Delhi District Court
Mohd. Sultan vs Ghyas Alam on 17 February, 2020
IN THE COURT OF ARVIND BANSAL,
ACJ/CCJ/ARC: SOUTH-EAST, SAKET COURTS, DELHI.
*****
Ev. 65/18 Mohd. Sultan s/o Late Abdul Rashid.
r/o 270/1, Teachers College Road, Jamia Nagar, Okhla, New Delhi.
Through Attorney:
Rafay Sultan s/o Mohd. Sultan ....Petitioner VERSUS Ghyas Alam s/o Munshi Jamshed Ali at: Chaudhary Book Store, Ground Floor, Property No. 337-C/26, Near Aggarwal Sweets, Batla House, Main Road, Jamia Nagar, New Delhi. ..... Respondent Date of institution : 13.11.2018 Date of order : 17.02.2020 ORDER ON LEAVE TO DEFEND THE FACTS:
1. The present petition u/s 14 (1) (e) of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 has been filed by the petitioner against the respondent for his eviction from Property No. 337-C/26, Batla House, Main Road, Okhla, Jamia Nagar, New Delhi- 110025 (hereinafter called tenanted premises).
________________________________________________________________ Ev. No. 65/18 Mohd. Sultan Vs. Ghyas Alam 1/17
2. It is the case of petitioner / landlord that he is the owner of three shops and their back portion including hall situated on the ground floor of the property bearing no. 337C/26, Batla House, Jamia Nagar, New Delhi. It is averred that one shop of ground floor of aforesaid property was let out in May 1974 to the respondent and rent agreement was executed between wife of present petitioner and the respondent at a monthly rent of Rs. 140/- per month which was enhanced from time to time and shop is presently let out to the respondent at a monthly rent of Rs. 500/- per month.
3. It is averred that the petitioner has three sons, out of them, two are permanently settled in United States of America (USA) and one namely Rafay Sultan, aged about 54 years, was working with TV Today Group as Head of Camera since the year 2000, has left his employment in April 2017 due to illness of his father. The daughter of petitioner is averred to be married and settled with her husband at her matrimonial home. It is averred that son of the petitioner Rafay Sultan is totally unemployed since April 2017 after leaving his job with TV Today Group, and having no source of income, is totally dependent upon petitioner/landlord. It is averred that son of the petitioner intends to start business of video coverage of marriages and parties, and photo studio for the said purpose. He is stated to have consulted an architect who has suggested the necessity of space of about 448 sq. feet on the front portion of the road. It is averred that except the aforesaid property, petitioner/landlord has no other suitable commercial property for facilitating his son to start his business.
4. Notice of this eviction petition was sent to respondent in the prescribed format which was duly served. In response thereto, respondent ________________________________________________________________ Ev. No. 65/18 Mohd. Sultan Vs. Ghyas Alam 2/17 filed leave to defend application within the prescribed limitation period.
5. In his application / affidavit seeking leave to defend, respondent averred that property was let out in May 1974 vide a rent agreement executed between wife of petitioner and the respondent. It is submitted that respondent has been regularly paying rent of the tenanted premises. It is submitted that petitioner has four other properties available with him which are as follows:
1. Z-326/2, Okhla Main Road, Near Tikona Park, Jamia Nagar, New Delhi;
2. 259/2, Noor Nagar, Jamia Nagar, New Delhi;
3. All Friends Apartment, Plot No. 32, Street No. 11, West Zakir Nagar, New Delhi; &
4. Approximately 100 Bigha Land on Road in Ghoshipur Village, Hapur Road, Meerut, Uttar Pradesh.
6. It is averred that out the aforesaid properties, property at serial no. 1 and 3 have also been let out by the petitioner to other tenants and the one at serial no. 2 is lying vacant. It is stated that petitioner is also receiving pension of Rs. 80,000/- per month from Jamia Milia University and his son is also well settled in life as camera head of TV Today Group.
7. Respondent has also raised the aspect of ownership of suit property stating that rent agreement was entered into by wife of petitioner who also used to receive rent from respondent. It is submitted that son of petitioner has also received rent from respondent at many occasions and therefore, ________________________________________________________________ Ev. No. 65/18 Mohd. Sultan Vs. Ghyas Alam 3/17 it was not clear as to who was the owner of the property and therefore, petitioner was not entitled to seek relief from the Court without proving his ownership of the tenanted premises.
8. In reply to leave to defend of the respondent, it is submitted by petitioner that properties mentioned by respondent are not suitable for the business intended to be started by his son. It is stated that property bearing no. Z-326/2, Okhla Main Road, Near Tikona Park, Jamia Nagar, New Delhi, is a built up property and petitioner is owner of first, second and third floor of the same and it being residential, cannot be used for the business purpose of the son of the petitioner. Similarly, the property bearing no. 259/2, Noor Nagar, Jamia Nagar, New Delhi is completely constructed and lying vacant due to objections of the neighbours regarding its construction and is situated in residential area with 06 feet gali and as such, not suitable for any business purpose.
9. It is further submitted that property bearing Plot No. 32, Street No. 11, All Friends Apartment, West Zakir Nagar, New Delhi is a residential flat and petitioner is the owner of one flat at ground and fourth floor each. This property is also stated to be residential and not suitable for commercial purpose. It is stated that petitioner does not own 100 Bigha of land at Ghoshipur Village, Hapur Road, Meerut, Uttar Pradesh as asserted by respondent. It is submitted that son of petitioner has already left TV Today Group in April 2017 and is as such unemployed and requires the tenanted premises for starting his business.
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10. Learned counsel for respondent moved an application u/s 151 CPC stating therein that one another shop at the ground floor had been let out by the petitioner which is being used to run restaurant in the name and style of Kicthies.
11. In reply to the said application, it is submitted by petitioner that there are three shops on the ground floor, and submitted that he had filed two eviction petitions for the two shops on the ground floor, third shop which was lying vacant, was let out vide rent agreement dated 10.03.2019 upon condition that lease could be terminated even before expiry of lease period by giving one month written notice. It is submitted that third shop was let out due to financial crisis with the petitioner and can be got vacated after he succeeds in the two petitions before this Court.
12. Ld. counsel for the petitioner has inter alia relied upon the following judgments:-
(a) A. K. Woolen Industries vs. Narayan Gupta (Delhi High Court dated 31.10.2017);
(b) Anil Bajaj Vs. Vinod Ahuja 2014 AIR (SC) 2294;
(c) Labu Lal vs. Sandhya Gupta 2015 (224) DLT 473.
(d) Bhupinder Singh Bawa Vs. Asha Devi 2016 (4) CLJ 441 SC;
13. Ld. counsel for the respondent has relied upon judgment titled as Mod. Hannan & Anr. Vs. Abdul Basit Civil Appeal no. 3879 of 2019 decided on 11.04.2019 by Hon'ble Apex Court and S. K. Seth and Ors Vs. Vijay Bhalla 191 (2012) DLT 711.
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14. I have heard Ld. Counsels for the parties at length, gone through the records and considered the judgments.
The Law:-
15. In order to succeed in a petition for eviction filed under section 14(1)
(e) of the Act, the petitioner must establish that:
1. He is the owner and landlord in respect of the tenanted premises.
2. Relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties;
3. That he requires the premises bonafidely for himself or any member of his family dependent upon him; and
4. He has no other reasonably suitable accommodation available.
It is observed that the scope of Sec. 14(1)(e) of the Act has been enlarged in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court titled as "Satyawati Sharma v. Union of India" AIR 2008 SC 3148 so as to include premises let out for commercial purposes within the ambit of a petition under section 14(1)(e) of the Act.
As far as application for leave to defend is concerned, while deciding the question of grant of leave, the Court has to consider whether the tenant has raised any triable issue, the decision of which may disentitle the landlord from recovering possession of the premises. For the said purpose, the Controller is not required to conduct a full fledged trial but only to scrutinize the affidavit of the tenant.
________________________________________________________________ Ev. No. 65/18 Mohd. Sultan Vs. Ghyas Alam 6/17 In the judgment titled as "Nem Chand Daga v. Inder Mohan Singh Rana" reported as 94 (2001) DLT 683, the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi held:
"...that before leave to defend is granted, the respondent must show that some triable issues which disentitled the applicant from getting the order of eviction against the respondent and at the same time entitled the respondent to leave to defend existed. The onus is prima facie on the respondent and if he fails, the eviction follows..."
Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in case titled "Sarwan Dass Bange Vs. Ram Prakash" 167 (2010) DLT 80, while referring to "Baldev Singh Bajwa v. Monish Saini" (2005) 12 SCC 778 held as under:
"...that the legislative intent is of expeditious disposal of the application for ejectment of tenant filed on the ground of requirement by the landlord of the premises for his own occupation; a special category of landlords requiring the premises for their own use has been created; if there is any breach by the landlord, the tenant is given a right of restoration of possession; the landlord who evicts a tenant on the ground of own requirement is not only prohibited from letting out the premises or disposing of the same but also required to use the same for his own residence only. It was held that these restrictions and conditions inculcate in built strong presumption that the need of the landlord is genuine; the conditions and restrictions imposed on the landlord make it virtually improbable for the landlord to approach the Court for ejectment of tenant unless his need is bona fide − no unscrupulous landlord in all probability, under this Section, would approach the Court for ejectment of the tenant considering the onerous conditions imposed on him. It was further held that this inbuilt protection in the Act for the tenants implies that whenever the landlord would approach the court his requirement shall be presumed to be genuine and bona fide. It was further held that a heavy burden lies on the tenant to prove that the requirement is not genuine..."
The Findings:
16. In the aforesaid legal backdrop, the Court shall consider the present case and find out whether the need of landlord is actually genuine or the tenant has been successful in raising a triable issue on the basis of defences raised in the application seeking leave to defend u/s 25B of the ________________________________________________________________ Ev. No. 65/18 Mohd. Sultan Vs. Ghyas Alam 7/17 Act. The point wise discussion is as under:
Landlord/owner It is the case of petitioner that the tenanted premises were let out to the respondent / tenant in the year 1974 and a rent agreement was executed between his wife and the respondent. The said fact has remained undisputed and in fact, admitted by respondent in his affidavit filed u/s 25B of the Act. It is the averment that rent used to be paid by respondent either to the wife of petitioner or to his son and therefore, the ownership of property was not clear and as such, petitioner cannot seek his eviction.
It is observed that in a petition seeking eviction, title is not required to be proved on the standard of a civil suit based on title and a prima facie proof of ownership is sufficient to serve the purpose. In this scenario, following observations of Hon'ble Delhi High Court in "Sushil Kanta Chakarvarty Vs. Rajeshwar Kumar", 79 (1999) DLT 210 are significant to be quoted:
"in case of a petition u/s. 14 (1) (e) of the Act, in order to show the ownership, it is not necessary to show absolute ownership. The legislature used the word "owner", in section 14 (1) (e) not in the sense of absolute owner, but it was used in contra distinction with a landlord as defined in the Act who is not an owner but who owns the property for the benefit of another person and merely collects the rent. If the person collected the rent for himself and for his own benefit and the property is his own even in the loose sense and no one is claiming rights over the property, then he is considered as owner for the purpose of section 14 (1) (e) of the Act. Even possessory rights over the property of a person have been given recognition as ownership vis−a -vis tenant under Delhi Rent Control Act."
Further, the observations of this Court are fortified by the observations of Hon'ble Delhi High Court in "Meenakshi Vs. Ramesh Khanna & Anr.
________________________________________________________________ Ev. No. 65/18 Mohd. Sultan Vs. Ghyas Alam 8/17 60(1995) DLT 524:
" mere denial of ownership is no denial at all. It has to be something more. The object of the requirement contained in clause (e) that the petitioner should be the owner of the premises is not to provide an additional ground to the tenant to delay the proceedings by simply denying the ownership of the landlord of the premises and thereby putting him to proof by way of a full fledged trial. The object seems to be to ensure that the provision is not misused by the people having no legal right or interest in the premises. In proceedings under section 14 (1) (e) of the Act, the tenant is never a contender for title to the property. ...For this, first and foremost thing which has always been considered as a good guide is, does that tenant say who else is the owner of the premises, if not the petitioner? Thus, the tenant has to specify about the actual owner, in case he denies the ownership of the petitioner / landlord."
In the present case, the wife of petitioner has been admitted by the respondent to be the landlord, and he has also recognized the attorney of petitioner to have the status of landlord by admitting that rent used to be paid to him. In fact, there is nothing on record to even suggest that there is any dispute regarding the ownership of the tenanted premises. In fact during the proceedings, an application under Order VII Rule 14 CPC was moved by petitioner seeking permission to place the documents of his ownership on record. The application was allowed. This Court has gone through the copy of registered sale deed dated 13.01.1969 whereby the premises were purchased by petitioner from the erstwhile owner. This document nullifies the challenge of respondent that the ownership of tenanted premises is unclear making the petitioner ineligible to file the present petition. It is observed that the aforesaid sale deed dated 13.01.1969 alongwith admission of respondent / tenant regarding execution of rent agreement with wife of petitioner clarifies that petitioner is the landlord and owner of the premises and eligible and entitled to file the ________________________________________________________________ Ev. No. 65/18 Mohd. Sultan Vs. Ghyas Alam 9/17 present petition.
Relationship of landlord and tenant:
17. As observed in the preceding paragraph, respondent / tenant has admitted execution of rent agreement in May 1974 with wife of petitioner.
He has also admitted in his application / affidavit seeking leave to defend that rent used to be paid to wife of petitioner and at times to his son. In view of this admission and in terms of Section 116 of Indian Evidence Act, the respondent is estopped from raising a question mark over the landlord tenant relationship between the parties. The same was also held in the case of "Ramesh Chand Vs Uganti Devi" 157 (2009) Delhi Law Times 450 as follows:
"...It is settled preposition of law that in order to consider the concept of ownership under Delhi Rent Control act, the Court has to see the title and right of the landlord qua the tenant. The only thing to be seen by the Court is that the landlord had been receiving rent for his own benefit and not for and on behalf of someone else. If the landlord was receiving rent for himself and not on behalf of someone else, he is to be considered as the owner, howsoever imperfect his title over the premises may be. The imperfectness of the title of the premises cannot stand in the way of an eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act, neither the tenant can be allowed to raise the plea of imperfect title or title not vesting in the landlord and that too when the tenant has been paying rent to the landlord. Section 116 of the Evidence Act creates estoppels against such a tenant. A tenant can challenge the title of landlord only after vacating the premises and not when he is occupying the premises. In fact, such a tenant who denies the title of the landlord, qua the premises, to whom he is paying rent, acts dishonestly....."
In view of the aforesaid, it stands clearly established from material available on record that there is landlord tenant relationship between the parties for the purposes of section 14 (1) (e) of the Act. As such, no triable issue on the aspect either of ownership or landlord tenant relationship is ________________________________________________________________ Ev. No. 65/18 Mohd. Sultan Vs. Ghyas Alam 10/17 made out.
Bonafide Requirement as well as alternative accommodation:-
18. The petitioner has averred that tenanted premises are bonafidely required for use by his son for starting the business of video coverage of marriages and parties as well as for a photo studio. It is the averment that son of petitioner is presently unemployed having left his earlier job in April 2017 due to the illness of petitioner. It is also the case that there is no other family member to lookafter the petitioner as the other sons of petitioner are residing in USA.
The aforesaid averments have been challenged by the respondent stating that son of petitioner is not dependent upon him and is earning handsomely. It is averred that son of petitioner does not require either the financial or physical support of the petitioner for sustenance in life and therefore, the bonafide requirement claimed in the petition is false.
In the opinion of the Court, the rival averments of the parties need to be tested on the legal touchstone as laid down in the following judgments by the Hon'ble Higher Courts.
In "Jaswinder Singh Vs. Surinder Kaur", 204 (2013) DLT 716, it has been held as follows:
"14. As per law, bonafide requirement has to be seen and considered from the perspective of the landlord and tenant cannot be allowed to dictate the terms in which portion the landlord should reside."
It has been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in "Rishi Kumar Govil Vs. Maqsoodan", 2007 (1) RCR (Rent) 405 "It is the choice of the landlord to choose the place for the business which is most suitable for him. He has complete freedom in the matter."
________________________________________________________________ Ev. No. 65/18 Mohd. Sultan Vs. Ghyas Alam 11/17 In "Mohd. Ayub and anr Vs. Mukesh Chand" (2012) 2 SCC 155 it has been held that:
"...It is well settled the landlord's requirement need not be a dire necessity. The court cannot direct the landlord to do a particular business or imagine that he could profitably do a particular business rather than the business he proposes to start..."
Therefore, not only the landlord is at absolute liberty to carry on the business which he desires but he has the right to choose the premises from which he intends to carry on the business. No embargo can be put either on the choice of business or the place from where he intends to carry on the business. These terms cannot be dictated to the landlord by the tenant. The only safeguard for the tenant is the bonafide of landlord in this regard, and the Court is also duty bound to find out objectively that such requirement as pleaded by the landlord is genuine and not false or motivated.
19. The petitioner in the present case is retired from Jamia Milia University and is staying with his wife, son and his family. Petitioner is aged about 85 years and needs care and protection of the family. It is also not disputed that two sons of the petitioner are permanently staying in USA and he has only one son (who is also his attorney in the present case) to lookafter him and his wife in this oldage. The son of petitioner is stated to have left his previous employment in April 2017 and a letter in this regard issued by the employer has also been placed on record by the petitioner. This aspect of present unemployment of the son of petitioner has remained unchallenged by the respondent / tenant.
Besides the aforesaid, petitioner has sought eviction of the ________________________________________________________________ Ev. No. 65/18 Mohd. Sultan Vs. Ghyas Alam 12/17 respondent / tenant on the ground of requirement of the shop for his son to set up business of video coverage of marriages, parties and setting up of a photo studio. The son of petitioner has admittedly worked as camera head with his previous employer and as such, can reasonably and justifiably start such a business. Petitioner has also clarified the size of premises required for such a business. Petitioner is also justified in seeking eviction of the respondent from tenanted premises for the aforesaid purpose as in the circumstance discussed above, the son can be considered to be dependent upon his father particularly when he left his settled job to lookafter the ailing father and aged mother, and now seeking support of his father to set up his own business.
It is observed that petitioner has averred before the Court that how his son needs the tenanted premises to start new business. On the other hand, the respondent has failed to make any averment to show that there is no such bonafide requirement or that the factal situation is such that no bonafide requirement to start a new business can be said to exist. Therefore, there is no reason for this Court to doubt the bonafide need portrayed by the petitioner. The need to start a new separate business venture by a grown-up son who was so far employed outside, is natural, justified and bonafide. In the present facts, nothing has been shown to raise a doubt on such a bonafide need of the petitioner / his son. It is observed that parents in this country still consider themselves morally and socially obligated to provide maximum support possible for the growth and needs of their children and even grandchildren.
For this view support is also drawn from the observations made in "Kirshan Kumar Gupta Vs. Krishan Bhushan Gupta" 152 (2008) DLT ________________________________________________________________ Ev. No. 65/18 Mohd. Sultan Vs. Ghyas Alam 13/17 556 wherein it has been held that:
"In this country there is no social security system provided by State and the only social security is the security of the family. For gaining this social security of the family by the aged parents, they have to provide their sons and daughters the living accommodation, if available with them. The requirement of the landlord's sons and daughters and their families even if they are not financially dependent on him cannot be said to be unjustified or a mala fide requirement. If a daughter or son is taking care of the aged father/grandfather and his wife, it would be a bonafide necessity of the landlord, if he desires that his daughter or son should continue to live with him so that he continues to take care of him and his wife. Similarly, when it become difficult, due to old age, to move out, a person may desire that his sons and daughters visit him frequently and stay with him and the requirement of the landlord for this purpose cannot be said to be malafide but is a bonafide requirement."
In the opinion of the Court, respondent/ tenant failed to make any averment raising any contradiction or shortcoming in the averments and claims of the petitioner. In these circumstances, the ground of bonafide requirement raised by petitioner appears justified and respondent / tenant could not make a case of a triable issue on the basis of averments made in the application / affidavit seeking leave to defend.
20. Learned counsel for respondent has emphasized that the petitioner has many other properties available with him and can be utilized for starting the new business of his son. He has referred to four such properties in his application / affidavit seeking leave to defend. In reply thereto, petitioner has explained the status of all such properties.
As per the averments of respondent himself, the property of petitioner at Z-326/2, Okhla Main Road, Near Tikona Park, Jamia Nagar, New Delhi is already on rent. Similarly, property at Plot No. 32, Street No. 11, All Friends Apartment (where petitioner admitted to have one flat each ________________________________________________________________ Ev. No. 65/18 Mohd. Sultan Vs. Ghyas Alam 14/17 at ground and fourth floor) is also admittedly on rent. In fact, petitioner has clarified in his reply that both these properties are residential in nature. As regards, property no. 259/2, Noor Nagar, Jamia Nagar, New Delhi, the same has been averred to be lying vacant. It has been clarified by the petitioner that the same is lying vacant for last six years as during its construction, some neighbourers raised objection and the construction could not be completed. The property is averred to be situated in a six feet gali and is residential in nature. These aspects clarified by petitioner have not been controverted by the respondent / tenant by any written reply.
21. It is a settled law that a landlord is the best judge of his requirement and cannot be compelled to shift his prospective business at a place liked by tenant. In the present case, the requirement of petitioner and his son is that of a commercial property viable to start business of video coverage of marriages and parties and setting up of a photo studio. Undoubtedly, the Court cannot assume and direct the landlord to start such a business from a residential building and that to from first or fourth floor of the same. In the opinion of the Court, law requires that the tenant should respect the genuine and bonafide requirement of the landlord, and does not expect the landlord to face inconvenience in his life to ensure convenience of the tenant. In this regard, learned counsel for petitioner has relied upon judgment of Hon'ble Delhi High Court in case titled "M/s A. K. Woolen Industries & Ors vs. Shri Narain Gupta", Delhi High Court decided on 31.10.2017 wherein it was held that:
"19. ...It has been held that even if the landlord has other commercial premises available to him and even if the landlord is carrying on other businesses, if it is found that the landlord ________________________________________________________________ Ev. No. 65/18 Mohd. Sultan Vs. Ghyas Alam 15/17 intends to use the premises in occupation of the tenant for carrying on his business therefrom, the landlord is entitled to an order of eviction and the Courts cannot intervene in the same."
It was further observed in the said case:
"24. Supreme Court in Dhanna Lal vs. Kalawatibai (2002) 6 SCC 16 and in Uday Shankar Upadhay vs. Naveen Maheshwari (2010) 1 SCC 503 held that judicial notice can be taken of the fact that the upper floors are generally not commercially viable and consumers and patrons of the market are reluctant to walk into the same and are more prone to walk into a shop on the ground floor. Thus availability of the upper floors above the shop Nos. 602 and 603 supra on the ground floor cannot be said to be alternate suitable accommodation."
It is also necessary to refer to the observations of Hon'ble Delhi High Court in case titled "Anil Kumar Gupta vs. Deepika Verma" 2015 (224) DLT 473 wherein it is held:
"12. ... rather, legislators consciously and deliberately have used the words 'any member of family dependent on the landlord' instead of defining clear degree of relations so as to construe a vital meaning to the aforesaid words as man is social creature and part of complex sociatal system involving myriad of relations from which he cannot be isolated. It is significant to understands that dependencey is not restricted to financial or physical but also includes emotional reliance on another person.
...
similarly in Sain Dass Vs. Madan Lal; 1972 Ren CJ (SN) 8 (Delhi), this Court has acknowledged that the word 'himself' has to be construed to meet 'himself as co-habiting with his family member with whom he is normally accustomed to live. Therefore, contrary to the submissions of learned counsel for petitioner, financial or physical incapacipation cannot be the sole premise for determining dependency on another".
22. In view of the aforesaid discussion and particularly the fact that the requirement of tenanted premises by the petitioner for use by his son for starting a new business has been found bonafide, and the fact that the properties referred to by respondent can by no means be considered an alternative suitable accommodation, it is concludingly observed that the ________________________________________________________________ Ev. No. 65/18 Mohd. Sultan Vs. Ghyas Alam 16/17 respondent / tenant has failed to make any such convincing averment in the application / affidavit seeking leave to defend which may create or raise a triable issue thereby dis-entitling the landlord from seeking his eviction from the tenanted premises. Further, in the considered opinion of this Court, no purpose would be served by compelling the petitioner to step into the witness box. As such, no triable issue on the basis of averment of respondent in the application / affidavit seeking leave to defend is made out.
23. For the foregoing reasons, the application of respondent seeking leave to defend is hereby dismissed and as a necessary consequence thereof, an eviction order is passed in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent for his eviction from one shop measuring 10x8, at ground floor of property no. 337-C/26, Batla House, Main Road, Jamia Nagar, New Delhi which is portion of Khasra No. 465/118, Khatoni No. 64/197 of Revenue Estate of Village Okhla, New Delhi. (shown in red in site plan Mark X, the Mark put by the court for the purpose of identification). However, in the light of Section 14 (7) of the Act, the aforesaid eviction order shall not be executable for a period of six months from the date of this order. The parties to bear their own costs.
File be consigned to the Record Room after due compliance. Announced in the open Court on 17.02.2020.
(ARVIND BANSAL) Additional Rent Controller (South-East) Saket Courts, New Delhi.
________________________________________________________________ Ev. No. 65/18 Mohd. Sultan Vs. Ghyas Alam 17/17 ________________________________________________________________ Ev. No. 65/18 Mohd. Sultan Vs. Ghyas Alam 18/17