Punjab-Haryana High Court
General Manager Punjab Roadways And ... vs Sh. Dharam Singh And Anr. on 18 April, 1996
Equivalent citations: (1996)113PLR374
Author: T.H.B. Chalapathi
Bench: T.H.B. Chalapathi
JUDGMENT T.H.B. Chalapathi, J.
1. This Writ Petition has been filed challenging the award of the presiding officer, Labour Court, Amritsar, dated April 5, 1994. Respondent No. 1 was employed as Conductor in the Punjab Roadways in the year 1970. It appears that sometime in 1979, the bus in which he was conductor was checked by the Inspector. It was found that Conductor-respondent No. 1 had not issued the tickets to three passengers. On that basis, respondent No. 1 was charge-sheeted and after the enquiry, the services of respondents No. 1 were terminated on October 17,1980. Thereafter, respondent No. 1 filed a suit in a Civil Court for a declaration that the order of termination is illegal but that suit was dismissed on the ground that the petitioner was not entitled to the relief. The same was confirmed by the Appellate Court vide its order dated May 17, 1984. Thereafter, respondent No. 1 served a demand notice. On that, the matter was referred to the Labour Court by the State Government for adjudication. The Labour Court came to the conclusion that respondent No. 1 put in service of ten years and he was found guilty of not issuing three tickets because of the rush and, therefore, the punishment of removal from service was not warranted and accordingly set aside the order of termination and imposed stoppage of four increments with cumulative effect.
2. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner, namely, Punjab Roadways, has filed this writ petition seeking a writ of Certiorari to quash the order of the Labour court.
3. In this Writ Petition the petitioners challenged the order of the Labour Court on two grounds, firstly, on the ground that the dismissal of the suit filed by the petitioners operates as res judicata and that the decree of the Civil Court is binding on the Labour Court and, therefore, the Labour Court should have rejected the reference on that ground. Secondly, that the Labour Court was not justified in interfering with the order of termination when the Labour Court itself found that the petitioners did not issue the tickets to three passengers in the bus.
4. The first contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is liable to be rejected straightaway. The principles of res judicata are embodied in Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure says that the decision of a Court will be binding in a subsequent suit/proceeding if the Civil Court is competent to try the latter suit or proceeding initiated subsequently. There cannot be any dispute that the civil court has no jurisdiction to decide an industrial dispute. There cannot be any doubt that the dispute between the workman and the management in regard to the order of termination comes within the definition of an industrial dispute. Therefore the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is excluded to try such a suit and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to grant a declaration that the order of termination is bad as the dispute relates to an industrial dispute. Therefore, I am of the opinion that decree and judgment of the Civil Court are not binding on the Labour Court and the same does not operate as res judicata
5. The learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the Labour Court ought not to interfere with the order of termination having found that respondent No. 1 was guilty of not issuing tickets to three passengers. Under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, "It is open to the Labour Court, if it is satisfied that the order of discharge or dismissal was not justified, to direct the reinstatement of the workman on such terms and conditions as it thinks fit." It is now settled law that the Labour Court has jurisdiction to impose any other appropriate punishment basing on the facts and circumstances of each case. It cannot be said that the labour Court has no power to alter the punishment awarded by the management. The learned D.A.G. relief upon the decision of this Court in Gurmail Singh v. Presiding Officer, L.C. Patiala, 1995(4) R.S.J. 264, wherein it has been held as follows :-
"Every public servant holds a public post as a trustee of public confidence and faith and once he is guilty of committing breach of this trust or faith, he loses the right to continue in service. Court of law do protect the employee against the arbitrary acts of the employer, but if employee is found guilty of misappropriation, fraud, embezzlement, cheating etc., he has no right to serve as public employee. Therefore, the Labour Court was justified in not exercising its jurisdiction Under Section 11-A of the Act in favour of the petitioner and there is no illegality in the view taken by the Labour Court that the punishment of dismissal meted out to the petitioner does not call for any change."
In my view, the decision referred to above has no application to the facts of this case. There is no proof that respondent No. 1 was guilty of misappropriation, fraud or embezzlement. The only charge against him is that he did not issue tickets to three passengers and the witness who has been examined for the management, namely, Inspector of the checking party Kasturi Lal, categorically stated that the bus was full. When the entire bus was full and the conductor was busy in issuing tickets at the time where the bus was checked may be three passengers were left out in issuing tickets. There is no evidence on record that respondent No. 1 collected fare from three passengers and did not issue the tickets. Therefore, there is no question of misappropriation, or embezzlement on the part of respondent No. 1, but it can be a case of sheer negligence on the part of respondent No. 1. Therefore, I am of the opinion that respondent No. 1 is not guilty of any misappropriation or embezzlement. In these circumstances, I do not find anything wrong in the award of the Labour Court applying the provisions of Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act in setting aside the order of termination and imposing the punishment of stoppage of four increments.
6. I do not, therefore, find any ground warranting interference with the order of the Labour Court.
7. Writ petition, therefore, fails and is accordingly dismissed.