company, he has got no relation whatsoever with the company, nor has he got any individual right, title or interest in the aforesaid plot of land.
5. It is further submitted that after resignation of the petitioner from the above company, in the year 2002, above company sought permission for construction and some construction appears to have been raised on the said plot. However, petitioner was neither involved in the proceedings of (Uploaded on 27/11/2025 at 03:26:54 PM) (Downloaded on 27/11/2025 at 06:19:48 PM) [2025:RJ-JP:46822] (3 of 11) [CRLMP-3981/2019] taking sanction for construction, nor was he part of construction team, on account of his resignation as a Director in the 2001.
6. The Enforcement Officer of the JDA inspected the aforesaid building on 04.08.2014 and issued notice under Section 31(1) & 32 of the Act of 1982 pointing out certain violations in the construction and directed the company to remove the aforesaid construction. However, the said notice was issued in the name of petitioner showing him to be a Director of Sidhi Vinayak Buildestate Private Limited, whereas as on 04.08.2014, he was no longer a Director of the company. Hence, on 14.08.2014, the petitioner submitted reply to the notice issued by the Enforcement Officer of JDA clarifying that he had already resigned from the company on 16.08.2001 and the details of existing directors of the company along with their mobile numbers was also given by the petitioner to the Enforcement Officer of JDA.
7. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that despite clarification given by the petitioner that after his resignation in the year 2001, he is not at all connected with the company, a complaint under Section 75 of the Act of 1982 was filed by the Enforcement Officer of JDA before the Chief Judicial Magistrate No.1, JDA, Jaipur. The complaint is titled as JDA Vs. Ridhi Sidhi Vinayak Buildestate Private Limited, however, in the array of parties, the aforesaid company has not been impleaded as accused, whereas the petitioner has been shown as the sole accused in the complaint.
8. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the complaint has been filed in a printed format and the cause of action has been shown of 04.08.2014. The representation dated (Uploaded on 27/11/2025 at 03:26:54 PM) (Downloaded on 27/11/2025 at 06:19:48 PM) [2025:RJ-JP:46822] (4 of 11) [CRLMP-3981/2019] 14.08.2014 filed by the petitioner in order to clarify as well as to apprise the Enforcement Officer of JDA that he has already resigned from the company w.e.f. 16.08.2001 was also part of complaint/charge-sheet filed by the Enforcement Officer of JDA before the Chief Judicial Magistrate No.1, JDA, Jaipur. It is also submitted that without their being any application of judicious mind and overlooking the material on record, learned Chief Judicial Magistrate No.1, JDA, Jaipur took cognizance against the petitioner vide order dated 23.04.2015. Bare perusal of the order would reveal that the order also appears to have been passed in a pre-decided format, without discussing anything with regard to making out of any cognizable offence against the petitioner.
9. Learned counsel for the petitioner would also submit that Section 74 of the Act of 1982 is explicitly clear, which deals with offences by company and in quite unambiguous words, the aforesaid provision lays down that if the person committing an offence under the Act of 1982 is a company, every person, who at the time the offence was committed was incharge of, and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence.
10. Learned counsel for the petitioner also submits that in view of the aforesaid provision, by no stretch of imagination, in the aforesaid circumstances, petitioner can be held guilty of the offence which was allegedly committed by the company on 04.08.2014. Thus, challenging the cognizance order, he filed revision petition before the Revisional Court. However, it overlooked the serous illegality as well as jurisdictional error on (Uploaded on 27/11/2025 at 03:26:54 PM) (Downloaded on 27/11/2025 at 06:19:48 PM) [2025:RJ-JP:46822] (5 of 11) [CRLMP-3981/2019] the part of learned trial Court in taking cognizance and rejected the revision petition vide order dated 27.04.2019 by an irrational and illogical order.
11. Learned counsel for the complainant-JDA opposed the present petition and submitted that since in the lease deed dated 13.07.2001 executed in respect of complaint in question, the petitioner was shown as the Director of the Company, therefore, no mistake whatsoever has been committed by JDA in filing complaint after impleading the petitioner as accused. It is also submitted that at the time of taking cognizance, the Magistrate is not required to meticulously examine the probable defence and in the circumstances, where bare reading of the complaint discloses commission of cognizable offence, the Magistrate can take cognizance. Hence, in the present case, the defence of the petitioner that he was Director of the company on the date of commission of offence, could not have been considered by the Magistrate at the stage of cognizance. He prayed for dismissing the instant petition by submitting that the cognizance order has also been examined by the Revisional Court, where the petitioner has failed to point out any jurisdictional error on the part of the Magistrate in taking cognizance in the matter.
12. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
13. Perusal of the complaint would reflect that the complaint has been drawn on a printed format, wherein although title of the case has been shown as JDA Vs. Ridhi Sidhi Vinayak Buildestate Private Limited but in the list of accused persons, company has not been impleaded as accused. The complaint also (Uploaded on 27/11/2025 at 03:26:54 PM) (Downloaded on 27/11/2025 at 06:19:48 PM) [2025:RJ-JP:46822] (6 of 11) [CRLMP-3981/2019] shows that the petitioner has been impleaded in his personal capacity without referring that he was Director of the aforesaid company. Documents enclosed along with complaint including notice under Sections 31 & 32 of the Act of 1982 would make it clear that the petitioner has been shown as Director of the Company. The representation/letter dated 14.08.2014 submitted by the petitioner to the Enforcement Officer of JDA is also a part of the complaint, wherein he has apprised the Enforcement Officer of JDA that he had already resigned from the company w.e.f. 16.08.2001 and even details of existing directors of the company was also given in the representation.
14. Thus, the entire complaint along with the documents would reveal that the sole reason for impleading the petitioner as accused in the instant matter is that as if he was Director of the Company on the date of commission of the offence. However, the Enforcement Officer of JDA has not investigated upon the factual aspects laid by the petitioner before him that he had already resigned as Director w.e.f 16.08.2001 and the company was being run by other directors as specified in the representation.
15. The order of cognizance is also silent with regard to any analysis whatsoever in respect of commission of any offence by the petitioner. It is a settled proposition of law that cognizance cannot be taken by the Magistrate in mechanical and routine manner and he is required to apply his judicious mind before taking cognizance of any offence.
16. In the present case, where the complaint is totally vague specifically in relation to role of the petitioner on the date of commission of offence i.e., in 04.08.2014 and the complaint (Uploaded on 27/11/2025 at 03:26:54 PM) (Downloaded on 27/11/2025 at 06:19:48 PM) [2025:RJ-JP:46822] (7 of 11) [CRLMP-3981/2019] although being titled as JDA Vs. Ridhi Sidhi Vinayak Buildestate Private Limited, yet the company has not even been made as accused in the instant case.
17. In the instant case, the petitioner has also produced the Form 32 submitted before the Registrar of Companies by Ridhi Sidhi Vinayak Buildestate Private Limited certifying the fact that the petitioner has already resigned from the company w.e.f. 16.08.2001. Thus, for an offence committed in relation to a property owned by the company, whether petitioner who had resigned w.e.f. 16.08.2001 can be said to be guilty of offence committed on 04.08.2014, it would be relevant to refer Section 74 of the Act of 1982, which is as under:
"74. Offence by companies- (1) If the person committing an offence under this Act is a company, every person, who at the time of offence was committed was incharge of, and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly:
Provided that nothing contained in this sub- section shall render any such person liable to any punishment provided in this Act, if he proved that the offence was committed without his knowledge or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-
section (1) where an offence under this Act has been committed by a company and it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance or, is attributable to any neglect on the part of any Director, Manager, Secretary or other officer of the company, such Director, Manager, Secretary, or other officer shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly."
18. Bare reading of aforesaid Section 74 of the Act of 1982 would make it clear that in the cases, where offence has been (Uploaded on 27/11/2025 at 03:26:54 PM) (Downloaded on 27/11/2025 at 06:19:48 PM) [2025:RJ-JP:46822] (8 of 11) [CRLMP-3981/2019] committed by the company, not all the directors or officers of the company can be held liable and only those directors, who were responsible for conduct of work of the company can be said to be responsible, in case, any offence has been committed. There is sufficient material on record to infer that petitioner was not a Director on 04.08.2014 when the offence is alleged to have been committed, nor was he in any manner responsible for any act or omission of the company on 04.08.2014. Therefore, by applying the provisions of the Section 74 of the Act of 1982, he cannot be said to have committed any offence on behalf of the company. Moreso, in the instant case, even the company has not been impleaded as accused in the complaint by the Enforcement Officer of JDA.
19. In the case of S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. Vs. Neeta Bhalla & Anr. reported in 2005 (8) SCC 89, where the Hon'ble Supreme Court was considering offences by company under the provisions of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short, 'the Act of 1881'), where the provisions of Section 141 of the Act of 1881 are para materia to Section 74 of the Act of 1982. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that, in view of the provisions, the criminal liability can be fastened only on the person who was either incharge of or responsible for the conduct of the business of the company on the date of commission of offence. In that case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has gone to the extent that merely being a Director of the company is not sufficient to make a person liable for commission of offence, if he was not in-charge of and responsible for the conduct of business of the company. In the present case, the petitioner was not even (Uploaded on 27/11/2025 at 03:26:54 PM) (Downloaded on 27/11/2025 at 06:19:48 PM) [2025:RJ-JP:46822] (9 of 11) [CRLMP-3981/2019] Director of the company on the date of commission of offence, therefore, he could not have been impleaded as accused in the complaint. Moreso, when this fact was clearly disclosed by the petitioner to the Enforcement Officer of JDA and such document was also part of the record of the learned trial Court.
20. In the case of State of Haryana Vs. Brij Lal Mittal & Ors. reported in 1998 (5) SCC 343, the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the offences by a company under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act 1940 (for short, 'the Act of 1940'), where also provisions of Section 34 of the Act of 1940 are para materia to Section 74 of the Act of 1982, and the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that even the directors, who were not responsible for the alleged act cannot be made liable for offence merely on account of holding the office of Director in the company. At the cost of repetition, in the present case, petitioner was not a Director of the company on the date of commission of offence.
21. The aforesaid principles laid down in the cases of Brij Lal Mittal (supra) & S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (supra) have been followed by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of D.P. Soni Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. reported in 2006 SCC OnLine Raj 356.
22. The principles with regard to taking cognizance have been laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of JM Laboratories & Ors. Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr. reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 208, where it has been underscored by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that order of the Magistrate taking cognizance must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. It (Uploaded on 27/11/2025 at 03:26:54 PM) (Downloaded on 27/11/2025 at 06:19:48 PM) [2025:RJ-JP:46822] (10 of 11) [CRLMP-3981/2019] was further observed that the Magistrate is required to examine the nature of allegations made in the complaint and the material in support thereof and as to whether that would be sufficient for proceeding against the accused.
23. In the instant case, the order of taking cognizance by the Magistrate would reflect that no reasons whatsoever even for the namesake have been assigned by the learned Magistrate, therefore, applying the well-known principles of criminal jurisprudence that the order of issuance of process is not an empty formality and the Magistrate is required to apply his mind as to whether sufficient grounds for taking cognizance exists or not, this Court finds that the order dated 23.04.2015 passed by the Magistrate is totally mechanical and is liable to be quashed and set aside. The Revisional Court in its order dated 27.04.2019 has also assigned baseless and unfounded reasons so as to negate the challenge by the petitioner and has totally overlooked that there was manifest and apparent jurisdictional error on the part of Magistrate in taking cognizance over a totally vague and evasive complaint assigning no role whatsoever to the petitioner as well as the fact that the complaint was filed in total controvention of the provisions of Section 74 of the Act of 1982.
24. For the foregoing reasons, this Court is of the considered view that permitting prosecution of the petitioner pursuant to complaint in question as well as the cognizance order dated 23.04.2015 would be sheer abuse of process of law. Hence, in order to secure ends of justice, this Court deems it just and proper to quash the cognizance order dated 23.04.2015 along (Uploaded on 27/11/2025 at 03:26:54 PM) (Downloaded on 27/11/2025 at 06:19:48 PM) [2025:RJ-JP:46822] (11 of 11) [CRLMP-3981/2019] with Revisional Court order dated 27.04.2019. Consequently, the petitioner stands discharged of all the charges.
25. Accordingly, the present Criminal Miscellaneous Petition stands allowed.
26. Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.
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