Madras High Court
Ramamurthy And Ors. vs V. Perumal on 5 October, 1990
Equivalent citations: (1990)2MLJ494
ORDER Srinivasan, J.
1.The petitioners applied for eviction of the respondent under the provisions of the Tamilnadu Cultivating Tenants' Protection Act. The Revenue Court passed an order on 9.4.1987 directing the respondent to deposit a sum of Rs.2647.55 being the arrears of rent on or before 9.6.1967. The respondent did not make the deposit in time. The petitioners filed I.A.372 of 1987 for passing an order of eviction as the respondent failed to comply with the direction given by the Revenue Court by its earlier order. The application was filed in September, 1987. The respondent filed a counter affidavit in October 1988 in which he stated that he had deposited the money as per the orders of the Revenue Court on 4-8-1987 under Challan No.843. He produced a xerox copy of the Challan along with the counter affidavit.
2. The Revenue Court has taken the view that the deposit having been made even before the filing of I.A. 372 of 1987 and there being no explanation on the part of the petitioners for not having sought an order of eviction as soon as the respondent committed default in making the deposit, the petitioners are not entitled to an order of eviction as prayed for by them. Consequently, the application filed by the petitioners has been dismissed by the Revenue Court.
3. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioners have filed this revision petition. It is rather strange that the Revenue Court should observe that the petitioners ought to have filed an application for an order of eviction as soon as the time granted by the Revenue Court for deposit of the money had lapsed. It is certainly open to the petitioners to file the petition for passing an order of eviction at any time after the commission of default on the part of the respondent. There is no time limit prescribed by the Act or any Rule, within which the petitioners ought to move the Revenue Court for an order of eviction.
4. The respondent has not chosen even to attempt to give an explanation for his default in complying with the order of the Revenue Court In the counter affidavit, he has merely stated as a fact that he made the deposit on 4.8.87 alleging that it was as per the orders of the Revenue Court. Certainly, it was not in accordance with the orders of the Revenue Court. The deposit was made long after the period prescribed by the Revenue Court expired. Hence there can be no doubt that the respondent has failed to comply with the order of the Revenue Court. Under Section 3(4)(b) of the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants' Protection Act, the Revenue Court may allow the cultivating tenant such time as it considers just and reasonable for depositing the arrears of rent and if the cultivating tenant fails to deposit the same as directed, the Revenue Court shall pass an order for eviction. The language used in the section is mandatory and the only option available to the Revenue Court is to pass an order of eviction.
5. The matter has been considered by a Division Bench of this Court as in Kuppana Chettiar v. Ramachandran . After extracting the section referred to above, the Bench observed as follows:
A reading of these provisions will clearly show that under Section 3(4)(b) of the Act, once a cultivating tenant has failed to comply with the direction to deposit the rent into the Revenue Court within the time given by the Revenue Divisional Officer, the Revenue Divisional Officer has no option but to pass an order for eviction. If, for any reason, the tenant was not able to deposit the rent within the given time, certainly he should have approached the Revenue Divisional Officer for extension of time, and, if he unreasonably refused to extend the time, the tenant may then have a grievance with respect thereto. But once a date has been fixed for the deposit of the rent, and within the time the amount has not been paid and there has been no application for extension of time by the tenant before the Revenue Divisional Officer, the Revenue Divisional Officer is under an obligation to pass an order for eviction, because, in such a situation, Section 3(4)(b) says that the Revenue Divisional Officer shall pass an order for eviction'....
In Mariyayee Ammal v. Janab Mohammed Sheriff (1982) 2 L.W. 417, I have expressed the same opinion in the following words:
In fact, the last Part of Section 3(4)(b) of the Act is mandatory and the Revenue Court has no option but to pass an order of eviction once it is found that the order directing deposit of rent has not been complied with. When the petitioner did not choose to apply for extension of time to deposit the rent or seek to set aside the order dated 17.3.1987, the only course open to the Revenue Court on 15.9.1987 was to pass an order of eviction.
This Court has also taken the view that after the expiry of the time prescribed by the Revenue Court, it is not open to the tenant to file an application for extension of time. If the tenant is desirous of having the time extended, he should file an application before the expiry of the time granted. In Kandan Moopan v. Arumugha Mudaliar it was held that where there was a default by non-compliance with a direction to deposit the arrears within the time fixed by the Revenue Court it would be beyond the power of the Revenue Court to extend time. The learned Judge observed as follows:
It seems to be manifest that, where there is a default by non-compliance with a direction to deposit the arrears within the time fixed by the Revenue Court, it would be beyond the power of the Revenue Court to extend time. The Sub-section clearly states that in such an event, namely, failure on the part of the tenant to deposit the arrears within the time fixed, the Revenue Divisional Officer should pass an order for eviction. This is the view I took in C.R.P. No. 2625 of 1960. But the question arises whether where the tenant applies, before the expiry of the time fixed, for extension of time, the extension could be granted. Rajagopalan, J. in WP. No. 1496 of 1956 considered that it was within the power of the Revenue Court I find myself in respectful agreement with this view of the provision. Where a power is granted for fixing a time, in my opinion, it necessarily means and implies also a power to extend the lime provided the time granted already has not expired and the applicant for extension applies before expiry of the time." In this case, the respondent did not apply for any extension of time before making the deposit. He did not even make such an application or pray for condonation of delay in depositing when he filed the counter affidavit in I.A.372 of 1987. As pointed out earlier, he did not even give any explanation for the default committed by him.
In the circumstances, the Revenue Court had no jurisdiction to dismiss the application in I.A. No. 372 of 1987. The only course open to the Revenue Court was to pass an order of eviction as prayed for by the petitioners.
6. Hence the revision petition is allowed. The order of the Revenue Court in I.A. 372 of 1987 is set aside. The said application in I.A. 372 of 1987 is allowed. The respondent is directed to hand over possession of the land in question to the petitioners. There will be no order as to costs.