Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi
Hon Ble Shri Shekhar Agarwal vs Anjaly Yadav on 20 February, 2014
CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL PRINCIPAL BENCH R.A.NO.329 OF 2012 (In O.A.No. 339 of 2012) New Delhi, this the 20th day of February,2014 CORAM: HONBLE SHRI SHEKHAR AGARWAL, ADMINISTRATIVE MEMBER AND HONBLE SHRI RAJ VIR SHARMA, JUDICIAL MEMBER . Dileep G, R/o 43/H/CBI Residential Complex, Vasanth Vihar, New Delhi 110057 India . Petitioner (By Advocate: Shri Wills Mathews) Vrs. 1. Anjaly Yadav, D/o Sh.Jagroop Singh, R/o 117A, New Colony, Gurgaon, Haryana 2. Union Public Service Commission, Represented by its Chairman, Dholpur House, Shah Jahan Road, New Delhi 3. The Central Forensic Science Laboratory, Represented by its Director, Central Bureau of Investigation, Block IV, CGO Complex, Lodhi Road, New Delhi .. Respondents (By Advocates: Shri R.N.Singh for R-1, Shri Rajender Nischal for R-2 & Shri Saurabh Ahuja for R-3) . ORDER Raj Vir Sharma, Member(J):
In this Review Application, the petitioner has prayed for the following relief:
a. Review the order dated 18-04-2012 passed by this Honble tribunal in OA No.339/2012 filed by the 1st respondent titled as Anjali Yadav v. Union Public Service Commission and another.
Pass any order staying the proceedings connected with the appointment of respondent no.1 for the post of Senior Scientific Officer Gr.II with the 3rd respondent till the final disposal of the present review petition.
Pass such other directions or orders as this honourable Tribunal may deem fit and proper to meet the ends of justice.
2. We have perused the records and heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties.
3. The review petitioner, by filing the present R.A., seeks review of the order dated 18.04.2012 passed by this Tribunal in OA No.339/2012. The 1st respondent in the R.A. was the applicant, whereas the 2nd and 3rd respondents in the R.A. were the respondents, in the said O.A. The review petitioner was not a party to the said O.A.
4. In pursuance of the Advertisement published in the Employment News 27 August 2 September 2011, both the review petitioner and the 1st respondent had made applications to the 2nd respondent-UPSC for recruitment by selection to the three posts of Senior Scientific Officer Grade II (Lie Detector) in the 2nd respondent-Central Forensic Science Laboratory (CFSL).
5. The 2nd respondent-UPSC, vide its communication dated 17.1.2012, informed the 1st respondent that her application was rejected on the ground that copies of certificates/mark sheets are not accepted after the closing date and that subsequent mark sheets do not commensurate with the mark sheet submitted earlier along with the application form. Challenging the communication dated 17.1.2012 (ibid) and praying for a declaration that she was possessing the requisite qualification for the said post and for some other reliefs, the 1st respondent filed OA No.339 of 2012 before this Tribunal. The Tribunal, vide its order dated 18.4.2012, allowed the said O.A. quashing the impugned communication dated 17.1.2012 and holding that the applicant was possessing the requisite qualification for the post in question. The Tribunal also directed the respondents to declare the result of the applicant-1st respondent within the period specified therein as she had already participated in the interview as per the interim order passed by the Tribunal on 17.2.2012.
6. The review petitioner asserts that the applicant-1st respondent was not at all eligible for selection to the post in question. She committed fraud by suppressing material facts and by filing wrong experience certificate and making incorrect statements in OA No.339 of 2012, and the Tribunal on the basis thereof granted her the relief by allowing the O.A., vide order dated 18.4.2012. It is also asserted by the review petitioner that the order dated 18.4.2012(ibid) having been passed by the Tribunal on the basis of such wrong statements and wrong experience certificate filed by the applicant-1st respondent, is a nullity and void. It is also submitted by the review petitioner that the decisions relied on by the Tribunal in the order dated 18.4.2012 (ibid) were not applicable to the facts and circumstances of OA No.339 of 2012. In support of his contentions, the applicant has relied on State of West Bengal and others v. Kamal Sengupta and another, (2008) 8 SCC 612, and A.V.Papayya Sastry and others v. Govt. of A.P. and others, (2007) 4 SCC 221.
7. In State of West Bengal and others v. Kamal Sengupta and another(supra), the facts of the case were that the respondents, who were members of the West Bengal Food & Supplies & Service, filed application before the Administrative Tribunal, in which they claimed Pay Scales 19 and 21 of the Career Advancement Scheme framed by State Government, vide memorandum dated 21.6.1990. The claim was rejected by the Administrative Tribunal, vide its order dated 25.2.1997. The respondents approached the Honble High Court and the Honble Supreme Court, but did not get any relief. Thereafter, another set of employees filed an application in the Administrative Tribunal wherein they claimed Pay Scales 17,18 and 19. This application was allowed by the Tribunal, vide its order dated 25.3.1998, by distinguishing its earlier order dated 25.2.1997 passed in the case of the respondents. Besides, there was another memo dated 13.3.2001 wherein the Government reviewed the earlier scheme of 21.6.1990 and created additional posts in Pay Scale 19. However, this memo came into effect from 1.1.2001. Based on these developments, the respondents filed a review application seeking review of the Tribunals earlier order dated 25.2.1997. The Tribunal initially rejected the review application, but on the directions of the High Court, allowed the review application, vide order dated 25.9.2001, inter alila, relying on order dated 25.3.1998, and memo dated 13.3.2001. Hence the appeal was filed against the said order of the Honble High Court. The Honble Supreme Court, after taking note of its several decisions, in paragraph 35 of the judgment observed thus:
35. The principles which can be culled out from the above noted judgments are :
The power of the Tribunal to review its order/decision under Section 22(3)(f) of the Act is akin/analogous to the power of a Civil Court under Section 114 read with Order 47 Rule 1 of CPC.
The Tribunal can review its decision on either of the grounds enumerated in Order 47 Rule 1 and not otherwise.
The expression "any other sufficient reason" appearing in Order 47 Rule 1 has to be interpreted in the light of other specified grounds.
An error which is not self-evident and which can be discovered by a long process of reasoning, cannot be treated as an error apparent on the face of record justifying exercise of power under Section 22(3)(f).
An erroneous order/decision cannot be corrected in the guise of exercise of power of review.
A decision/order cannot be reviewed under Section 22(3)(f) on the basis of subsequent decision/judgment of a coordinate or larger bench of the Tribunal or of a superior Court.
(vii) While considering an application for review, the Tribunal must confine its adjudication with reference to material which was available at the time of initial decision. The happening of some subsequent event or development cannot be taken note of for declaring the initial order/decision as vitiated by an error apparent.
Mere discovery of new or important matter or evidence is not sufficient ground for review. The party seeking review has also to show that such matter or evidence was not within its knowledge and even after the exercise of due diligence, the same could not be produced before the Court/Tribunal earlier. In paragraphs 54, 55 and 56 of the judgment in the said case, the Honble Supreme Court held thus:
54. We may now advert to the High Court's order. A perusal thereof shows that even while accepting the contention of the appellants that the Tribunal did not have the jurisdiction to review order dated 25.2.1997, the High Court approved the direction given for extending the benefit of Scale Nos.19 and 21 to the respondents, albeit without taking cognizance of the stark fact that they had received promotions on the posts of Assistant Director, Deputy Director and Director; that they were holding highest posts in the service; that they were given the benefit of higher pay scales under ROPA 1981 and ROPA 1990 and no material had been placed before the Court to show that members of other State Services to whom the benefit of Scale Nos.19 and 21 had been given under the Scheme had also received three promotions after joining the service. The High Court also overlooked the fact that members of three out 17 State Services had not been given benefit of Scale No.19 and posts in Scale No.21 had been sanctioned only for 2 out of 17 State Services.
55. It is our considered view that in the absence of factual foundation, the High Court was not justified in recording a conclusion that denial of Scale Nos.19 and 21 had resulted in violation of the respondents' fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution and that too by ignoring the fact that the respondents had not produced any tangible evidence to prima facie prove that they had been subjected to hostile discrimination or that the decision of the State Government not to extend the benefit of Scale Nos.19 and 21 to members of the service was irrational and arbitrary. It is trite to say that in such matters the onus is always on the employee to prima facie substantiate the plea of discrimination or arbitrary exercise of power and only then the State or its instrumentality/agency or the public body (the employer) can be called upon to show that its decision is non-discriminatory, non-arbitrary, fair and in public interest.
55. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The order of the High Court as also the one passed by the Tribunal in R.A. No.26 of 1998 are set aside. The parties are left to bear their own costs.
8. The ratio decidendi laid down by the Honble Supreme Court in State of West Bengal and others v. Kamal Sengupta and another(supra) is that the Tribunal, while exercising its power of review, ought not to have reviewed its order and granted relief prayed for by the applicant in the original application on the basis of a subsequent decision rendered by it taking a contrary view, when the order sought to be reviewed attained finality consequent upon dismissal of the writ petition by the Honble High Court and dismissal of the SLP by the Honble Supreme Court, and when the applicant seeking review of the Tribunals order failed to substantiate that the rejection of his claim resulted in violation of Articles 14,16 and 21 of the Constitution of India. Besides, it is to be noted here that in State of West Bengal and others v. Kamal Sengupta and another(supra) the applicants in the Original Application were the review petitioners who sought the review of the order. Thus, in our considered view, the decision in State of West Bengal and others v. Kamal Sengupta and another(supra) does not help the review petitioner in the instant case.
9. In A. V. Papayya Sastry & ors v. Govt. of A.P. & Others (supra), it was the case of the appellants that they were the owners of the land in question and the Port Trust required the land for construction of quarters for their employees over it. The Chairman of the Port Trust made a requisition to the District Collector to acquire the land for the said public purpose. The possession of the land was taken over by the Estate Manager of the Port Trust on 29.8.1972 by private negotiations. The Special Officer & Competent Authority, under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 passed order declaring that the appellants were non-surplus landholders. Notification under Section 4 and declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act were issued. But when the Chief Engineer of the Port Trust clarified to the Land Acquisition Officer that actual physical possession was not taken over by the Port Trust, the State Government, in exercise of suo motu revisional power under Section 34 of the Ceiling Act, set aside the order of the Special Officer & Competent Authority. The appellant-landowners filed writ petitions seeking direction of High Court to State authorities to complete land acquisition proceedings and questioned the legality of the revisional order. The Single Judge of the High Court allowed the writ petitions and the Division Bench dismissed the appeal against the same. The SLPs preferred by the State authorities were dismissed by the Honble Supreme Court. The State authorities thereafter filed recall application before the High Court stating that fraud was committed and material facts were suppressed by the landowners and that even if Port Trust was deemed to be in possession of the land when Ceiling Act came into force, the land acquisition proceedings having not been concluded, the Port Trust possessed the land for and on behalf of the landowners and land was required to be declared surplus and vacant under the Ceiling Act. In paragraphs 38 and 39, the Honble Supreme Court observed thus:
38. The matter can be looked at from a different angle as well. Suppose, a case is decided by a competent court of law after hearing the parties and an order is passed in favour of the plaintiff applicant which is upheld by all the courts including the final court. Let us also think of a case where this Court does not dismiss special leave petition but after granting leave decides the appeal finally by recording reasons. Such order can truly be said to be a judgment to which Article 141 of the Constitution applies. Likewise, the doctrine of merger also gets attracted. All orders passed by the courts/authorities below, therefore, merge in the judgment of this Court and after such judgment, it is not open to any party to the judgment to approach any court or authority to review, recall or reconsider the order.
39. The above principle, however, is subject to exception of fraud. Once it is established that the order was obtained by a successful party by practicing or playing fraud, it is vitiated. Such order cannot be held legal, valid or in consonance with law. It is non-existent and non est and cannot be allowed to stand. This is the fundamental principle of law and needs no further elaboration. Therefore, it has been said that a judgment, decree or order obtained by fraud has to be treated as a nullity, whether by the court of first instance or by the final court. And it has to be treated as non est by every court, superior or inferior. In paragraph 46, the Honble Supreme Court held as follows:
46. Keeping in view totality of facts and attending circumstances including serious allegations of fraud said to have been committed by the landowners in collusion with officers of the respondent Port Trust and the Government, report submitted by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), prima facie showing commission of fraud and initiation of criminal proceedings, etc., if the High Court was pleased to recall the earlier order by issuing directions to the authorities to pass an appropriate order afresh in accordance with law, it cannot be said that there is miscarriage of justice which calls for interference in exercise of discretionary and equitable jurisdiction of this Court. We, therefore, hold that this is not a fit case which calls for our intervention under Article 136 of the Constitution. We, therefore, decline to do so.
10. In A. V. Papayya Sastry & ors v. Govt. of A.P. & Others (supra), the respondent-State authorities were parties to the writ petition and the stand taken by them was rejected by the Honble High Court and Honble Supreme Court. Subsequently, when it came to light that fraud was committed and material facts were suppressed by the appellants, the respondent-State authorities filed petition before the Honble High Court for recalling its original judgment. The Honble High Court found that the earlier judgment was rendered by it on account of suppression of material facts and fraud perpetrated by the appellant-landholders in collusion with the officers of the respondent-Port Trust and the State Government, in respect of which the Central Bureau of Investigation also submitted a report prima facie showing commission of fraud and initiation of criminal proceedings. In view of this, the Honble High Court recalled its earlier judgment at the instance of the State authorities who were parties to the writ petition. But in the case at hand, the review petitioner was not a party to the O.A. He is not seeking recall of the order dated 18.4.2012. He is seeking review of the order dated 18.4.2012 (ibid) and for other reliefs. He cannot be said to be placed at the same footing as that of the respondent-State authorities in A. V. Papayya Sastry & ors v. Govt. of A.P. & Others (supra).
11. However, in the case at hand, since the review petitioner is seeking review of the order dated 18.4.2012 (ibid) as being a nullity and void because of suppression of material facts and fraud committed by the respondent no.1(applicant in the O.A.), keeping in view the principles enunciated by the Honble Supreme Court in A. V. Papayya Sastry & ors v. Govt. of A.P. & Others (supra), we would like to examine as to whether the review petitioner has made out a case that the applicant-respondent no.1 suppressed the material facts and committed fraud, as a consequence of which the order dated 18.4.2012 was passed by the Tribunal in her favour.
12. In the R.A., the review petitioner has stated the following grounds:
a) Because as per records the respondent no.1 submitted before UPSC, it is the case of the respondent no.1 that she is having 4 years, 8 months and 10 days experience according to Column 10.B of the application form submitted to UPSC dated 07.09.2011. Respondent No.1 has given the details at part 2, detailed particulars showing the particulars of experience. From the records submitted it is clear that, the respondent no.1 was working as Research Assistant with DFS, Gandhi Nagar during the period 26.06.2006 to 15.12.2006 (5 months and 19 Days). It is also the case of the respondent no.1 herein that she was working almost in the same period with DFS, Gandhi Nagar as Faculty for Research and Analytical Work during 01.07.2006 to 31.12.2006 ( 6 Months). It is relevant to mention that the calculation of days is totally incorrect as there is an excess of 5 Months and 14 days added willfully and deliberately to defraud UPSC. The respondent No.1 willfully and deliberately filed the said application to mislead UPSC by giving excess experience without producing a proper experience certificate to show her experience during the said period in the format as prescribed by UPSC thereby committed fraud. For this reason itself the application of the applicant was liable to be dismissed.
b) Because it is the case of the respondent no.1 herein that she was granted Research Fellowship by MHA and Directorate of Forensic Sciences for doing Ph.D in Forensic science on the basis of her Masters Degree in Forensic Science (two years course) she obtained in 2006. Experience and Qualification in the field of Forensic Science is irrelevant as per the notification published for the said post and as such it is not relevant.
c) The respondent no.1 is not having the required experience/eligibility which is evident from the fact that throughout she was studying till the time of submitting application for the post. There is nothing in record to show that she is having three years experience in applied psychology or criminology/crime investigation as according to the records throughout she was studying without any break. This being the situation she is not having the basic experience and eligibility to apply for the post.
d) Because the experience certificate dated 18.12.2006 from NRCFRP is signed by co-investigator which is not valid in the eyes of law.
e) On the issue of minimum education qualification, it was categorically stated in the said application that 4.They are advised to satisfy themselves before applying that they possess at least the essential qualifications laid down for various posts. And as such admittedly the respondent was not aware whether she passed the examination or not seriously affecting her eligibility for application for the post.
f) It is also relevant to mention that at item No.13 it is very categorically stated that Essential: (i) Masters Degree in Criminology or Psychology from a recognized University or equivalent. (ii) Three years experience in Applied Psychology or Criminology/Crime Investigation.
Here the relevant is Masters Degree and not the receipt of the mark list. Just for the reason a candidate received mark list of the examination she has undergone conclusion cannot be reached she has received the degree. There is a lot of difference between the mark list and the degree certificate. Admittedly in the present case the mark list was provided by the respondent after the last date. Assuming the submission of the mark list submitted is of no help as she has submitted the degree certificate only after the last date for acceptance of the forms. For this reason itself the application was liable to be dismissed.
g) Admittedly, the last date for receipt of the complete forms was 15.09.2012 whereas, even the provisional certificates was submitted by the respondent only on 29.09.2011. The respondent can be set to be in possession of the degree only after the issuance of the degree certificate and not the mark list.
h) It is respectfully submitted that the UPSC rejected the application of the respondent no.1 rightly under the head Incomplete Applications as it was incomplete in all respects.
i) It is also submitted that as per the detailed instructions issued to the candidates along with the advertisement the candidates are required to submit self attested copies of degree/diploma certificate along with the mark statement pertaining to all academic years as proof of educational qualification claimed further to this it was stated that in the absence of degree, diploma certificate professional certificate along with mark sheet pertaining to all the academic years are accepted. However, in the present case the respondent has not submitted the degree certificate resulting in a situation she is not entitled to apply for the post.
13. In O.A. No.339 of 2012 filed by the applicant-1st respondent, the communication dated 17.1.2012 issued by the 2nd respondent-UPSC was impugned and consequential relief was claimed by her. The relevant portion of the said communication dated 17.1.2012 reads thus:
I am directed to refer to your representation dated 03.01.2012 for the subject post, and to say that as per the existing policy of the commission, the copies of certificates/Marks-sheet submitted by the applicants after the closing date are not accepted. Moreover, the Marks-sheet now submitted by you, does not commensurate with the Marks-sheet submitted by you earlier along with the application form. Your candidature, therefore, stands rejected.
14. A perusal of the grounds taken by him reveals that the review petitioner has attempted to make out a case that the applicant-1st respondent submitted the mark sheet and experience certificate which were not acceptable. But, as would appear from the communication dated 17.1.2012 (ibid) issued by the 2nd respondent-UPSC, her application was rejected on the grounds that copies of certificates/Marks-sheet submitted by her after the closing date were not acceptable and that the Marks-sheet submitted by her subsequently does not commensurate with the Marks-sheet submitted by her earlier along with the application form. The applicant-1st respondent was aggrieved by that communication and filed the O.A. before this Tribunal. The experience certificate furnished by her along with the application form was not questioned by the 2nd respondent-UPSC. After analyzing the materials available on record and relying on the decisions of the Honble Apex Court in Dolly Chhanda v. Chairman, JEE & others, (2005) 9 SCC 77; Charles K.Skaria and others v. Dr.C.Mathew and others, (1980)2 SCC 752, the Tribunal held thus:
..In the present case, the applicant submitted the marks sheet of M.Sc. (Applied Psychology) in a confidential envelope as per rules prior to the closing date, and it can be presumed that on the last date of submission of the application form, the applicant was possessing the requisite qualification. In the present case, the proof of the academic qualification was submitted prior to the closing date. From all these circumstances, the only inference that can be drawn is that on the last date of submission of the application form, the applicant was possessing the requisite qualification required for the post against item No.13 of the advertisement in question, and the applicant was eligible to participate in the interview..
15. As the experience certificate was not questioned by the 2nd respondent-UPSC, the applicant did not make any averment in relation thereto in the O.A. and consequently, the answering respondents did not give any reply and place any material before the Tribunal. Whether the experience certificate furnished by the applicant-1st respondent was acceptable was not a question raised and decided by the Tribunal in the O.A. Because of this, and because of the clear findings arrived at by the Tribunal in favour of the applicant-1st respondent with regard to acceptability of the educational certificate furnished by the applicant, it can by no stretch of imagination be said that the applicant-1st respondent suppressed the material facts and committed fraud, as alleged by the review petitioner.
16. Order 47, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads thus:
1. Application for review of judgment.-(1) Any person considering himself aggrieved
(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred.
(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or (c ) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the court which passed the decree or made the order. Even assuming for the moment that the applicant is aggrieved by the Tribunals order dated 18.4.2012(ibid), yet it cannot be said that the applicant has urged any of the grounds enumerated in Order 47, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, far less substantiated the same.
17. Admittedly, in W.P. (C) No.5077 of 2012 filed by the 2nd Respondent-UPSC, the Honble High Court, vide judgment dated 28.2.2013 upheld the order dated 18.4.2012 passed by the Tribunal in OA No.339 of 2012. The order dated 28.2.2013 passed by the Honble High Court reads thus:
ORDER 28.02.2013
1. On the peculiar facts and circumstances of the instant case, we are not inclined to interfere with the impugned order passed by the Tribunal. Our reason for the same.
2. The notified cut-off date prescribed as per the advertisement issued by UPSC was 15.09.2011. Anjali Yadav the respondent had taken the Second and the Final Year examination pertaining to the Masters Course M.Sc. (Applied Psychology). The examination was held in May, 2011. Unfortunately, the University had not formally declared the result but the same was lying tabulated in the office of the Controller of Examination. As per rules of Annamalai University it was permissible for candidates to pay a fee and obtain a confidential mark list. Anjali Yadav so obtained one on September 09, 2011. Enclosing the same as proof of having the prescribed educational qualification she submitted the application form. Thereafter, the results were formally declared by the University and marksheets were officially issued to all the candidates including Anjali Yadav. The date on which the Statement of Marks were issued is September 29, 2011.
3. UPSC has held Anjali Yadav not entitled to be considered for the selection process, holding the confidential marksheets submitted by her along with the application to be invalid document.
4. The circumstances under which Anjali Yadav had to obtain the confidential mark list on September 09, 2011 have already been noted by us hereinabove. She had to meet the deadline of September 15, 2011.
5. UPSC may have a point that since it conducts large number of selection process, where lacs and lacs of candidates apply, it may be difficult for UPSC to subject each and every application to a specific scrutiny, but at the same time it has to be kept in mind that if a University has a procedure to issue a confidential mark list and a candidate relies upon the same, provisional clearance to the candidature could be a good methodology adopted by UPSC, for after all, what can candidates do if Universities declare results belatedly? It pains the Court to note that examination held in May,2011 resulted in official marksheet being issued as late as September 29,2011 notwithstanding results being ready and tabulated much prior to September 09, 2011; the confidential marklist was issued to Anjali Yadav on September, 09, 2011.
6. Not to be treated as a precedent, on the peculiar facts we do not interfere with the impugned order noting that under interim orders passed in Anjali Yadav was permitted to take the selection process and finds herself empanelled at serial no.3 of the Select Panel pertaining to the three posts.
7. Dismissed.
8. No costs.
18. In view of the dismissal of the writ petition by the Honble High Court, the Tribunals order dated 18.4.2012 merged with the judgment of the Honble High Court.
19. It is next to be seen as to whether the applicant could maintain a Review Application against the Tribunals order dated 18.4.2012 (ibid) when admittedly the writ petition filed against the same was dismissed by the Honble High Court.
20. In State of Maharashtra and another v. Prabhakar Bhikaji Ingle, (1996) 3 SCC 463, the Honble Supreme Court, in paragraphs 4 and 5, held as follows:
4. But in this case, when the self-same main order was confirmed by this Court, the question arises whether the Tribunal has had power under Order 47, Rule 1 CPC or any other appropriate provision under the Tribunals Act to review the orders passed by it and confirmed by this Court by refusing to grant leave. We find that the exercise of the review power is deleterious to the judicial discipline. Once this Court has confirmed the order passed by the Tribunal, that becomes final. Therefore, the Tribunal cannot have any power to review the previous order which stands merged with the order passed by this Court.
5. It is next contended by the learned counsel for the respondent that though the Tribunal was communicated with the order of this Court dated 25.8.1995, it has thereafter passed the order. It would mean that though it had the knowledge of dismissal of the order passed by this Court, the Tribunal has exercised the power of review and that, therefore, it cannot be said to be illegal. We are wholly unable to appreciate the contention of the learned counsel. We could appreciate that if the Tribunal had no knowledge of dismissal of the SLP it might, in certain circumstances, review its earlier order, e.g., if it was found that the order was vitiated by any manifest error of law apparent on the face of the record. But having received the communication that this Court has already upheld its order, the Tribunals exercise of power can be said to be audacious and without any judicial discipline. Under those circumstances, we do not think that the Tribunal is justified in reviewing its own order when this Court had confirmed the order passed earlier.
21. The other aspect of the point is as to whether the order dated 18.4.2012 (ibid), which is sought to be reviewed by the review petitioner, has prejudicially affected his rights and if so, what is the remedy available to him.
22. In Gopabandhu Biswal v. Krishna Chandra Mohanty and others, (1998) 4 SCC 447, the Honble Supreme Court in paragraphs 8, 10 and 10, held as follows:
8. The power of review which is granted to an Administrative Tribunal is similar to power given to a civil court under Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore, any person (inter alia) who considers himself aggrieved by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred can apply for review under Order 47 Rule 1(1) (a). An appeal lies to this Court from a decision of the Administrative Tribunal. If an appeal is preferred, the power to review cannot be exercised. In the present case, a special leave petition to file an appeal was preferred from the judgment of the Tribunal in T.A.No. 1 of 1989 to this Court, and the special leave petition was rejected. As a result the order of the Tribunal in T.A.No. 1 of 1989 became final and binding. The rejection of a petition for leave to appeal under Article 136 of the petition for leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution, in effect, amounts to declining to entertain an appeal, thus making the judgment and order appealed against final and binding. Once a special leave petition is filed and rejected, the party cannot go back to the Tribunal to apply for review. In the case of State of Maharashtra & Anr. v. Prabhakar Bhikaji Ingle [(1993) 3 S.C.C. 463] this Court held that when a special leave petition from the order of the Tribunal was dismissed by a non-speaking order, the main order was confirmed by the Supreme Court. Thereafter the power of review cannot be exercised by the tribunal. The Court said that the exercise of power of review by the Tribunal in such circumstances would be "deleterious to judicial discipline". Once the Supreme Court has confirmed the order passed by the Tribunal, that becomes final. In Sree Narayana Dharmasanghom Trust v. Swami Prakasananda & Ors. [(1997) 6. S.C.C. 78] the above decision was reaffirmed. This Court held that after an order of this Court dismissing the S.L.P. in limine from a judgment of the High Court, the High Court cannot review it. The Court followed the earlier judgment in State of Maharashtra & Anr. v. Prabhakar Bhikaji Ingle (supra).
9. In the case of K. Ajit Babu & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. [(1997) 6 S.C.C. 47] to which one of us was party, this Court examined Section 22(3)(f) of the Administrative Tribunals Act,1985 and held that an application for review under that section attracts the principles contained in Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore once an S.L.P is preferred and dismissed, review is not permissible. The same view has been taken by this Court in Raj Kumar Sharma & Ors. etc. etc. v. Union of India & Ors. etc. etc. (1995 (2) SCALE 23). The Court observed in that case that the Tribunal was in error in entertaining a review petition and allowing it after the special leave petition against its main judgment had been dismissed by this Court and the review petition filed in this Court against the dismissal of the special leave petition had also been dismissed. It was undisputed that the grounds on which the review was sought before the Tribunal was a ground taken in the special leave petition as well as in the review petition filed in this Court. In such a situation, to say the least, it was wholly inappropriate for the Tribunal to sit in judgment on the merits of this Court's order dismissing the special leave petition giving finality to the Tribunal's main order. In the present case, therefore, on the dismissal of the special leave petition by this Court, the judgment of the Tribunal in T.A. No. 1 of 1989 became final and binding as between the parties and the Tribunal had no power to review that Judgment thereafter.
10. In the present case, however, it is urged that the four applicants who filed the two review petitions before the Tribunal were not parties to the main petition. They were also not parties to the special leave petition filed before this Court which was dismissed. However, they are parties aggrieved and hence are entitled to apply for a review of the main judgment of the Tribunal. It is contended by them that the judgment of the Tribunal holding that the two cadres of Deputy Superintendent of Police and Assistant Commandant were a single cadre till 5.11.1980, has affected the chances of promotion of the applicants and, therefore, the appellants, being persons aggrieved, are entitled to maintain such review petitions when they had not been parties to the earlier judgment as well as the earlier special leave petition. We will assume for the time being that the applicants are persons aggrieved. Even so, the question is whether they can have a judgment which has attained finality by virtue of an order of this Court, set aside in review. There is no doubt that as between the parties to the main judgment, the judgment is final and binding. The respondents, State of Orissa and Union of India, are, therefore, bound to give effect to the judgment of the Tribunal in T.A.No. 1 of 1989 in the case of Gopabandhu Biswal. If this is so, can a third party by filing a review petition get that same judgment reviewed and obtain an order that Gopabandhu Biswal is not entitled to the benefits of the directions contained in the main judgment since that judgment is now set aside? In our view this is wholly impermissible. It will lead to re-opening a matter which has attained finality by virtue of an order of this Court. The applicants, even if they are persons aggrieved, do not have, in the present case, a right of review under any part of Order 47 Rule 1. Even under Order 47 Rule 1(2), the party not appealing from a decree or order can apply for review only on grounds other than the grounds of appeal which were before the appellate court, and during the pendency of the appeal. In the present case all the grounds which were urged in review were, in fact, urged before the Tribunal at the time when the Tribunal decided the main application and they were also urged by the petitioner in the special leave petition which was filed before this Court. The special leave petition has been dismissed. The same grounds cannot be again urged by way of a review petition by another party who was not a party in the main petition.
11. According to the applicants certain documents though produced before the Tribunal were not noticed by the Tribunal in deciding the main matter. Even so, once a judgment of a Tribunal has attained finality, it cannot be reopened after the special leave petition against that judgment has been dismissed. The only remedy for a person who wants to challenge that judgment is to file a separate application before the Tribunal in his own case and persuade the Tribunal either to refer the question to a larger Bench or, if the Tribunal prefers to follow its early decision, to file an appeal from the Tribunal's judgment and have the Tribunal's judgment set aside in appeal review is not an available remedy.
23. In view of the decision of the Honble Supreme Court in Gopabandhu Biswal(supra), the review petitioner, a third party, cannot be permitted to file a review petition to get the order dated 18.4.2012 (ibid) reviewed and obtain an order that the applicant-1st respondent is not entitled to the benefits of the direction contained in the order dated 18.4.2012 (ibid) which has been upheld by the Honble High Court.
24. It would not be out of place to mention here that the 2nd respondent-UPSC, vide communication dated 7.3.2012, informed the review petitioner that his application was rejected as he did not meet the requirement of relevant experience of three years. Aggrieved thereby, the review petitioner filed OA No.1010 of 2012. The Tribunal, vide order dated 29.5.2012, dismissed the said O.A. W.P. (C ) No. 4619 of 2012 filed by the review petitioner against the order dated 29.5.2012 (ibid), the Honble High Court of Delhi, vide judgment dated 30.01.2013, quashed the same and restored OA No.1010 of 2012 for fresh adjudication before the Tribunal. Thus, it is clear that the review petitioner availed of the remedy available to him under law for redressal of his grievances, if any, in the matter of rejection of his candidature by the 2nd respondent-UPSC.
25. In the light of the above discussions, we hold that the Review Application is not maintainable either on facts or in law, besides being devoid of merit. Accordingly, the Review Application is dismissed. No costs.
(RAJ VIR SHARMA) (SHEKHAR AGARWAL) JUDICIAL MEMBER DMINISTRATIVE MEMBER AN