Calcutta High Court
Indofer Society & Ors. vs Director General Of Foreign Trade & Ors. on 19 January, 2001
Equivalent citations: (2001)2CALLT257(HC), 2001(134)ELT356(CAL)
Author: K.J. Sengupta
Bench: Kalyan Jyoti Sengupta
JUDGMENT K.J. Sengupta, J.
1. After completion of filing of affidavits for final hearing of the writ petition and in fact after the writ petition itself was being heard for two days this application has been taken out for the following reliefs:--
(a) Amendment of the main writ petition being W.P. No. 12492(W) of 1999 as shown in a copy of the said writ petition delineated in a writ being annexure 'X';
(b) Alternatively and in any event, the petitioners be allowed to urge the grounds as enumerated in the instant application and to mould the prayers as mentioned in the instant application:
(c) in any event the instant application be permitted to be treated as part of the main writ petition being W.P. No. 12492(W) of 1999.
2. In this application neither of the parties has filed any affidavit-in-opposition. The petitioners and added parties and/or intervenors apart from advancing oral submission have filed written notes of arguments but other parties were contended with oral submission.
3. Dr. Singhvi, learned Advocate for the petitioners submitted various aspects both on the question of jurisdiction and my authority as to whether I can entertain the aforesaid application at this stage without deciding the question of jurisdiction in the writ petition Itself.
4. He contends that question of territorial jurisdiction for entertaining and trying the present amendment petition is absolutely of no relevance. In this situation the correct procedure would be to first grant amendment and, thereafter, to decide the question of territorial jurisdiction. In support of his submission he has relied on the following decisions,
(i), (ii) , (iii) AIR 1953 Hyderabad 212, (iv) . (v) AIR 1949 Madras 208. (vi) , (vii) AIR 1982 Kerala 28, (viii) AIR 1969 N. 75, (ix) and (x) .
5. In the present case, he contends, that there is no new or inconsistent cause of action. In the original writ petition there are two parts of causes of action and the reliefs too claimed in relation thereto, one of the grievances of the writ petitioners is against order of the Designated Authority in not having considered the second application for imposition of and dumping duty and had, therefore, prayed that the Designated Authority be commanded by an appropriate writ to perform his statutory duty of dealing with anti dumping petition on merit, Another substantial plea raised by the petitioner in the present writ relates to threatened Injury owing to possible withdrawal of the floor price fixed vide notification dated 11th December, 1998 and this plea of the petitioner is Independent of, but not Inconsistent with the plea regarding the application for discharging statutory duty by the Designated Authority. It is one of the cases of the petitioner in the present writ petition that the respondent No. 1 should not withdraw floor price fixed in respect of H.R. Coils vide aforesaid notification.
6. He contends now this apprehension and threat have become true as the floor price which was originally there, has been totally withdrawn and this subsequent event has taken place during pendency of the writ petition.
7. He contends that it is now settled law that the subsequent event could always by looked into by the Courts when they occur during pendency of the petition and/or lis. When by subsequent event the law is changed or such event materially alter the situation prevailed originally, the same can always be challenged by amending the writ petition else there would be multiplicity of the litigation. For this proposition he has relied on the following decisions.
(i) ; (ii) AIR 1978 SC 1178, (iii) . (iv) . (v) , (vi) , and (vii) (F.B.).
8. In his alternative argument he contends that if it appears to the Court that the proposed amendment is based upon a fresh cause of action then such amendment should also be allowed as multiplicity of litigation would be avoided. In support of this submission he has relied on the following decisions.
(i) , (ii) . (iii) . (iv) AIR 1970 Cal 882, (v) , (vi) AIR 1987 SC 1087 and (vii) .
9. Dr. Singhvi contends that delay in taking out the application is of no relevance since the amendment has been allowed even after the Court has closed arguments in a matter. He seeks to rely for this proposition on two decisions and . On the question of territorial jurisdiction of this Court it is submission of the writ petitioner advanced by Dr. Singhvi alternatively that in order to decide this question the Court is to look into the averments of the writ petition only nothing more nothing less.
10. He contends perusal of the Cause Title of the original writ petition that the subject matter of the writ petition is stated and the same being the notification dated 11th December, 1998 issued by the Director General of foreign Trade, Ministry of Commerce. Government of India, New Delhi under section 5 of the Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992.
11. He contends that the places of business of the petitioners, as stated in the Cause Title, are situated within the territorial jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court. Besides the notification dated 11th December. 1998, continuance of which is the subject matter of the present writ petition has all India operation including West Bengal within the territorial jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court. It is averred that the petitioner No.3 carries on business of H.R. Coils and had its registered office within the territorial jurisdiction of the Hon'ble Court. It is stated that when the original records were produced before the Court pursuant to the order dated 12th August, 1999 the relevant noting clearly showed that the Designated Authority also recognised and found that no injury would be caused to the Indian Industry at the existing floor price. It thus follows as a consequence of what is stated by the Designated Authority Itself that in the event of the variation of the floor price, the entire Indian Steel Industry would be affected and such effect would be felt within the territorial jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court as any effect to the Indian Industry as a whole would be felt within the territorial jurisdiction. So, the petitioners have suffered Injury because of the aforesaid Inaction and/or threatened action of withdrawal of floor price at their respective places of business situate within the territorial limit of this Hon'ble Court and the same have been pleaded effectively. So part of the cause of action thus arose within the jurisdiction of this Court. In support of the aforesaid submission the following decisions have been relied on.
(i) . (ii) 1954 SCR 1122. (iii) 1950 SCR 869, (iv) , (v) . (vi) , (vii) . (viii) .
12. It is submitted further that the notification fixing the floor price has been circulated all over India and had its effect on all the steel industries including the petitioners herein whose place of business situate within the jurisdiction of this Court. It has been held by this Hon'ble Court that the plea where the effect of a particular order passed by Union of India was felt is the place of accrual of part of the cause of action. He referred to the following decisions in this context.
(i) 1953 SCR 1154. (ii) 1954 SCR 738, (iii) . (iv) .
13. However, the aforesaid decisions are of no use in view of the insertion of amendment of Article 226 by 15th amendment bringing in theory of the part of cause of action. After having noted the aforesaid amendment it has been held by the various Court that affect of the order which is the subject matter of the writ petition is felt would confer territorial jurisdiction on the place of felt effect situates. In this context the following decisions have been relied on.
(i) . (ii) . (iii) . (iv) . (v) , and (vi) .
14. Learned Advocate General appearing on behalf of Essar Steel India Ltd. one of the supporting respondents in his argument reiterates elaborately the contention of Dr. Singhvi and brought additional decisions on the question of jurisdiction and amendment.
15. Mr. Jayanta Mitra, learned senior Advocate appearing for the Steel Authority of India is one of the respondents though advanced separate argument but substance thereof is identically same with that of Dr. Singhvi and the learned Advocate General. Mr. Mirta has also relied on the same decision, however, he drew my attention to the relevant paragraphs specifically on the amendment and the question of jurisdiction for allowing amendment.
16. Mr. N.C. Roychowdhury, learned senior Advocate appearing for Union of India strenuously opposed this application for amendment saying this amendment application is absolutely malafide and there is no warrant, to take out this application.
17. He contends the subject matter of the writ petition really against alleged inaction of the Designated Authority for not disposing of second application for imposition of anti dumping duty. The proposed amendment relates to withdrawal of the floor price by subsequent notification of November, 1999. However, this alleged subsequent event had already been brought to the notice of this Court and the Court having noted the same granted Interim relief. The alleged grievance against withdrawal of the floor price by the impugned notification dated 1st November. 1999 is not the cause of action nor the substantial relief claimed but ancillary to the same. This amendment has been taken out only to enjoy the Interim order as long as possible because of the interim order the Government has to maintain floor price. He also contends that this Court has no territorial jurisdiction either to entertain amendment application or to maintain Interim order.
18. Both Mr. Milan Banerjee learned Senior Advocate and Mr. Kapoor learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the respective added respondents and/or the intervenors submit that the amendment application should not be entertained at all. It has been held by the Division Bench of this Court that it is not permissible to make any order of amendment where the Court lacks jurisdiction to bring the case within the jurisdiction of this Court. In this connection he relied on a decision . In another decision of this Court it was held that when a Court lacks pecuniary or territorial jurisdiction it is not competent to allow amendment of the plaint. The aforesaid principle has also been followed in other judgments of this Court and 1983 (2) CLJ 44 respectively.
19. This Court has no jurisdiction, going by the averment made in the present writ petition, as no part of cause of action is pleaded to have arisen within the territorial limit of this Court and this has been settled in the Supreme Court decisions , and 1988 All 36.
20. On merit of this Amendment application they contend that there is no question of amendment in this matter. The principal grievance in the writ petition is against the decision of the Designated Authority dated 8th February, 1999. This decision was taken at and communicated by letter dated 8th February, 1999 Issued by the Designated Authority, from New Delhi.
21. They contend realising the futility of the main prayers of the writ petition, for the purpose of granting amendment emphasis is sought to be laid by the petitioners upon the prayers (a) (iii) and (d) of the writ petition. In any event, allegations and averments made in the proposed amendment are not the cause of action nor the same have any nexus with the subject matter of the writ petition. In order to maintain a writ, action either initially or by way of amendment, one has to establish that there is subsisting legal right and then breach thereof which causes damage and, also legal Injury. No such case has been made out in the proposed amendment. The two notifications which are sought to be brought by way of amendment did not hold out to the writ petitioner any enforceable right or promise. Moreover, they were not and cannot be said to have been extended any representation much less a promise to the writ petitioner of any kind extending to them any benefit for any Indefinite period. The said notification did not create any legal relationship between the Central Government and the writ petitioners from which they became entitled indefinitely to draw benefit supposed to be flowing from the said notification. Therefore, so-called cause of action about apprehended wrong or for that matter such apprehended wrong has become reality are wholly misconceived, no wrong was done by the Issue of the said two notifications, nothing was done nor can even be said to have been done by withdrawing those two notifications. The pretended grievance in this behalf is misconceived and wrong.
22. By the proposed amendments the writ petitioners and their supporters are seeking to introduce grievances about subsequent notification dated 1st November, 1999. The notification dated 1st November, 1999 was not (in fact could not be) subject matter of the original writ petition. Admittedly, the notification dated 1st November, 1999 expired and spent its force on and from 1st January. 2000 and does not survive today. The notification dated 1st November, 1999 was passed in lawful performance of executive duties and statutory powers by the Central Government. The aforesaid notification superseded the earlier notification dated 11th December, 1998.
23. It is now well settled law that in this situation, where the prayers sought for are futile and infructuous consequently no relief can be granted, proposed amendment should fall on this ground alone. The contention of the subsequent event is wholly misconceived. Under the guise of the subsequent event a new cause of action cannot be Introduced. In this connection they have sought reliance on a Judgment of the Supreme Court .
24. He contends that it will appear from the aforesaid Judgment that the right of the parties is determined by the facts as they existed on the date of an action is instituted. Moreover, it will appear from the act and conduct of the petitioners this belated amendment is wholly malafide inasmuch as the said notification was issued dated 1st November, 1999 and the writ petitioners allowed the period prescribed by the said notification to expire and no application for amendment was made. Now after more than 10 months the present application for amendment is taken out, the same is barred not only because of delay but by reason of the fact as the proposed amendment seeks to Introduce a futile, infructuous and malafide point.
25. Having heard the learned Advocates for the parties in this amendment application I am to consider whether I will decide the question of jurisdiction of this Court while determining the question of amendment or not.
26. The learned Advocates for all the parties have cited a number of decisions on the aforesaid point apparently both in favour and against the aforesaid proposition. After considering the principles laid down by the various Courts on this point and having considered the sequence of events of this case I think it fit question of jurisdiction at this stage need not be decided and the same should be decided at the time of hearing of this application on merit. Since the learned lawyers of both the parties have already addressed on the question of jurisdiction so I will not permit any of the learned lawyers or parties to address once again on this question. The reasons for not deciding the question of jurisdiction while deciding the question of amendment are as follows:--
27. Firstly, on factual and legal aspect of this particular matter it appears to me that by my order dated 10th August, 2000 I decided to hear out the writ petition on merit treating the application of added parties and/ or intervenors as an affidavit-in-opposition. In fact pursuant to the aforesaid order the writ petition itself was being heard on merit as well as on question of jurisdiction. However, previous thereto there arc several orders passed by the learned single Judges as well as the Division Bench and it was by necessary implication, decided that this application should be heard on merit and on the question of jurisdiction altogether.
28. Secondly, in this case I do not find it is a case of inherent lack of jurisdiction so much so the issue of jurisdiction needs decision before deciding the amendment application. At the highest it is a case of lack of territorial jurisdiction on the given allegation and averment of jurisdictional fact in the writ petition.
29. Mr. M.K. Banerjee, learned Senior Advocate and Mr. Kapoor, learned Senior Advocate want me to decide the question of jurisdiction right now on reliance of decisions of this Court , , and 1983 (2) CLJ 44.
30. In the decision Justice Anil Kumar Sen (as His Lordship then was) speaking for Division Bench held on the question of amendment that where the Court inherently lacks jurisdiction the Court has no authority either to allow or reject amendment. In the case above it was a case of inherent tack of territorial jurisdiction as the subject matter of the suit related to immovable property (Wakf) which situated outside the territorial limit of the Court.
31. The case, , was decided by a learned single Judge of this Court. The decision on the question of amendment in the reported case was rendered apparently following earlier Division Bench judgment . With great respect to the learned Single Judge the correct ratio laid down by the Division Bench was not followed as the learned single Judge has omitted to record that Division Bench held where the Court Inherently lacks jurisdiction either pecuniary or territorial it cannot grant any amendment of the plaint to bring the case within its jurisdiction.
32. The decision of the learned single Judge of this Court has rather observed, following the earlier decision of this Court and a decision of Bombay High Court that It is permissible for the Court to allow amendment of the jurisdictional fact which was lacking originally. In other words, if the plaint did not disclose that the Court had jurisdiction the plaintiff was entitled to show other that It had jurisdiction. I respectfully accepting observation of the learned single Judge, Justice C.K. Banerji hold that the Court can entertain an application for amendment of the plaint in order to incorporate the jurisdictional fact provided reading as a whole of the plaint and the proposed amendment Court finds that it does not lack inherent jurisdiction, then it obviously follows logically in order to decide this amendment application the Court will not decide the question of jurisdiction at the first instance. The Court will examine whether by amendment the jurisdictional fact has been brought or not, otherwise if the amendment application is rejected on the ground that the Court has no jurisdiction as the plaint does not disclose jurisdictional fact though actually the Court doth have, then on the technical ground the suit and/or lis might be dismissed, but the controversy would not be set at rest and in that case the plaintiff will be driven to fresh action on the self same fact and before the same Court because the suitor would have no option but to approach again. This can be avoided if the amendment application is entertained allowing the plaintiff to bring jurisdictional fact that was originally left out. This can be done when there exists an accidental omission.
33. There are large number of decisions of various High Courts cited by Dr. Singhvi, learned Advocate General and Mr. Mitra (. , AIR 1953 Hyd. 212, , AIR 1949 Mad. 208, , AIR 1982 Ker 28, AIR 1969 N 75, , .) which have laid down consistently that the Court can allow amendment in order to oust its territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction after doing so. It would return the plaint to appropriate court. But in my view the aforesaid principle of law is not applicable in each and every case. The Court cannot pass any order of amendment ousting its inherent jurisdiction. For instance, if it is a suit for land and the same situates wholly within the territorial limit of a particular Court subject to pecuniary jurisdiction then that Court alone is competent to entertain the suit and/ or lis and no other Court, and in that case it would be absurd to allow amendment seeking to oust the jurisdiction. However, this principle do not lend any assistance in this case as the issue here is whether the Court not having jurisdictional fact, can entertain any application for amendment of the pleading and further allow to bring the case within Jurisdiction.
34. Now I shall examine the case should the amendment be allowed either to incorporate jurisdictional fact or new cause of action on subsequent event in this case?
35. The object of the legislature empowering the Court to allow amendment of the pleading is for the purpose of determining the real question in controversy between the parties which are to be felt necessary by the Court. This will appear from the language of Order 6 Rule 17 of the Civil Procedure Code (since this Court has adopted under the Rule 53 relating to constitutional matter, the provision of Civil Procedure Code as far as possible).
Order 6 Rule 17 : "The Court may at any stage of the proceedings allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings in such manner and on such forms as may be just, and all such amendments shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties."
36. Such questions obviously must have nexus and/or relation with the controversy arose at the time of filing of the suit. Therefore in order to decide this question, to my mind, the duty of the Court is to examine what is controversy between the parties highlighted in the original pleading. Questions in relation to different controversy between the same parties cannot be brought into one litigation that will result in jumbling of the controversies which may lead to confusion to the Court.
37. All the decisions cited as above at the bar in support of amendment of new cause of action or subsequent event are in my view repetition and reiteration of the same principle and I cannot quarrel with them. The question is applicability of the aforesaid principle in this case. So I examine the scope of the writ petition filed in this case without looking into the other averments made in number of interlocutory applications taken out by both the parties.
38. Upon careful perusal of the writ petition and the prayers made thereunder the basic grievance and/or cause of action in the writ petition is that the Designated Authority had not disposed of the second application made by Essar Steels Ltd. and Steel Authority of India Ltd. (who are the supporting respondents, not even by the petitioners herein) for imposition of anti dumping duty in accordance with law and on merit resulting dumping of imported materials were allowed to be perpetrated with Impunity. Though such application was disposed of, and according to the writ petitioner, the same was done without considering the merit, so the petitioners have grievance.
39. To make the aforesaid summarized case of the writ petition explicit, reproduction of a few paragraphs of the writ petition would be sufficient.
"By a communication dated 8th February, 1999 bearing No.9 (i)/99-DGAD, it was, Inter alia, Informed by the concerned respondents as follows:
The petition has been carefully examined and it is regretted that it is not possible to initiate anti-dumping proceedings as mentioned above, since at present, there is a floor price in operation for imports of Hot Rolled Coils, Strips, Sheets and Plates imported into India at USD302 PMT with effect from December, 1998. At the current level of floor price, the domestic industry would not suffer any Injury. In case, the circumstances change in future, a fresh petition may be submitted for consideration on merits. A copy of the said letter/order dated 8th February 1999 is annexed hereto and marked 'B'. (para 25) Your petitioners state that the entire subject-matter of the said communication dated 8th February, 1999, is based on the assumption that since the notifications dated 10th and 11th December, 1998, issued under section 5 of the Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act. 1992 Inter alia provide a price mechanism in the style of floor price for import of HRC/strips/sheets/plates, the domestic Industry therefore would not suffer any Injury and such being the case, under the changing circumstances in future, the petitioners may submit a fresh petition which would be considered at that point of time on merits, (para 27) By virtue of the aforesaid communication dated 8th February, 1999 the concerned respondents not only allowed the countries mentioned in the second anti-dumping petition to go scott free inspite of instances of dumping of the said items of import, but in the near future if the aforesaid notifications are modified to the detriment of your petitioners and/or withdrawn, your petitioners will be exposed to the high risk of anti-dumping of the said items once again and before anti-dumping duties are Imposed again a considerable passage of time will pass causing Irreparable loss and injury to the petitioners." (para 29)
40. Dr. Singhvi, learned Advocate General and Mr. Jayanta Mitra, Senior Counsel contend in chorus that apart from the aforesaid grievance there is another grievance which is Interconnected and inextricably linked with non-disposal of second anti-dumping petition, that the petitioner and supporting respondents were seriously and genuinely apprehending that the notification by which floor price of H.R. Coils of 302 dollars per Metric Ton would very soon be withdrawn and/or further notification would be Issued reducing the floor price. The reason for non-disposing of the antidumping petition on merit was that there did exist floor price of 302 US Dollars per metric tonnes for H.R. Coils. If the reason and/or basis is withdrawn then the petitioners and the supporting respondents would suffer serious injury as the entire steel industries would be facing inevitable closure. So, according to them, maintenance of floor price of 302 US dollars per metric tonnes for H.R. Coils is also another substantive case and/or prayer in the present writ petition.
41. The face value of this argument is attractive to grant amendment, as the established principle of law, on the question of amendment encourage the Court to allow amendment liberally. But upon careful examination of averment of writ petition and reliefs claimed therein I find the case of floor price is not the controversy between the parties nor the same can be any question to the controversy, the same is at the highest an ancillary grievance. In this case at the highest the writ petitioner if at all, can get relief for direction upon the Designated Authority to dispose of the second anti-dumping petition in accordance with law on merit as it requires under the Rules, and by holding an enquiry after having got, the communication refusing to decide the application set aside. For the purpose of granting this relief It is difficult for the Court to pass any order for maintaining floor price. This finding, however, of course is my tentative and for taking a decision on this amendment application. It would be open for the parties to argue at length when the writ petition would be decided finally.
42. So, I hold that the petitioner's case of apprehended injury has nothing to do with the controversy in the writ petition. Though it may be some extent repetition, the controversy between the parties, is as to whether the Designated Authority should have disposed of this second anti-dumping petition otherwise than the way and in the manner it has been decided by the impugned letter, or not. This is also admitted by the petitioners elaborately in paragraph 3 of the amendment application.
43. For the purpose of deciding the aforesaid question maintenance of floor price is not necessary and it cannot be a question in relation to controversy in the writ petition. The maintenance of floor price may or may not be a piece of evidence and/or rather admission on part of the Government that anti-dumping petition needs to be decided in favour of the applicants. This question may be a relevant factor before the Designated Authority who decides the application for imposition of anti-dumping duty. So I hold that the so-called petitioner's 'a quia timet' action is absolutely misplaced here.
44. By the proposed amendment the writ petitioner wants to challenge notificated dated 1.11.1999 being No.31 (RE-99) 1997-2002 by which the floor price of H.R. Coil was reduced from US D 302 per Metric Tonnes and then withdrawn altogether. The whole grievance of the petitioner is that the floor price should not have been withdrawn at all keeping this second anti-dumping petition undisposed on merit. This case has been termed to be a subsequent event and/or a new cause of action in order to bring within the scope of controversy between the parties. I observed above subsequent event must have a relation and/or nexus with the controversy which existed at the time of filing of the lis. The controversy herein as indicated above relates to non-disposal of the second antidumping petition by the Designated Authority in accordance with law. No. case has been made out as a subsequent event and/or new cause of action in relation to disposal or non-disposal of the second antidumping petition. All the decisions cited at Bar for amendment on subsequent event or for new cause of action are not thus applicable here and the same are distinguishable.
45. Initially the Court's approach was that while deciding the question of amendment the Court will not see as to whether the proposed case made out can be granted finally or not, this would be decided at the time of final hearing treating that the case made out prima facie is entertainable. But Justice P.N. Bhagwati speaking for the Bench in the Supreme Court decision held amongst other when a claim is futile and infractuous there is no point to entertain such a case. In the case , Supreme Court held amongst other two propositions were laid down. Firstly it was held it is basic to our processual jurisprudence that right to relief must be judged to exist as on the date a suit for institutes legal proceedings. This is an emphatic statement that the right of a party is determined by the facts as they exists as on the date the action is instituted. Granting the presence of such facts, then he is entitled to Its enforcement.
46. I wish to extend this theory at the time of amendment as well, for the simple reason what cannot be entertained at the initial stage, cannot be done by amendment. Therefore test would be whether lis could have been entertained at the initial stage having gone through prima facie value of the averment or not. In my view case made out in the proposed amendment does not disclose subsisting right in order to maintain a writ petition. Maintaining of floor price by the respondent authority cannot be any legal right nor any promise not to speak of any fundamental right. So unless the petitioner makes out such a case the writ petition cannot be entertained.
If no case being made out it cannot be said to be any cause of action having been disclosed so as to bring within the purview of amendment by way of Insertion of new cause of action or for that matter a subsequent event. Even the case sought to be brought by amendment has become infractuous and futile as the effect of impugned notification has come to an end because of efflux of time. Therefore the cases cited in support of the subsequent event or bringing new cause of action are absolutely inappropriate here as there is no prima facie entertainable case. Therefore I do not find any merit on this amendment application.
47. Moreover I find this application is wholly rnalaflde and this has been taken out at a stage when the hearing of the writ petition was being taken up. It is not that the so-called subsequent event was not within the knowledge of the writ petitioner and this has occurred as far back as in November 1999. This could have been brought at that stage but it was not done so rather an application for interim relief was made after the aforesaid notification was issued, for maintaining floor price of 302 US dollars per Metric Tonne for H.R. Coils. Had there been any genuine grievance of the petitioners they could have got It Incorporated by way of amendment at that stage, this suggests that this is not the grievance of the petitioner canvassed in the writ petition. According to me this is abuse of process of the Court and it was resorted to aiming at prevent the matter being disposed of finally. So this application is bound to be and is hereby dismissed with costs assessed at 500 Cms. to be paid to the respondent Union of India 300 Cms., and 100 Cms. to each of the added respondents and/or intervenors.
48. Now I take up the application for addition of party taken out by the Union of India. C.A.N. No. 8730 of 2000.
49. Mr. P.K. Mallick, learned Senior Advocate appearing in support of this application contends that the workers are part and parcel of the industry concerned since their bread and butter will depend on the fate of this writ petition and their rights are also seriously affected. So they have some say in this matter. The decision of the application for imposition of anti-dumping duty very much concern survival of the steel Industry consequently their employment. This application is supported by the supporting respondents and the writ petitioner, however it is opposed by the Union of India and other added respondents and/or intervenors. They contend that this Union has been set up by the petitioner and supporting respondents at the last stage and this is another device engineered by them to stall the hearing of the writ petition on merit.
50. Having heard the contentions of the learned Advocate I am to examine in order to grant relief on this application, whether the Union should be added as a party respondents or not. It is settled law under Order 1 Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Code a person or persons can he added when the Court will find the name of such person should have been joined and/or whose presence before the Court is required for effective and complete adjudication upon and/or settled all the questions Involved in the suit.
51. It is not the case of affectation of interest and/or right but it is a case of effective and complete adjudication of the issues Involved in the lis. I have observed in the amendment application that the issue and/or controversy between the parties is whether the second anti-dumping petition has been decided in accordance with taw or not. The existence and/or survival of the writ petitioners and/or the steel industry will depend upon the decision of the Designated Authority (judged by the extreme case of the writ petitioners) not by this Court. In this case the workers are not the applicant for Imposition of anti-dumping duty. So they cannot have any say in the writ petition nor I do think their right is affected thereby.
Accordingly, the application is dismissed.
There will be no order as to costs.
52. Application dismissed