Gujarat High Court
J.K. Corporation Limited And Ors. vs State Of Gujarat And Ors. on 12 July, 1995
JUDGMENT
1. The question raised in this petition is whether rule 62-A(2) to 62-A(6) and forms 45-B and 45-C prescribed under the Gujarat Sales Tax Rules vide notification dated December 22, 1993, in purported exercise of the powers conferred under section 59-A of the Gujarat Sales Tax Act contravene the provisions of articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 301 of the Constitution of India and transgress the limits of the law-making authority specified in articles 303 and 304. It is also questioned that the impugned rules and forms are in excess of the delegation of authority under section 59-A.
2. Before noticing the provisions and the precise contentions raised in this behalf, it would be appropriate to notice the backdrop of the impugned notification. By the Gujarat Sales Tax (Second Amendment) Act, 1976, section 59-A was inserted in the Gujarat Sales Tax Act, 1969, in the following terms :
"59A. Inspection of goods in transit, etc. - (1) If the State Government considers that with a view to preventing evasion of tax in any place or places in the State, it is necessary to do so, it may, by notification in the Official Gazette, direct that such number of check-posts shall be set up or such number of barriers shall be erected at such places as may be specified in the notification.
(2) At every check-post or barrier set up or erected under sub-section (1), the driver or any other person-in-charge of any vehicle, boat or animal shall stop the same, and keep it stationary so long as may reasonably be necessary, and allow the officer-in-charge of the check-post or barrier to examine the contents in the vehicle or boat or on the animal and inspect all records relating to the goods carried in the vehicle or boat or on the animal which are in the possession of such driver or other person-in-charge who shall, if so required, give his name and address and the names and addresses of the owner of the vehicle, boat or animal as well as of the consignor and consignee of such goods; and where any of the consignors or consignees is a dealer registered under this Act or the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 or relevant Act in any other State, the driver or any other person-in-charge of the vehicle, boat or animal shall also give the number and place of issue of the certificate of registration, if any, of such dealer.
(3) The driver or other person-in-charge of a vehicle, boat or animal carrying goods shall -
(a) carry with him a log book, a bill of sale or delivery note and such other documents relating to the goods carried in the vehicle or boat or on the animal and containing such particulars as may be prescribed and the driver or person-in-charge of a transport vehicle shall, in addition, carry a goods vehicle record and a trip sheet;
(b) produce the same when requested to do so by the officer-in-charge of the check-post or barrier;
(c) give to the officer-in-charge of the check-post or barrier a declaration relating to particulars of the goods carried in the vehicle or boat or on the animal in such form as may be prescribed (and keep one copy of declaration with him).
(4) The officer-in-charge of the check-post or barrier is of the opinion that -
(i) goods under transport are not covered by goods vehicle record, tripsheet or log book; or
(ii) goods under transport are not in accordance with the documents prescribed under clause (a) of sub-section (3); or
(iii) a declaration relating to particulars of goods as made under clause (c) of sub-section (3) is false, he may, after recording the reasons, seize such goods and give receipt thereof to the person from whose possession or control the goods are seized.
(5)(a) The officer-in-charge of the check-post or barrier may, after giving the owner, driver or person-in-charge of goods, a reasonable opportunity of being heard and after holding such further inquiry, as he deems fit, impose on him penalty, in addition to tax payable under this Act, not exceeding one and one-half times of the tax for possession of goods so seized.
(b) The officer-in-charge of the check-post or a barrier may release any of the goods or documents so seized under sub-section (4) on payment of tax and penalty or on furnishing such security in such form as may be prescribed.
(6) The aforesaid provisions of this section shall apply in respect to such animals, the sales or purchases of which are liable to tax and which are led by a person as if reference in the aforesaid provisions to a driver or person-in-charge of a vehicle, boat or animal carrying goods in a reference to the person leading the animal.
(7) The officer-in-charge of the check-post or barrier may, during inspection and verification of goods under transport including the documents and records relating thereto, direct the carrier not to part with the goods including re-transporting or re-booking until verification of goods, records and documents is done or enquiry, if any, is completed.
Explanation. - In this section -
(a) 'goods vehicle record' means the documents required to be carried by the driver of a transport vehicle under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (4 of 1939) or the rules made thereunder;
(b) 'log book' means record a register statement or other record containing particulars of the goods under transport;
(c) 'trip sheet' means a sheet or other documents containing particulars relating to the tripwise use of a transport vehicle, required to be carried by the driver under the Act referred to in clause (a);
(d) 'goods under transport' means goods which have been handed over to a carrier and complete delivery thereof has not been taken from carrier;
(e) 'carrier' means any person or agency who undertakes to carry or transport goods from one place to another."
3. In pursuance of the aforesaid provisions, rule 62-A was inserted vide notification dated November 8, 1976 which reads as under :
"62-A. The driver or other person-in-charge of the vehicle, boat or animal carrying goods, shall give to the officer-in-charge of the check-post or the barrier a declaration relating to the particulars of the goods carried in the vehicle or boat or on the animal in form 45-A."
4. The form 45-A required the driver to give the information relating to name and complete address of the consignor, certificate of registration number of the consignor under the State Sales Tax Act, 1969, under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, and name and complete address of the consignee, a certificate of registration of consignee, if available, under the State Sales Tax Act and the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, place including district from which the goods are despatched, destination including the name of district, description of goods, quantity and/or weight of the goods, value of goods, consignor's invoice number and date, signature. From the form, it further appears that the aforesaid information was to be signed by the consignor along with his designation under clause 9 of the form showing signature and designation of signatory. The other information which were required to be divulged under form 45-A was the name and full address of the carrier, transport company or owner of the vehicle, the details of the vehicle with its number under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, name and address of the person if any, in-charge of the goods. The declaration was to be signed by the driver. It has further been disclosed in the form that in case a copy of the transport receipt showing the facts about the carrier stated above in clause 10 of the form is available on the copy of the transport receipt then the details in columns 10(a) and 10(b) are not to be insisted upon, then, it was for the office to fill in the time of arrival of the vehicle, boat or animal, time of departure of the vehicle, boat or animal and reasons of abnormal stoppage of the vehicle, boat or animal at the check-post.
5. By the impugned notification dated December 22, 1993, the aforesaid rule 62-A was renumbered as 62-A(1) and sub-rules (2) to (6) were inserted as under :
"62-A. Declaration under sub-section (3) of section 59-A :
(1) .................
(2)(a) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule (1) if any person other than a registered dealer within the State (hereinafter referred to in this rule as the 'importer') intends either by way of purchase or otherwise, to bring, import or receive any specified goods from a place outside the State of Gujarat, of the value of rupees five thousand or more for use, consumption or disposal within the State, he shall make and furnish or cause to be furnished a declaration in form 45-B, -
Explanation. - For the purpose of this rule, specified goods means cement.
(b) Form 45B shall be obtained by making a simple application to the Sales Tax Officer concerned of the area where the importer ordinarily resides. Such application shall bear a court fee stamp of rupees two for each form. The counterfoil of the declaration shall be retained by the importer and portions thereof marked original and duplicate shall be produced before the officer-in-charge of the check-post, who shall retain such original portion and return such duplicate portion duty sealed and signed in token of having verified it to the importer producing it. Provided that such application shall be rejected if the Sales Tax Officer is satisfied that such form is not required for bona fide use.
(c) An importer obtaining form 45-B shall not transfer it to other person for use under clause (b) or shall not authorise any other person for such use on his behalf.
(d) If form 45-B obtained under clause (b) is lost, destroyed or stolen, the person concerned shall immediately report it in writing in this behalf to the officer from whom such form was obtained.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule (1), if a registered dealer imports any specified goods for sale, use in manufacture or processing of goods for sale or for sale by way of execution of a works contract or receives any specified goods consigned to him from outside the State for the aforesaid purpose, he shall make and furnish or cause to be furnished a declaration in form 45-C. The counterfoil of the declaration shall be retained by such dealer and portion thereof marked original and duplicate shall be produced before the officer-in-charge of the check-post who shall retain such original portion and return such duplicate portion duly sealed and signed in token of having verified it to the person producing it. Such duplicate portion of the declaration shall then be furnished by the dealer along with a quarterly statement in form 45-D to the Sales Tax Officer within whose jurisdiction he is registered;
(4) Form 45-C may be obtained by the registered dealer or any person duly authorised by him from the registering authority. The forms shall be available in a book of twenty-five certificates and a fee of rupees twenty-five (in court fee stamps) shall be charged for every such book;
(5) The provisions of sub-rules (3) to (12) of rule 24-A and clauses (e) and (f) of 24-B shall apply mutatis mutandis to declaration in form 45-C;
(6) The authority issuing the form 45-C may refuse to issue such form to a dealer who has failed to comply with conditions prescribed in clauses (e) and (f) of rule 24-B."
6. The effect of insertion of the aforesaid sub-rules read with forms 45-B and 45-C :
From the perusal of the newly inserted rules, it appears that the new rules and the forms have been made applicable only in the case of import of cement as a specified commodity mentioned in rule 62-A(2) and is not applicable to general movement of goods including cement within the State of Gujarat or any commodity including cement going out of Gujarat. While a declaration under form 45-B is to be furnished by an importer of cement who is other than a registered dealer form 45-C is to be furnished by an importer who is a registered dealer. It is further to be noticed that if it is form 45-B, it is to be obtained from the Sales Tax Officer concerned of the area where the importer, in case of not being registered dealer, ordinarily, resides; in case of registered dealer the form 45-C is to be obtained from the registering authority. The issuance of form 45-C has further been subjected to fulfilment of requirement of provisions of sub-rules (3) to (12) of rule 24-A and clauses (e) and (f) of rule 24-B of the Gujarat Sales Tax Rules. While sub-rules (3) to (12) of rule 24-A deal with the situation arising from loss, destruction or theft of the specified forms issued under the rules or the blank forms left with the dealer on his registration certificate being cancelled which are not very relevant for the present purpose. Rule 24-B, clauses (e) and (f) prescribe conditions for issuing the form itself and have a bearing on the controversy raised before us, the same are reproduced hereinbelow :
"24-B. Conditions to be fulfilled for obtaining from the registering authority books containing forms prescribed under rule 24.
(a) ................
(b) ................
(c) ................
(d) ................
(e) The dealer should satisfy the registering authority that all the returns due to the time of making the application have been filed within the prescribed time and that no amount is due from the applicant-dealer by way of tax, penalty or interest on the date on which application for obtaining the form is made;
(f) The applicant should further satisfy the registering authority that purchases made on the strength of the respective certificate have been accounted properly in regular books of accounts and sales of the goods purchased or sales of manufactured goods out of the goods purchased on the strength of such certificates are also accounted properly in regular books of account and tax due and payable as per the provision for these purchase, sales and resale has been duly paid within the prescribed time-limit."
7. The information required required from the importer other than the registered dealer under form 45-B is the very same information minus the details about the name and address of driver or the person-in-charge of the vehicle carrying the goods as is required from driver under form 45-A as will be seen from the form reproduced hereinafter. In addition thereto, a copy of the purchase order and the consignor's invoice number and date was also to be furnished along with the declaration. In form 45-C the same information is to be supplied by the registered dealer in case of purchases made by him. In addition to the aforesaid information, he has further to furnish in the declaration the nature of transaction. Forms 45-B and 45-C are reproduced as under :
.
FORM 45-
[See rule 62-A(2)]
Declaration by person other than a registered dealer importing
specified goods
Counterfoil/Duplicate/Original
Book No. : Sr. No.
Name of the office of issue : Seal of issuing authority
Date of issue :
Valid up to ..................
Shri/Mrs ............................................................
(name and full address) is/are .................................................. permitted to import into the State of Gujarat a consignment as detailed below :-
Description of goods :
Quantity :
Purchase/to be purchased from :
Signature and designation of issuing authority.
8. Declared and certified that the details of the goods covered by the above permission are as under :-
Name and complete address of the :
(1) (a) Out-State consignor :
(b) A certificate of registration No. of the consignor.
(i) under the ........ (mention the name of the State) Sales Tax Act (Certificate No.) ..........
(ii) under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 ...........
(2) Name and complete address of the importer (consignee) (3) (a) Name and complete address of the agent, person, broker though whom the order is booked.
(b) A certificate of registration No. of such agent, person, etc.
(i) under the ....... (mention the name of the State) Sales Tax Act,
(ii) under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 .............
(4) Copy of the order so placed is attached.
(5) Complete address including the name of :
(i) District
(ii) State, from which the goods are dispatched.
(6) Complete address of the destination including the name of
(i) Taluka
(ii) District of the State to which the goods are despatched :
(7) Description of goods.
(8) Quantity and the weight of goods.
(9) Value of goods.
(10) Consignor's invoice No. and date (copy of the purchase price/cash memo No ....... dt ...... to be presented along with this declaration for inspection). (11) Details of the transport such as :
(i) Truck No.
(ii) L.R. No. and date.
(iii) Name of the transporting company.
(12) Signature and designation of the signatory.
Note : Form is in triplicate.
FORM 45-C [See rule 62-A(3)] Declaration by a registered importing dealer specified goods for sale, etc. Counterfoil/Duplicate/Original Book No. : Sr. No. Name of the officer on issue. Seal of issuing authority Date of issue : Place :
Date :
To The officer in-charge of the check-posts or barrier.
Declared and certified that the goods particulars of which are given below have been imported by me/us for sale, use in manufacture of processing of goods for sale or for sale by way of execution of works contract and hold myself/ourselves liable for payment of tax as per the Gujarat Sales Tax Act, 1969 on the sale thereof. (1) (a) Name and complete address of the out-State consignor.
(b) A certificate of registration No. of the consignor.
(i) under the ........ (mention the name of the State) Sales Tax Act.
(ii) under the Central Tax Act, 1956 ............
(2) Nature of transaction :
(a) Consignment.
(b) Depot transfer.
(c) Inter-State sale/purchase.
(d) Any other.
(3) (a) Name and complete address of the consignee.
(b) A certificate of registration No. of the consignor.
(i) under the Gujarat Sales Tax Act, 1969.
(ii) under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956.
(4) (a) Name and complete address of the agent, person, broker through whom the order is booked.
(b) A certificate of registration No. of such agent, person, etc.
(i) under the ....... (mention the name of the State) Sales Tax Act.
(ii) under the central Sales Tax Act, 1956 .............
(5) Copy of the order so placed is attached.
(6) Complete address including the name of :
(i) District
(ii) State from which the goods are despatched.
(7) Complete address of the destination including the name of
(i) Taluka
(ii) District of the State to which the goods are despatched.
(8) Description of goods.
(9) Quantity and the weight of goods.
(10) Value of goods.
(11) Consignor's invoice No ....... and date .....(copy of the purchase bill/cash memo No ........ date ......... to be presented along with this declaration for inspection). (12) Details of the transport such as :
(i) Truck No .........
(ii) L.R. No. & date ........
(iii) Name of the transporting company.
(13) Signature and designation of the signatory.
9. According to the averments made in the petition prior to November, 1993, on the representation of cement manufactures in the State of Gujarat, the then Chief Minister of the Gujarat State made a public statement that the directions were given to the State Government to take certain measures for protecting the interest of cement manufacturers in Gujarat. It was in consequence of that the impugned notification was issues. In reply thereto, the following averments were made by the respondents on affidavit narrating the circumstances which led to insertion of the impugned sub-rules in rule 62-A in the Gujarat Sales Tax Rules, 1970.
"4. In exercise of its powers under sub-section (5) of section 8 of the Central Act, the Government of Rajasthan reduced the rates of tax on inter-State sales of cement first to 7 per cent and then to four per cent and dispensed with requirement of 'C' form. The effect of this reduction of rate of tax was that on all inter-State sales of cement whether to the Government or to a registered dealer or to any other person whomsoever stood reduced to 4 per cent rendering it immaterial whether the purchased is a dealer or a consumer. This in turn would lead to the following consequences :
(i) Manufacturers in Rajasthan having branches in Gujarat and registered as dealer under the Gujarat Sales Tax Act, 1969 (which is the case of the petitioner No. 1) started booking order for cement in Gujarat; effect of delivery directly from their factories in Rajasthan to the purchasers in Gujarat and collecting the sale proceed in Gujarat;
(ii) Consumers in Gujarat started purchasing cement from factories in Rajasthan in quantities much larger than their genuine requirement and surreptitiously sold/disposed of quantity in excess of their requirements.
It may be noted here that the factories of several cement manufacturers in Rajasthan are located in areas contiguous close to Gujarat. For instance, the factory of petitioner No. 1 is located in Sirohi district in Rajasthan which is adjacent to Banaskantha district in Gujarat. The main units of cement manufacturers in Gujarat are located in the western and southern part of Saurashtra; compared to their location, the location of several manufacturers in Rajasthan is nearer to the north Gujarat and central Gujarat. Cement manufactured in Gujarat was found to be costlier by purchasers in Gujarat as compared to cement purchased from manufacturers outside the State of Gujarat.
5. In the circumstances narrated hereinabove, manufacturer of cement in Gujarat as well as trade organisations like the Gujarat Chamber of Commerce and Industry made representations to the State Government to take suitable remedial measures so that the spirit and intent of the Central Act is preserved and the State Government gets its revenue on cement sold in Gujarat and manufacturers in Gujarat can compete with their counterparts. In these circumstances, the Government of Gujarat took the following decision :
(i) There should be no restriction for registered dealer who intends to bring in goods from Rajasthan to Gujarat either for use or for sale in the State of Gujarat but he will be required to furnish required information in the prescribed form.
(ii) In respect of persons other than registered dealer intending to purchase or bring cement from any place outside the State of Gujarat, they will be required to give a declaration.
(iii) With a view to implement the aforesaid decision, the Gujarat Sales Tax Rules, 1970, were amended by re-numbering rule 62-A thereof as 62-A(1) and inserting sub-rules (2) to (6) therein and appending forms 45-B and 45-C thereto.
6. That in the matter of taxation, the Legislature enjoys wide latitude and has powers to provide for all matters ancillary or incidental to the legislation. Further, that there is no precise or set formula or doctrine tests of precise of the felt needs of the times and exigencies of situation. That in the situation narrated hereinabove, the State Government had to consider two options as follows :
(1) to reduce the rate of tax on sale of cement under the local Act, or (2) to crete a regulatory machinery which would while not restricting or undermining freedom of inter-State trade or commerce minimise, if not totally remove, the possibility of any undue advantage being taken in the guise of effecting an inter-State sale or purchase.
The State Government felt that reducing the rate of tax on sale of cement under the local Act would adversely affect revenues of the State. The State Government, therefore, pursued the other alternative namely, creating a regulating machinery in order to ensure that bogus billing and tax evasion is checked.
7. I respectfully submit that viewed in the perspective regulation, if any, on sale or purchases in the course of inter-State trade or commerce are minimal and reasonable. I submit that the impugned rule 62-A of the Gujarat Sales Tax Rules, 1970, does not prevent, prohibit or restrict sales or purchases in the course of inter-State trade or commerce. It only provides for collection of certain basic data so as to prevent sale or purchases ostensibly made in the course of inter-State trade or commerce being uses as means of making local or purchases surreptitiously."
10. The petitioner's contentions in support of the petition are that the impugned Rules have been inserted not for the purpose for which power has been conferred for prescribing documents in section 59-A(3)(a). The Rules have been framed by the delegated authority in colourable exercise of the said powers of prescribing documents for the purposes of section 59-A to be carried out along with the carrier for impeding the movement of cement from other State to Gujarat by directly putting the importers sunder irrelevant and unreasonable conditions. The requirement of the very same information, which was to be furnished by the drover, from the importer other than registered dealer (for convenience hereinafter called "the consumer") more particularly, the requirement of furnishing the invoice number and date and the details of the transport such as truck number, lorry receipt number and date and name of the transport company prescribed in clauses 10 and 11 of form 45-B and disclosing the name, address and name of the district and State from which the goods are despatched in clause No. 5 amounts to directly impeding the free flow of trade in cement or at least restricting and obstructing for a period which is neither necessary nor required and, therefore, amounts to unreasonable restriction on the movement of goods within the meaning of article 304(b). For the same reason, requirement of furnishing such information under form 45-C has been challenged. This is on the ground that these information are not in the personal knowledge of the consumer or the importer registered dealer but is in the personal knowledge of the consignor or the carrier who is otherwise supposed to divulge the same information under the parent provision. The requirement from the consumer importer or the registered dealer within the State of Gujarat to furnish this declaration to the carrier to be carried along with goods directly results in making the goods stationary until the information is received by the importer from the consignor and/or transporter after the goods have been subjected to invoice, delivery to the transporter, and the vehicle or the other carriage is identified in which the goods are to be carried and, thereafter, the declaration is filled in by the importer under his signature and delivered to the carrier. Therefore, until the declaration duly filled and signed by the importer is delivered after the goods have been ready for delivery, the goods have to be kept stationary at the trasporter's end or it implies that all transactions must be carried on in the presence of the importer and the man must be deputed and stationed at the place of despatch to coller necessary information and deliver it to the carrier at that stage or to keep a track of the movement of goods from the place of despatch until it reaches the check-post or barrier. This is so because declaration is to be carried along with the goods and produced at the check-post or barrier. As the importer is situated within the State of Gujarat and is not at the place of despatch and the declaration is to be given under his signature and cannot be furnished later on, the direct result of this requirement of carrying a declaration by the importer along with the goods results in impeding the free movement of goods.
11. It was further contended that the purpose of enacting section 59-A is to prevent evasion and avoidance of of tax. The provision of the parent Act is not directly confined to import of goods or export of goods from the State of Gujarat but is a general provision made applicable to movement of any goods within the territory of Gujarat from the point of its entry; or to the point of its exit if such goods are sent outside the State and dealt with in the State of Gujarat, the provisions are applicable and are subjected to the same condition uniformly whether the manufacturer is within the State or goods imported from outside the State, whether sold or purchased in the course of inter-State trade or is intra-State transaction. By subjecting only cement imported within the State of Gujarat to the exclusion of all other commodities and to the exclusion of other transactions of cement also generally results directly in giving preferential treatment to goods manufactured in the State of Gujarat over the goods from other States which is clearly in violation of mandate of articles 303 and 304(a) of the Constitution. It was also argued that the impugned provisions being part of law imposing tax, which is not regulatory, for the aforesaid reasons of being applied to import of cement manufactured out of the State is violative of article 304(a). That apart, as is apparent from the reply, the provisions have been made with the avowed purpose of facilitating the trade of cement by the manufacturers of cement within the State to mitigate the ill-effect of a higher rate of inter-State sales resulting in locally manufactured cement costlier than the cement imported from neighbouring State for the buyer within the State, makes it abundantly clear that the delegated authority has not exercised powers under section 59-A(3)(a) of prescribing documents for the purpose envisaged but for other purpose shielding the local manufacturers of cement from the competitive market. Therefore, the exercise of powers in framing rules is not only ultra vires the parent Act and provisions of the Constitution but is colourable exercise of the powers by delegate. In this connection, it was also argued that if the purpose for which the rule 62-A(2) and (3) has been framed and subjected to condition prescribed in rule 24-B(e) and (f) is prevention of tax evasion then there is no discernible reason why such provisions have been made applicable only to the commodity known as cement and that too only to the transaction of import. It cannot be said that there is any specific problem of evasion of tax related to import of cement requiring a special treatment for that purpose for which, according to the petitioners, there is no clue in the return furnished by the respondents. If that is not so, then the provision per se not only violates articles 303 and 304(a) of the Constitution but also articles 14 and 19(1)(g) affecting the freedom of trade of citizens unreasonably. That discrimination on account of unreasonable classification is stamped on the face of it. It is also the contention of the learned counsel that while the Act authorises the rule-making authority only to prescribe the "documents" to be carried along with the transport but it does not authorise to impose any condition on the import of commodities from other State or to prescribe condition even for issuing forms of declaration which is not otherwise attached to any other commodity or transaction. It was elaborated that under rules 24-B(e) and (f), it is required of the registered dealer before obtaining form 45-C to satisfy the registering authority that as on the date of application all returns have been filed within the prescribed time-limit and that no amount is due from the applicant-dealer by way of tax, penalty or otherwise on the date when the application is made. He is further to satisfy the registering authority that the purchases made on the strength of the declaration given in the form have been accounted properly in regular account books and resales of the goods purchased or sales of goods manufactured out of the goods purchased under such declaration are also accounted properly in regular books of account and tax due and payable as per rules have been fully paid within the prescribed time-limit. In the absence of such satisfaction, the concerned Sales Tax Office has been empowered to refuse to issues such forms at all. That is to say in that event the dealer cannot import the cement manufactured by a person outside the State of Gujarat for the purpose of his trade. But notwithstanding that no such returns have been filed, no such tax, penalty or interest has been paid, no such satisfaction about the making entries in regular books of account and payment of tax in respect of such returns have been filed, no such tax, penalty or interest has been paid, no such satisfaction about the making entries in regular books of account and payment of tax in respect of such purchases even made in time, the registered dealer is free to trade in the cement manufactured locally. That is a direct restriction on trade and also the restriction on import of cement. These restrictions in the context in which they have been imposed have no rational nexus to the purpose for which the power under section 59-A could be exercised. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on [1971] 27 STC 4 (SC); (1971) 1 SCC 59 (Hansraj Bagrecha v. State of Bihar) and in the case of Alka Agarwal v. State of Rajasthan [1987] 66 STC 204, a decision of the Rajasthan High Court.
12. It was strongly contended by the learned counsel for the Revenue that section 59-A is a provision enacted for preventing evasion of tax. It authorises the State Government, the rule-making authority, to prescribe any document containing requisite information to be carried along with goods by the transporter. In exercise of that power, it has been prescribed that impugned declarations be furnished by the importer of the goods to be carried by the transporter. The information required from the importer is all relevant information which has nexus to the question of preventing avoidance and evasion of tax in respect of the goods which on being imported become mass of the property within the State and is liable to be dealt with the registered dealer or the consumer within the territory of State which may attract liability of tax. The fact that the information is required from the importer and not from the driver is of little importance so long the required information is relevant. It is not important from whom the information is required. It was urged by the learned counsel that though rule 62-A introduced originally requiring driver to submit requisite information of general nature and applies to all carriages of goods in the territory of Gujarat as a result of intra-State transactions and inter-State transactions, in practice that declaration is sought from driver only in case the goods are exported out of Gujarat. His contention was that the provisions are regulatory in character and not restrictions, therefore, they are beyond the purview of articles 301 and 304 under Part XIII of the Constitution. According to him, unless a law results directly in impeding the free movement of goods mere indirect effect or temporary stoppage of goods on account of regulatory measures does not come within the purview of article 304(b). As the impugned rules do not restrict or barricade trade in cement directly and immediately as distinct from creating remotely some indirect or inconsequential inconvenience cannot be held to be unreasonable or ultra vires of any provisions of the Constitution or the Act. Strong reliance is placed on Atiabari Tea Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam AIR 1961 SC 232, Automobile Transport (Rajasthan) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1962 SC 1406, Sodhi Transport Co. v. State of U.P. [1986] 62 STC 381; AIR 1986 SC 1099 and State of Bihar v. Harihar Prasad Debuka reported in [1989] 73 STC 353; AIR 1989 SC 1119. In this connection, it was also contended that the decision in Alka Agarwal's case [1987] 66 STC 204 (Raj) is founded on a decision of the Patna High Court reported in [1987] 66 STC 178 [FB] (Harihar Prasad Debuka v. State of Bihar). The decision of the Patna High Court in [1987] 66 STC 178 [FB], has been reversed in [1989] 73 STC 353 (SC); AIR 1989 SC 1119 (State of Bihar v. Harihar Prasad Debuka) and, therefore, the decision of the Rajasthan High Court should also be deemed to have been overruled. It was also contended that Harihar Prasad's case [1989] 73 STC 353 (SC); AIR 1989 SC 1119 dealt with the similar provisions and forms prescribed by the Bihar State and the ratio of the said decision squarely governs the field. He, therefore, sought dismissal of the writ petition.
13. Before we proceed further, two common premises on which there is no dispute between the parties, may be stated. First that section 59-A has been legislated in exercise of powers conferred under entry 54 of State List of the Seventh Schedule as ancillary provisions of impositions of tax on sale or purchase of goods for making levy of tax workable with the purpose of achieving object of preventing evasion of tax in any place or places in the State. The goods during the transport can be subject to inspection at check-post created for that purpose within State and the carriage can be kept stationary as long as required for that purpose. As such provision could affect unfettered free-flow of trade, the provision was inserted vide President's assent in terns of article 304(b). The purpose of the parent provision is disclosed in wordings of section 59-A(1) itself. Secondly, the information required through declaration in forms 45-B and 45-C is relevant and not de hors the purpose. The contention is in respect of person from whom such information is required and the condition which has been imposed on such person for obtaining the requisite forms for importing the cement from outside the State of Gujarat.
14. As the impugned provisions of the rules and the forms appended thereto have been challenged both on the ground of having been made in excess of authority conferred by the parent Act in this regard and also being in contravention of the provision of the Constitution, more specifically articles 14 and 19(1)(g) and the scheme under Part XIII of the Constitution contained in articles 301 and 304, we shall first examine the issue relating to rules having been in excess of delegated authority.
15. Generally speaking, delegated legislation is open to scrutiny of the courts on two grounds namely, whether it violates any provisions of the Constitution and whether it violates or goes beyond the provisions of the enabling Act. It was opined by Lord Greene, M.R. in Carltona Ltd. v. Commissioners of Works [1943] 2 ALL ER 560 (PC) that, "Where a regulation of this kind commits to an executive authority the decision, all what is necessary or expedient, and that authority makes the decision, it is not competent to the court to investigate the grounds or the reasonableness of the reasons in the absence of any allegation of bad faith.
....... Parliament which authorises this regulation commits to the executive the discretion to decide and with discretion if bona fide exercised, no court can interfere. All that the courts can do is to see that the power which it is claimed to exercise is one which falls within the four corners of the powers given by the legislation and to see that those powers are exercised in good faith."
16. In Attorney General of Canada v. Hallet & Carys LA [1952] AC 27, the Privy Council was considering the case of validity of an order issued by the Governor-in-Council under the provisions of War Measures Act. Section 2 of which provided :
"The Governor-in-Council may do and authorise such acts and things and make from time to time such orders and regulation, as he may by reason of continued existence of national emergency ....... for the purpose of ........ (c) maintaining, controlling and regulating supplies and services, price, transportation, ........... to ensure economic stability and an orderly transition to conditions of peace."
17. The preamble of the impugned order made by the Governor-in-Council for vesting of certain powers in Wheat Board stated in unequivocal terms that it is necessary by reason of the continued existence of emergency to the effect the vesting in the Wheat Board of such holding, ....... for the purpose of maintaining, controlling and regulating supplies and prices to ensure economic stability and orderly transition to condition of peace.
18. Finding that there was nothing contrary to hold against the declared purpose, Lord Redcliffe said :
"How then, can a court of law decide that the vesting was for another and extraneous purposes or hold that what the Governor-in-Council has declared to be necessary is not in fact necessary for the purpose he has stated. There is no warrant at all for presenting this as a case in which powers entrusted for one purpose are deliberately used with design of achieving another itself unauthorised or actually for bidden. If bad faith of that kind can be established, a court of law may intervene."
19. These principles were reiterated by Court of Appeal in Mc. Eldomney v. Forde [1969] 2 All ER 39, by Lord Mc. Dermolt, C.J. In Sant Saran Lal v. Parsuram Sahu AIR 1966 SC 1852, the Supreme Court had occasion to examine the scope and ambit of rule-making power conferred by section 27 of the Bihar Money Lenders Act to prescribe the form of registration certificate and particulars to be included in an application made for the purpose of being registered as a money-lender. The rule-making authority authorised the registering authority to mention maximum amount up to which the money lenders could transact his business under the registration certificate issued to him. The said provision was held to be ultra vires on the ground :
"....... the Act does not anywhere provide for the fixing of the upper limit for the loans remaining outstanding at any particular time. The rule-making power of the Government does not extend to the fixing of such a limit. Section 27 empowers the State Government to prescribe, inter alia, the form of the registration certificate and the particulars to be contained in an application made for the purpose of being registered as a money-lender. It is significant to note that the rule-making power given to the State Government is not expressed in the usual form, i.e., is not to the effect that the State Government may make rules for the purposes of the Act. The rule-making power is limited to what is stated in clauses (a) to (e) of section 27 and these clauses do not empower the State Government to prescribe the limit up to which the loans advanced by a money-lender are to remain outstanding at any particular moment of time."
20. The Supreme Court in Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education v. Paritosh Bhupesh Kurmarsheth AIR 1984 SC 1543 laid down three-fold test for judging the validity of subordinate legislation : (1) whether the provisions of the regulations fall within the scope and ambit of the powers conferred on the delegate; (2) whether the regulations are made to any extent inconsistent with the provisions of enabling Act; and (3) whether they infringe any of the fundamental rights or other restrictions or limitations imposed by the Constitution.
21. From the aforesaid, it can fairly be said that a subordinate legislation when challenged is to be tested on the anvil (1) whether it suffers from the vice of colourable exercise of the powers that is to say that the powers entrusted for one purpose are deliberately used with the design of achieving another ?
(2) whether it shows on the face of it a misconstruction of enabling Act or a failure to comply with the condition which the Act prescribes for exercise of its power ?
(3) whether it is not capable of being related to one of the prescribed purposes ?
(4) if the power has been exercised under a provision which conferred authority of a limited scope, whether the rule made can be justified within the ambit of those limits ?
(5) whether the rule made is to any extent inconsistent with the provisions of the enabling Act ? and (6) whether the provision infringes any of the fundamental rights or other restrictions or limitations imposed by the Constitution ?
22. To see what is the authorisation, we shall first have to look at the enabling provisions. Section 59-A of the State Act has been enacted for the purpose of enabling the State Government to establish check-posts at any place or places within the State for the purpose of preventing evasion of tax in any place or places within the State. For achieving that purpose, further empowers the officer-in-charge of the check-post or barrier to stop the vehicle, boat or animal carrying goods and to examine the contents in the vehicle, boat or on the animal, which are in the possession of the driver or other person-in-charge of the goods. The driver or other person-in-charge of the goods have to meet with certain obligations when so required to stop the vehicle, boat or animal by the officer-in-charge of the check-post or barrier. In furtherance of the very object, it has further been designed that the driver or other person-in-charge of the vehicle, boat or animal is required to give his name and address, name and address of the owner of the vehicle, boat or animal as well as of the consignor or consignee of the goods, and in case consignee or consignor is registered dealer under the State Act or the Central Act or under relevant Act of any other State, to disclose the number and place of issue of certificate in such a cases.
23. The manner in which information required under sub-section (2) has been provide in sub-section (3) Under clause (a) of sub-section (3), it has been provided that driver or person-in-charge of the vehicle, boat or animal carrying the goods shall carry with him a log book, a bill of sale or delivery note, goods vehicle record. Apart from these documents described in sub-section (3)(a), it has been left to the rule-making authority to prescribed other "documents" related to such goods to be carried in the vehicle or boat or on animal which may contain such particulars as may be prescribed. Those documents which are to be carried along with the goods are required to be produced by the driver or the person-in-charge of the goods vehicle or boat or animal carrying goods when required to do so by the officer-in-charge of the check-post or barrier and lastly sub-clause (3) requires a declaration relating to particulars of the goods carried in the vehicle or boat or on the animal is such form as may be prescribed to be given by the driver or person-in-charge of a vehicle, boat or animal. Sub-section (4) authorises officer-in-charge of the check-post or barrier under certain conditions to seize the goods. Sub-section (5) further authorises the officer-in-charge of the check-post or barrier after giving the owner of the goods, driver or person-in-charge of the vehicle and goods a reasonable opportunity of being heard, to impose penalty in addition to tax payable under this Act not exceeding one and half time of the tax amount and recover the said amount. The provision is self-contained scheme and applies to all transportation of goods within the territory of the State of Gujarat including the goods which enter the State from outside or leave the State from within or the goods are transported within the State. While the intra-State transactions may directly result in attracting the provisions of the State Sales Tax Act and levy thereunder, goods leaving the State may attract the levy of the sales tax under the State Act or the Central Sales Tax Act to be administered by the State depending upon whether the movement of the goods has directly occasioned as a result of sale or not ? In the case of goods coming from outside there is no such liability of the State tax on that transaction is attracted, yet the provisions can be reasonably related to preventing of apprehended evasion of tax which is likely to arise as a result of dealing with the goods after the same has become part of the mass of the property within the State and is dealt with within the State thereafter. The list of the documents to be carried along with the goods has been described in the provision itself. The limited authority for the purpose of this provision which has been conferred on the rule-making authority is to prescribe documents other than mentioned in the Act relating to goods and containing such particulars as may be prescribed. At the same time a separate independent provision has also been made for securing "declaration" relating to particulars of goods carried in the vehicle which is to be obtained from driver or other person-in-charge of the vehicle.
24. Originally, under rule 62-A as reproduced above, the rule-making authority prescribed form 45-A in which declaration required under sub-section (3)(c) of section 59-A was required to be furnished by the driver in his declaration. The authority under the Act for the purposes of section 59-A confired on the rule-making authority was limited to prescribe documents relating to the goods carried by the carrier containing such particulars as may be prescribed.
25. The first question then arises is whether the "declaration" which is required by the impugned provisions from the consignee, whether a registered dealer or not, of particulars in terms of forms 45-B and 45-C respectively falls within the scope of that authority.
26. On a careful consideration of the scheme of the Act and terminology used, we are of the opinion that the statute itself has made a clear distinction between "documents" and the "declaration". A document and a declaration convey two distinct meanings. In its ordinary sense, document as per Webster's Third Dictionary is a noun and means "something as of writing that serves to administrate or prove something and original or official paper relied upon as the basis, prove or support or something, when used in plurals, the bill of lading and policy of insurance and sometimes other papers that evidence of effect of shipment of goods, transfer of tile, etc., or a formal or official writing or a personal identification". A declaration has been stated to mean "a statement made or testimony given by a witness or a party to a legal transaction usually not under oath".
27. The same distinction we find in the two expressions in Black's Law Dictionary (5th Edition). Declaration has been stated to mean "a declaration in law of evidence on unsworn statement or narration of facts made by the parties to the transaction or one who has interest in the facts".
28. The document has been defined to mean "an instrument and which is recorded by means of letters, figures or marks in original, official or legal form of something which may be eventually need in this sense. The term document applies to writing, words, printed lithographs, photographs, maps, etc. In the plural : deeds, agreements, title papers, letter receipts and other written instrument used to prove a fact.
29. Oxford's English Dictionary defines the word "document" as "something written, inscribed which furnishes evidence of any subject as a manuscript, title-deed, stone, picture, etc., the bill of lading and policy of insurance, handed over as collateral security to furnish with the papers or the documents for the manifestation of the ownership and cargo.
30. The declaration is contract has been defined to mean "a simple affirmation allowed to be taken in certain cases instead of oath or solemn affirmation".
31. Parent Act deals with tax on sale or purchase of goods. It is relating to such goods that documents are required to be carried along with the goods by the transporter, In this context, the "document" relating to goods containing prescribed particulars can only mean such documents as are used in the ordinary course of business as proof of the possession or control of goods and proof of dealing with the goods by the consignor and consignees, whether as owner, transferor, transporter or otherwise. A declaration of certain statement of facts or divulging certain information only is not in the ordinary sense of the commercial world with whom the statute deals, a document relating to goods.
32. In the context of the provisions, the word "documents" has been used in the sense of some form of written proof which discloses the connection of such goods with the consignee and the transporter which is a primary evidence to prove the information required to be furnished under sub-section (2) of section 59-A; whereas the "declaration" in that context means a simple statement relating to particulars of the goods required to be furnished by the driver in the form to be prescribed by the rule-making authority. The documentary proof in support of transportation of goods which are being carried by the carrier has something to do with the original instrument connecting those goods with the title or possession of the goods, nature of transaction under which the goods are being transported, connecting them with the consignor, consignee and the transporter. These original documents may be in the form of invoice, purchase order, excise receipts or such other kind of documents which may relate to the identity of the goods carried in the transport and connect them with the consignor, consignee and the transporter.
33. It is further to be noticed in this connection under sub-section (4) a falsity of declaration in clause (c) of sub-section (3) has been made subject to the consequences of seizure whereas it is only if the goods under transport are not in accordance with the document has been made subject to the same consequence but not falsity of the document. Documents, which under sub-section (3)(a) may be prescribed, are not in the context to mean mere statement of the consignor or consignee but means writings conveying title of the goods or relating to the identity of goods carried in the transport, or authorising possession of goods and its delivery to consignee by the transporter. Such documents may be required to disclose such particulars also as may be prescribed. To illustrate, a transport receipt may be required to be carried along with the goods, likewise a purchase order in pursuance of which sale transaction has taken place may be required to be carried along with the goods by prescribing under the parent Act and if the goods in transport do not accord with the description with such documents, the consequences to follow with the seizure. If the "documents" in the context of the scheme would have included mere statements by the parties to transaction, the falsity of document would also have been made an event entailing similar consequences as falsity of a declaration under section 59-A(3)(c).
34. Thus, in our opinion, under the scheme of the provisions of section 59-A which is a self-contained provision and confers a limited power on the rule-making authority for prescribing documents to be carried along with the goods, did not authorise the rule-making authority to obtain declaration of any person other than the driver or person in-charge of the vehicle, boat or animal carrying goods in exercise of the powers.
35. In this connection, it is further to be noticed that by the impugned rules 62-A(5) and (6), the issuance of form 45-C has further been made subject to clauses (e) and (f) of rule 24-B, i.e., to say making of declaration itself by the importer has been made possible only in case he has satisfied the conditions of rule 24-B(e) and (f) noticed hereinabove. The power conferred under section 59-A(3) is limited to the extent of prescribing documents to be carried along with the goods by the carrier and the same to be produced when called upon to do so by the officer-in-charge of check-post or the barrier. As noticed above, in such a case, the exercise of power has to be justified within the scope and ambit of the power conferred and if the power has been exercised beyond the authority, the same is invalid. The provision nowhere authorises the rule-making authority to prescribe conditions subject to which alone the prescribed form can be issued for the required declaration and the declaration, therefore, can be made only on fulfilment of the conditions mentioned in rule 24-B(e) and (f). The prescribing of such conditions on the face of it goes beyond the limited power conferred on the rule-making authority for prescribing documents at least to that extent. Rule 62-A(2) read with form 45-B makes it clear that in fact the form 45-B is designed to work as permit to import cement by the consumer. It is in fact the permit issued by the officer authorised to issue form. Section 59-A does not envisage any such power in favour of rule-making authority. No nexus with transaction has been established for designing procedure of permit for import only, a transaction which itself is not subject to State law. The case squarely falls within the ratio laid down by their Lordships in Sant Saran Lal's case AIR 1966 SC 1852. It was a case in which the rule-making power of the Government did not extend to fixing a limit up to which the registered money-lender could extend his transactions, therefore, the rule requiring the mention of maximum amount up to which the registered money-lender could transact under the certificate was held to be bad. The rule-making power under section 59-A(3)(a) is confined to prescribing documents to be carried along with the goods by the transporter and does not confer power to lay down strings for creation of such documents making it a provision not for prescribing documents but condition under which the goods can be carried. It is, in our opinion, clearly beyond the scope of the authority conferred on the State.
36. In this connection, learned counsel for the Revenue had strongly relied on the decision in State of Bihar v. Harihar Prasad Debuka [1989] 73 STC 353 (SC). We have carefully considered the contention and gone through the authority cited before us.
37. We shall consider the decision in detail later on. For the present, we notice that in pursuance of section 31(2a) of the Bihar Act the Transport Commissioner had issued notification and prescribed that a person transporting goods shall carry form XXVIII-A and XXVIII-B duly filed in in respect of the goods brought into the State or sent outside the State. Form XXVIII-A merely related to issue of permit by the officer concerned. Form XXVIII-B was a form of permit which was to be filed by the permit holder before the Transport Officer. From the aforesaid provisions, it is apparent that the Bihar Act has specifically empowered carrying on a declaration distinct from "documents", in such form as has been prescribed by the Commissioner. The declaration was not statutorily required to be furnished by the driver only as is the case under the provisions of the Gujarat Sales Tax Act with which we are concerned.
38. Section 35 of the Bihar Finance Act, specially provided for authorising restriction on movement or exit of goods by subjecting the same to "permit" rule which provision was not challenged. There is no such provision like section 35 of the Bihar Act under the State Law authorising rule-making authority to subject the import of any commodity to the issue of permit by officer authorised to issue form of declaration. Therefore, in our opinion, the scheme with reference to which the question had arisen before the Supreme Court in Harihar Prasad's case [1989] 73 STC 353; AIR 1989 SC 1119 was entirely different from the one with which we are concerned and has no bearing on the question whether the rule-making authority has exceeded the power conferred on it under section 59-A. The question as to the applicability of the principle enunciated therein in relation to the challenge to the notification on the ground of violating the provisions of Part XIII of the Constitution along with articles 14 and 19(1)(g) we shall be considering hereinafter.
39. For the same reasons, Sodhi Transport's case [1986] 62 STC 381 (SC); AIR 1986 SC 1099 is of little assistance. It was a case where section 28-B of the U.P. Sales Tax Act specifically provided for subjecting transporter carrying the goods which were transported from one State to another through the territory of U.P. but were not intended to be retained in the State, to obtain a permit of passage at the point of entry in the State and surrender the same at the exit. Failure to submit permit within the time specified in the permit by the transporter at the exit point, gave rise to a resumption against the transporter that he has sold the goods within U.P. attracting State sales tax. It was the provision relating to raising of presumption of sale for the purpose of levy which was challenged before the honourable Supreme Court. It was in this context that the court decided that :
"A rebuttble presumption which is clearly a rule of evidence has the effect of shifting the burden of proof and it is hard to see how it is unconstitutional when the person concerned has the opportunity to displace the presumption by leading evidence."
40. The court went on to hold that : "the restrictions imposed are not also shown to be unreasonable. They do not unduly hamper trade. On the other hand they are imposed in the public interest. The contentions based on article 301 and article 19(1)(g) of the constitution are, therefore, without substance".
41. Coming to the next question, part XIII of the Constitution guarantees free trade, commerce and intercourse within the territory of India spelling out India as a whole one indivisible unit and ensuring to its people economic inter-action and economic growth free from geographical barriers. Article 301 provides that trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India shall be free. This freedom is made subject to other provisions of Part XIII of the Constitution. Article 302 empowers the Parliament to legislate such restrictions on the said freedom as may be required in the public interest. Article 303 prohibits the Parliament as well as the State Legislature from making any law making or authorising preference to one State over another or making or authorising of making discrimination between one State and another by virtue of any entry relating to legislative powers of the Parliament or State Legislature as per the Lists enumerated in the Seventh Schedule. At the same time, it makes room for making laws by the Parliament alone for giving preference or making discrimination only in the case of a situation arising from scarcity of goods in any part of the territory of India if a declaration to that respect is specifically made by any such law. That is to say permissible criterion for preferential or discriminatory treatment in this regard is fixed by the Constitution itself leaving out the scope of bringing in other criterion for making laws for the purpose of giving preference to one State on other in the matter of trade, commerce or other intercourse. On that anvil law restricting export of a commodity from scarce area to other area can be justified but not the restriction on import within the State. Article 304(a) acknowledges the right of the State Legislature to legislate any law imposing tax on goods imported from other States or the Union Territories subject to condition that similar goods manufactured or produced in that State are also subjected to such tax and with a further condition that no discrimination is made between the goods imported and goods so manufactured within State. Article 304(b) further authorises the State Legislature to impose such reasonable restrictions on the freedom of trade, commerce or intercourse with or within that State as may be required in the public interest provided that such law or amendment is made with the previous sanction of the President. Article 305 saves the existing laws from the rigours of articles 301 and 303. It is in the light of the aforesaid provisions that the contention regarding the impugned rules have to be examined whether they contravene any of such provisions. As will be presently seen, law is now fairly settled that freedom in the context of article 301 does not mean absolute freedom but freedom from all restrictions except those which are provided in other articles of Part XIII.
42. In Atiabari Tea Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam AIR 1961 SC 232, a majority of Constitution Bench while considering the power of the Legislature of making laws with particular reference to taxing statute vis-a-vis Part XIII of the Constitution, held as under :
"The provision contained in article 301 guaranteeing the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse is not a declaration of a mere platitude, or the expression of a pious hope of a declaratory character; it is not also a mere statement of a directive principle of State policy : it embodies and enshrines a principle of paramount importance that the economic unity of the country will provide the main sustaining force for the stability and progress of the political and cultural unity of the country."
43. The power of the Parliament and the Legislature to make law including laws imposing taxes is subject to the provisions of the Constitution and that must bring in the application of the provisions of Part XIII. Article 301 read in its proper context and subject to the limitations prescribed by the other relevant articles in Part XIII must be regarded as imposing a constitutional limitation on the legislative power of the Parliament and the Legislature of the States. Wherever it is held that article 301 applies the legislative competence of the Legislature in question will have to be judged in the light of the relevant articles of Part XIII. Article 301 applies not only to inter-State trade, commerce and intercourse, the freedom of trade guaranteed by article 301 is freedom from all restrictions except those which are provided by the other articles in Part XIII.
44. The court was dealing with a tax imposed by the Assam Taxation (on Goods carried by Roads or inland Waterways) Act, 1954. The Act was passed by Assam Legislature in order to provide for tax on certain goods transported by road or inland waterways in the State of Assam. The court held that :
".......... restrictions, freedom from which is guaranteed by article 301, would be such restrictions as directly and immediately restrict or impede the free-flow or movement of trade. Taxes may and do amount to restrictions; but it is only such taxes as directly and immediately restrict trade that would fall within the purview of article 301. In determining the limits of the width and amplitude of the freedom guaranteed by article 301 a rational and workable test to apply would be : Does the impugned restriction operate directly or immediately on trade or its movement ?"
45. On the consideration of the said Act, the Act was held to be ultra vires article 301.
46. The matter again came up before the apex Court in Automobile Transport (Rajasthan) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1962 SC 1406. It was in relation to tax imposed by the Legislature of the State of Rajasthan on motor vehicles by the Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1951. The majority of the Constitution Bench reiterated the majority view expressed in Atiabari Tea Co.'s case AIR 1961 SC 232 and held as under :
"....... the concept of freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse postulated by article 301 must be understood in the context of an orderly society and as a part of the Constitution which envisages a distribution of powers between the States and the Union, and if so understood, the concept must recognise the need and the legitimacy of some degree of regulatory control, whether by the Union or the States. This is irrespective of the restrictions imposed by the other articles in Part XIII of the Constitution."
47. It further went on to hold "regulatory measures or measures imposing compensatory taxes for the use of trading facilities do not come within the purview of restriction contemplated by article 301 and such measures need not comply with the requirements of the proviso to article 304(b)". The court held that "the taxes imposed under the Act are compensatory which do not hinder the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse assured by that article".
48. In State of Madras v. N. K. Nataraja Mudaliar [1968] 22 STC 376 (SC); AIR 1969 SC 147, the provisions of the Central Sales Tax Act which permitted levy of tax at different rates in different States were challenged being violative of articles 301 and 304(a) while the court negatived the challenge by holding that an Act which is merely enacted for the purpose of imposing tax which is to be collected and to be retained by the State does not amount to law giving or authorising the giving of any preference to one State over another or making discrimination between one State and another merely because by varying rates prevalent in different States but emphasised that "article 301 is in terms of widest amplitude of trade, commerce and intercourse, are thereby declared free and unhampered throughout the territory of India. The freedom of trade is against imposing barriers or obstructions within the State as well as inter-State, all restrictions which directly and immediately affect the movement of trade are declared by article 301 to be ineffective. It must be taken as settled law that the restrictions or impediments which directly and immediately impede or hamper the free trade, commerce or intercourse fall within the prohibition imposed by article 301 and subject to other provisions of the Constitution, they may be regarded as void."
49. In Hansraj Bagrecha v. State of Bihar [1971] 27 STC 4 (SC); (1971) 1 SCC 59 the court was concerned with validity of levy of purchase tax on jute under section 3-A of the Bihar Finance Act and rule 31-B prohibiting the transporting of goods outside the State expect on obtaining a despatch permit in the prescribed form. Justice Shah, specking for the court after considering the decisions in the cases of State of Madras v. N. K. Nataraja Mudaliar [1968] 22 STC 376 (SC); AIR 1969 SC 147, Atiabari Tea Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam AIR 1961 SC 232, Automobile Transport (Rajasthan) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1962 SC 1406, Firm A. T. B. Mehtab Majid and Co. v. State of Madras [1963] 14 STC 355 (SC), concluded that : "it must be taken as settled law that the restrictions or impediments which directly and immediately impede or hamper free flow of trade, commerce and intercourse fall within the prohibition imposed by article 301 and subject to the other provisions of the Constitution they may be regarded as void".
50. While the court upheld the levy of purchase tax on the principle enunciated in majority view expressed by honourable Gajendragadkar, J., in Atiabari Tea Co.'s case AIR 1961 SC 232, Automobile Transport (Rajasthan) Ltd.'s case AIR 1962 SC 1406 and Andhra Sugars Ltd. v. State of Andhra Pradesh [1968] 21 STC 212 (SC) by holding that :
"Imposition of tax of the nature of purchase tax does not by itself restrict freedom of trade, commerce or intercourse. Imposition of tax may in certain circumstances impede free-flow of trade, commerce or intercourse. But, every tax does not have that effect. Imposition of a purchase tax by the State does not by itself infringe the guarantee of freedom under article 301."
51. However, while adverting to the rule 31B, taking note of the fact that it was a provision purported to be for preventing evasion of tax and ancillary or incidental to law relating to levy, collection and recovery of tax held it to be ultra vires. The court said :
"But in our judgment, rule 31B of the Bihar Sales Tax Rules, 1959 and the notification issued on December 26, 1967, are unauthorised and must be struck down ..... A provision which is made by the Act or by the Rules which seeks to prevent evasion of liability to pay intra-State sales or purchase tax would therefore be within the competence of the Legislature or the authority competent to make the rules. But the State Legislature has no power to legislate for the levy of tax on transactions which are carried on in the course of inter-State trade or commerce or in the course of export. Section 42 of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1959, prevents any person from transporting from any railway station, steamer station, airport, post-office or any other place any consignment of such goods exceeding the quantity specified with a view to ensuring that there is no evasion of tax payable under the Act. But the power under section 42 can only be exercised in respect of levy, collection and recovery of intra-State sales or purchase tax. It cannot be utilised for the purpose of ensuring the effective levy of inter-State sales or purchase tax ...... When rule 31-B seeks to prohibit transport of goods to any place outside the State of Bihar unless a certificate in obtained from the appropriate authority, it seeks to prohibit transport of goods pursuant to transactions which may not even be of the nature of sale or purchase transactions : in any case, it restricts transport pursuant to transactions in the course of inter-State trade and commerce. The operation of the rule is not restricted only to transaction in the course of intra-State trade and commerce. The rule authorises restrictions on inter-State transaction and in on that account unauthorised."
52. In Harihar Prasad's case [1989] 73 STC 353 (SC); AIR 1989 SC 1119 the court held :
"Whether there is a violation of the freedom guaranteed by article 301, one has to scrutinise whether the impugned legislative or executive act operates to restrict or barricade trade, commerce or intercourse directly and immediately, as distinct from creating some indirect or inconsequential impediment which may be regarded as remote. In other words, regulatory or compensatory measure cannot be regarded as violative of the freedom. Such measures may be of diverse nature or various kinds such as traffic regulation, making of declarations and filing of returns within reasonable limits. Such measures cannot be challenged as interfering with the freedom guaranteed by article 301 unless they are shown to be colourable measures to restrict the free-flow of trade, commerce and intercourse. Measures impeding the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse may be legislative or executive and may be fiscal or non-fiscal."
53. It is within the precincts of the aforesaid limits each case has to be examined independently in the light of all relevant provisions and the circumstances in which they have been placed.
54. As we have noticed, the impugned provisions have been made under the Gujarat Sales Tax Act as an ancillary measures, the law relating to imposition and collection of sales tax cannot be said to be a tax of regulatory nature. Any provision made as ancillary and incidental for the levy to be made effective, also cannot be, therefore, made a part of a measure intended to regulate the trade, but is essentially a part and parcel of the main enactment and, therefore, if any conditions or impediments in the free movement of trade is occasioned, it must be held to be as a result of restriction and not merely regulation. And if that is so, the restriction must fall in the category of reasonableness if they have to stand the test of article 304(b). The question that arises for our consideration is whether there is an immediate and direct impediment of free trade on account of the impugned provision ?
55. Section 59-A - the parent provision under the Act does not lay down any condition or restriction on account of trade. It merely envisages the stoppage of vehicles at the check-post or barrier specified by the State for the purpose of examination of the fact whether the goods carrier in transport are accompanied by proper documents as envisaged under sub-section (3) of the Act. The documents prescribed under the Act itself are log book, bill or sale or delivery note, goods vehicle record and entry sheet. The declaration required to be made under the main provision is by the driver or any other person-in-charge of the vehicle carrying the goods particulars to be contained in declaration have been prescribed in form 45-A under rule 62-A(1). Making of declaration under sub-section (3)(c) or carrying of any document under sub-section (3)(a) has not been made subject to any condition by parent provision nor has it authorised laying down any condition for carrying of document along with the goods or for furnishing the declaration. So far as rule 62-A(2) and (3) prescribes the forms 45-B and 45-C for declaration by importers, assuming for the present purposes that a declaration of this sort could be prescribed as documents to be carried within the meaning of section 59-A(3)(a), the act of prescribing declaration by itself prima facie does not result in restriction on movement of trade. We notice from forms 45-B and 45-C that the provision is not merely for making a declaration but a declaration which can be made only on fulfilment of certain conditions. While the form 45-B envisages a permission by the prescribed authority to import the specified goods in the State of Gujarat and is only on such permission that the goods can be imported, obtaining form 45-C itself has been subjected to the conditions prescribed under rule 24-B(e) and (f) quoted above. Before the form can be obtained by the registered dealer, he has to satisfy the registering authority that all the returns due up to the time of making the application for obtaining form have been filed within the prescribed time and that no amount is due from the applicant-dealer by way of tax, penalty or interest on the date of making such an application. The dealer has further to satisfy the registering authority that the goods obtained on the strength of the aforesaid required declaration have been accounted in regular books of account also and on resale of the goods purchased or sale of manufactured goods out of the goods purchased on the strength of declaration are also accounted properly in the books of accounts and tax payable as per same have been fully paid within the prescribed time-limit. It is common ground between the parties that while importing goods from outside the State, no question of any evasion of tax liability levied or leviable by the State Legislature or administered under the Central Sales Tax Act by the State arises. If the dealer fails to satisfy the two conditions, the registering authority is empowered to refuse to issue the requisite form to the dealer resulting in directly nullifying the sale transaction between the dealer and the seller situated outside the State. That is to say, it is a condition imposed through the rules directly on entering into a sale transaction with a person outside the State. Therefore, it results in direct and immediate obstruction of trade between the two States. It may be noticed that in Nataraja Mudaliar's case [1968] 22 STC 376 (SC); AIR 1969 SC 147 on which the reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the Revenue it has been clearly indicated that though neither tax operates directly on the free flow of trade or free movement of transport of goods from one part of the country, the tax is on the sale but the movement is incidental to and a consequence of the sale. The impugned conditions do not create a tax liability on the transaction in question or at the point of time when the declaration is required to be made, no tax to be levied or determined by the State of Gujarat comes into picture. The declarations required to be carried along with goods which are to move from another State to within the State of Gujarat as a result of sale transaction or otherwise and it is that movement which is incidental to and a consequence of such transaction of import which is directly intended to be restricted unless tax dues or returns in respect of the transaction other than one in question has been made in time before the requisite authority. That is to say, irrespective of the fact whether the returns have been made but if the same have been late, irrespective of the fact whether the levy of tax has been challenged and recovery are pending; or that the tax, penalty or interest has been the subject-matter of any dispute and any interim orders of the court or other appropriate authority, the registering authority is empowered to withhold the issuance of the form of declaration, which is only to serve as a purpose for collecting information in respect of the goods under movement, to keep track on future transaction that might take place within the State and the condition is imposed directly with reference to the purchase transaction made with an outside seller in present. In our opinion, such requirement under a taxing statute dealing with a tax which is not regulatory results in direct and immediate impediment of the free-flow of trade which is incidental and consequence of the sale and is not related to the regulatory measures for facilitating the trade throughout the frontiers of India.
56. It may be pertinent if reference is made in this connection to Sodhi Transport Co. v. State of U.P. [1986] 62 STC 381 (SC); AIR 1986 SC 1099. Their Lordships said that :
"...... it is sufficient to say here that these provisions are enacted to make the law workable and to prevent evasion. Such provisions fall within the ambit and scope of the power to levy the tax itself."
57. Reliance in this regard may also be made to Nataraja Mudaliar's case [1968] 22 STC 376 (SC); AIR 1969 SC 147 wherein their Lordships have held :
"It is also settled law that a tax may in certain cases directly and immediately restrict or hamper the flow of trade, but every imposition of tax does not do so."
58. In this connection, it can also be seen that so far as the provisions of rule 24-B(f) are concerned, it is impossible to be fulfilled at the time of making the required declaration. The requirement of sub-rule (f) quoted above requires the proper accounting of the goods purchased and sold in the books of account which can be fulfilled only after the goods reach the purchaser and are dealt with in accordance with the declaration. However, at the time of making declaration for importing the goods, the question of accounting the goods to be imported, in books of accounts and further satisfying the authority that the goods have further been accounted for when resold or utilised in manufacture by the registered dealer at a later date on such eventuality having taken place and tax having been paid thereof, simply does not arise; yet the form itself may be denied to the applicant-registered dealer on non-fulfilment of these conditions. Likewise, when no tax is due to the State either under the State or under the Central law, subjecting such transaction to see the light of day on the condition of making payment of tax and filing of returns in respect of the transactions which are not at all related to the carrying of goods in question goes to show that the rule is not related to prevent evasion of tax relating to transaction in relation to goods carried but to see fulfilment of other obligations. This is wholly beyond the object and purpose of the main provision of section 59-A. Such provision is directly a restriction on the import of goods by a registered dealer from another State. The condition in order to be reasonable must have a rational nexus sought to be achieve. It is not that a dealer is precluded from carrying on trading activity merely because the returns have been filed late or payment of tax has been delayed or tax has not been paid on account of pendency of disputes relating to levy does or for the like reason nor is the case of the State that the dealer is not entitled to trade at all in the eventuality of conditions of sub-rule (3) being not satisfied. That is to say a registered dealer is not precluded from intra-State or inter-State trade or any trading activity resulting in export when the transactions really may attract the levy and imposition of tax, etc., but the restriction has been imposed on the import of cement, a transaction on which the State tax is attracted, i.e., to say question of evasion and avoidance of State tax is not involved in the case of import and it is only that activity has been subjected to the impugned provisions. It is only that the subsequent dealing with cement may attract the State tax and it is alleged that for preventing the evasion and avoidance of tax on such subsequent transactions the provision has been made. If that were so, it does not stand to any reason that while a dealer is free to trade in the same commodity in respect of the transactions which are intra-State or which result in movement of goods outside the State without filing returns and without ensuring the payment of tax liability yet he is precluded to import goods to deal therein on which no tax is payable unless he makes the payment of his other outstanding and has fulfilled the obligation of filing returns within prescribed time-limit. That in our opinion not only results in direct impediment of free trade, commerce and intercourse but also results in imposing unreasonable restrictions on freedom of trade guaranteed under article 19(1)(g) having no nexus to the purpose sought to be achieved. The imposition of conditions referred to in rules 24-B(e) and (f) are otherwise also beyond the rule-making authority conferred on the State under section 59-A for the reasons already discussed hereinabove. So also, requirement of permit envisaged by form 45-B prescribed under rule 62-A(2) is a restriction unauthorised by the parent provision and this results in restriction on importing goods as a result of sale transaction between the consumer importer and the out of State seller. It is not a regulatory measure but restriction inasmuch as it is not for facilitating the movement of the goods from one place to another but for giving preferential treatment to cement manufactured within the State over cement manufactured outside the State thus favouring local manufacturers.
59. In this connection, strong reliance was placed by the Revenue on two decisions of the honourable Supreme Court which in our opinion are not applicable to the facts of the present case. The first case on which reliance was placed is of Sodhi Transport Co. v. State of U.P. [1986] 62 STC 381 (SC); AIR 1986 SC 1099. That was a case which arose out of the provisions of section 28-B of the U.P. Sales Tax Act which provided that a vehicle coming from outside the State and bound for any other place passes through the State, the driver or person-in-charge of the vehicle shall obtain in the prescribed form and manner a transit pass from the officer-in-charge of the check-post or barrier after entering into the State and deliver it to the officer-in-charge of the check-post or barrier before it makes exit from the State failing which it shall be presumed that the goods has been sold by the owner or person-in-charge of the vehicle in the State. The challenge to provision was that it results in levy of tax on the basis of presumption only. The court repelled the objection on the ground that the presumption was a rebuttble one which is clearly a rule of evidence, has the effect of shifting the burden of proof and the provision was enacted to prevent the evasion of tax. So far as legislative competence to impose tax on the presumption was concerned, it was held to be intra vires by holding that it was a machinery provision for levying of tax which prevents evasion of tax otherwise liable to pay by holding it to be a rebuttble presumption. The court held that they (section 28 of the Act and rule 87 of the Rules) are introduced as stated earlier to check evasion and to provide a machinery for levying tax from person who dispose of goods inside the State and avoid tax which they are otherwise liable to pay. The law provides enough protection to them and makes enough provision to enable them to show that they are in fact not liable to pay any tax.
60. As far as the ground of violation of article 301 concerned, it was held that :
"......... restrictions imposed are not also shown to be unreasonable. They do not unduly hamper trade. On the other hand they are imposed in the public interest."
61. From this, it is clear that the provision for obtaining permit has held to restriction though reasonable and in the public interest, in the circumstances, it was enacted. The reason is apparent that the goods which are not to be stationed within the State, if by rule of evidence are not shown to have gone out of the State after entry in the State territory, legitimate presumption could be drawn that they must have been sold within the State attracting the liability to State sales tax. The presumption being rebuttble, the person on whom the liability was imposed by raising presumption could lead evidence and show otherwise that liability is not there. Obviously, the goods which had entered the State and had not shown to have gone outside the State, the presumption would otherwise be that the same has been dealt with within the State. The provision was not to restrict the trade in any manner but was to impose tax on the transaction which could legitimately be presumed to have taken place within the State. The requirement of seeking transit pass was only to operate as a rule of evidence.
62. In the present case, we are not concerned with a law making provision for free passage of goods through the territory of Gujarat from entry to exist nor for levy of tax on presumed intra-State sales in the absence of proof of exist, but we are here concerned with a provision which relates only to import of cement and there is nothing in the Rules or the Act to show as to what is to happen thereafter. On the other hand, there is no provision or such restriction on the goods being dealt with within the State which are manufactured within the State or the goods which are exported out of the State really attracting liability of the sales tax within the State whether under the State Act or under the Central Sales Tax Act. The court was not concerned in Sodhi Transport's case [1986] 62 STC 381 (SC); AIR 1986 SC 1099 where requirement of declaration only in the case of import was made subject to obtaining permit by a person not registered dealer or subject to fulfilling all obligations under the State Sales Tax Act or the Central Sales Tax Act de hors the transaction in question before he can even be permitted to obtain the form for making a requisite declaration in order to enter into a sale transaction with other person situated in other State.
63. Strong reliance is placed on Harihar Prasad's case [1989] 73 STC 353 (SC); AIR 1989 SC 1119. It would be appropriate, while considering this case, to notice the relevant provisions of the Bihar Act under which the matter had arisen. Under the scheme of the Bihar Act, section 34 provided setting up of check-posts or barriers with a view to preventing evasion of tax payable under that part of the Act. Sub-section (2) of section 34 authorises the State Government to prescribe by a notification to file a correct and complete declaration in such form and the manner prescribed. Section 35 authorises certain restrictions on movement of the goods by laying down that no person shall transport from any railway station, steamer station, airport, post officer or any other place any consignment of such goods exceeding such quantities as may be specified in the notification except in accordance with such conditions as may be prescribed and such conditions shall be made with a view to ensure that there is no evasion of tax payable under this Act. Section 31 of the Bihar Finance Act provided of clearing and forwarding agents, wherein sub-section (2a) inserted by the Finance Act, 1984, which provided that :
"A person transporting goods shall carry a declaration in such form as may be prescribed by the Commissioner supported by either a cash memo, bill or a challan, in case the movement is otherwise than as a result of sale, in respect of goods which is being transported on a goods carrier, or a vessel and shall produce such challan, cash memo or bill along with the aforesaid form of declaration on demand before the prescribed authority :
Provided that the Commissioner, by notification in this respect, may prescribe a form of declaration or adopt a form of declaration or permit prescribed for the purpose of sections 34 and 35 of this part, and he may also prescribe in the said notification, the manner in which such declaration or permit shall be utilised for verification and assessment of tax payable under this part : Provided further that the Commissioner may exempt any person or dealer or class of registered dealers from the requirement of this sub-section."
64. It is also to be noticed that the provision was applicable for intra-State as well as inter-State transport carriers through the territory of Bihar. It was not restricted to goods being brought into the State but applied to goods being brought into the State for being sent out of the State. Section 35 about which there was no controversy itself envisaged certain restrictions on movement of goods and a permit for that has been prescribed. Explanation (ii) to section 31 had defined a person transporting goods to mean "besides the owner to include the manager, agent, driver, employee of the owner or person-in-charge of a place of loading or unloading of the goods carrier carrying such goods or a person who accepts consignment for despatch to other places or gives delivery of any consignment to the consignee."
65. In pursuance of this provision, the Commissioner issued a notification and prescribed forms XXVIII-A and XXVIII-B. While form XXVIII-A was a form of permit, form XXVIII-B was to be filled by permit holder before the goods are transported as per the form. The High Court took the view that as the importer has to send a form in advance to the consignor that it can be filled up to accompany the goods it blockades the transportation in inter-State trade or commerce. On this premise, the High Court held that as these provisions directly apply to inter-State trade or commerce, it was of the opinion that the primal requirement is that it must be filled in by the permit holder before the transport of goods. The names and addresses of the dealer and the consignor as well as the consignee must be filled in and equally the number of vehicle where the same is used. The requirement that such form should be filled in before the transport, ordinarily requires that same must be first sent to consignor in advance including the number of goods carrier which may not be issued in the State of origin of declaration. Goods may have to be transported from one vehicle to another and it is difficult if not impossible to postulate all the details required by the various columns of the prescribed form which may some times be difficult if not impossible of performance. Enumerating such other difficulties, the court held that the impugned provision results in impeding and obstructing, though not perhaps prohibiting the movement of the goods which may neither originate in the State nor are intended to be consumed in the State and are not exigible to any State tax being primarily in the course of inter-State trade and commerce and held the same to be ultra vires articles 301 and 304.
66. When the matter came up before the Supreme Court, the principal factors which were noticed by their Lordships were firstly the statement in the notification, and the forms were applicable in respect of the goods brought into the State and being sent outside the State in excess of the quantity specified in section 35 of the Act, secondly, notification in the said case ex facie showed the purpose namely, to prevent evasion and facilitate verification and assessment of sales tax; and thirdly while dealing with the difficulties, envisaged by the High Court on account of requirement of submitting declaration in advance, it observed :
"The High Court has taken the view that an importer has to send the form in advance to the consignor so that it could be filled up to accompany the goods and that would amount to a blockade placed on the free movement of goods in inter-State commerce. It should, however, be noted that the notification has been issued and the forms have been adopted by the State of Bihar and would be enforced in that State. There is nothing to indicate that the carrier would be penalised for not having filled up form XXVIII-A or XXVIII-B, as the case may be, while the goods were being carried through other States. They are to be filled up only when the carrier is within the territory of the State of Bihar. There is no provision to the effect that those who had not filled up the appropriate form at the earlier stages of the transit would not be allowed to fill up within the State. The particulars required are not such as would be impossible or difficult for the carrier to furnish. There is no prohibition on transportation of the goods themselves. We are accordingly of the view that there is no direct and immediate restriction of inter-State trade, commerce or intercourse as a result of the requirement to fill up and carry the forms. In other words, the continuity of the transport will not be obstructed or interrupted. Stoppage of the transporting vehicle for the purpose of obtaining and filling in the appropriate form would, in our opinion, not amount to interruption but only a stoppage."
67. Apparently, the ration of Harihar Prasad Debuka's case [1989] 73 STC 353 (SC); AIR 1989 SC 1119 is founded on the aforesaid three premises, namely the provision applied uniformly to all goods; the purpose for which the provision has been made is disclosed in the notification itself and there was no material to hold an inquiry into the correctness of such declaration, and that the required particulars are to be furnished by carrier at the time of entry in the State when requisite information is with him and, therefore, the provisions which have been made is ancillary to the levy of tax for preventing evasion. The stoppage of goods for checking for obtaining and filling up the forms does not result in direct and immediate restriction in inter-State trade or commerce. It is to be noted that as per the rule and the Act under consideration by their Lordships, the declaration was to be furnished by any person transporting the goods. The rule did not require the declaration to be furnished by importer. However, the same cannot be said in the present case. The fact that carrier is not a person who can furnish the requisite information in terms of impugned provisions, as was the case before their Lordships in Harihar Prasad's case [1989] 73 STC 353 (SC); AIR 1989 SC 1119, is apparent from the written submission made by the learned counsel for the respondent in which it has been stated :
"The State could require the purchaser to sign the documents at the check-post and no objection could be taken thereto. The check-posts are located in remote and separately populated areas and it would be far more convenient to the purchaser to have requisite documents signed by him or on his behalf at the place where the export of goods to Gujarat commences."
68. The rule itself requires the declaration to be furnished under the signature by the importer alone. It cannot be envisaged that the importer or his agent shall be accompanying the goods from the place of its originating point to entry within the State. However, the condition is that a declaration duly made and signed under the signature of the importer must be produced along with other documents when the vehicle carrying such goods is stopped for checking. Obviously, such declaration is required to be with carrier when reaching the check-post or barrier and it cannot be assumed that the carrier will carry a blank form signed by the consignee and deliver it by filling it himself. The requirement that a registered dealer-importer must satisfy the condition of rules 24-B(e) and (f) before obtaining form rules out the supply of information by the carrier. Form 45-B is not merely a permit but is also a declaration by the consumer-importer. In the case of Bihar Act and Rules, obtaining of the form of declaration itself was not subjected to any condition like the rules with which we are concerned. It cannot be reasonably envisaged that such declaration can be made by obtaining the form by the importer after the goods enter the State or being delivered to the transporter without putting unwarranted blockade. The necessary consequences of the rules and forms in question are that after the goods have been specified and invoice has been made and delivered to the transporter for carrying to the State of Gujarat from any other State, the requisite information about the particulars, namely, the exact address of the place of despatch, the invoice number under which goods are billed, quantity, weight and value stated in the invoice or challan, the name and address of the transporter and the vehicle number in which the goods are being carried, which come into existence only after leaving the stage of segregating the goods for despatch and delivery to the transporter are conveyed to the importer, thereafter only, the importer can fill in the form under his signature giving out to carrier. That is to say, after the goods have been ready for despatch, goods must remain stationary until such declaration form under the signature of the declaratory reaches the transporter or in the alternative, the goods after their being entering the State of Gujarat are made stationary until further information about its entry and place is furnished to the importer and he manages to transmit his declaration to the transporter for being delivered to the officer-in-change of the check-post or barrier before the carrier reaches such check-post or barrier. If the goods reaches the check-post or barrier and at the time of checking is not accompanied by such a declaration, the subsequent furnishing of declaration fulfilling the requirement is not envisaged by the impugned rules.
69. That apart, purpose of seeking declaration is to secure information or evidence in the form of statement consisting particulars of the goods being imported within the State. It is the requirement of the Act itself that such particulars are to be furnished by the driver or person-in-charge of the goods. That requirement cannot be done away with and substituted with another declaration by the rule-making authority as discussed hereinbefore. As has been contended before us that as per the practice followed and as envisaged by the Revenue authorities, the requirement of seeking declaration from the driver under rule 62-A read with section 59-A(3)(c) is only confined to goods going out of the State of Gujarat and not otherwise. The least we can say is that it is not founded on any reason. No such distinction exists between the goods entering the State or leaving the State or moving within the State has been made in the parent provisions. The provision makes it incumbent that the driver makes a declaration giving requisite information for the goods carried by it and that information which is contained in the documents carried along with the goods, namely, invoice or challan or the railway receipts is with the transporter at the time when the checking is made. Fulfilling that obligation by the driver or the person-in-charge of the goods serves the very purpose of transmitting information relating to consignor, consignee and the goods carried by the transporter, for securing the very same information additional stoppage of the goods comprehend no reason. Such unwarranted stoppage of movement in our opinion is clearly unreasonable. It is true that every stoppage for a duration does not necessarily amount to impediment of the free flow of trade and commerce but it depends on the facts and circumstances of each case whether any stoppage of the vehicle for a period amount to unreasonable impediment of trade. A stoppage of the movement of the vehicle to the extent, it is required for serving the purpose of law may be reasonable but any further detention may be unreasonable. Where the statute has made provision for securing information relating to the goods in transit, to be gathered from the driver by means of his statement, to make a provision in rules to secure the very information from importer either by dispensing with the requirement of parent provision or by providing for additional requirement thereto and to keep the vehicle stationary for that reason alone in our opinion, is de hors the purpose for which the stoppage can reasonable be made.
70. This brings us to the other part of the argument that the framing of rules 62-A(2) and (3) to (6) along with prescribing forms prescribing the conditions aforesaid is clearly violative of articles 303, 304(a) and article 14 being directly resulting in discriminating between the goods manufactured within the State of Gujarat and the similar goods manufactured outside the State when imported from other States and whether the impugned rules having been made in colourable exercise of rule-making powers to make law for preventing evasion of tax.
71. As we have noticed earlier, articles 303 and 304(a) limits the legislative powers of the Parliament as well as the State Legislature to make law including law imposing tax which discriminates between the goods imported from other States or giving preferential treatment to the goods manufactured within one State over the goods manufactured in another State. In State of Rajasthan v. Ghasiram Mangilal (1969) 2 SCC 710, State of Rajasthan had exempted sale of bardana from tax at the hand of first importer in the series of sales in the State.
72. In the said notification, the first importer selling bardana in the State of Rajasthan was subjected to tax and the tax was levied. That action was challenged. The Rajasthan High Court upheld the challenge and declared the sale of bardana on the first point to be in violation of articles 301 and 304(a). The decision of the High Court was upheld by holding that the decision of the High Court is apparently correct.
73. In Indian Cement Ltd. v. State of Andhra Pradesh [1988] 69 STC 305 (SC); AIR 1988 SC 567 which was a case wherein in order to give preference to the local cement manufacturers, rate of tax was reduced. The court held :
"There can be no dispute that taxation is a deterrent against free flow. As a result of favourable or unfavourable treatment by way of taxation, the course of flow of trade gets regulated either adversely or favourable. If the scheme which Part XIII guarantees has to be preserved in national interest, it is necessary that the provisions in the article must be strictly complied with. One has to recall the far-sighted observations of Gajendragadkar, J., in Atiabari Tea Co.'s case [1961] 1 SCR 809; AIR 1961 SC 232 and the observations then made obviously apply to case of the type which is now before us.
The two notifications of the Andhra Pradesh Government may now be referred to. Under the first notification made under section 9(1) of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, the rate of tax has been reduced to 4 per cent in respect of sales made by indigenous cement manufacturers to manufacturers of cement products. Admittedly, the Tamil Nadu producers have sales offices in Andhra Pradesh and in regard to their sale to such manufacturers of cement products the benefit of reduced rate of taxation is not applicable. The prescribed rate of tax under the Andhra Act is 13.75 per cent on cement. Thus under the Andhra notification in regard to the local tax the indigenous producers of cement have a benefit of 9.75 per cent. The return made to the court admits of the position that preference has been shown to local manufacturers. Two reasons have been advanced by way of justification. One is that it is beneficial to the State revenue and secondly it protects the local manufacturers too. The counsel for the State Government has not been able to demonstrate to us how the reduction in the rate of sales tax is beneficial to the State revenue. The other justification is what provisions of Part XIII of the Constitution do not permit. The reasonable restrictions contemplated in Part XIII have to be backed by law and not by executive action provided the same are within the limitations prescribed under the scheme of Part XIII."
74. The facts of the present case are very mush nearer. Here also, it is a case of making rule 62-A(2) to (6) applicable only in the case of importer of cement and no other commodity. The importer of cement has been subjected to two conditions which a purchaser of cement within the State or exporter of cement outside the State has not been subjected to.
75. In State of Tamil Nadu v. Sanjeetha Trading Co. AIR 1993 SC 237, the court while sustaining the prohibition imposed on movement of timber outside the State while upholding the prohibition on the ground of it being a declaration an essential duty under the Tamil Nadu Essential Articles Control and Requisitioning (Temporary Powers) Act (29 of 1949) observed that :
"The matter may be different where total prohibition has been imposed on the movement of goods or articles from one State to another which have not been declared to be essential commodities or articles. In those cases the State, which has imposed such ban, has to satisfy the court that in spite of total prohibition it amounts only to regulation of the trade in such articles or that even if it was a restriction it was reasonable within the meaning of article 304(b) of the Constitution and has been imposed by law as required by article 304(b). Sometimes it is being said that many artificial barriers on movement of produce of a particular State are being contemplated or imposed only on the consideration of 'My-State-My-people'. This will only amount to the protection of regional interests for political end and not of public interest."
76. Regional preference was denounced in no uncertain terms. It is also to be noticed that it dealt with regulation of trade in essential commodity through rules framed under an existing law within the meaning of article 305 and article 303 specifically laid down criterion for differential treatment in the case of scarcity.
77. It can fairly be said that the Parliament or the State Legislature while making any law and State Legislature while making law relating to imposition of tax has no power to make a law which gives preference to goods manufactured in one State over similar goods manufactured and brought into from another State. While the prohibition has been spelt generally in article 303, it has been made specific with reference to taxing law of State under article 304(a). Law relating to imposition of tax takes within its purview three stages.
78. The classical dicta spoken by Lord Dunedin in Whitney v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue (1925) 10 TC 88 (HL) is :
"Now, there are three stages in the imposition of a tax : there is the declaration of liability that is the part of the statute which determines what persons in respect of what property are liable. Next, there is the assessment. Liability does not depend on assessment. That, ex hypothesi, has already been fixed. But assessment particularises the exact sum which a person liable has to pay. Lastly, come the methods of recovery, if the person taxed does not voluntarily pay."
79. The above enunciation was quoted with approval by the apex Court in Gurusahai Saigal v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Punjab [1963] 48 ITR 1; AIR 1963 SC 1062. Referring to these principles, the Supreme Court observed in Sodhi Transport Company's case [1986] 62 STC 381 (SC); AIR 1986 SC 1099 :
"..... that these provisions are enacted to make the law workable and to prevent evasion. Such provisions fall within the ambit and scope of the power to levy the tax itself."
80. Article 304(a) makes it clear that while State Legislatures are free to impose tax within its territory but prohibits to make any such law which is not equally applied to goods manufactured within the State and goods brought from outside. If a Legislature at any stage of imposition of tax gives preference and does not subject locally manufactured goods to the same rigours to which goods manufactured outside the State and brought into the State, are subjected, it would be clearly violative of article 304(a). Article 304(a) does not make any distinction between the law which falls in the category of restrictive or regulatory. The preference of local goods over the imported can be manifested at any stage of imposition and levy of tax by subjecting it to such conditions to which local goods are not subjected to. If the substance of taxing law is to give preferential treatment to local goods over the imported goods, it transgresses the limits of article 304(a). Moreover, article 303 which prohibits making of any law by Parliament or State Legislature, provide only one exception and that is to meet the situation arising out of scarcity of any goods in any part of the country. According to it, while export of goods from scarce State to outside may be prohibited, but no such differentiation can be made in the framing of law in the matter of inflow of any goods from other State within that State and such law can be made only by Parliament, not by State Legislature except in case where there exists a pre-existing laws as envisaged under article 305. Viewed from this angle also, the impugned provisions cannot be sustained.
81. As can be noticed from the averments made by the respondents in this regard, it is transparently clear that the impugned provisions in respect of cement subjected that importers to clearing of all obligations under the State Sales Tax Act not pertaining to transaction in connection with which permission is required to be obtained or declaration giving particulars which are not presently in the personal knowledge of the importer, at the time when the declaration is required to be furnished, are directed to give preference to cement manufacturers in State and support the local manufacturers of the cement who are unable to find a market within the State of Gujarat because of the cost factor including higher rate of tax compared to the neighbouring State manufacturing cement. The pretended purpose of the provision having been made for preventing evasion and avoidance of tax does not hold good even to the naked eyes inasmuch as to our repeated queries, we find no answer, as to what differentiate the commodity of cement than the other commodity in the matter of meeting the objective of prevention of the tax evasion. Article 303 lays down itself exception about giving of differential treatment by permitting only Parliament to make such law which is deemed necessary for the purpose of dealing with the situation arising from scarcity of goods in any part of the country. Thus, except for the purpose mentioned in article 303(2), no law giving preferential treatment to one State over another affecting free flow of trade is permissible to be made even by the Parliament. Article 304(a) while envisaging that imposition of tax by State Legislature by itself may not be construed as impeding free flow of trade through the entire territory of India, has made it clear that it cannot subject the goods manufactured outside the State to greater rigours than the similar goods which are manufactured within the State, are subjected to.
82. There is yet another reason for us to conclude that the impugned rule 69-A(2) to (6) is contrary to constitutional provisions. Article 14 guarantees equality before law and protection against unreasonable and irrational discrimination at the hands of the State. Article 19(1)(g) guarantees freedom of trade, subject to reasonable restrictions. Part XIII makes trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India free, imposing limitation on the exercise of legislative power, whether by the State or the Union, except to the extent provided under articles 302 to 304. Article 303 and 304(a) as noticed above, prohibit Union as well as the State within the sphere of their respective legislative power to make any law which discriminates between the goods manufactured in one State and the goods manufactured in another State. That is to say, it is a specie of provision against discrimination guaranteed in its magnificient amplitude under article 14 cutting at the roots of all arbitrariness and unreasonableness. To the extent article 19 ensures freedom of trade for the individual and article 301 ensures free trade, commerce and intercourse, throughout the territory of India, there are tones of overlapping in the field of their respective operations, apart from the fact that article 19(1)(g) confers a fundamental right to the citizen of the country, article 301 confer a justiciable right as distinct from fundamental. It has further been settled since the Automobile case AIR 1962 SC 1406 that regulatory measures are outside the purview of article 301, the same cannot be said to be outside the purview of touchstone of articles 14 and 19. Whenever a fetter is placed on the freedom of trade of the individual reasonableness of restriction or fetter has to be examined.
83. In the present case, by the impugned rules fetters have been put on the individual or trader on free import of cement which is manufactured or purchased from outside the State of Gujarat which has a direct bearing on free trade, commerce and intercourse in the commodity known as cement in so far as such trade is between a person stationed in Gujarat is concerned. A person who is purchasing cement in the State of Gujarat enters into a transaction with the manufacturer of cement within the State of Gujarat and the goods are carried in transport as a result of that transaction, the trader is not subjected to requirement of obtaining form 45-B or 45-C as the case may be nor is he required to obtain permit as contained in form 45-B, nor is he required to satisfy the conditions referred in rules 24-B(e) and (f) if he is a registered dealer, nor the very same activity when the commodity cement is despatched outside the State is subjected to those conditions. However, the very same person buying cement from a manufacturer or other dealer in cement from outside the State and as a result of that transaction the said cement is to move from such other State to within the State of Gujarat he is subjected to the rigours of the impugned rules. The question then arises for consideration is what is the rational nexus of this differentiation between a person transacting the purchase of cement within the State of Gujarat and transacting the same quantities from a trader outside the Gujarat as to the purpose for which the rule is enacted. We see none. Nor anything was pointed out by the learned counsel for the Revenue, nor there is anything in the reply affidavit to throw any light in this regard.
84. It begets further question. If the purpose for which the rule is enacted to be taken to be for preventing evasion of tax then what is the rational nexus for treating cement on different platitude than other commodities so far as the purpose of preventing evasion of tax is concerned. We see no reason, nor any has been furnished in the reply, which relates to this differential treatment given to cement for treating it differently from other commodities in the matter of subjecting to the rigours of impugned rules 62-A(2) to (6) and forms prescribed therein. It cannot be said nor any such case has been made out that cement or dealers in cement have any particular feature or special tendency in respect of evasion of tax for their being dealt with within the State after import than dealing with other commodities imported in the State of Gujarat from outside Gujarat. The law is well-settled that a classification in order to be reasonable must be shown to be founded on reasonable criteria having rational nexus to the purpose sought to be achieved. We are conscious of the fact that in the matter of taxing statute the State has wide discretionary power in chosing the commodity to be taxed and prescribing rates but not beyond the part of article 14 and the test of reasonableness. Present is not the case of taxing cement at different rate. In fact, article 304(a) prohibits prescribing different rate of tax on the same commodity on the basis of its origin. Once tax has been imposed on various commodities and they become object of tax other machinery provisions for collection and recovery are applicable equally in respect of all commodities. It is difficult to understand, unless one is made out, in plain terms that the provisions relating to prevention of evasion in respect of one commodity may vary in respect of other commodity. Prima facie when such a measure is taken to subject only one commodity for the purpose of bringing it within the provisions of a law whether by enacting or framing rule or by executive action, it must be justified on the basis of classification being based on intelligible differentia, and the same having rational nexus to the purpose sought to be achieved.
85. Law is trite that classification may be reasonable even though a single individual or subject is treated by a class itself, if there are some special circumstances or reasons applicable to it alone and not applicable to others. In Budhan Choudhry v. State of Bihar AIR 1955 SC 191, it was observed that :
"It is now well-established that while article 14 forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation. In order, however, to pass the test of permissible classification, two conditions must be fulfilled, namely (i) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group and (ii) that that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. The classification may be founded on different bases, namely, geographical, or according to objects or occupations or the like. What is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the Act under consideration."
86. The principles laid down in the aforesaid decision was reiterated in Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S. R. Tendolkar AIR 1958 SC 538 and the court further held that, "that a law may be constitutional even though it relates to a single individual if, on account of some special circumstances or reasons applicable to him and not applicable to others, that single individual may be treated as a class by himself ......
87. ......... that the Legislature is free to recognise degrees of harm and may confine its restrictions to those cases where the need is deemed to be the clearest."
88. The principles were restated in S. P. Mittal v. Union of India AIR 1983 SC 1.
89. If we look for the reason with reference to object for which the rules are purported to have been made, no reasonable basis for the classification appears on the face of the rule nor is deducible from the surrounding circumstances or matter of common knowledge, how the cement as a commodity on being imported, a transaction which does not attract levy of any tax within the State of Gujarat stands differently from other commodities imported within the State of Gujarat for the purpose of preventing evasion of tax, occasion of which may arise on its subsequent dealing by the importer within the State of Gujarat after it has become part of the mass of the property within the State of Gujarat. Any other commodity like cement if imported from a place outside the State of Gujarat and is dealt with in the same manner by a consumer importer or by a registered dealer imported by the same methodology as is applicable to cement, what are the special features which put cement and dealers of cement as a class by itself qua the purpose for which rule could be made and is alleged to be made by the State. If we scan surrounding circumstances, the averments made in reply affidavit, leaves no room of doubt that the apparent and real purpose for enacting the impugned rules was a representation made by the manufacturers of cement within the State to find out a way by which they could stand in competition with the cement imported from the neighbouring States on account of cost difference. It was to meet the situation with the object, for supporting local manufacturers the two alternatives were thought by the State either to reduce the rate of tax or to frame the impugned rules and they chose the latter one. Obviously purpose of classifying cement for the purpose of impugned rule is clear in itself and importer therein is treated distinctly from importers of other commodities. It is further apparent from the averments made in para 7 of the return that the rules only provided for collection of certain basic data so as to prevent sale and purchase made in the course of inter-State trade or commerce being used as means of making local sales and purchases surreptitiously. One fails to understand, nor we could get an answer despite repeated query as to what was meant and what was the nexus between collecting data and to prevent sales or purchases in the inter-State trade or commerce. Ostensibly means that something which is not really what it appears to be. The impugned provisions are applicable only to the import. An import cannot be a local sale or purchase. The import itself may be a sale or not a sale. If it is a sale, it may be a sale or purchase in the course of inter-State trade or commerce or a sale or purchase outside the State. What is nexus of requirement of collecting data with a view to prevent the subsequent use of goods imported with the prevention of sale or purchase through which the goods are imported is difficult to apprehend. In fact the reply affidavit unlids the cover of object. Object is to prevent inter-State purchase resulting in import of cement. If the import of cement through inter-State trade is prevented, there cannot be any occasion of its being assimilated in the mass of property of the State of give rise to any tax liability in future and there will be no occasion for using the provision for preventing tax evasion on such future transactions. Moreover, cement as a class falls in a special category for the purpose of being differential treatment with respect to this object is not disclosed nor is discernible otherwise from surrounding circumstances. From the perusal of paras 4, 5 and 6, it is apparent that it was the situation arising from purchasers of cement having been attracted to making purchases from outside the State resulting in lesser taxable transactions in cement taking place within the State, prompted to create a device so that the local purchaser desist from purchasing cement from outside the State. To achieve that object, the impugned methodology has been adopted out of the various alternatives thought by the State. That object has nothing to do with the object of preventing evasion of tax for the purpose of which power of prescribing documents to be carried along with goods have been conferred on the State. The provisions in question are not only confined to "cement" but are further confined to import of cement. It is not in dispute that the transactions under which transport of cement is made subject to rules do not by itself involve any evasion of tax with which State of Gujarat is concerned. The only justification that is stated is that after the import of cement, it becomes assimilated with the mass of property of the State, and dealing in cement at that stage may give rise to tax liability under the State law. If that be so, in order to sustain the twin test or reasonable classification the criterion or reason for such classification must relate to some special problem relating to evasion of tax which is peculiar to import of cement manufactured outside the State. As has been noticed the evasion envisaged is at the stage of dealing with the goods after the same are assimilated with the other property in the State. If that be so, it is obvious that at the point of entry, there is no relation to evasion of tax and at the subsequent stage, there is no distinction between dealing methodology which is adopted with respect to cement purchased from a local manufacturer or from outside manufacturer. While the trader cannot purchase the cement from outside manufacturer without clearing the deck of obligations under the State Act, he can do so for purchasing the cement from local manufacturers without clearing the deck. No such declaration is required for inter-State movement, irrespective of methodology that may be used. It cannot be said that branch transfer is possible only in respect of inter-State movement. It cannot also be said that a consumer purchasing cement from local manufacturer cannot indulge in resale as is envisaged in the case of an importer consumer. We are of the view that there does not exist any criterion having rational nexus to purpose for which under section 59-A(3)(a) could be exercised, or under any other provision of the Sales Tax Act, for treating "cement" as a class by itself under the impugned rules. Viewed from this angle, the picking up of "cement" as commodity for special treatment appears neither to be founded on intelligible differentia distinguishing it from other commodities nor it has rational nexus to the purpose for which rule could be enacted nor to the purpose for which the power has been conferred.
90. If looked in the proper perspective, in the aforesaid circumstances, it is further clear that the rules have been framed in colourable exercise of powers under section 59-A(3)(a). In this connection, we may recall the observations of their Lordships in Harihar Prasad's case [1989] 73 STC 353 (SC); AIR 1989 SC 1199 wherein their Lordships while enunciating the scope and ambit of the constitutional validity of regulatory or compensatory measures vis-a-vis article 301 had expressed clearly :
"Such measures cannot be challenged as interfering with the freedom guaranteed by article 301 unless they are shown to be colourable measures to restrict the free flow of trade, commerce and intercourse."
91. In Harihar Prasad's case [1989] 73 STC 353 (SC); AIR 1989 SC 1199 the court found that the purpose was disclosed in the notification itself. Therefore, the court held that in view of the clear declaration in the notification itself, there was nothing to hold further enquiry about the colourable nature of the exercise of the powers and distinguished the decision in Bagrecha's case [1971] 27 STC 4 (SC); (1971) 1 SCC 59 wherein the purpose was not disclosed for the notification and the court was left to find out the purpose for issuing notification from the surrounding circumstances. Fortunately, the purpose has been disclosed in the return in the present case which led to issuance of the notification. The notification was clearly not issued for the purpose for which the power has been conferred but for some other purpose which may have a commendation from the geographical or regional point of view but cannot be related for the purpose for which the power has been deprecated again in State of Tamil Nadu v. Sanjeetha Trading Co. AIR 1993 SC 237, wherein the court said in unequivocal terms as under :
"The matter may be different where total prohibition has been imposed on the movement of goods or articles from one State to another which have not been declared to be essential commodities or articles. In those cases the State, which has imposed such ban, has to satisfy the court that in spite of total prohibition it amounts only to regulation of the trade in such articles or that even if it was a restriction, it was reasonable within the meaning of article 304(b) of the Constitution and has been imposed by law as required by article 304(b). Sometimes it is being said that many artificial barriers on movement of produce of a particular State are being contemplated or imposed only on the consideration of 'My-State - My-people'. This will only amount to the protection of regional interests for political end and not of public interest. This was not conceived by Chapter XIII of the Constitution. In Charles H. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig Inc. (1934) 294 US 511, while dealing with the commerce clause in the American Constitution, Cardozo, J., observed :
"This part of the Constitution was framed under the dominion of a political philosophy less parochial in range. It was framed upon the theory that the peoples of the several States must sink or swim together and that in the long run prosperity and salvation are in union and not division'."
92. We have also seen while considering the first issue that a delegated legislation is open to attack on the ground of bad faith in contrast to a primary legislative Act with uninhibited powers.
93. In Gajapati Narayan's case AIR 1953 SC 375, Justice Mukherjea speaking for the court observed :
"It may be made clear at the outset that the doctrine of colourable legislation does not involve any question of bona fides or mala fides on the part of the Legislature. The whole doctrine resolves itself into the question of competency of a particular Legislature to enact a particular law. If the Legislature is competent to pass a particular law, the motives which impelled it to act are really irrelevant. On the other hand, if the Legislature lacks competency, the question of motive does not arise at all. Whether a statute is constitutional or not is thus always a question of power vide Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, Volume 1, page 379. A distinction, however, exists between a Legislature which is legally omnipotent like the British Parliament and the laws promulgated by it which could not be challenged on the ground of incompetency, and a Legislature which enjoys only a limited or a qualified jurisdiction."
94. In enunciating the principle, the court approved what Duff, J., has said in Attorney-General for Ontario v. Reciprocal Insurers 1924 AC 328 :
"Where the law-making authority is of a limited or qualified character, it may be necessary to examine with some strictness the substance of the legislation for the purpose of determining what is that the Legislature is really doing."
95. Thus, it was made clear that in the case of legislative Act enacted by Legislature itself where the Legislature has a limited jurisdiction as distinct from being legally omnipotent like the British Parliament that enquiry must always be as to the principal nature and character of the challenged legislation and it is the result of such investigation and not the form alone that determines whether or not it relates to the subject which is within the power of the legislative authority.
96. In R. S. Joshi, Sales Tax Officer v. Ajit Mills Limited [1977] 40 STC 497 (SC); AIR 1977 SC 2279, on which reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the Revenue that bad faith or motive is not relevant while examining the impugned provisions, the court was examining the constitutional validity of the primary legislation with reference to entry in the List under the Seventh Schedule distributing the legislative powers between the Parliament and the State Legislature. It was not a case concerned with the examination of the subordinate legislation as is the case before us.
97. Moreover, we have noticed above that a delegated legislation or subordinate legislation is further open to scrutiny on the ground of bad faith in the sense that it has not been made for a purpose for which it has been empowered.
98. In view of the settled position, we are unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the Revenue that once power to make a rule for preventing evasion of tax has been shown to exist with the rule-making authority and the rule-making authority asserts that the power has been so exercised for that purpose, the question of colourable exercise is not germane for examining its validity.
99. We have already noticed that the powers have been exercised in the present case for singling out cement and imports of cement manufactured outside the State and importer of cement in the State for the purpose other than preventing evasion of tax and such classification also have no intelligible differentia having nexus with the purpose under section 59-A(3)(a), for purported exercise of powers under which the rules have been made, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the impugned provisions also suffers from the vice of colourable exercise of powers by the delegated authority.
100. Before closing we may deal with other contentions.
101. It was argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that any provision which results in restriction of trade and can be saved on the anvil of article 304(b) can only be an Act of Legislature. Rules framed under the Act by the delegated authority not being a legislative act, cannot be saved with reference to that provision inasmuch as only Parliament under article 303 and the State Legislature with the previous sanction of the Parliament under article 304(b) are empowered to impose such reasonable restrictions as are in the public interest and not any other authority. The learned counsel for the petitioner, for this purpose, relied on a decision of the apex Court in the case of State of Mysore v. H. Sanjeeviah AIR 1967 SC 1189.
102. Having carefully scrutinised the contention, we are unable to accept this contention. Their Lordships in the case of State of Tamil Nadu v. Hind Stones AIR 1981 SC 711 considering the Sanjeeviah's case AIR 1967 SC 1189 held as under :
"...... A statutory rule, while ever subordinate to the parent statute, is otherwise, to be treated as part of the statute and as effective. 'Rules made under the statute must be treated for all purposes of construction or obligation exactly as if they were in the Act and are to be of the same effect as if contained in the Act and are to be judicially noticed for all purposes of construction or obligation'."
103. Regarding Sanjeeviah's case AIR 1967 SC 1189, the court said : that was a case where by reference to section 77 of the Mysore Forest Act which declared the effect of the rules it was held that the rules when made did not become part of the Act. That was apparently because of the specific provisions of section 77 which while declaring that the rules would have the force of law stopped short of declaring that they would become part of the Act. In the absence of any express provision as now, the ordinary rule as enunciated in Maxwell and the State of Uttar Pradesh v. Babu Ram Upadhya AIR 1961 SC 751 would perforce apply.
104. The view was reiterated in Video Electronics Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Punjab [1990] 77 STC 82 (SC); AIR SC 820. In view of such settled position, this contention of the petitioner is not sustainable. However, we may add that section 59-A has been inserted with the approval of President as per article 304(b), which requires that before placing any reasonable restriction in public interest, the law must be made by the State Legislature with the previous sanction of the President. A delegated legislation in such case is also confined to the extent power has been conferred by Legislature under the parent provision enacted with the previous sanction of President and not beyond it general delegation of power.
105. It is true that the decision of the Patna High Court in Harihar Prasad's case [1987] 66 STC 178 [FB] wherein the impugned notification required a permit by the consumer-importer and required a declaration from registered dealer-importer under the provisions of the Bihar Finance Act, by which the impugned provisions were declared ultra vires, has been reversed by the Supreme Court in [1989] 73 STC 353; AIR 1989 SC 1119 (State of Bihar v. Harihar Prasad Debuka). The distinguishing features of that case from the present have already been noticed above. In this connection, we may further notice that a learned single Judge of the Rajasthan High Court in Alka Agarwal's case [1987] 66 STC 204 wherein provisions of the Rajasthan Rules made under the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act which read as under :
"Koi mal rajya ke bahar se kray karna chahe tho wah prarup vi. ka. 18 man goshana karega aur prasthuth karega yaa karvayega".
106. These were held to be ultra vires. That was a case in which the State of Rajasthan has required an importer of vehicle within the State of Rajasthan to furnish a declaration of the type and the same was not applicable to the goods carried in pursuance of the transactions made within the State or goods sold outside the State of Rajasthan. On consideration of those provisions, it was held that "the contract of sale clearly provided that the scooter could be moved from Kanpur in the State of Uttar Pradesh to Jaipur in the State of Rajasthan, it was, therefore, clear that the movement of goods in the instant case from one State to another was the result of covenant or an incident of contract of sale and the sale was an inter-State sale under section 3(a) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, and a provision which was made by the Act or by the Rules which sought to prevent evasion of liability to pay intra-State sale or purchase tax would be within the competence of the Legislature or the authority competent to make the Rules but the State Legislature had no power to legislate for the levy of tax on the transaction which are carried in the course of inter-State trade or commerce".
107. In this connection, it may also be noticed that after the aforesaid judgment, the State Government made certain amendments in the impugned rule and ultimately as a result of agreement during the pendency of special appeal before the Division Bench, the petitioners withdrew the petition itself and the judgment was set aside as a result of such withdrawal (State v. Miss Alka Agarwal 1988 RTJS (4) Pt. 1 p. 22). But the reasoning adopted by the learned single Judge of the Rajasthan High Court found its support not only from the decision in Hansraj's case [1971] 27 STC 4 (SC); (1971) 1 SCC 59 but it was further supported by a decision of a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Check Post Officer, Coimbatore v. K. P. Abdulla and Bros. [1971] 27 STC 1; AIR 1971 SC 792, wherein the provisions of section 42(3) of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959, on the pattern of the similar scheme as is under section 59-A were struck down as being beyond the legislative competence of the State Legislature under article 246 read with Schedule VII, List II. It was held :
"..... A legislative entry does not merely enunciate powers; it specifies a field of legislation and the widest import and significance should be attached to it. Power to legislate on a specified topic includes power to legislate in respect of matters which may fairly and reasonably be said to be comprehended therein. A taxing entry therefore confers power upon the Legislature to legislate for matters ancillary or incidental including provision for preventing evasion of tax. But the power conferred by sub-section (3) of section 42 of the Madras General Sales Tax Act to seize and confiscate and to levy penalty in respect of all goods which are carried from one State to another in a vehicle whether the goods are sold or not is not incidental or ancillary to the power to levy sales tax."
108. We may further notice that this decision of the Constitution Bench has not been brought to the notice either in Sanjeetha's case AIR 1993 SC 237 or in Harihar Prasad's case [1989] 73 STC 353 (SC); AIR 1989 SC 1199. However, as we have reached our conclusion on the scheme of the Gujarat Sales Tax Act itself and on various issues discussed above, we leave this matter here.
109. Learned counsel for the respondents tried to draw support from the report of the Tax Inquiry Commission, 1953-54 suggesting that where the transaction takes place between registered dealer at one State and unregistered dealer or consumer in another, low rate of levy prescribed in the Central Sales Tax Act will not be suitable and it also suggested that the transaction of this type should be taxable at the same rate which exporting State imposes on similar transactions within their own territories. We are not here concerned with the legality or legitimacy of the rate structure of taxation provided in other States under the existing law relating to the Central sales tax. Firstly, that is an action which is not under challenge before us. Secondly, the recommendation of the commission of 1953-54 is not of any relevance in so far as the question of rate structure that can prevail under the Central Sales Tax Act is concerned. That can be decided only with reference to the provisions of the Central Sales Tax Act. If the provisions of that Act authorise the State Government to act in any particular manner, the fact that such provision was not recommended by the Taxation Inquiry Commission cannot be of any help. Said report has no bearing on the merit of the question raised before us, namely, whether the State of Gujarat in exercise of the powers conferred under section 59-A could provide special procedure for carriage of goods through the territory of Gujarat, in the case of its import for one commodity only within the framework of the parent statute and the provisions of the Constitution. The recommendation relied on by the learned counsel for the Revenue in support of his contention that the taxation commission recommended for providing higher rate of taxation on transaction between registered dealer at the place of export and unregistered dealer situated at the place of import. The impugned action has nothing to do with the question of prescribing the rate with which the recommendation relied on by the learned counsel for the Revenue was concerned.
110. We may summarise our conclusions thus :
(i) Rules 62-A(2) to (6) prescribing for obtaining declaration from person other than driver or person-in-charge of vehicle as is required under section 59-A(3)(c) eliciting the same information from other source is beyond the power conferred under section 59-A(3)(a) and, therefore, ultra vires the provisions of the Act.
(ii) The requirement of obtaining permit as a consumer and furnishing information relating to address of the place from which the goods are despatched, consignor's invoice number and date and details of the transports required to be furnished under the signature of the importer under form 45-B (clauses 5, 10, 11) or under form 45-C (clauses 6, 11 and 12) results in unreasonable fetter on the free trade, commerce and intercourse in respect of cement between other States and Gujarat State and results in violation of article 304(b) so also results in violation of article 19(1)(g).
(iii) Impugned restriction made in the rules and forms are void because the same have been enacted under the colourable exercise of powers conferred under section 59-A(3)(a) of the Gujarat Sales Tax Act.
(iv) In so far as the provisions of sub-rules (5) and (6) of rule 62-A are concerned, they result in imposing restriction which results in immediate and direct impediment of free flow of trade, commerce and intercourse relating to cement between Gujarat and other States and are not reasonable restrictions envisaged under article 304(b), therefore, are ultra vires the said provisions.
(v) The provisions of rules 62-A(2) to (6) having been enacted/framed in respect of cement for giving preference to the local manufacturers of cement over the cement manufacturers outside the State and classifying the cement for such special treatment are violative of articles 14, 303 and 304(a) of the Constitution of India.
(vi) Classification of cement as commodity and importers of cement within the State of Gujarat for the purpose of rules 62-A(2) to (6) is not based on any intelligible differentia having nexus to purpose sought to be achieved. The provisions of rule 62-A(5) and (6) to the extent they subject the registered dealer importer and make it imperative for the importers of goods to satisfy the conditions referred to in rule 24-B(e) and (f) and further to submit a declaration under his signature to the transporter for carrying the goods to the extent it requires furnishing address of the place of despatch, invoice number and particulars about the vehicle is violative of article 304(b) amounting to unreasonable restriction on free trade, commerce and intercourse between other States and the State of Gujarat and is also unreasonable restriction on the freedom of trade, of the petitioner violating article 19(1)(g).
111. Accordingly, the petition succeeds. Rules 62-A(2) to (6) and the forms 45-B and 45-C prescribed thereunder are therefore declared ultra vires section 59-A(3) as well as ultra vires the provisions of the Constitution. No order as to costs.
112. Petition allowed.