Ram Briksh And Another vs State Of U.P. on 17 October, 2025

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Allahabad High Court

Ram Briksh And Another vs State Of U.P. on 17 October, 2025

1. The present Criminal Appeal under Section 374 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred as Cr.P.C.) has been filed against the judgment and order dated 13.06.1986 passed by IIIrd Additional Sessions Judge, Ballia in Session Trial No. 128 of 1985, whereby the trial court convicted the appellants under Section 201 (Indian Penal Code herein after referred as I.P.C) and sentenced the appellant no. 1 undergo to 1 year rigorous imprisonment and appellant No. 2 undergo to 7 years rigorous imprisonment. However, the appellants are acquitted under Section 302 of I.P.C.

2. Brief facts of the case giving rise to the present appeal is that on 29.05.1985 in evening appellant no. 2 Swaminath (brother-in-law देवर of the first informant) assaulted his wife by axe, due to which (sister-in-law देवरानी of the first informant) sustained injury, thereafter, the appellant no. 2 and appellant no. 1 (father-in-law of the first informant) brought sister-in-law of the first informant to hospital for treatment. But they have not returned till the lodging of the F.I.R. Later on, she heard that her sister-in-law died on the way to the hospital and the appellants threw the dead body of the sister-in-law of the first informant in the river and fled away; several persons saw the incident.

3. After lodging of the first information report S.I. Tarkeshwar Pandey (PW-6) started the investigation and prepared the sketch plan of place of incident (Ex.-Ka.3) and recovered the dead body; inquest report of skelton was prepared on 02.06.1985 wherein only some muscles were present in the foot and palm. After recording the statements of the prosecution witnesses, he submitted the charge-sheet against the appellants under Sections 304, 201 of I.P.C.

4. After taking cognizance by the Magistrate, case was committed to the court of Session, after considering the pre-summoning evidence learned trial court framed the charges against the appellants under Sections 302 and 201 of I.P.C.

5. To substantiate the charges against the appellants, the prosecution examined as many as 10 witnesses namely Muneshwari Devi (PW-1), Manti (PW-2), Ramapati (PW-3), Radha Kishun (PW-4), B.N. Singh (PW-5), S.I. Tarkeshwar Pandey (PW-6), Jangali (PW-7), Virendra (PW-8), Udai Narain Singh (PW-9) and Ram Ratan Yadav (PW-10).

6. After examination of prosecution witnesses, statements of the appellants have been recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., wherein they stated that deceased was residing with her husband in the State of Punjab where her husband was doing service and she died in the State of Punjab and cremation was also taken place in the Punjab. However, appellants have not produced any documentary evidence as well as oral evidence in defence.

7. Before the trial court learned counsel for the appellants argued that the prosecution has not proved the prosecution case under Section 302, 201 of I.P.C. against the appellants but the trial court without appreciating the evidence in right perspective convicted the appellants under Section 201 of I.P.C.

8. The trial court after considering the evidence of Muneshwari (PW-1), Manti (PW-2), Virendra, (PW-8), Udai Narain Singh (PW-9) who were declared hostile by the prosecution, acquitted the appellants under Section 302 of I.P.C. but after referring the evidence of PW-3 Ramapati, PW-4 Radha Kishun and PW-7 Junglee, observed that the prosecution has successfully proved the charge of offence punishable under Section 201 of I.P.C. against the appellants and convicted and sentenced the appellants under Section 201 of I.P.C.

9. Learned counsel for the appellant No. 2 submits that the prosecution has not proved the charge under Section 201 of I.P.C. against the appellants beyond reasonable doubt. It is further submitted that the appellants were acquitted under Section 302 of I.P.C. The charge-sheet has not been submitted any other known or unknown person.

10. Learned A.G.A. vehemently opposed the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellants and supported the judgment passed by the trial court and argued that the trial court after referring the evidence of Pws successfully proved the charges under Section 201 of I.P.C. against the appellants, hence this appeal is liable to be dismissed.

11. Heard, Sri Ram Krishna Yadav, learned counsel for the appellants No. 2 and Sri Kamleshwar Singh, learned A.G.A. for the State and perused the material on record.

12. The present criminal appeal stands abated for appellant No. 1 Ram Briksh after his death, vide order dated 22.03.2017.

13. Before considering the arguments of learned counsel for the appellants, it is appropriate to go through entire prosecution evidence.

14. Muneshwari (PW-1), first informant/ sister-in-law of the deceased (Jethani), Manti (PW-2), daughter of the appellant no. 1, Virendra (PW-8), son of the deceased have been declared hostile by the prosecution and they have not supported the prosecution case that the appellant no. 2 committed murder of his sister-in-law (wife of elder brother).

15. Muneshwari (PW-1) first informant stated in her chief examination that at the time of incident, she was in parental house and she visited the matrimonial house after the death of her sister-in-law (Devrani);

16. Manti (PW-2) stated in her chief-examination that at the time of incident, she was in her maternal grandparents' house (ननिहाल), she did not know how the deceased had died.

17. Virendra (PW-8) son of the deceased stated in his chief examination that at that time of incident, he was also in his maternal grandparents' house (ननिहाल), he had not witnessed the incident.

18. Ramapati (PW-3) stated in his chief examination that when he reached the place of incident, wife of Butan was lying on courtyard (आँगन), she sustained injuries on her head and bleeding was oozing there, she was unconscious.

19. Manti (PW-2) told him that Swaminath (appellant no. 2) assaulted the deceased by a tangi and fled away, the appellant no. 1 was present, he came back from the place of incident after seeing the condition. One suggestion was asked from this witness that the cattle of appellant No. 1 were confined in the cattle shed. This witness stated after questioning by the court that after the incident she saw the appellants, they brought the injured to the hospital by a cot after the incident, the husband of the deceased was not in the village.

20. Radha Kishun (PW-4) stated in his chief examination that he reached the place of incident, where he found wife of Butan, who sustained injuries on her head and bleeding was oozing and she lying on courtyard (आँगन), she was alive at that time and some persons assembled there talked each other that appellant no. 2 assaulted her by tangi. He asked to the wife of real brother of appellant no. 2 why she did not save her, she told him that the appellant no. 2 is a strong man. Husband of deceased was doing service in Faridabad.

21. Radha Kishun (PW-4) stated in his cross-examination that wife of brother of appellant no. 2 is his daughter-in-law in relation. He had no knowledge about the fact that appellant no. 1 stated earlier that son of the witness was committed dacoity in the house of Ram Janm Mishra.

22. PW-5 Bhrigu Nath Singh H.C., is scriber, who registered the F.I.R. and provide a G.D. Report.

23. PW-6 S.I. Tarkeshwar Pandey, Investigating Officer stated in his chief examination that he started investigation in the morning at about 06:45 A.M. when he reached the place of incident and prepared (sketch plan) Ex-ka3 and after searching of half kilometres, found the Skelton of human body and one bangle has been found in one hand and found injuries on her head and found fracture also and one cot was also found near the bank of river, the Skelton was found over the river bank where water was touched partly.

24. Janglee PW-7 Village Chowkidar, identified the dead body of wife of Butan as Parwati, he prepared the inquest report along-with other necessary documents and sent the dead body/ Skelton for post-mortem and prepared a sketch plan of recovery of Skelton.

25. S.I. Tarkeshwar Pandey (PW-6) has stated in his cross-examination that he had not prepared the memo of recovery of cot and also not taken into possession the bangle, he had not remembered that at the time of inquest report bangle was found broken or not. He further stated that he does not remember whether he had a bangle on his hand when he sealed the dead body. At the time of the inquest report, he did not call the person who was the arbitrator in the boat in which the body was brought to the other side of the river. He further stated that he visited place of incident on 01.06.1985 at 10:20 hours, he reached the village on 31.05.1985 at 11 and 1/2 P.M. and he stayed in the village in the night. He did not found any blood in the courtyard in the house of Ram Briksh. One material suggestion had been asked to the witness by the defence as it is wrong to say that seized Skelton was not of the deceased.

26. Junglee PW-7, this witness is related to accompany the Investigating Officer in search of Skelton. In his chief examination he stated that one red colour of bangle was found in the hand of Skelton and injury of axe over the head was also found and nearby one cot was also lying and he identified on the basis of such articles as Skelton is of the deceased at the time of search, there were no other villagers, on some distance some shepherds and sailors (चरवाहे और मल्लाह) were present. He found some blood over the cot and one bangle was also found in hand of the deceased at the time of seal of the dead body. No person was signed on any papers at that time. One suggestion was asked to this witness prior to the incident. No dead body or bangles were recovered in front of him, it is wrong to say that bangles and dead body were recovered in-front of him.

27. Udai Narain Singh (PW-9), who recorded the statements of Virendra (PW-8), Muneshwari (PW-1) under Section 164 of Cr.P.C.

28. Ram Ratan Yadav, PW-10, scriber of the F.I.R. stated in his cross-examination that he did not write the report at police station. One suggestion was asked that it is wrong to say that the report had been written on the instance of the police.

29. Before considering the respective submissions of the parties, it is apposite to re-visit the position of law. The Supreme Court after considering the several judgment and observed in Dinesh Kumar Kalidas Patel Vs. State of Gujarat (2018) 3 SCC 313, the relevant paragraphs of the said judgement are reproduced herein below:

6. InPalvinder Kaur v. state of punjab , AIR 1952 SC 354 , this Court held as follows: (AIR p. 356, para 14)

14. In order to establish the charge under Section 201 of the Indian Penal Code 1860, it is essential to prove that an offence has been committed mere suspicion that it has been committed is not sufficient that the accused knew or had reason to believe that such offence had been committed and with the requisite knowledge and with the intent to screen the offender from legal punishment causes the evidence thereof to disappear or gives false information respecting such offences knowing or having reason to believe the same to be false.

7. The Constitution Bench decision in Kalawati and Ranjit Singh v. state of H.P. , AIR 1953 SC 131, may not be of much assistance in this case since the facts are completely different. The co-accused was convicted under Section 302 IPC for the main offence, and in the peculiar facts and circumstances of that case, this Court deemed it fit to convict Kalawati only under Section 201 of the IPC.

8. Relying on Palvinder Kaur (supra), this Court in Suleman Rehiman AIR 1968 SC 829, made the following observation:( Suleman Rehman, AIR p. 830,para 6)

6. The conviction of Appellant 2 under Section 201 IPC depends on the sustainability of the conviction of Appellant 1 under Section 304-A IPC. If Appellant 1 was rightly convicted under that provision, the conviction of Appellant 2 under Section 201 IPC on the facts found cannot be challenged. But on the other hand, if the conviction of Appellant 1 under Section 304-A IPC cannot be sustained, then, the second appellants conviction under Section 201 IPC will have to be set aside, because to establish the charge under Section 201, the prosecution must first prove that an offence had been committed not merely a suspicion that it might have been committed and that the accused knowing or having reason to believe that such an offence had been committed, and with the intent to screen the offender from legal punishment, had caused the evidence thereof to disappear. The proof of the commission of an offence is an essential requisite for bringing home the offence under Section 201 IPC see the decision of this Court in Palvinder Kaur v. State of Punjab.

It is necessary to note that the reason for acquittal under Section 201 in the above case was that there was no evidence to show that the rash and negligent act of appellant 1 caused the death of the deceased. Hence, the court acquitted appellant 2 under Section 201. The observation at paragraph 6 has to be viewed and analysed in that background.

9. In Ram Saran Mahto v. State of Bihar (1999) 9 SCC 486 , this Court discussed Kalawati (supra) and Palvinder Kaur(supra). It has been held at paragraphs-13 to 15 that conviction under the main offence is not necessary to convict the offender underSection 201IPC. To quote: (Ram Saran Mahto case , SCC pp. 490-91)

13. It is not necessary that the offender himself should have been found guilty of the main offence for the purpose of convicting him of offence under Section 201. Nor is it absolutely necessary that somebody else should have been found guilty of the main offence. Nonetheless, it is imperative that the prosecution should have established two premises. The first is that an offence has been committed and the second is that the accused knew about it or he had reasons to believe the commission of that offence. Then and then alone the prosecution can succeed, provided the remaining postulates of the offence are also established.

14. The above position has been well stated by a three-Judge Bench of this Court way back in 1952, inPalvinder Kaur v. State of Punjab: (AIR p.356,para 14)

14. In order to establish the charge under Section 201, of the Penal Code, it is essential to prove that an offence has been committed, mere suspicion that it has been committed is not sufficient that the accused knew or had reason to believe that such offence had been committed and with the requisite knowledge and with the intent to screen the offender from legal punishment causes the evidence thereof to disappear or gives false information respecting such offences knowing or having reason to believe the same to be false.

15. It is well to remind that the Bench gave a note of caution that the court should safeguard itself against the danger of basing its conclusion on suspicions however strong they may be. InKalawati and Ranjit Singh v. State of H.P. (supra) a Constitution Bench of this Court has, no doubt, convicted an accused underSection 201IPC even though he was acquitted of the offence under Section 302. But the said course was adopted by this Court after entering the finding that another accused had committed the murder and the appellant destroyed the evidence of it with full knowledge thereof.In a later decision inNathu v. State of U.P. (1979) 3 SCC 574 , this Court has repeated the caution in the following words: (SCC p. 575, para 1)

1. Before a conviction under Section 201 can be recorded, it must be shown to the satisfaction of the court that the accused knew or had reason to believe that an offence had been committed and having got this knowledge, tried to screen the offender by disposing of the dead body.

10. In V.L. Tresa v. State of Kerala, this Court has discussed the essential ingredients of the offence under Section 201 of the IPC at paragraph 12:

12. Having regard to the language used, the following ingredients emerge:

(I) committal of an offence;

(II) person charged with the offence under Section 201 must have the knowledge or reason to believe that the main offence has been committed; (III) person charged with the offence under Section 201 IPC should have caused disappearance of evidence or should have given false information regarding the main offence; and (IV) the act should have been done with the intention of screening the offender from legal punishment.

11. InSukhram v. State of Maharashtra, this Court discussed Kalawati (supra),Palvinder Kaur(supra),Suleman Rehiman(supra) andV.L. Tresa(supra) among others. The essential ingredients for conviction underSection 201of the IPC have been discussed at paragraph 18:

18. The first paragraph of the section contains the postulates for constituting the offence while the remaining three paragraphs prescribe three different tiers of punishments depending upon the degree of offence in each situation. Tobring home an offence underSection 201IPC, the ingredients to be established are: (i) committal of an offence; (ii) person charged with the offence under Section 201 must have the knowledge or reason to believe that an offence has been committed; (iii) person charged with the said offence should have caused disappearance of evidence; and (iv) the act should have been done with the intention of screening the offender from legal punishment or with that intention he should have given information respecting the offence, which he knew or believed to be false. It is plain that the intent to screen the offender committing an offence must be the primary and sole aim of the accused. It hardly needs any emphasis that in order to bring home an offence underSection 201IPC, a mere suspicion is not sufficient. There must be on record cogent evidence to prove that the accused knew or had information sufficient to lead him to believe that the offence had been committed and that the accused has caused the evidence to disappear in order to screen the offender, known or unknown.

12. InVijaya v. State of Maharashtra, though this Court held that the decision inV.L. Tresa(supra) was of no assistance to the State in the particular facts, it re-iterated that there is no quarrel with the legal principle that notwithstanding acquittal with reference to the offence underSection 302IPC, conviction under Section 201 is permissible, in a given case.(2003) 8 SCC 296

13. The decisions inVijaya(supra) andV.L. Tresa(supra) were noticed inState of Karnataka v. Madesha8. While the appeal of the State was dismissed, this Court in unmistakeable terms held that:

9. It is to be noted that there can be no dispute that Section 201 would have application even if the main offence is not established in view of what has been stated in V.L. Tresa and Vijaya cases

14. Thus, the law is well-settled that a charge underSection 201 IPC can be independently laid and conviction maintained also, in case the prosecution is able to establish that an offence had been committed, the person charged with the offence had the knowledge or the reason to believe that the offence had been committed, the said person has caused disappearance of evidence and such act of disappearance has been done with the intention of screening the offender from legal punishment. Mere suspicion is not sufficient, it must be proved that the accused knew or had a reason to believe that the offence has been committed and yet he caused the evidence to disappear so as to screen the offender. The offender may be either himself or any other person.

30. In Yogesh Singh Vs. Mahabeer Singh & Ors., (2017) 11 SCC 195, the Supreme Court observed in paragraph No. 15, 16, 17, 18 and 29 which are reproduced as under:-

15. It is a cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that the guilt of the accused must be proved beyond all reasonable doubts. However, the burden on the prosecution is only to establish its case beyond all reasonable doubt and not all doubts. Here, it is worthwhile to reproduce the observations made by Venkatachaliah, J., in State of U.P. v. Krishna Gopal, (1988) 4 SCC 302: (SCC pp. 313-14, paras 25-26)

25. Doubts would be called reasonable if they are free from a zest for abstract speculation. Law cannot afford any favourite other than truth. To constitute reasonable doubt, it must be free from an overemotional response. Doubts must be actual and substantial doubts as to the guilt of the accused person arising from the evidence, or from the lack of it, as opposed to mere vague apprehensions. A reasonable doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or a merely possible doubt; but a fair doubt based upon reason and common sense. It must grow out of the evidence in the case.

26. The concept of probability, and the degrees of it, cannot obviously be expressed in terms of units to be mathematically enumerated as to how many of such units constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. There is an unmistakable subjective element in the evaluation of the degrees of probability and the quantum of proof. Forensic probability must, in the last analysis, rest on a robust common sense and, ultimately on the trained intuitions of the judge. While the protection given by the criminal process to the accused persons is not to be eroded, at the same time, uninformed legitimization of trivialities would make a mockery of administration of criminal justice.

[See also Krishnan v. State, (2003) 7 SCC 56; Valson v. State of Kerala, (2008) 12 SCC 24 and Bhaskar Ramappa Madar and Ors. v. State of Karnataka, (2009) 11 SCC 690].

16. Another golden thread which runs through the web of the administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. (Vide Kali Ram v. State of H.P., (1973) 2 SCC 808; State of Rajasthan v. Raja Ram, (2003) 8 SCC 180; Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415; Upendra Pradhan v. State of Orissa, (2015) 11 SCC 124 and Golbar Hussain v. State of Assam and Anr., (2015) 11 SCC 242).

17.However, the rule regarding the benefit of doubt does not warrant acquittal of the accused by resorting to surmises, conjectures or fanciful considerations, as has been held by this Court in the case of State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh, (1974) 3 SCC 277: (SCC pp. 285-86, para 23)

23. A criminal trial is not like a fairy tale wherein one is free to give flight to ones imagination and fantasy. It concerns itself with the question as to whether the accused arraigned at the trial is guilty of the offence with which he is charged. Crime is an event in real life and is the product of interplay of different human emotions. In arriving at the conclusion about the guilt of the accused charged with the commission of a crime, the court has to judge, the evidence by the yardstick of probabilities, its intrinsic worth and the animus of witnesses. Every case in the final analysis would have to depend upon its own facts. Although the benefit of every reasonable doubt should be given to the accused, the courts should not at the same time reject evidence which is ex facie trustworthy, on grounds which are fanciful or in the nature of conjectures.

18. Similarly, in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793, V.R. Krishna Iyer, J., stated thus: (SCC p. 799, para 6)

6... The cherished principles or golden thread of proof beyond reasonable doubt which runs through the web of our law should not be stretched morbidly to embrace every hunch, hesitancy and degree of doubt. The excessive solicitude reflected in the attitude that a thousand guilty men may go but one innocent martyr shall not suffer is a false dilemma. Only reasonable doubts belong to the accused. Otherwise any practical system of justice will then break down and lose credibility with the community.

29. It is well settled in law that the minor discrepancies are not to be given undue emphasis and the evidence is to be considered from the point of view of trustworthiness. The test is whether the same inspires confidence in the mind of the Court. If the evidence is incredible and cannot be accepted by the test of prudence, then it may create a dent in the prosecution version. If an omission or discrepancy goes to the root of the matter and ushers in incongruities, the defence can take advantage of such inconsistencies. It needs no special emphasis to state that every omission cannot take place of a material omission and, therefore, minor contradictions, inconsistencies or insignificant embellishments do not affect the core of the prosecution case and should not be taken to be a ground to reject the prosecution evidence. The omission should create a serious doubt about the truthfulness or creditworthiness of a witness. It is only the serious contradictions and omissions which materially affect the case of the prosecution but not every contradiction or omission. (See Rammi Vs. State of M.P., (1999) 8 SCC 649; Leela Ram Vs. State of Haryana and Another, (1999) 9 SCC 525; Bihari Nath Goswami Vs. Shiv Kumar Singh (2004) 9 SCC 186; Vijay Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2010) 8 SCC 191; Sampath Kumar Vs. Inspector of Police, (2012) 4 SCC 124; Shyamal Ghosh Vs. State of West Bengal, (2012) 7 SCC 646 and Mritunjoy Biswas Vs. Pranab, (2013) 12 SCC 796).

31. On the basis of close scrutiny of the evidence, the prosecution has not proved the charges under Section 201 of I.P.C. against the appellant no. 2 beyond reasonable doubt, following facts clearly emerged:

(a) As per prosecution case, offence of murder of his sister-in-law alleged to have been committed by the appellant no. 2. In the present case defence constantly stated that the deceased was residing with her husband in the State of Punjab, where the brother-in-law of the appellant no. 2 was doing service, where she died.

(b) The appellant has been acquitted under Section 302 of I.P.C.

(c) The charge-sheet has not been submitted against the any other known or unknown person.

(d) Charge-sheet has been submitted under Sections 304, 201 of I.P.C. against the appellants.

(e) Blood stained earth or simple earth, cot and bangle have not been taken into possession.

(f) The Skelton of the dead body was found after 4th day of the incident.

(g) The Skelton has not been identified by the family members specially by first informant (PW-1) or by son of the deceased (PW-8) and another relative of deceased. However, only Chowkidar of Police Station identified the Skelton of the deceased.

32. On the basis of the facts and circumstances discussed above, and keeping in mind the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Dinesh Kumar Kalidas Patel (supra) and Yogesh Singh (supra), an inference can easily be drawn that the prosecution has not proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. The contrary view taken by the trial court is against the weight of evidence.

33. For all the reasons recorded and discussed above, I am of the considered view that the prosecution has failed to prove the charges for the offence punishable under Section 201 I.P.C. against the appellant no. 2 beyond reasonable doubt as the evidence on record does not bring home the guilt of the appellant no. 2 beyond the pale of doubt, the appellant no. 2 is entitled to the benefit of doubt. Consequently, the appellant no.2 is entitled to be acquitted of the charges for which he was tried.

34. As a result, present criminal appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and order of conviction as well as sentence recorded by the trial court is set aside. The appellant no. 2 Swaminath, is acquitted of the charges for which he has been tried. The appellant no. 2 Swaminath, is on bail, therefore, his personal bonds and sureties are, hereby, discharged. The appellant no. 2 will fulfill the requirement of Section 437-A, Cr.P.C. to the satisfaction of the trial court at the earliest.

35. The trial court records be returned forthwith with a certified copy of this judgment for compliance.

Order Date :- 17.10.2025 Ishan (Sanjay Kumar Pachori,J.)

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