Karnataka High Court
Smt. Soumya M Bapat vs The State Of Karnataka on 26 September, 2025
Author: S.G.Pandit
Bench: S.G.Pandit
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 26TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2025
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S. G. PANDIT
AND
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K.V.ARAVIND
WRIT PETITION NO.26378/2025 (S-KSAT)
BETWEEN:
SMT. SOUMYA M BAPAT
W/O SRI BHEEMASHANKAR S GULED
AGED ABOUT 39 YEARS
ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF
COMMERCIAL TAXED-LGST037
O/O JOINT CCT DGSTO 5, 5TH FLOOR
VTK-2, KORAMANGALA
BENGALURU - 560 047
R/AT A1, GROUP A OFFICERS APARTMENTS
1ST CROSS, 8TH MAIN,
PALACE LOOP ROAD, VASANTH NAGAR,
BENGALURU-560052.
... PETITIONER
(BY SMT. KEERTHANA NAGARAJ, ADV.)
AND:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
REP. BY ITS CHIEF SECRETARY
VIDHANA SOUDHA
BANGALORE - 560001.
2
2. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
REP. BY ADDITIONAL CHIEF SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE
VIDHANA SOUDHA
BANGALORE- 560 001.
3. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
REP. BY ITS UNDER SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE
(CT - II & COORDINATION)
VIDHANA SOUDHA
BANGALORE- 560 001.
4. THE COMMISSIONER AND COMMERCIAL TAXES
COMMISSIONER TAXES OFFICE
1ST MAIN, KALIDASA ROAD
GANDHI NAGAR
BANGALORE- 560009.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI V SHIVAREDDY, AGA) THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO I). SETTING ASIDE THE ORDER DATED 06.04.2023 PASSED BY KARNATAKA STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL AT BENGALURU IN APPLICATION NO.3197/2021, PRODUCED AS ANNEXURE-A, AS BEING ILLEGAL AND VOID; II). ISSUE APPROPRIATE WRIT OR ORDER IN THE NATURE OF CERTIORARI QUASHING THE IMPUGNED ENDORSEMENT BEARING NO.AAE78 VATHEC 2019 DATED 19.04.2021 ISSUED BY THE 3RD RESPONDENT PRODUCED AT ANANEXURE-A11 TO THIS PETITION AND ETC.
THIS PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR ORDER ON 16.09.2025 COMING ON THIS DAY, S.G.PANDIT J., PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING: 3
CORAM: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE S.G.PANDIT and HON'BLE MR JUSTICE K.V.ARAVIND CAV ORDER (PER: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE S.G.PANDIT) The petitioner, Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes is before this Court, aggrieved by the order dated 06.04.2023 in Application No.3197/2021 passed by the Karnataka State Administrative Tribunal at Bengaluru (for short "Tribunal") where under, her challenge to endorsement dated 19.04.2021 refusing to include her name in the State-wide Local Cadre of Hyderabad-
Karnataka is rejected and also her challenge to Rule 6 of Karnataka Public Employment (Reservation for Employment in Hyderbad-Karnataka Region) (Organisation of Local Cadres Allottment & Transfer of Persons) Rules, 2013 (for short "2013 Rules") is also rejected.4
2. The petitioner, in pursuance to recruitment of Gazetted Probationers Group-A and Group-B as per Karnataka Recruitment of Gazetted Probationers (Appointment by Competitive Examination) Rules 1997 was appointed as Commercial Tax Officer under Notification dated 17.02.2014. Subsequently, on 31.01.2018, the petitioner was promoted to the post of Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes. Prior to her appointment, the petitioner married one Sri.Bheemashankar S. Guled on 29.11.2012. Pursuant to Article 371-J of the Constitution of India, Government of Karnataka framed 2013 Rules. In terms of Rule 6 of 2013 Rules, the State Government constituted Local Cadre. The petitioner had not sought to include her name in the local cadre when the process was initiated and local cadre was formed in the Department of Commercial Taxes. Subsequently, after more than 4 years from the date 5 of her appointment, she made a representation seeking inclusion of her name in the Hyderabad- Karnataka local cadre. The said request was rejected by endorsement dated 19.02.2019 and the said endorsement was the subject matter of Application No.3221/2019 before the Tribunal. The Tribunal, under order dated 07.08.2020 directed the respondents to consider the application of the petitioner without reference to delay. The Tribunal, in another Application No.2513/2020 by its order dated 26.08.2020 set aside the time line prescribed under Rule 6 of 2013 Rules. This Court, by order dated 18.03.2021 in W.P.No.3377/2021 modified the order passed by the Tribunal, with a direction to the respondents to consider the representation of the petitioner dated 28.12.2018 on merits and in accordance with law afresh. The said representation was rejected by issuance of endorsement dated 6 19.04.2021 which was the subject matter of Application No.3197/2021 and the Tribunal, vide the impugned order dated 06.04.2023 held that the petitioner was not a local person as on the date of claiming the benefits. Questioning the said order of the Tribunal, petitioner is before this Court in this writ petition.
3. Heard learned counsel Smt.Keerthana Nagaraj for petitioner. Learned AGA Sri.V.Shivareddy for respondents. Perused the entire writ petition papers.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that the impugned order passed by the Tribunal is without considering the contentions raised by the petitioner, as such, the same requires interference by this Court. Learned counsel would submit that the petitioner acquired status of a local person through her marriage in the year 2012 itself and the 7 respondents-authorities ought to have given an opportunity to the petitioner to claim her right as local person and ought to have included her name in the local cadre. It is submitted that denial of inclusion of petitioner's name in the Hyderabad Karnataka Local Cadre has affected the seniority and promotional prospects of the petitioner and that if her name was included in the local cadre, she would have been entitled for next promotion. Thus, learned counsel would pray for allowing the writ petition.
5. To the Court query with regard to delay in preferring the present writ petition, learned counsel for the petitioner filed an affidavit dated 16.09.2025 stating that the petitioner was on maternity leave from 18.04.2022 to 15.01.2023 and her husband was transferred from Benglauru to Belagavi and she was also transferred from Bengaluru to Belagavi by order dated 07.03.2024. In the said circumstances, she 8 submits that she could not approach this Court in time.
6. On the contrary, learned AGA would submit that the petitioner has neither claimed her status as Local Person nor has she sought for inclusion of her name in the local cadre as on the date of her recruitment and appointment on 17.02.2014. It is only 4 years after her appointment that she had made representation claiming to include her name in the local cadre. Further, learned AGA would submit that there is delay of more than 2 years in approaching this Court, which is not properly explained. The petitioner was on maternity leave prior to the passing of the impugned order by the Tribunal and the petitioner has not explained the delay in approaching this Court from the date of passing of the order by Tribunal, till the writ petition is filed on 28.08.2025. Thus, learned AGA 9 prays for dismissal on merits as well as on the ground of delay.
7. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the entire writ petition papers, the only point which falls for our consideration is as to whether the impugned order passed by the Tribunal requires interference at the hands of this Court.
8. Answer to the above point would be in the negative for the following reasons:
Admittedly, the petitioner was appointed in pursuance of the recruitment notification of Gazetted Probationers Group-A and Group-B by competitive examination under Notification dated 17.02.2014.
Admittedly, the petitioner has not claimed reservation or applied under Hyderabad-Karnataka Local Cadre.
It is also an admitted fact that the petitioner though married to one Bheemashankar S Guled who belonged 10 to Hyderabad-Karnataka region in November 2012, has not claimed her status as Hyderabad-Karnataka and has not sought for including her name in the local cadre seniority list till her representation on 28.12.2018, i.e. more than 4 years from the date of her appointment. When option was called in terms of Rule 6 of 2013 Rules on 20.10.2014, the petitioner has not opted for Hyderabad-Karnataka region local cadre. Having failed to claim local cadre status at an appropriate time, the petitioner for the first time submitted representation in the year 2018. The Tribunal has rightly observed that the petitioner is not recruited to the local cadre and she has not claimed local cadre reservation, she would not be entitled for benefits of local cadre. The Tribunal has also answered petitioner's contention that her case is governed by decision of the Tribunal in Application No.2513/2020 dated 26.08.2020. The Tribunal has 11 rightly come to the conclusion that there is no pleading or averment in the application to compare her case to that of case in Application No.2513/2020.
On careful examination of the impugned order passed by the Tribunal, we do not find any error in the order passed by the Tribunal.
9. Moreover, the petitioner is not diligent in prosecuting her grievance, as observed earlier, she was appointed as Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes in February 2014; for the first time she made a representation to include her name to the local cadre only in December 2018.Thereafter, she approached the Tribunal; the Tribunal passed order on 06.04.2023 and the present writ petition is filed only on 28.08.2025, more than 2 years from the date of passing the impugned order by the Tribunal. 12
10. There is no explanation in the writ petition with regard to delay in filing the writ petition before this Court. To the Court query with regard to delay, the petitioner has filed an affidavit wherein at paragraph 9, it is stated as follows:
"9. I submit that copies of the office orders and leave records, are annexed to this affidavit. These documents clearly establish that:
(a) That I was on maternity leave from 18.04.2022 till 15.01.2023.
(b) That my husband was
transferred from Bengaluru to
Belagavi in September, 2023.
(c) That, I too was officially
transferred to Belagavi as per order dated 07.03.2024, which is far from Bengaluru.13
(d) That circumstances made it practically impossible for me to give instructions to counsel in time."
The above indicates that the petitioner was on maternity leave from 18.04.2022 to 15.01.2023, the period which is prior to the date of impugned order passed by the Tribunal on 06.04.2023. There is no explanation for delay from the date of Tribunal's order on 06.04.2023 to the date of filing the writ petition on 28.08.2025. The reasons of maternity leave and her transfer are prior to the date of order impugned. Transfer of her husband to Belagavi and petitioner's transfer to Belagavi on 07.03.2024 would have no bearing on delay in approaching this Court. Both petitioner as well as her husband are Group-A Officers and it is not open for the petitioner to say that it was practically impossible for her to give instructions to her counsel in time. The petitioner is taking a chance 14 by filing the present writ petition. The grievance of the petitioner is only that her promotional prospects are affected, but it is not her case that she is denied promotion itself.
11. The Hon'ble Apex Court in P.S.SADASIVASWAMY v/s STATE OF TAMIL NADU reported in (1975) 1 SCC 152 has observed that it is not that there is any period of limitation for the Courts to exercise their power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India nor is it that there can never be a case where the Courts cannot interfere in a matter after passage of a certain length of time. But it would be sound and wise exercise of discretion for the Courts to refuse to exercise their extraordinary powers under Article 226 in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for relief and who stand by and allow things to happen and then approach the Court to put forward stale claims and try 15 to unsettle settled matters. The above observation of the Hon'ble Apex Court was while considering the case of challenge to a promotion belatedly.
12. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of MRINMOY MAITY V. CHHANDA KOLEY AND OTHERS , reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 551 was considering the question of delay in approaching the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and held that when the extraordinary jurisdiction of the writ court is invoked, it has to be seen as to whether within a reasonable time same has been invoked and even submitting of memorials would not revive the dead cause of action or resurrect the cause of action which has had a natural death. Relevant paragraphs 9, 10, 11 and 12 read as follows:
"9. Having heard rival contentions raised and on perusal of the facts obtained in the present case, we are of the considered view that writ petitioner ought to have been non-suited or in 16 other words writ petition ought to have been dismissed on the ground of delay and latches itself. An applicant who approaches the court belatedly or in other words sleeps over his rights for a considerable period of time, wakes up from his deep slumber ought not to be granted the extraordinary relief by the writ courts. This Court time and again has held that delay defeats equity. Delay or latches is one of the factors which should be born in mind by the High Court while exercising discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a given case, the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if laxity on the part of the applicant to assert his right has allowed the cause of action to drift away and attempts are made subsequently to rekindle the lapsed cause of action.
10. The discretion to be exercised would be with care and caution. If the delay which has occasioned in approaching the writ court is explained which would appeal to the conscience of the court, in such circumstances it cannot be gainsaid by the contesting party that for all times to come the delay is not to be 17 condoned. There may be myriad circumstances which gives rise to the invoking of the extraordinary jurisdiction and it all depends on facts and circumstances of each case, same cannot be described in a straight jacket formula with mathematical precision. The ultimate discretion to be exercised by the writ court depends upon the facts that it has to travel or the terrain in which the facts have travelled.
11. For filing of a writ petition, there is no doubt that no fixed period of limitation is prescribed. However, when the extraordinary jurisdiction of the writ court is invoked, it has to be seen as to whether within a reasonable time same has been invoked and even submitting of memorials would not revive the dead cause of action or resurrect the cause of action which has had a natural death. In such circumstances on the ground of delay and latches alone, the appeal ought to be dismissed or the applicant ought to be non- suited. If it is found that the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and latches, the High Court ought to dismiss the petition on that sole 18 ground itself, in as much as the writ courts are not to indulge in permitting such indolent litigant to take advantage of his own wrong. It is true that there cannot be any waiver of fundamental right but while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226, the High Court will have to necessarily take into consideration the delay and latches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. This Court in the case of Tridip Kumar Dingal v. State of W.B., (2009) 1 SCC 768 has held to the following effect:
"56. We are unable to uphold the contention. It is no doubt true that there can be no waiver of fundamental right. But while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Articles 32, 226, 227 or 136 of the Constitution, this Court takes into account certain factors and one of such considerations is delay and laches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. It is well settled that power to issue a writ is discretionary. One of the grounds for refusing reliefs under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution is that the petitioner is guilty of delay and laches.
57. If the petitioner wants to invoke jurisdiction of a writ court, he should come to the Court at the earliest reasonably possible opportunity.19
Inordinate delay in making the motion for a writ will indeed be a good ground for refusing to exercise such discretionary jurisdiction. The underlying object of this principle is not to encourage agitation of stale claims and exhume matters which have already been disposed of or settled or where the rights of third parties have accrued in the meantime (vide State of M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai, [AIR 1964 SC 1006 : (1964) 6 SCR 261], Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Court, [AIR 1967 SC 1450] and Bhoop Singh v. Union of India, [(1992) 3 SCC 136 : (1992) 21 ATC 675 : (1992) 2 SCR 969]). This principle applies even in case of an infringement of fundamental right (vide Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi, [(1969) 1 SCC 110], Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports & Exports, [(1969) 1 SCC 185] and Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India, [(1970) 1 SCC 84]).
58. There is no upper limit and there is no lower limit as to when a person can approach a court. The question is one of discretion and has to be decided on the basis of facts before the court depending on and varying from case to case. It will depend upon what the breach of fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and when and how the delay arose."
12. It is apposite to take note of the dicta laid down by this Court in Karnataka Power 20 Corporation Ltd. v. K. Thangappan, (2006) 4 SCC 322 whereunder it has been held that the High Court may refuse to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction if there is negligence or omissions on the part of the applicant to assert his right. It has been further held thereunder:
"6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, [(1969) 1 SCC 185 : AIR 1970 SC 769]. Of course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably.
7. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd, [[L.R.] 5 P.C. 221 : 22 WR 492] (PC at p. 239) was approved by this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Meher, [AIR 1967 SC 21 1450] and Maharashtra SRTC v. Shri Balwant Regular Motor Service, [(1969) 1 SCR 808 : AIR 1969 SC 329]. Sir Barnes had stated:
"Now, the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy either because the party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitation, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances always important in such cases are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy."
8. It would be appropriate to note certain decisions of this Court in which 22 this aspect has been dealt with in relation to Article 32 of the Constitution. It is apparent that what has been stated as regards that article would apply, a fortiori, to Article 226. It was observed in Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India, [(1970) 1 SCC 84 : AIR 1970 SC 470] that no relief can be given to the petitioner who without any reasonable explanation approaches this Court under Article 32 after inordinate delay. It was stated that though Article 32 is itself a guaranteed right, it does not follow from this that it was the intention of the Constitution-makers that this Court should disregard all principles and grant relief in petitions filed after inordinate delay.
9. It was stated in State of M.P. v.
Nandlal Jaiswal, [(1986) 4 SCC 566 :
AIR 1987 SC 251] that the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule is premised on a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring, in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the 23 effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third- party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction."
13. For the reasons recorded above, on merits as well as on the ground of delay, the writ petition stands rejected.
SD/-
(S.G.PANDIT) JUDGE SD/-
(K.V.ARAVIND) JUDGE MPK CT: bms