Gujarat High Court
Poonamben @ Tasleem D/O Ajitsingh Rana vs State Of Gujarat on 6 March, 2020
Author: Vikram Nath
Bench: Vikram Nath, Ashutosh J. Shastri
C/LPA/1606/2019 CAV JUDGMENT
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 1606 of 2019
In
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 20814 of 2018
With
CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR STAY) NO. 1 of 2019
In
R/LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 1606 of 2019
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. VIKRAM NATH
and
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE ASHUTOSH J. SHASTRI
=========================================================
1 Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see
the judgment ? Yes
2 To be referred to the Reporter or not ? Yes
3 Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy of the No
judgment ?
4 Whether this case involves a substantial question of law No
as to the interpretation of the Constitution of India or any
order made thereunder ?
=========================================================
POONAMBEN @ TASLEEM D/O AJITSINGH RANA
Versus
STATE OF GUJARAT
=========================================================
Appearance:
MR ASIM PANDYA, SR. ADVOCATE Assisted by SHRI SURAJ
MATEIDA for MR ANANT R CHRISTIAN(8522) for the Appellant(s) No.1
ARPIT R SINGHVI(9524) for the Appellant(s) No. 1
for the Respondent(s) No. 2
MR DM DEVNANI ASSISTANT GOVERNMENT PLEADER/PP(99) for
the Respondent(s) No. 1
=========================================================
CORAM: HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. VIKRAM NATH
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C/LPA/1606/2019 CAV JUDGMENT
and
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE ASHUTOSH J. SHASTRI
Date : 06/03/2020
CAV JUDGMENT
(PER : HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE ASHUTOSH J. SHASTRI) The present Letters Patent Appeal is filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, against the judgment and order dated 29.08.2019.
The background of facts giving rise to the present Letters Patent Appeal is that the appellant - original petitioner, is a resident of Vadodara. The appellant - original petitioner was charged with offences punishable under Sections 3, 4, 5 and 7 of The Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act 1956. The said complaint was registered before the Pradhyumannagar Police Station, Rajkot City on 04.07.2008 which was registered as FIR being C.R. No.II83 of 2008. Pursuant to the said First Information Report, the appellant has got herself released on bail. Apprehending an action of detention against her, a petition was brought before this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, claiming the following reliefs : "18(A) Your Lordships may be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or directions quashing and setting aside the order of detention prepared and sought to Page 2 of 42 Downloaded on : Sun Jun 14 02:16:46 IST 2020 C/LPA/1606/2019 CAV JUDGMENT be served on the petitioner by respondent no. 2, under the provisions of Section 3(2) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti Social Activities Act, 1985;
(B) During pendency and final disposal of this petition, Your Lordships may be pleased to stay further operation, implementation and execution of the order of detention prepared by respondent no. 2 under the provisions of Section 3(2) of the Gujarat Prevention of AntiSocial Activities Act, 1985;
(C ) Pass any other and/or further orders that may be thought just and proper, in the facts and circumstances of the present case;"
This petition appears to have been filed in the month of December, 2018 and it came up for consideration before the learned Single Judge on 29.08.2019. After hearing both the sides, the learned Single Judge was pleased to dismiss the petition vide order of date since the same is at the stage of pre execution. By assigning reasons, the order came to be passed, which has been made the subject matter of the present Letters Patent Appeal before us.
We have heard Shri Asim Pandya, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Shri Suraj Mateida, learned counsel for Shri A.R. Christian, learned counsel appearing for the appellant and Shri D.M. Devnani, learned Assistant Government Pleader representing the State - authorities.
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Before dealing with the present controversy arraigned in Letters Patent Appeal, we may like to quote some preface.
The society is governed by the Rule of law and effect of it is to regulate orderly behaviour of a citizen. The appellant herein was offender of the provisions of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956. The object of this enactment is to curb the activity of immoral traffic. In the past, prior to enactment, it was found that some States had legislation on the subject of immoral traffic but the provisions were not uniform and many of the States were not having even such legislation. In the process of thinking to uniform, the Government of India ratified an International Convention for the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Persons and Exploitation of Prostitution of Others, which Convention was held at New York on 9th May 1950 and with a view to accelerate pace of achieving the said object, Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Bill was introduced in the Parliament and then, gradually, through process, this Act 104 of 1956 came to be enacted in the name of "The Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956". Since a prostitution involves employment of human body for hire, stringent provisions have been made in the Act with rigorous Page 4 of 42 Downloaded on : Sun Jun 14 02:16:46 IST 2020 C/LPA/1606/2019 CAV JUDGMENT consequences of its violation. Here is a litigant an appellant who deliberately and with impunity has come out with a plea of claiming parity in respect of preexecution of an order of detention. A systematic attempt is made to evade the process of execution of detention. The appellant before us has been found to have indulged herself into a nefarious activity of running a business of flesh trade, which is strictly prohibited by virtue of the provisions of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956. At the time when the raid was carried out, the appellant herself was found along with one another lady and in the commercial complex, other ladies were found with customers, allegedly committed an offence which was running under the shelter of the present appellant's activity. Upon lodging the complaint before Pradyuman Nagar Police Station, Rajkot City, the appellant got herself released on bail and after one or two reporting, in response to the compliance of the conditions of bail, she did not respect to the conditions of bail and throughout did not cooperate with the present complaint and its process, which ultimately led the said criminal case to be put under dormant stage for want of service of summons.
Now, after successfully evading from the clutches of law, Page 5 of 42 Downloaded on : Sun Jun 14 02:16:46 IST 2020 C/LPA/1606/2019 CAV JUDGMENT the present appellant has surfaced and made an attempt to secure the liberty under the guise of filing the writ petition at a preexecution stage and that too, after coaccused being released, who was detained herself and then got the order in the writ petition, challenging her detention order. The object of this enactment is to curb the activity of immoral traffic. In the past, prior to enactment, it was found that some States had legislation on the subject of immoral traffic but the provisions were not uniform and many of the States were not having even such legislation. In the process of thinking to uniform, the Government of India ratified an International Convention for the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Persons and Exploitation of Prostitution of Others, which Convention was held at New York on 9th May 1950 and with a view to accelerate pace of achieving the said object, Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Bill was introduced in the Parliament and then, gradually, through process, this Act 104 of 1956 came to be enacted in the name of "The Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956". Since prostitution involves employment of human body for hire, stringent provisions have been made in the Act with rigorous consequences of its violation.
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In light of the aforesaid, we have heard learned Senior Advocate Shri Asim Pandya, Shri Asim Pandya, learned Senior Counsel has vehemently contended that a bare perusal of the allegations contained in the complaint itself suggest that no circumstance is visible to exercise and invoke power of detention under the provisions of The Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act"). By referring to Section 3 of the Act, the learned Senior Counsel has submitted that the appellant has neither disturbed the public order nor adversely affected the public tempo. It has also been contended that this is merely a solitary offence registered against her. As such, since the condition precedent contained under the provisions of the Act is not satisfied, the action of detention cannot be initiated and the order of detention passed cannot be executed, since the same is not sustainable in the eye of law.
Shri Pandya, learned Senior Counsel has further contended that the liberty of a citizen cannot be curtailed, as is enshrined under Constitution of India. Simply because a citizen is entangled in a criminal complaint, it would not ipso facto Page 7 of 42 Downloaded on : Sun Jun 14 02:16:46 IST 2020 C/LPA/1606/2019 CAV JUDGMENT grant the discretion to invoke the draconian power of detention. Exfacie, according to Shri Pandya, learned Senior Counsel the ingredients are not satisfied, hence, the view taken by the learned Single Judge is apparently erroneous. It has been submitted that the authorities have not properly posted the facts before the learned Single Judge. Otherwise, undisputedly, for declaring the appellant as an absconder, the steps are to be taken under Sections 82 and 83 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the procedure contained therein, has not been observed at all. As such, the Notification, which is attempted to be pressed, dated 05.01.2009, is of no significance, since the same is not legally enforceable.
Shri Pandya, learned Senior Counsel has further submitted that, in fact, no genuine efforts were made by the investigating agency to search out the appellant and has unilaterally opined before the Court that the appellant has remained absconder. As such, the learned Single Judge has committed an error in observing the appellant as an absconder.
Shri Pandya, learned Senior Counsel has further submitted that there is no absolute proposition that at preexecution stage, Page 8 of 42 Downloaded on : Sun Jun 14 02:16:46 IST 2020 C/LPA/1606/2019 CAV JUDGMENT no writ jurisdiction can be exercised at all. In fact, it all depends on a case to case basis and here is a case where when solitary offence is registered, and codetenue has been enlarged and released, the writ Court ought to have considered this material aspect before passing the order. As such, the order passed by the learned Single Judge is not sustainable.
It is further submitted that the appellant has not been absconder. In fact, she was very much present in the city of Vadodara, and at various offices at various stage. She was very much present when the documentation had taken place, for registration in the office of the SubRegistrar. Not only was she very much present in the year 2010, 2013, 2015 as well as in the year 2019, she herself has remained present before the office of the SubRegistrar and then got the documents registered. Therefore, to brand the appellant as an absconder is nothing but a clear attempt to prejudice the Court. Shri Pandya, learned Senior Counsel has further submitted that except on one occasion i.e. on 20.11.2018, genuine efforts ought to have been made throughout, right from 2008 to 2019. However, no such steps were taken. As a result of this, without appreciating this material aspect, since the learned Single Judge has dismissed Page 9 of 42 Downloaded on : Sun Jun 14 02:16:46 IST 2020 C/LPA/1606/2019 CAV JUDGMENT the petition, the order requires consideration.
It has further been submitted that here is a case in which the order of detention was passed way back in the year 2008. The same has not been executed throughout even till 2019. That circumstance in itself would suggest that there is no live link established. The effect of the order of detention itself has lost its significance. Accordingly, Shri Pandya, learned Senior Counsel, has submitted that on the similar lines on which, the coaccused has been released from the detention, the same benefit be extended to the present appellant as well. The detention matter of coaccused in the form of Special Civil Application No. 20467 of 2018 came to be decided on 18.02.2019. Therefore, this circumstance ought not to have been ignored by the learned Single Judge.
Shri Pandya, learned Senior Counsel has also emphasized the concept of liberty enshrined under Constitution of India. He has submitted that such a valuable right of a citizen cannot be scuttled in the manner in which the learned Single Judge has dismissed the petition. To emphasize this point and to persuade us to exercise the jurisdiction, the following are the decisions Page 10 of 42 Downloaded on : Sun Jun 14 02:16:46 IST 2020 C/LPA/1606/2019 CAV JUDGMENT pressed into service by the learned Senior Counsel referred hereinafter : (1) In the case of Jayshreeben @ Jyotiben W/o Kiritbhai Joshi v. State of Gujarat, rendered in Special Civil Application No. 20467 of 2018 decided on 18.02.2019. (2) In the case of Alpesh Navinchandra Shah v State of Maharashtra & Ors., reported in 2007 (2) SCC 777. (3) In the case of Mohammad Ashraf Ismail Nagori v.
State of Gujarat rendered in Special Civil Application No. 3774 of 2019 decided on 03.04.2019.
(4) In the case of Chandrasinh Kanuji Rathod v. State of Gujarat through the Public Prosecutor, rendered in Special Civil Application No. 14366 of 2011 decided on 17.01.2012.
(5) In the case of S.M.D. Kiran Pasha v. Government of A.P. & Ors., rendered in Criminal Appeal No. 702 of 1989 decided on 09.11.1989. (Equivalent citation : (1990) 1 SCC 328.
(6) In the case of Kavalappara Kottarathil Kochunni @ Moopil Nayar v. State of Madras & Ors., reported in 1959 Suppl. (2) SLR 316 (Equivalent citation = AIR 1959 SC 725.
Page 11 of 42 Downloaded on : Sun Jun 14 02:16:46 IST 2020 C/LPA/1606/2019 CAV JUDGMENT (7) In the case of Nawabkhan Abbaskhan v. The State of Gujarat reported in (1974) 2 SCC 121.
After referring to some of the observations contained in the aforesaid decisions, Shri Pandya, learned Senior Counsel has reiterated his submissions and submitted that the order passed by the learned Single Judge is not tenable in the eye of law. The order passed by the learned Single Judge since erroneous and contrary to the aforesaid well settled proposition, the appeal deserves to be allowed. It is requested to grant the reliefs as prayed for. No other submissions have been made.
As against this, Shri D.M. Devnani, learned Assistant Government Pleader appearing on behalf of the State - authority has vehemently contended that in view of the proposition of law laid down by the decision delivered by the Full Bench of this Court, detention orders are not to be interfered with in a routine manner, unless and until a special circumstance is made out. This being not that kind of a case, no interference be made and the learned Single Judge has not committed any error in disposing of the petition. Shri Devnani, learned Assistant Page 12 of 42 Downloaded on : Sun Jun 14 02:16:46 IST 2020 C/LPA/1606/2019 CAV JUDGMENT Government Pleader has vehemently contended that the learned Single Judge has rightly observed that the appellant - petitioner is an absconder, evading arrest since long pursuant to the order of detention. To substantiate this contention, Shri Devnani, learned Assistant Government Pleader has referred to some of the documents which are attached with the affidavitinreply filed in the present proceedings.
First document which has been referred to is a document dated 22.07.2008 which is an order of detention in respect of the appellant. According to Shri Devnani, learned Assistant Government Pleader, the appellant was supposed to observe conditions of bail in respect of the very offence i.e. C.R. No. II83 of 2008. By referring to communication dated 05.09.2008, it has been contended that after intimating about being unable to mark presence on 15.09.2008, on the medical ground, the appellant has remained absconding and has not observed the conditions of the bail as well. Therefore, such a citizen who has evaded the process of law and has for years violated the conditions of bail is not to be given any equitable consideration.
Additionally, Shri Devnani, learned Assistant Government Page 13 of 42 Downloaded on : Sun Jun 14 02:16:46 IST 2020 C/LPA/1606/2019 CAV JUDGMENT Pleader has submitted that the Police authorities have taken effective steps immediately on noticing the fact that the appellant has committed breach and not obeyed the instructions and evading arrest under Section 8(2) of the PASA Act, 1985. The Pradhyumannagar Police Station, PSI, Rajkot City, has already written a letter to the Commissioner of Vadodara City intimating that since the appellant - accused is an absconder in connection with the detention order, procedure for attachment of the property deserves to be undertaken, hence, solicited certain information with respect to the appellant's property. Simultaneously, the RTO officer, Vadodara City has also been informed about the particulars of the vehicle, which is registered in the name of the appellant. The District Collector, Vadodara has also been informed by the Pradhyumannagar Police Station, Rajkot City to provide information related to the properties belonging to the appellant. In the year 2008, as well, statements were recorded of the relatives, who happened to be the brother and mother. The statement of the chowkidar of Eliash Apartment has also been recorded, where the appellant is stated to have been residing. The said statement was recorded in the year 2015 also, along with those of other persons residing in the area namely, Urmilaben W/o. Rajubhai Tadvi. The said statement has Page 14 of 42 Downloaded on : Sun Jun 14 02:16:46 IST 2020 C/LPA/1606/2019 CAV JUDGMENT indicated that the appellant is residing in Eliash Apartment, but in the evening had gone to attend a marriage ceremony. The contact number and every details are not available. The statements of other neighbouring persons have also been recorded. Indravadan R. Solanki is a resident of Ravi Park Society, Vadodara, where he is carrying on his business activity. Further statements have also been recorded in the month of December, 2015, but such efforts failed to trace out the appellant. However, on instructions, Shri Devnani, learned Assistant Government Pleader has submitted that the said efforts are still on to nab the appellant. As a result of this, despite efforts having been made by the Police authorities, the appellant has been successful in evading arrest. Accordingly, Shri Devnani, learned Assistant Government Pleader has requested that this is a sufficient reason on account of which, the appeal deserves to be dismissed.
Shri Devnani, learned Assistant Government Pleader has further submitted that this appellant has not only indulged in such heinous and torturous activity, but caught red handed when the raid was carried at Rajkot. However, she was successful to get herself released on bail and thereafter, Page 15 of 42 Downloaded on : Sun Jun 14 02:16:46 IST 2020 C/LPA/1606/2019 CAV JUDGMENT absconded. On the contrary, when the statement was recorded at the relevant point of time, on 05.07.2008, this appellant has given incorrect address of her residence. Not only that, she has made an attempt to utilize the number plate of 'Vice President, Indian Press Council, Gujarat State' and has successfully evaded the process of law throughout. This fact is clearly visible from her own statement which has been recorded where she has clearly admitted the said fact. On the basis of the material on record, Shri Devnani, learned Assistant Government Pleader has submitted that this is a fit case where Letters Patent Appeal deserves to be dismissed with costs.
Shri Devnani, learned Assistant Government Pleader has further submitted that the appellant - petitioner, was very much aware of steps being taken against her under the provisions of the PASA Act, 1985. This apprehension has been clearly voiced out by herself, which is reflected from communication at page 117 as well as 118, attached to the affidavitinreply. That being the position, the appellant was completely aware of the fact that detention steps have already been in contemplation. She has moved a petition only after seeing that the coaccused has been already granted relief in the month of February, 2019. Shri Page 16 of 42 Downloaded on : Sun Jun 14 02:16:46 IST 2020 C/LPA/1606/2019 CAV JUDGMENT Devnani, learned Assistant Government Pleader has drawn our attention from the affidavits made by the appellant and thereby has contended seriously that taking advantage of the order passed by the Court in respect of coaccused, who after successfully evading arrest is now seeking relief at preexecution stage, without surrendering herself to the process of law. Here, Shri Devnani, learned Assistant Government Pleader has submitted that in the case of the coaccused, she surrendered herself to the order of detention. She then submitted a petition which is allowed, whereas here, the appellant is making consistent efforts without surrendering herself to the process of detention. Shri Devnani, learned Assistant Government Pleader has reiterated that here is a case which is not a simplicitor case of a single offence or innocent person whose liberty is at stake. Rather, here is a smart litigant who had successfully dribbled the authority time and again, has evaded arrest and has now come forward to take advantage to claim parity. This conduct itself requires deprecation. This circumstance is sufficient enough not to exercise extra ordinary equitable jurisdiction in favour of the appellant.
Apart from this, the allegations contained in FIR are Page 17 of 42 Downloaded on : Sun Jun 14 02:16:46 IST 2020 C/LPA/1606/2019 CAV JUDGMENT sufficient enough to see that a systematic organized crime was undertaken by the appellant. As such, Shri Devnani, learned Assistant Government Pleader has requested that let the statutory authority be allowed to exercise power to execute the order. Hence, no case is made to call for interference. Shri Devnani, learned Assistant Government Pleader has relied upon the following decisions to substantiate his contentions.
(1) In the case of N.K. Bapna v. Union of India & Ors., reported in (1992) 3 SCC 512.
(2) In the case of Naresh Kumar Goyal v. Union of India reported in 2005 (8) SCC 276.
(3) In the case of Vinod K. Chawla v. Union of India & Anr., reported in (2006) 7 SCC 337.
(4) In the case of Dropti Devi & Anr., v. Union of India & Ors., reported in (2012) 7 SCC 499.
(5) In the case of Vijaysinh @ Gatti Pruthvisinh Rathod v. State of Gujarat, reported in 2015 (1) GLR 703. Additionally, Shri Devnani, learned Assistant Government Pleader has further submitted that discretion not be exercised in favour of such person, particularly, in view of the fact that in a Page 18 of 42 Downloaded on : Sun Jun 14 02:16:46 IST 2020 C/LPA/1606/2019 CAV JUDGMENT criminal complaint, a case is now put up in dormant stage for want of service of summons. As such, the concept of liberty cannot be stretched to such kind of element who do not respect the process of law. As such, it is requested to the Court to dismiss the Letters Patent Appeal by confirming the order passed by the learned Single Judge and not to exercise the discretion in favour of the appellant - petitioner.
Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties and having gone through the material on record, few circumstances are not possible to be left unnoticed by this Court for arriving at an ultimate conclusion in the present proceedings.
Upon perusal of the allegations levelled in the First Information Report, it is specifically alleged that the present appellant is indulging in such kind of activity on regular basis and called the girls from outside. Based upon this allegation, the present appellant was found physically present when the raid was carried out and is specifically named in the First Information Report. The persons have been found from the respective offices premises. Resultantly, the First Information Page 19 of 42 Downloaded on : Sun Jun 14 02:16:46 IST 2020 C/LPA/1606/2019 CAV JUDGMENT Report was registered.
Further, it appears that in connection with this FIR, this very appellant was, after some period, released on bail upon some suitable conditions. However, as per the stand of the authority, this appellant has, after marking presence on one or two occasions, disappeared and not obeyed the conditions upon which, she was released on bail. It is further revealed from the specific assertion, supported by documentary evidence, that the Police authorities have taken effective steps at the relevant point of time to secure the presence of the appellant and to serve the detention warrant issued on 16.08.2008. However, under one pretext or another, the appellant has evaded arrest and not submitted herself to the process of law. Further, it is revealed from the documents attached to the affidavitinreply, filed by the Police Commissioner, Rajkot City, Mr. Manoj Agarwal, that there are serious discrepancies in the residential address of this appellant - Poonamben. Few statements, which were recorded at the relevant point of time, indicate veracity of the address of the appellant and some statements are to the effect that the address has been given wrongly, so as to see that the appellant may not be available. The statement of the mother, Shabnamben @ Page 20 of 42 Downloaded on : Sun Jun 14 02:16:46 IST 2020 C/LPA/1606/2019 CAV JUDGMENT Khurshid Aziz Nawab has also been recorded in which, she has specifically asserted that though this appellant has been coming and going, but for two years, she has not come and her correct name is Taslim while she was calling herself Poonam.
Yet another statement recorded is that of her brother Mr. Saifudinbhai Aziz Nawab, who himself has stated that he had no knowledge regarding where the appellant presently resides. Further he has clearly asserted that she has misused Car No. GJ 5 CS 5225 and has been residing lavishly and not coming home at all. He has further asserted that the car on which although the name plate of 'Member, Vice President, Indian Press Council' is pasted, however, in truth, the brother is not a member of the Council and she has misused his name.
Additionally, the address given of Elaish Apartment, Ground Floor, where the Chowkidar of the said Apartment is from nearby vicinity named as Rajubhai Natubhai Tadvi has asserted that the appellant is not available. Same is the case with the statement of Urmilaben w/o Rajubhai Natubhai Tadvi, who has also fortified the said statement. Another person named as Indravadan Raijibhai Solanki recorded a statement in the year Page 21 of 42 Downloaded on : Sun Jun 14 02:16:46 IST 2020 C/LPA/1606/2019 CAV JUDGMENT 2015 and has conveyed that he had seen her in Eliash Apartment, but all these flats are in a dilapidated condition. Right now the appellant is out of station and her whereabouts are not available. So it appears from the statements recorded in the year 2008 and 2015, that this appellant is either residing in Ravi Park Society or at Eliash Apartment, however, this is not ascertained by the authorities. One statement of this Poonamben, which is recorded by herself on 05.07.2008 has clearly admitted that the car which she purchased from the brother, on which 'Vice President, Indian Press Council' is mentioned, she has no evidence for that. She has clearly admitted that she has not removed that name plate from the car is a mistake. Now, regarding the brother, whether he is a Member of the Press Council or not has also not been ascertained clearly since he merely carries on his business of buffing of specs at Makarpura, Vadodara, which was visible. It appears that the stand taken by the authority that this appellant has tried to give a wrong impression of her actual residence, leading to the police authority remaining unsuccessful in nabbing her.
The record further indicates from page 112 onwards that the steps have been taken by the authorities to some extent to Page 22 of 42 Downloaded on : Sun Jun 14 02:16:46 IST 2020 C/LPA/1606/2019 CAV JUDGMENT arrest the appellant. However, on account of the aforesaid situation, it appears that the authority has not been able to secure her presence and arrest, the same in furtherance of the detention warrant.
It further appears from the record posted before us by this appellant herself that at the relevant point of time, a handwritten letter written by herself to the Hon'ble Home Minister, apprehending PASA warrant being executed and threat from the Police authority clearly suggests that the appellant was conscious of the fact that her activities would lead to serious consequences. Resultantly, after giving reason of medical exigencies, the appellant herself has chosen to keep herself away from the clutches of the law. Even the communication dated 19.03.2009, reflected on page 118 also suggests that one Municipal Councilor of Vadodara Municipal Corporation herself has written a letter to the then Home Minister, indicating to see that the Rajkot Police may not put her in trouble. Now these communications also indicate the fact that this very appellant was quite conscious of her alleged criminal activity, the process of law related to detention and has successfully kept herself away from the clutches of law. This has led the Police Page 23 of 42 Downloaded on : Sun Jun 14 02:16:46 IST 2020 C/LPA/1606/2019 CAV JUDGMENT Commissioner, Rajkot City to even issue a notification on 05.01.2009, directing her to remain present. failing which appropriate steps would be taken against her. So the overall material indicates prima facie that though steps have been taken by the authority to nab the appellant, the appellant has remained successful in keeping herself from being arrested. As such, this Court is prima facie of the opinion that simply because execution has not taken place for a considerable time, benefit should not automatically go to the appellant. On the contrary, it appears that as a part of a systematic design, this petition has been moved after seeing that coaccused Jayshreeben is released from the detaining authority. It seems that though the petition is affirmed on 24.12.2018, it appears to have been presented at a much later stage on 07.09.2019, that is after the order passed in coaccused i.e. dated 18.02.2019. As such, it appears that after getting the coaccused released from the detention, this petition is moved for claiming parity. Unfortunately, we are not inclined to accept this stand of the appellant since, coaccused had first surrendered to the process of law and then got herself released on merit by order of this Court dated 18.02.2019. For the violation of law, we are not inclined to exercise our extra ordinary equitable jurisdiction, Page 24 of 42 Downloaded on : Sun Jun 14 02:16:46 IST 2020 C/LPA/1606/2019 CAV JUDGMENT particularly, when the situation on fact is very much reflected on record.
Normally, this Court might have considered that, since the coaccused has been released from detention, to some extent, the Court has to think about the parity. However, here is the case where the appellant has not only given misimpression about actual residence under the pretext of medical exigencies, she has also taken advantage, and thereafter not obeyed the process of law. She has admitted, clearly, in her statement that she has misused the number plate of the car. When that is so, this conduct of the appellant would not satisfy us to allow her by invoking the writ of equitable jurisdiction. The Court cannot grant liberty to such conduct even if the concept of liberty is very much recognized. This concept of liberty has to be viewed for persons who respect the process of law and not to evaders and violators.
Additionally, a further document, upon close scrutiny, indicates that not only was there a clear suspicion about her actual residence, but page 34 onwards clearly indicate that at one point of time this very Poonamben, who purchased the property, has given her address as E/42 Gopal Baug Society, Page 25 of 42 Downloaded on : Sun Jun 14 02:16:46 IST 2020 C/LPA/1606/2019 CAV JUDGMENT Vasad, Vadodara. Whereas, in other documents, her address is found to be 14B, Shreeji Krupa Society, behind T.B. Hospital, Gotri. Now these properties, which she has said to have purchased are also different properties than her other residence. In yet another document, in the form of a Power of Attorney reflected on page 67, she has given her address as B/14, Karam Bungalow, behind New Medical College, Gotri Road, Vadodara. This is again a different address than what she has mentioned before the Police. The address given, where she is not residing, as is reflecting her close relatives are residing. It appears that despite all efforts being made at the relevant point of time, to secure the presence of the appellant, after almost a period of 11 years, she has approached this Court to secure herself under the guise of concept of liberty. We are not inclined to allow such a concept of liberty benefiting an element like this. As a result of this, we refrain ourselves from exercising any jurisdiction in favour of the appellant.
Further from the order passed by the learned Single Judge dated 29.08.2019, we have perused the order in which it has been clearly indicated that the appellant is an absconder evading arrest. Trial will take a long time and if investigation is allowed, involvement of the appellant may surface regarding similar Page 26 of 42 Downloaded on : Sun Jun 14 02:16:46 IST 2020 C/LPA/1606/2019 CAV JUDGMENT offences. As a result of this, we deem it proper to allow the statutory authorities to carry out the appropriate process under law by executing detention warrant of the present appellant. We see no infirmity in the order passed by the learned Single Judge in any form. Hence, at stage of prexecution, we are not inclined to exercise our discretion.
Before dealing with the decisions of the learned counsel on aforesaid issues, we deem it proper to postulate the settled position of law reflected from relevant decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as by the Full bench of this Court.
(1) In the case of N.K. Bapna (supra) wherein the issue was whether the order of detention can be challenged, even before the service of the order on the detenue. This issue has been dealt with by the Apex Court and the relevant observations contained in this decision, we deem it proper to reproduce the same hereinafter : "4. It is now well settled that, even in a case of preventive detention, it is not necessary for the proposed detenue to wait till a detention order is served from him before challenging the detention order. It is true that the Constitution of India, which permits preventive detention requires the detaining authorities to serve the grounds of detention within a prescribed period after the detention order is served on the detenue. It does not envisage any disclosure of the grounds of detention prior to the service of the Page 27 of 42 Downloaded on : Sun Jun 14 02:16:46 IST 2020 C/LPA/1606/2019 CAV JUDGMENT detention order on the detenue. To apprise the detenue in advance of the grounds on which he is proposed to be detained may well frustrate the very purpose of the law. On the other hand, to insist that no order of detention can be challenged until actual detention in pursuance thereof takes place might irretrievably prejudice the rights of proposed detenue in certain situations. Thus, the conflicting claims of the State and the fundamental right of a citizen need to be reconciled and the limitations, if any, precisely enunciated. This has been done by the recent decision of this Court in The Additional Secretary to the Government of India & Ors. v. Smt. Alka Subhash Gadia & Ors., 1991 (1) J.T. (S.C.) 549. The real question of law that fell for consideration before the court in that case was whether the 274 detenue or anyone on his behalf is entitled to challenge the detention order without the detenu submitting or surrendering to it and if so in what type of cases. As a corollary to this question, the incidental question that had to be answered was whether the detenu or the petitioner on his behalf, is entitled to the detention order and the grounds on which the detention order is made before the detenu submits to the order. The first question was answered by saying that the courts have power to interfere even before the detention order is served or the detention is effected but that such power will be exercised sparingly and in exceptional cases of the type enunciated therein. The Court observed :
"It is not correct to say that the courts have no power to entertain grievances against any detention order prior to its execution. The courts have the necessary power and they have used it in proper cases as has been pointed out above, although such cases have been few and the grounds on which the courts have interfered with them at the pre execution stage are necessarily very limited in scope and number, viz., where the courts are prima facie satisfied
(i) that the impugned order is not passed under the Act under which it is purported to have been passed, (ii) that it is sought to be executed Page 28 of 42 Downloaded on : Sun Jun 14 02:16:46 IST 2020 C/LPA/1606/2019 CAV JUDGMENT against a wrong person, (iii) that it is passed for a wrong purpose, (iv) that it is passed on vague, extraneous and irrelevant grounds or (v) that the authority which passed it had no authority to do so. The refusal by the courts to use their extraordinary powers of judicial review to interfere with the detention orders prior to their execution on any other ground does not amount to the abandonment of the said power or to their denial to the proposed detenu, but prevents their abuse and the perversion of the law in question."
On the second question, the Court had this to say:
"In view of the discussion aforesaid, the answer to this question has to be firmly in the negative for various reasons. In the first instance, as stated earlier, the Constitution and the valid law made thereunder do not make any provision for the same. On the other hand, they permit the arrest and detention of a person without furnishing to the detenu the order and the grounds 275 thereof in advance. Secondly, when the order and the grounds are served and the detenu is in a position to make out prima facie the limited grounds on which they can be successfully challenged, the courts, as pointed out earlier, have power even to grant bail to the detenu pending the final hearing of his petition. Alternatively, as stated earlier, the Court can and does hear such petition expeditiously to give the necessary relief to the detenu. Thirdly, in the rare cases where the detenu, before being served with them, learns of the detention order and the grounds on which it is made, and satisfies the Court of their existence by proper affirmation, the Court does not decline to entertain the writ petition even at the pre execution stage, of course, on the very limited grounds stated above. The Court no doubt even in such cases is not obliged to interfere with the impugned order at that stage and may insist that the detenu should first submit to it. It will, however, depend on the facts of each case. The Page 29 of 42 Downloaded on : Sun Jun 14 02:16:46 IST 2020 C/LPA/1606/2019 CAV JUDGMENT decisions and the orders cited above show that in some genuine cases, the Courts have exercised their powers at the preexecution stage, though such cases have been rare. This only emphasizes the fact that the Courts have power to interfere with the detention orders even at the preexecution stage but they are not obliged to do so nor will it be proper for them to do so save in exceptional cases. Much less can a detenue claim such exercise of power as a matter of right. The discretion is of the Court and it has to be exercised judicially on willsettled principles."
The Apex Court has clearly observed in the aforesaid paragraph that no doubt the Courts have power to exercise jurisdiction prior to its execution, but such power is to be exercised sparingly and with circumspection. The aforesaid observations, if we apply to the background of the present case, then we would be doing violence to a settled principles of law as the facts are such where such judicial review on equitable consideration is not possible to be extended.
Yet in another decision, the Apex Court has, after considering several decisions, has dealt with this similar issue in the case of Naresh Kumar Goyal (supra), wherein also, the Apex Court has considered several decisions and then observed clearly in para 11 onwards that on refusal by the courts to use the Page 30 of 42 Downloaded on : Sun Jun 14 02:16:46 IST 2020 C/LPA/1606/2019 CAV JUDGMENT extraordinary powers of judicial review to interfere with the detention orders prior to their execution on any other ground does not amount to the abandonment of the said power or to their denial to the proposed detenue. Rather it prevents the abuse and perversion of the law in question. Therefore, even if there is some delay, if properly explained, then the Court may not interfere at the preexecution stage. This decision has taken place in consideration of the observations made by the Apex Court in the case of Alka Subhash Gadia, on which, heavy reliance is placed by the appellant before us and as such keeping in view these observations of the Apex Court in the aforesaid order, we see no justifiable reason to carve out any absolute proposition that detenue can insist for exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under the guise of concept of liberty.
Yet another decision delivered by the Apex Court in the case of Vinod K. Chawla (supra), almost a similar view has been taken and the relevant observations contained in para 16 bottom, we would like to reproduce the same herein after : "16 ........... These facts conclusively establish that the detention order which was passed on 12.02.1997, soon after the searches had been made and the statement of the appellant had been recorded, could not be served in spite of every possible attempt that had been made to serve him as the appellant was absconding. Where a person himself Page 31 of 42 Downloaded on : Sun Jun 14 02:16:46 IST 2020 C/LPA/1606/2019 CAV JUDGMENT evades service of detention order, it is not open to him to contend that in view of the long period which has elapsed between the offending activities and the actual arrest and detention, the vital link had snapped and there was no ground for actually detaining him. An otherwise valid detention order cannot be rendered invalid on account of the own act of the detenue of evading arrest and making himself scarce. The contention thus raised has absolutely no merit and has to be rejected."
Few other decisions are also on similar line, one of which is in the case of Dropti Devi (supra), in which the relevant observations are contained in para 79. But since the principle is well enunciated, we would not like to over burden the present order. However, the last decision which has been pressed into service by Shri Devnani, learned Assistant Government Pleader is the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Vijaysinh @ Gatti Pruthvisinh Rathod (supra) to which, we are bound by such proposition. Hence, we deem it proper to refer to and rely upon the following observations made by the Full Bench of this Court. The said observations are contained in para nos. 8 and 9 since, relevant, are reproduced hereinafter : [8.0] It is true that in the subsequent decision in the case of Subhash Popatlal Dave (Supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has opined that five grounds mentioned in the case of Smt. Alka Subhash Gadia (Supra), on which the order of detention can be challenged at preexecution stage are illustrative and not exhaustive. However, the question as to on what other grounds the order of detention at pre execution stage can be challenged is not the subject Page 32 of 42 Downloaded on : Sun Jun 14 02:16:46 IST 2020 C/LPA/1606/2019 CAV JUDGMENT matter / issue before us. The issue which this Bench is required to answer is observed hereinabove.
[9.0] Having heard learned advocates appearing on behalf of the respective parties and considering the aforesaid decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and even considering the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Mancharam Samaram Meena (Supra) and the decision of another Division Bench in the case of Chirag @ Vijay Bhikhubhai Chtrabhuj (Supra), we are of the opinion that as there cannot be any controversy and/or dispute that as such the petition challenging the order of detention at predetention / preexecution stage would be maintainable on the grounds permissible. However, such powers are required to be exercised sparingly and in exceptional cases and on the grounds permissible under the law.
We are of the opinion that the view taken by the Division Bench in the case of Mancharam Samaram Meena (Supra) that in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the order of detention at preexecution / predetention stage the High Court has no jurisdiction at all to call for the original file, the order of detention and the grounds for detention and to undertake the exercise to satisfy, as to whether the order of detention is sustainable or not is impermissible and beyond the jurisdiction of the High Court, cannot be accepted.
Similarly, even the view taken by the Division Bench in the case of Chirag @ Vijay Bhikhubhai Chtrabhuj (Supra) that while considering the challenge to order of detention at predetention/preexecution stage in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, it is the bounden duty of the Court and/or the Court is obliged to call for the order of detention for its own perusal to satisfy itself as to validity of the detention order also cannot be accepted. Considering the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to hereinabove and the powers of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are very wide and once it is held that the petition at predetention / preexecution stage is maintainable on the ground Page 33 of 42 Downloaded on : Sun Jun 14 02:16:46 IST 2020 C/LPA/1606/2019 CAV JUDGMENT which may be available under the law, in an appropriate case being made out on the basis of the averments and the grounds set aside in the memo of petition, the Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and so as to satisfy the legality and validity of the order of detention on the grounds which may be available at the pre detention/preexecution stage, the Court may in its discretion and subject to its satisfaction call for the relevant file/order of detention / grounds for detention at preexecution stage, however such power shall be exercised sparingly and in exceptional cases and such discretion is to be exercised judicially on well settled principles. However, in all cases the Court is not obliged to do so and undertake such exercise of calling the original file, order of detention and grounds of detention. Similarly, even the detenu cannot claim such exercise of power of calling the order of detention, grounds of detention at predetention / preexecution stage as a matter of right. It is purely discretion of the Court to exercise it's jurisdiction. [9.1] The sum and substance of the aforesaid discussion would be that in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the order of detention at predetention / preexecution stage as such the Court is not obliged and/or bound to call for the original file, order of detention and the grounds for detention to satisfy itself whether the order of detention is sustainable or not. However, in an appropriate case being made out on the basis of the averments on affidavit and on the grounds set out in the memo of petition, the Court in its discretion would have jurisdiction to call for the original file, order of detention and grounds for detention so as to satisfy itself the challenge to the order of detention at preexecution stage on the grounds which may be available under the law at the predetention/ preexecution stage, however such powers may be exercised in exceptional and rare cases and such exercise can be undertaken by a Writ Court with extreme care, caution and circumspection.
At the same time, in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the order of detention at preexecution stage, the detenu as a matter of right cannot Page 34 of 42 Downloaded on : Sun Jun 14 02:16:46 IST 2020 C/LPA/1606/2019 CAV JUDGMENT seek a Writ of Mandamus directing the detaining authority to produce the original file, order of detention and grounds of detention as otherwise also, as observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in catena of decisions, the detenu is not entitled to the grounds of detention unless the order of detention is served and executed upon the detenu. [10.0]The Reference is answered accordingly. Now, the Registry may place the matters before the learned Single Judge as per the roster, to be decided in accordance with law."
We may also refer to the relevant observations contained in para 18 to reproduce, which observation is in concurrence with the view taken by the Full Bench by general majority.
"18. Hence, the reference can be answered as under: (1) As both the Division Benches of this Court in the case of Manchharam Samaram Meena vs. State of Gujarat (supra) and in the case of Chirag @ Vijay Bhikhubhai Chitrabhuj vs. State of Gujarat (supra) are not on disagreement for the maintainability of the petition for challenging the order of detention under Article 226 of the Constitution at the preexecution stage, no further view deserves to be expressed. (2) Further, if the order of detention is challenged at preexecution stage under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court by way of selfimposed restriction may examine as to whether the case is covered by the criteria laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Addl. Secy. To the Govt. of India v. Alka Subhash Gadia (Smt.)(supra) and Deepak Bajaj Vs. State of Maharashtra & Another, reported in (2008) 16 SCC 14 (supra) and thereafter may call for the relevant record from the detaining authority, but such would depend upon sound exercise of judicial discretion of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and it cannot be said that in all cases, it would be obligatory for the High Court to satisfy itself as to whether the detention order is passed in consonance with the scheme of the enactment under which the detention order is passed or whether the detention order suffers from Page 35 of 42 Downloaded on : Sun Jun 14 02:16:46 IST 2020 C/LPA/1606/2019 CAV JUDGMENT the vice of illegality or not, save and except the criteria as laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Addl. Secy. To the Govt. of India v. Alka Subhash Gadia (Smt.)(supra) and Deepak Bajaj Vs. State of Maharashtra & Another, reported in (2008) 16 SCC 14 (supra)."
Resultantly, the aforesaid parameters are clearly suggesting that there is no absolute proposition that at the pre execution stage, keeping in view the concept of liberty enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, the Court has to in every case, entertain the petition, and as such, the submissions which have been made by the learned Senior Counsel are not acceptable.
The aforesaid decisions which have been referred to and relied upon by the learned Assistant Government Pleader, one decision, that we cannot lose sight of, hence, certain observations, which are contained in para 41 and 43 in the case of D.N. Jeevaraj v. Chief Secretary, Government of Karnataka & Ors., reported in (2016) 2 SCC 653, we may deem it proper to reproduce the same hereinafter : "41. This Court has repeatedly held that where discretion is required to be exercised by a statutory authority, it must be permitted to do so. It is not for the courts to take over the discretion available to a statutory authority and render a decision. ..........................................................By taking over the functions of the BDA in this regard, the High Court has Page 36 of 42 Downloaded on : Sun Jun 14 02:16:46 IST 2020 C/LPA/1606/2019 CAV JUDGMENT given a complete gobye to the procedural requirements and has mandated a particular course of action to be taken by the BDA. It is quite possible that if the BDA is allowed to exercise its discretion it may not necessarily direct forfeiture of the lease but that was sought to be pre empted by the direction given by the High Court which, in our opinion, acted beyond its jurisdiction in this regard.
43. To this we may add that if a court is of the opinion that a statutory authority cannot take an independent or impartial decision due to some external or internal pressure, it must give its reasons for coming to that conclusion. The reasons given by the court for disabling the statutory authority from taking a decision can always be tested and if the reasons are found to be inadequate, the decision of the court to bypass the statutory authority can always be set aside. If the reasons are cogent, then in an exceptional case, the court may take a decision without leaving it to the statutory authority to do so. However, we must caution that if the court were to take over the decision taking power of the statutory authority it must only be in exceptional circumstances and not as a routine. Insofar as the present case is concerned, the High Court has not given any reason why it virtually took over the decision taking function of the authorities and for this reason alone the mandamus issued by the High Court deserves to be set aside, apart from the merits of the case which we have already adverted to. "
From the aforesaid situation which has been brought before us on record and keeping in view the aforesaid proposition of law on the issue of exercise of jurisdiction at preexecution stage, we are inclined to allow the statutory authority to deal with this appellant, strictly, in accordance with law. We are not inclined to interfere with the order passed by the learned Single Judge.
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Now in light of the aforesaid situation which is prevailing on record, we perused the decisions cited by learned Senior Counsel Shri Pandya, we would like to deal with it individually.
At the first instance, Shri Pandya, learned Senior Counsel has submitted that the codetenue was already released by the Court, in a petition which was decided on 18.02.2019. It was submitted that on the basis of principle of parity, the benefit be given to the present appellant as well. To this submission, we are of the clear opinion that there were no allegations with regard to such changing of address nor with regard to misuse of car, nor the allegation about systematic avoidance of the execution of the detention warrant. The said detenue has surrendered herself to the process of law and then, requested the Court to exercise the discretion, whereas, here in the instance case, the appellant conveniently, after seeing release of the co detenue, has chosen to press the petition and then made an attempt to seek the benefit of parity, to which we are not at all inclined to grant in this peculiar background of the present case on hand. Accordingly, the decision is of no avail to the appellant.
Additionally, we have also been posted with the fact by the Page 38 of 42 Downloaded on : Sun Jun 14 02:16:46 IST 2020 C/LPA/1606/2019 CAV JUDGMENT learned Assistant Government Pleader Shri Devnani, that in addition to earlier submission that a criminal case which was lodged against the appellant has gone into the stage of dormant cases and this is only on account of non service of summons. When such kind of conduct is visible on the record, we are not inclined to exercise our writ jurisdiction.
Further Shri Pandya, has heavily pressed into service the decision delivered by the Apex Court in the case of Alpesh Navinchandra Shah (supra), wherein also the case of Alka Subhash Gadia has been considered by the Court and in a different factual situation, the Apex Court has dealt with COFEPOSA detenue. On close reading of the said decision would clearly indicate that not only is the background of fact is different, but even the statute is also different and apart from that while, seeking parity from the coaccused decision, in case of that appellant, there was an order of Settlement Commission which has been given unconditional immunity. So the background of fact was altogether different and as such, the general proposition cannot be applied as a straightjacket formula in a different set of facts.
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We may refer here that a principle of precedent is by now well settled, wherein the Apex Court has clearly propounded that if the background of fact is different, even one additional fact would make a world of difference in applying the precedent. Since, the facts are altogether different, we are not inclined to accept to the submissions made by Shri Pandya, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant on the basis of aforesaid judgments. Few other decisions which are also cited before us by the learned Senior Counsel, but the said decisions since have altogether different facts situation, we are not impressed by the submissions made by the learned Senior Counsel. We are conscious about the status of the illegal order, we are conscious about the concept of judicial review when to exercise, but we are also doubly sure of the parameters prescribed in that regard. Resultantly, in view of this peculiar background of facts of the case, we are not inclined to exercise our equitable extraordinary jurisdiction.
The other decisions which are cited, we have consciously gone through the same and having found a different facts situation, even after considering the said decisions, we are of the considered opinion that the present appellant is not entitled to Page 40 of 42 Downloaded on : Sun Jun 14 02:16:46 IST 2020 C/LPA/1606/2019 CAV JUDGMENT have any equitable relief. Hence, the appeal lacks merits, the same is dismissed hereby.
While parting with the present order, we must convey the State - authorities to caution the officers concerned, and those who are in charge of the service of the detention warrants and the orders. This kind of situation is taking place on account of the contributory lethargy on the part of the officers as well. We have seen that in large number of cases, even if the detenues are available in jail, and may be available for taking effective steps, the authorities at times have shown negligence in serving the detention orders/warrants which may have the effect of frustrating the very object of the detention. Some stringent measures are expected to be taken to curb such kind of eventualities and for which, the State authorities to take steps as early as possible, by taking even action against the concerned officers.
With the aforesaid observations, we dismiss the present Letters Patent Appeal.
Consequently, the connected civil application also stands Page 41 of 42 Downloaded on : Sun Jun 14 02:16:46 IST 2020 C/LPA/1606/2019 CAV JUDGMENT disposed of. Interim relief granted earlier, if any, stands vacated.
(VIKRAM NATH, CJ) (ASHUTOSH J. SHASTRI, J) Shri Asim Pandya, learned Senior Advocate, made request that interim protection may be granted for further period of four weeks to enable the appellant to take further recourse as remedy may be available. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, we are not inclined to accept the said request and same is rejected.
sd/ (VIKRAM NATH, CJ) sd/ (ASHUTOSH J. SHASTRI, J) /phalguni/ Page 42 of 42 Downloaded on : Sun Jun 14 02:16:46 IST 2020