Jharkhand High Court
Sushil Kumar vs State Of Jharkhand Trough The Secretary ... on 23 June, 2016
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L.P.A No. 174 of 2008
[Against the judgment dated 29th April, 2008 passed in W.P (S) No.889/2003]
Sushil Kumar son of Sri Sriniwas Sharma resident of village and PO Kespa
PS Tekari District Gaya (Bihar) Appellant
Versus
1.The State of Jharkhand through the Secretary Ministry of Home,
Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi
2.Director General of Police, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi
3.Superintendent of Police, Chatra
4.State of Bihar through the Secretary Department of Home, Government
of Bihar, Patna Respondents
......
PRESENT
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Virender Singh, Chief Justice
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Shree Chandrashekhar
......
For the Petitioners/Appellant : Dr.S.N.Pathak, Senior Advocate
For the Respondents : Mrs.Rakhi Rani, GA IV
......
Dated : 23
rd
June, 2016
Per Virender Singh, C.J. :
Being aggrieved of the judgment dated 29th April, 2008 passed in W.P (S) No.889/2003 whereby, writ application filed by the appellantwrit petitioner (hereinafter to be referred to as petitioner) stands dismissed, he has preferred the instant appeal which was pending on board since long and now taken up for its final consideration as the old cases are being taken up by the Court on priority basis.
2. The case pleaded by the petitioner is that, on a representation to the then DirectorGeneral of Police, Bihar, Patna for appointment on humanitarian grounds, he was appointed as a constable and he joined the post on 24th May, 1996. It so happened that after about six years, on 7th March, 2002, a communication was sent through Memo No.1046 issued by the Inspector General of Police (Administration), Bihar, Patna to the Director General of Police, Jharkhand, to dispense with the services of those persons who were appointed by the then ExDirector General of Police, Bihar, Patna, enclosing a list of those persons. Accordingly, notices 2 were issued to such appointees including, the petitioner, aggrieved of the same the petitioner moved the writ court in W.P (S) No.2893/2002, which was disposed of on 10th May, 2002 granting liberty to raise all the questions before the Superintendent of Police, Chatra. After considering the showcause reply/documents submitted by the petitioner, vide Order no.9 dated 5th January, 2003, the services of the petitioner were dispensed with on the ground that it was illegal inasmuch, as no procedure for appointment was followed and that there was no provision for appointing him on humanitarian ground. The petitioner being aggrieved of the said order once again moved the writ court in W.P (S) No.889/2003, which now stands dismissed, vide the impugned judgment dated 29.04.2008.
3. Dr.S.N.Pathak, learned Senior Counsel referring to certain orders passed by the writ court and the Division Bench in different L.P.As contends that the case of the petitioner is at par with other constables who were appointed in the same manner and that the orders dispensing with their services have been quashed by the writ court and in some of the cases, those orders were affirmed by the Division Bench. He also relied upon a judgment of learned Single Judge in CWJC No.3461/2004 (Patna High Court) in the case of Kamal Chandra Sah Vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. in which it has been held that State can always make an exception to Rule 661 B of the Police Manual in deserving cases. In short, Dr.Pathak contends that the case of the petitioner was also a most deserving case and thus, an exception and therefore, the impugned order terminating the services of the petitioner deserves to be set aside. The learned Senior Counsel further submitted that in the alternative the case of the petitioner can be remitted to the writ court for a fresh consideration after considering the judgments on which he has now relied upon.
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4. We do not find any substance in the submissions of Dr.Pathak. The learned Senior Counsel has failed to demonstrate that all those constables against whom orders of termination of service were passed and set aside subsequently, were also appointed along with the petitioner in the same transaction. Not only that, in all the cases relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel, facts are different and the case of the petitioner can be distinguished on facts however, we do not feel the necessity of going into details of those cases. The fact of the matter is that the appointment of the petitioner is against the relevant Rules and in breach of Article 14 read with Article 16 of the Constitution. There is no provision otherwise for humanitarian appointment in the manner as was done in the case of the petitioner. Admittedly, it is not an appointment on compassionate ground.
5. Dr.S.N.Pathak, learned Senior Counsel, lastly contended that several other persons who were also appointed in similar manner are still continuing in service whereas, unfortunates like the petitioner have been thrown out of service.
6. To this, we may only observe that there cannot be equality in illegality. Where a party's claim is not founded on valid grounds, equity takes the backseat. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of "State of Maharashtra & Ors. Vs. Prabhu" reported in (1994) 2 SCC 481 observed that "It is the responsibility of the High Court as custodian of the Constitution to maintain the social balance by interfering where necessary for sake of justice and refusing to interfere where it is against the social interest and public good".
7. Article 14 of the Constitution of India is not to perpetuate illegality and it does not envisage negative equalities. In State of U.P. 4 versus Rajkumar Sharma [(2006) 3 SCC 330] it was held as under: "15. Even if in some cases appointments have been made by mistake or wrongly that does not confer any right on another person. Article 14 of the Constitution does not envisage negative quality, and if the State committed the mistake it cannot be forced to perpetuate the same mistake. (See Sneh Prabha v. State of U.P. (1996) 7 SCCC 426; Secy., Jaipur Development Authority v. Daulat Mal Jain (1997) 1 SCC 35; State of Haryana v. Ram Kumar Mann (1997) 3 SCC 321;
Faridabad C.T. Scan Centre v. D.G, Health Services (1997) 7 SCC 752; Jalandhar Improvement Trust v. Sampuran Singh (1999) 3 494; State of Punjab v. Dr. Rajeev Sarwal (1999) 9 SCC 240; Yogesh Kumar v. Govt. of NCT, Delhi (2003) 3 SCC 548; Union of India v. International Trading Co. (2003) 5 SCC 437 and Kastha Niwarak Grihnirman Sahakari Sanstha Maryadit v. President, Indore Development Authority (2006) 2 SCC 604.)"
8. While considering a similar plea, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of "Vice Chancellor, M.D.University, Rohtak Vs Jahan Singh"
reported in (2007) 5 SCC 77 observed as under: "28.Even assuming the respondent and the said Shri Taneja were similarly situated, we may observe that Article 14 of the Constitution of India carries with it a positive concept. Article 14 of the Constitution cannot be invoked, for perpetuating illegality".
9. We are alive to the situation that illegal appointments such as appointment of the petitioner cannot be sanctioned in law. We are also of the view that any indulgence by this Court in the present petition would only perpetuate the illegality. In "M.P.Mittal v. State of Haryana" reported in (1984) 4 SCC 371, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that "it is open to the High Court to consider whether, in the exercise of its undoubted discretionary jurisdiction, it should decline relief to such petitioner if the grant of relief would defeat the interests of justice. The Court always has power to refuse relief where the petitioner seeks to invoke its writ jurisdiction in order to secure a dishonest advantage or perpetuate an unjust gain."
10. Appreciating the case of the petitioner from all angles once again, we find no infirmity in the impugned judgment of the writ court 5 calling for interference of the Court in the instant Letters Patent Appeal. Resultantly, it merits dismissal. Ordered accordingly. (Virender Singh, C.J.) (Shree Chandrashekhar,J.) Jharkhand High Court, Ranchi The 23rd June, 2016 NAFR/dey