Karnataka High Court
Rayappa S/O Gundappa Doddamani And Anr vs Smt.Putalabai W/O Bhimashankar Mala ... on 24 November, 2025
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NC: 2025:KHC-K:7140
RSA No. 200147 of 2014
HC-KAR
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
KALABURAGI BENCH
DATED THIS THE 24TH DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2025
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM
REGULAR SECOND APPEAL NO.200147 OF 2014 (SP)
BETWEEN:
1. RAYAPPA S/O GUNDAPPA DODDAMANI,
AGE: ABOUT 49 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE,
R/O DASTAPUR,
TQ. AND DIST. GULBARGA. -585105
2. PEERAPPA S/O GUNDAPPA DODDAMANI,
AGE: ABOUT 35 YEARS,
OCC: AGRICULTURE, R/O DASTAPUR,
TQ. AND DIST. GULBARGA. -565105
...APPELLANTS
(BY SRI. DEEPAK V. BARAD, ADVOCATE)
Digitally signed by
RENUKA AND:
Location: HIGH
COURT OF SMT. PUTALABAI W/O BHIMASHANKAR MALA,
KARNATAKA
SINCE DECEASED THROUGH HER LRS,
1. SMT AYYAMMA @ ANOORADHA,
W/O LATE REVANĄSIDDAPPA MALA,
AGE: ABOUT 37 YEARS
OCC: HOUSEHOLD AND AGRICULTURE,
R/O KAPNOOR, TQ. AND DIST,
GULBARGA -585104.
2. NANDINI D/O LATE REVANASIDDAPPA,
AGE: ABOUT 13 YEARS,
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NC: 2025:KHC-K:7140
RSA No. 200147 of 2014
HC-KAR
OCE: NIL, R/O KAPNOOR,
TQ. AND DIST. GULBARGA-585104.
3. NAINA D/O LATE REVANASIDDAPPA,
AGE: ABOUT 11 YEARS, OCC: NIL,
R/O KAPNOOR,
TQ. AND DIST. GULBARGA -585104.
4. BHUMIKA D/O LATE REVANASIDDAPPA,
AGE: ABOUT 9 YEARS, OCC: NIL,
R/O KAPNOOR,
TQ. AND DIST. GULBARGA-585104.
5. NAGAVENI D/O LATE REVANASIDDAPPA,
AGE: ABOUT 7 YEARS,
OCC: NIL, R/O KAPNOOR,
TQ. AND DIST. GULBARGA- 585104.
THE RESPONDENT NO.2 TO 5 BEING MINORS
REPRESENTED BY THEIR NEXT-FRIEND/MOTHER,
I.E RESPONDENT NO. 1 AYYAMMA.
6. SHIVALEELA W/O BABURAO HANDRALE,
AGE: ABOUT 47 YEARS, OCC: HOUSEHOLD,
R/O PWD QUARTERS NO.26(B),
OLD JEWARGI ROAD, GULBARGA.-51510
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. K. S. SAKRY, ADVOCATE FOR R1 TO R5;
NOTICE TO R6 IS SERVED)
THIS REGULAR SECOND APPEAL IS FILED UNDER
SECTION 100 OF CPC, PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT
AND DECREE DATED 26.02.2014 PASSED BY THE III ADDL
SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE GULBARGA, IN R.A.NO.87/2012 AND THE
JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 09.07.2012 PASSED BY THE
PRINCIPAL CIVIL JUDGE & J.M.F.C. AT GULBARGA IN
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NC: 2025:KHC-K:7140
RSA No. 200147 of 2014
HC-KAR
O.S.NO.52/2010, AND ALLOW THE SUIT AS PRAYED FOR, IN
THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY.
THIS APPEAL, COMING ON FOR FURTHER HEARING, THIS
DAY, JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM
ORAL JUDGMENT
(PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM) The captioned second appeal by the unsuccessful plaintiffs, who are assailing the concurrent judgments rendered by both the Courts below dated 26.02.2014 passed by III Addl. Senior Civil Judge, Gulbarga in RA No.87/2012 and dated 09.07.2012 passed by Principal Civil Judge and JMFC Court, Gulbarga in OS No.52/2010, who have declined to grant discretionary relief of specific performance and have ordered refund of earnest money of Rs.2,72,000/- with future interest at the rate of 6% p.a.
2. For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to as per their rank before the Trial Court. -4-
NC: 2025:KHC-K:7140 RSA No. 200147 of 2014 HC-KAR
3. Facts leading to the case are as under:
A suit in O.S. No.52/2010 was instituted by the plaintiffs seeking specific performance of a registered agreement of sale dated 19.10.2006. The plaintiffs alleged that the husband of defendant No.2, namely Revanasiddappa, had executed the agreement for legal necessity and had received an advance sale consideration of Rs.2,72,000/-. According to the plaintiffs, despite repeated requests by the legal heirs of the original agreement holder, Gundappa, the legal heirs of Revanasiddappa failed to execute the sale deed, compelling them to file the present suit.
4. The defendants contested the suit by seriously disputing the alleged agreement of sale. Defendant No.1 filed an individual written statement; defendant Nos.2 to 6 filed a joint written statement; and defendant No.7, sister of Revanasiddappa, filed a memo adopting the statement of defendant No.1. The consistent defence was that the -5- NC: 2025:KHC-K:7140 RSA No. 200147 of 2014 HC-KAR suit property is joint family ancestral property. The defendants denied the execution of the agreement and the receipt of Rs.2,72,000/-. They further contended that no legal or family necessity existed and, therefore, Revanasiddappa had neither authority nor compelling reason to alienate the ancestral property. His locus to execute the alleged agreement of sale was specifically questioned.
5. The Trial Court, after framing issues, permitted both sides to adduce oral and documentary evidence. On appreciation of the material on record, the Trial Court answered Issue Nos.1 and 2 in the affirmative, holding that the plaintiffs had proved the execution of the agreement dated 19.10.2006 as well as their readiness and willingness. However, while considering the discretionary relief of specific performance, the Court held that the suit property being joint family ancestral property, the plaintiffs were not entitled to such equitable relief. The suit was therefore partly decreed by directing refund of the -6- NC: 2025:KHC-K:7140 RSA No. 200147 of 2014 HC-KAR advance consideration, while the principal relief of specific performance was declined.
6. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree, the plaintiffs preferred R.A. No.87/2012. The Appellate Court, on re-appreciation of the evidence, concurred that the execution of the agreement and the plaintiffs' readiness and willingness stood proved. Nonetheless, the Appellate Court proceeded on a different premise and observed that granting the larger relief of specific performance at this stage would seriously prejudice the rights of the defendants. On this reasoning, the appeal came to be dismissed.
7. This Court, by order dated 05.02.2015, admitted the appeal and formulated the following substantial question of law:
"Whether the Trial Court and First Appellate Court having come to the conclusion that the plaintiffs have proved the execution of the agreement of sale by the defendant dated -7- NC: 2025:KHC-K:7140 RSA No. 200147 of 2014 HC-KAR 19.10.2006 and that the plaintiffs have been ready and willing to purchase the suit scheduled property/ committed any legal error dismissing the suit exercising the discretionary power on the ground that it will cause inconvenience to the plaintiffs and other share holders of the property?"
Finding on substantial question of law:
8. In a suit for specific performance, the Court's inquiry is narrowly tailored to two facets: (i) whether the plaintiffs have established due execution of the suit agreement, and (ii) whether they have proved continuous readiness and willingness to perform their part of the contract as required under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. The ultimate grant or denial of the decree rests on a judicious exercise of discretion; however, such discretion must be exercised on legally relevant considerations. The Trial Court declined the relief solely on the ground that the suit property is joint family ancestral -8- NC: 2025:KHC-K:7140 RSA No. 200147 of 2014 HC-KAR property. That approach is perverse, palpably erroneous, and contrary to the settled position of law.
9. Repeatedly, this Court has held that in a suit for specific performance the contest is primarily inter se the agreement-holder and the executant; the competing claims of non-alienating coparceners are not adjudicated within such proceedings. The Court must confine itself to the proof of the agreement and the plaintiff's readiness and willingness. Refusal of the larger relief can only be in accordance with the mandate of Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act (as applicable), i.e., upon legally sustainable grounds such as comparative hardship, unfair advantage, or other recognized equitable considerations duly pleaded and proved. Absent those foundations, a mere label of "ancestral property" cannot defeat an otherwise valid claim for specific performance.
10. It is incumbent upon a defendant who seeks the Court's discretion under Section 20 to specifically plead and lead evidence on comparative hardship or other -9- NC: 2025:KHC-K:7140 RSA No. 200147 of 2014 HC-KAR equitable bars. Specific performance cannot be refused by resort to Section 20 in the absence of such pleadings and proof. In the present case, there is not even a whisper in the written statements about comparative hardship, unforeseen detriment, or disproportionate prejudice to the defendants. The Trial Court, therefore, had no occasion nor any legal basis to weigh hardship; indeed, it did not advert to that enquiry precisely because no such plea was raised. Refusal of specific performance without the requisite pleadings and evidentiary substratum is legally impermissible.
11. The Trial Court has declined specific performance solely because the property is described as ancestral. That reasoning is unsustainable. In a suit for specific performance, the Court adjudicates the agreement-holder's right by applying the principles under Section 16(c) and by testing the agreement's validity, enforceability, and the plaintiffs' conduct. If the equities lean in favour of the plaintiffs, the decree must follow. The
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NC: 2025:KHC-K:7140 RSA No. 200147 of 2014 HC-KAR mere ancestral character of the property is not, by itself, a defense to specific performance as between the agreement holder and the executant. The rights of non-alienating coparceners if any are not tried within such suit; they may work out their independent remedies in a properly instituted partition or declaratory action. Time and again, this Court has refused to permit non-alienating members to defeat a specific performance claim on the bare plea that the property is joint family ancestral property. To that extent, the Trial Court's contrary view suffers from perversity and warrants interference.
12. Turning to the First Appellate Court's reasoning, this Court finds that the Appellate Court fell into error by examining "hardship" when no issue on that point was framed and no foundational pleadings existed. At no stage did the defendants contend that grant of specific performance would inflict irreparable loss upon them that could not be compensated in money or that enforcement would operate with disproportionate severity. In the
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NC: 2025:KHC-K:7140 RSA No. 200147 of 2014 HC-KAR absence of a specific plea and an issue on comparative hardship, the Appellate Court could not have invoked Section 20 to deny the decree. Its approach amounts to travelling beyond the pleadings and issues, and is therefore legally infirm.
13. In any event, even on the plea of hardship, the defendants' own documents, Records of Rights marked as Exs.D6 and D7 show that the family owns other lands besides the suit property. The defendants' rebuttal evidence thus undermines any suggestion of disproportionate hardship. Moreover, if a decree for specific performance is drawn, the conveyance will, in law, abide the outcome of any partition proceedings and operate to the extent of the alienor's transferable interest, with appropriate equities to be worked out by the competent Court in the partition suit.
14. It is also placed on record by learned counsel for the respondents/defendants that defendant No.7 (sister of Revanasiddappa) has instituted a partition suit,
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NC: 2025:KHC-K:7140 RSA No. 200147 of 2014 HC-KAR which stands decreed. Even so, grant of specific performance herein will be subject to, and operate consistently with, the preliminary decree in the partition suit; the conveyance shall pass such right, title and interest as the alienor could validly convey, leaving intact the rights of non-alienating members to have their shares carved out in those proceedings. The First Appellate Court, therefore, erred in invoking "comparative hardship" in the teeth of absent pleadings and issues. Its refusal to grant the larger relief on that ground is perverse and contrary to settled law, and cannot be sustained.
CONCLUSION:
15. Upon a comprehensive re-appraisal of the findings of both the Courts below and an examination of the legal principles governing suits for specific performance, this Court is constrained to hold that the judgments of the Trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court suffer from serious legal infirmities amounting to perversity.
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NC: 2025:KHC-K:7140 RSA No. 200147 of 2014 HC-KAR
16. The Trial Court, despite having categorically recorded findings in favour of the plaintiffs on the crucial issues namely, due execution of the agreement of sale dated 19.10.2006 and the plaintiffs' readiness and willingness proceeded to deny the relief of specific performance on an untenable ground that the suit property is joint family ancestral property. This approach reflects a fundamental misapplication of law.
17. The Trial Court failed to appreciate that the nature of the property or the competing claims of non- alienating coparceners are wholly irrelevant considerations in a suit for specific performance between the agreement- holder and the executant. The Trial Court travelled far beyond the permissible scope of scrutiny under Sections 16(c) and 20 of the Specific Relief Act. No plea of comparative hardship or equity was raised in the written statements, nor any issue framed. Yet, the Trial Court declined relief on an extraneous and legally impermissible ground. This deviation from the settled proposition of law
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NC: 2025:KHC-K:7140 RSA No. 200147 of 2014 HC-KAR has rendered the finding not merely erroneous but perverse, as it completely ignores binding precedents which hold that non-alienating members may pursue their rights only in an independent partition action.
18. The First Appellate Court, though concurring that execution of the agreement and the plaintiffs' readiness and willingness stood proved, dismissed the appeal on a wholly new ground: alleged hardship to the defendants if specific performance were to be granted. This reasoning is equally unsustainable and exhibits perversity on multiple counts:
i. Absence of Pleadings: The defendants never pleaded comparative hardship or any disproportionate prejudice in their written statements. In the absence of pleadings, no foundation existed for the Appellate Court to examine hardship under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act.
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NC: 2025:KHC-K:7140 RSA No. 200147 of 2014 HC-KAR ii. Absence of Issue: No issue regarding hardship was framed by the Trial Court. The Appellate Court could not have ventured into an area outside the scope of the pleadings and issues.
iii. Contrary Evidence: Even assuming hardship could be examined, the defendants' own documents (Exs. D6 and D7) establish that the family owns substantial properties apart from the suit property. This evidence negates any theory of hardship. Yet, the Appellate Court chose to rely on an unfounded assumption, ignoring relevant evidence on record. iv. Disregard of Settled Law: The First Appellate Court overlooked the principle that hardship must be pleaded, proved, and shown to have been unforeseeable at the time of contract. None of these foundational requirements were satisfied.
19. The First Appellate Court's finding is, therefore, perverse as it rests on conjecture, is unsupported by
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NC: 2025:KHC-K:7140 RSA No. 200147 of 2014 HC-KAR pleadings or evidence, and is directly contrary to binding legal principles.
20. The perversity in the findings of both the Courts below goes to the very root of their respective judgments. Both Courts ignored the admitted and proved factual matrix, travelled beyond their jurisdictional limits, relied upon legally impermissible considerations, and failed to apply the settled principles governing the grant of specific performance. This has resulted in miscarriage of justice, warranting interference by this Court under Section 100 of CPC.
21. The substantial question of law framed by this Court therefore stands answered in the 'affirmative', in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendants.
22. For the foregoing reasons, this Court proceeds to pass the following:
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NC: 2025:KHC-K:7140 RSA No. 200147 of 2014 HC-KAR ORDER I. The Regular Second Appeal is allowed. II. The suit in O.S. No.52/2010 is decreed for specific performance. The plaintiffs shall deposit the balance sale consideration before the Trial Court within six (6) weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this judgment. III. Defendant Nos.1 to 6 shall execute a registered sale deed in favour of the plaintiffs, upon receipt of the balance sale consideration, within two (2) months from the date of such deposit/notice of deposit before the Court below. IV. In default of execution by the defendants within the aforesaid period, the plaintiffs shall be at liberty to seek execution of the decree; the Trial Court shall thereupon cause the sale deed to be executed in accordance with law.
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NC: 2025:KHC-K:7140 RSA No. 200147 of 2014 HC-KAR V. It is clarified that the conveyance and its incidents shall abide by, and be subject to, the rights of non-alienating family members as determined in the partition proceedings, and shall operate to the extent of the alienor's transferable interest, with equities to be adjusted by the competent Court.
VI. Draw decree accordingly.
Sd/-
(SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM) JUDGE NJ/SRT List No.: 3 Sl No.: 1 CT:SI