Karnataka High Court
National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs Sarojini And Ors. on 25 February, 1994
Equivalent citations: II(1994)ACC423, 1994ACJ781, 1994(2)KARLJ53
Author: T.J. Chouta
Bench: T.J. Chouta
JUDGMENT M. Ramakrishna, J.
1. We have heard Mr. O. Mahesh, learned counsel for the appellant and perused the grounds taken in the appeal as well as the order made by the Tribunal under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter called as 'the Act') by which a sum of Rs. 25,000/- has been awarded by way of interim award along with interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum.
2. The main contention of Mr. O. Mahesh in support of the appeal is that the original claimant, Sarojini Gopal Hegde, mother of Anitha, who died in the accident that occurred on 30.5.1992, having died during the pendency of M.V.C. No. 850 of 1992, the Tribunal was in error in allowing the application under Section 140 of the Act for grant of interim compensation in favour of the respondents herein who are none other than the other dependants of Sarojini. His submission is that the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 being not the legal representatives of the deceased Anitha are not entitled to come on record claiming compensation.
3. We have perused the order under appeal. In para No. 9 thereof, the Tribunal observed that the respondents, including the appellant herein, did not seriously object to the grant of interim compensation. However, being aggrieved by the order granting interim compensation in favour of respondent Nos. 2 and 3, the appellant filed this appeal.
4. On merits, we do not agree with the contention of Mr. O. Mahesh inasmuch as this court having considered a similar question in M.F.A. No. 1627 of 1986, disposed of on 19.1.1994, held against the similar contention.
5. Further, the Supreme Court in the case of Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai 1987 ACJ 561 (SC), has held that:
(10) Clauses (b) and (c) of Sub-section (1) of Section 110-A of the Act provide that an application for compensation arising out of an accident may be made where death has resulted from the accident by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased or by any agent duly authorised by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased. The proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 110-A provides that where all the legal representatives of the deceased have not joined in any such application for compensation, the application shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all the legal representatives of the deceased and the legal representatives who have not so joined shall be impleaded as respondents to the application. The expression 'legal representative' has not been defined in the Act. Section 2(11) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, defines 'legal representative' as a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person and includes any person who intermeddles with the estate of the deceased and where a party sues or is sued in a representative character the person on whom the estate devolves on the death of the party so suing or sued. The above definition, no doubt, in terms does not apply to a case before the Claims Tribunal but it has to be stated that even in ordinary parlance the said expression is understood almost in the same way in which it is defined in the Code of Civil Procedure. A legal representative ordinarily means a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person or a person on whom the estate devolves on the death of an individual. Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 110-A of the Act authorises all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased to make an application for compensation before the Claims Tribunal for the death of the deceased on account of a motor vehicle accident and Clause (c) of that Sub-section authorises any agent duly authorised by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased to make it. The proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 110-A of the Act appears to be of some significance. It provides that the application for compensation shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all the legal representatives of the deceased. Section 110-A(1) of the Act thus expressly states that (i) an application for compensation may be made by the legal representatives of the deceased or their agent and (ii) that such application shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all the legal representatives. Both the person or persons who can make an application for compensation and the persons for whose benefit such application can be made are thus indicated in Section 110-A of the Act. This section in a way is a substitute to the extent indicated above for the provisions of Section 1-A of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, which provides that 'every such action or suit shall be for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent and child, if any, of the person whose death shall have been so caused, and shall be brought by and in the name of the executor, administrator or representative of the person deceased'. While the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, provides that such suit shall be for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent and child of the deceased, Section 110-A(1) of the Act says that the application shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of the legal representatives of the deceased. A legal representative in a given case need not necessarily be a wife, husband, parent and child. It is further seen from Section 110-B of the Act that the Claims Tribunal is authorised to make an award determining the amount of compensation which appeals to it to be just and specifying the person or persons to whom compensation shall be paid. This provision takes the place of the third para of Section 1-A of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, which provides that in every such action, the court may give such damages as it may think proportioned to the loss resulting from such death to the parties respectively, for whom and for whose benefit such action shall be brought. Persons for whose benefit such an application can be made and the manner in which the compensation awarded may be distributed amongst the persons for whose benefit the application is made are dealt with by Section 110-A and Section 110-B of the Act and to that extent the provisions of the Act do supersede the provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, insofar as motor vehicles accidents are concerned. These provisions are not merely procedural provisions. They substantively affect the rights of the parties. As the right of action created by the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, was 'new in its species, new in its quality, new in its principles, in every way new' the right given to the legal representatives under the Act to file an application for compensation for death due to a motor vehicle accident is equally new and an enlarged one. This new right cannot be hedged in by all the limitations of an action under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. New situations and new dangers require new strategies and new remedies.
6. Therefore, in the light of the law laid down by the Supreme Court and this court in the above appeal, we reject the contention of Mr. O. Mahesh, learned counsel.
7. In view of the aforesaid reasons, we do not see any ground to interfere with the impugned order. In the result, appeal fails and is dismissed.