Allahabad High Court
State Of U.P. vs Amit Sachan on 29 November, 2019
Author: Pritinker Diwaker
Bench: Pritinker Diwaker, Raj Beer Singh
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
Court No. 48
Government Appeal No. 202 of 2019
State of Uttar Pradesh ------- Appellant
Vs.
Amit Sachan ------ Accused-Respondent
For Appellant : Sri J.K. Upadhyay, A.G.A.
For Respondent-Accused : None
Hon'ble Pritinker Diwaker, J.
Hon'ble Raj Beer Singh, J.
(Per: Raj Beer Singh, J)
1. The present government appeal arises out of impugned judgement and order dated 04.02.2019 passed by XIX learned Additional Sessions Judge, Kanpur Nagar in Session Trial No. 84 of 2018, under Sections 376, 504, 506 IPC and Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, P.S. Barra, District Kanpur Nagar, whereby accused-respondent Amit Sachan has been acquitted of charge under Sections 376, 504, 506 IPC and Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act.
2. According to prosecution version, after her M.C.A. Education, complainant (prosecutrix) Alpana was doing her job in Delhi and in the year 2015, she came into contact with accused-respondent Amit Sachan by way of internet. Accused-respondent told her that he is M.B.A. and was serving in F.G.B. Bank in Dubai and expressed his desire to marry with her. Complainant's parents went to the parental house of accused-respondent and made proposal of marriage of their daughter Alpana with accused-respondent, but parents of accused-respondent told them that if they would give a Swift Dzire car and a flat in Kanpur City, only then marriage would be solemnized. Complainant's parents have agreed their demand and told that they would fulfil the demand after selling their flat. After that complainant's mother-in-law came in Delhi and resided with her for one week. On 15.11.2015, Tilak Ceremony has taken place. Accused-respondent started making pressure for money to purchase car and for that complainant's father and maternal uncle have given Rs. 7 lacs to accused-respondent and his parents, by which accused-respondent has purchased a car and date of marriage was fixed for 02.04.2016. Due to pressure of family members of accused-respondent, complainant has even left her job and started living with family members of accused-respondent in a rented premises at Hardev Nagar, Kanpur. It was alleged that whenever accused-respondent used to visit there, he established physical relation with the complainant. Accused-respondent and his family members got postponed the date of marriage and they started making pressure on her that she must sell her house situated at Navbasta, Kanpur Nagar. They also started harassing her physically and mentally and car purchased from the money given by her parents, was also taken away by them. It was alleged that accused-respondent and his family members have misappropriated the car and other articles worth Rs. 10 lacs and refused for marriage. As per complainant, accused-respondent has committed rape upon her on the pretext of marriage and also harassed and threatened her.
3. On the basis of written complaint of complainant, case was registered on 13.08.2016, under Sections 498-A, 376, 504, 506 IPC read with Section 3/4 of D.P. Act against accused-respondent Amit Sachan and his seven family members.
4. Perusal of record shows that after investigation, a charge-sheet was filed against accused-respondent Amit Sachan and seven of his family members, however, the concerned Magistrate has committed the case to the court of sessions for trial, only in respect of accused-respondent.
5. Trial court framed charge under Sections 376, 504, 506 of IPC and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act against accused-respondent. Accused-respondent pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.
6. In order to bring home the guilt of accused-respondent, prosecution has examined five witnesses. Accused-respondent was examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C., wherein he denied prosecution evidence and claimed false implication. In defence, accused-respondent Amit Sachan has got examined himself as DW-1.
7. After hearing and analysing the evidence on record, accused-respondent was acquitted under Sections 376, 504, 506 of IPC and Section 3/4 of D.P.Act., vide impugned judgment and order dated 04.02.2019, which is being impugned by State in the instant government appeal.
8. We have heard Sri J.K. Upadhyay, learned State Counsel for appellant. None has appeared on behalf of the accused-respondent.
9. It has been argued by learned State Counsel that evidence of prosecutrix is quite clear and cogent that on the pretext of marriage, she was subjected to rape by accused-respondent Amit Sachan and that she was also harassed for dowry. Version of PW-1 Alpana (prosecutrix) is supported by her father PW-2 Raj Kishore Katiyar and PW-4 Pushplata Katiyar, who is mother of the prosecutrix. Prosecution version is further supported by PW-5 Mini Katiyar, who is cousin of prosecutrix. It was submitted that there are no reasons to disbelieve the testimony of above-stated witnesses and that accused-respondent has been acquitted on the basis of surmises and conjectures. It was argued that prosecution has been able to prove its case beyond doubt, but learned trial court has not appreciated the evidence in its correct perspective and committed error by acquitting accused-respondent Amit Sachan.
10. We have considered submissions of learned counsel for the appellant and perused the record.
11. It is an appeal against the order of acquittal. It is well settled that while exercising the powers in appeal against the order of acquittal, the Court of appeal would not ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal unless the approach of the lower Court is vitiated by some manifest illegality and the conclusion arrived at would not be arrived at by any reasonable person and, therefore, the decision is to be characterized as perverse. Merely because two views are possible, the Court of appeal would not take the view which would upset the judgment delivered by the Court below. However, the appellate Court has a power to review the evidence if it is of the view that the conclusion arrived at by the Court below is perverse and the Court has committed a manifest error of law and ignored the material evidence on record. A duty is cast upon the appellate Court, in such circumstances, to reappreciate the evidence to arrive to a just decision on the basis of material placed on record to find out whether any of the accused is connected with the commission of the crime he is charged with.
12. The principles which would govern and regulate the hearing of appeal by this Court against an order of acquittal passed by the trial Court, have been very succinctly explained by the Apex Court in a catena of decisions. In the case of M.S. Narayana Menon @ Mani Vs. State of Kerala & Anr, reported in (2006) 6 S.C.C. 39, the Apex Court has narrated about the powers of the High Court in appeal against the order of acquittal. In para 54 of the decision, the Apex Court has observed as under:
"In any event the High Court entertained an appeal treating to be an appeal against acquittal, it was in fact exercising the revisional jurisdiction. Even while exercising an appellate power against a judgement of acquittal, the High Court should have borne in mind the well settled principles of law that where two view are possible, the appellate Court should not interfere with the finding of acquittal recorded by the Court below."
13. In the case of Chandrappa Vs. State of Karnataka reported in (2007) 4 S.C.C. 415, the Apex Court laid down following principles;
"42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge:
[1] An appellate Court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.
[2] The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.
[3] Various expressions, such as, "substantial and compelling reasons", "good and sufficient grounds", "very strong circumstances", "distorted conclusions", "glaring mistakes", etc. are not intended to curtain extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of "flourishes of language" to emphasis the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.
[4] An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court.
[5] If two reasonable conclusions are possible on thebasis of the evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court."
14. In case of Mookkiah and Anr. Vs. State, rep. by the Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu, reported in AIR 2013 SC 321, the Apex Court in para 4 has held as under:
"4. It is not in dispute that the trial Court, on appreciation of oral and documentary evidence led in by the prosecution and defence, acquitted the accused in respect of the charges leveled against them. On appeal by the State, the High Court, by impugned order, reversed the said decision and convicted the accused under Section 302 read with Section 34 of IPC and awarded RI for life. Since counsel for the appellants very much emphasized that the High Court has exceeded its jurisdiction in upsetting the order of acquittal into conviction, let us analyze the scope and power of the High Court in an appeal filed against the order of acquittal. This Court in a series of decisions has repeatedly laid down that as the first appellate court the High Court, even while dealing with an appeal against acquittal, was also entitled, and obliged as well, to scan through and if need be re-appreciate the entire evidence, though while choosing to interfere only the court should find an absolute assurance of the guilt on the basis of the evidence on record and not merely because the High Court could take one more possible or a different view only. Except the above, where the matter of the extent and depth of consideration of the appeal is concerned, no distinctions or differences in approach are envisaged in dealing with an appeal as such merely because one was against conviction or the other against an acquittal. [Vide State of Rajasthan vs. Sohan Lal and Others, (2004) 5 SCC 573]"
15. It is also a settled legal position that in acquittal appeal, the appellate Court is not required to rewrite the judgement or to give fresh reasonings, when the reasons assigned by the Court below are found to be just and proper. Such principle is laid down by the Apex Court in the case of State of Karnataka Vs. Hemareddy, reported in AIR 1981, SC 1417, wherein it is held as under:
"... This Court has observed in Girija Nandini Devi V. Bigendra Nandini Choudhary (1967) 1 SCR 93:(AIR 1967 SC 1124) that it is not the duty of the Appellate Court on the evidence to repeat the narration of the evidence or to reiterate the reasons given by the trial Court expression of general agreement with the reasons given by the Court the decision of which is under appeal, will ordinarily suffice."
16. Thus, it is a settled principle that while exercising appellate power, even if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court. Similar principle has been laid down by the Apex Court in the cases of State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Ram Veer Singh & Ors reported in 2007 A.I.R. S.C.W. 5553 and in Girja Prasad (Dead) by LRs Vs. State of MP reported in 2007 A.I.R. S.C.W. 5589. Thus, the powers, which this Court may exercise against an order of acquittal, are well settled. In case, the Appellate Court agrees with the reasons and the opinion given by the lower Court, then the discussion of evidence is not necessary. In this regard the decision of Apex Court in Vinod Kumar Vs. State of Haryana, AIR 2015 SC 1032 and Gulbar Husain Vs. State of Assam, 2015 (11) SCC 242 may be referred.
17. In the instant case, perusal of record shows that prosecutrix PW-1 Alpana has, inter alia, alleged that she and accused-respondent Amit Sachan were having love affair and their engagement has taken place on 15.11.2015. Her parents have presented a swift dzire car to accused-respondent and cash of Rs. 1 lac as well as chain, ring and golden ginni were given in engagement. After that, parents of accused-respondent have resided with her in Delhi and date of marriage was fixed for 02.04.2016, but accused-respondent has made a telephonic call from Dubai and asked her to pursue the matter of her house at Kanpur Nagar and that on his insistence, she has left her job. In January, 2016, parents of accused-respondent asked to defer marriage by telling that accused-respondent would not get leave on alleged date i.e. 02.04.2016. In February, 2016, accused-respondent came from Dubai and he along with his family members started living in a rented premises at House No. 123-A Hardev Nagar, Kanpur. On 13.03.2016, accused-respondent has brought prosecutrix to Kanpur in said rented house, where his parents were also residing and prosecutrix has resided there till 12.04.2016. During that period, on one day while she was sleeping in her room, accused-respondent has forcibly committed rape upon her. Prosecutrix has further stated that when she has told this incident to his mother and sister-in-law (bhabhi), they told that now, she (prosecutrix) and Amit Sachan are wife and husband and they asked not to disclose this incident to anyone.
In her cross-examination, she has stated that she came into touch with accused-respondent Amit Sachan through facebook and they also used to chat on facebook and whatsapp. She has also admitted that by way of chatting on facebook, she fell in love with accused-respondent and as she was having confidence in accused-respondent, she has sent her family members to house of accused-respondent for making proposal of her marriage. She has stated that she does not know that who is owner of alleged house i.e. house no. 123-A Hardev Nagar, Kanpur. After 10-15 days of 'godbharai' ceremony, accused-respondent has gone to Dubai and he has returned back in February, 2016. She has further stated that accused-respondent has refused for marriage with her. She has denied the suggestion that she was having any relationship with one Shubham and that accused-respondent has broken promise of marriage due to that reason. She has further denied the suggestion that she has learnt driving from said Shubham and that she has also gone to Nainital with him. However, she admitted that sometime she along with her family members used to go with Shubham. PW-1 has further stated that she has taken out print of chatting and facebook conversation from mobile number of accused-respondent with help of Global Printing and Internet Cafe, Gallamandi, Navbasta, Kanpur and the same were handed over to the Investigating Officer.
18. PW-2 Raj Kishore Katiyar, who is father of the prosecutrix, has inter alia, stated that after her M.C.A., while his daughter was doing job in Delhi, she came in contact with accused-respondent Amit Sachan through facebook and that he has asked his daughter to make a marriage proposal to his family members. Thereafter, PW-2 has made a proposal of marriage to the family members of the accused-respondent and he has given Rs. 7 lacs to them for purchasing a car and after that godbharai ceremony was solemnized and date of marriage was fixed for 02.04.2016. However, that date was deferred on the request of family members of accused-respondent. PW-2 further stated that between 14.03.2016 to 12.04.2016, accused-respondent has committed rape upon his daughter and she has told that fact to him. In his cross-examination, he stated that his daughter and accused-respondent used to live together and he was treating accused-respondent like his son-in-law. He further admitted that after 29.07.2016, accused-respondent was not in India.
19. PW-4 Pushplata Katiyar, who is mother of the victim, has also made similar statement to that of PW-2 Raj Kishore Katiyar.
20. In defence evidence, DW-1 Amit Sachan stated that he came into touch with the prosecutrix through her sister Sapna Katiyar and they used to chat with each other. He stated that alleged Sapna Katiyar has made a proposal of marriage of her sister (Alpana Sachan) to him and after that, her family members have also made talk in this regard. Meanwhile, accused-respondent and prosecutrix also started chatting with each other on whatsapp. On demand of Alpana, he has given two diamonds rings in ring ceremony. As it was going to be a love marriage, thus, there was no question of dowry. Prosecutrix has made shopping of jewellery and clothes and payment was made by accused-respondent and she has also taken his debit card and withdrawn Rs. 25,000/- from the same. After that he has closed that debit card. Swift dzire car was booked by him on 01.11.2015, while he was in Dubai and after that delivery of said car has taken place on 09.11.2015 and payment of Rs. 7 lacs was made by him by withdrawing same from his account and after that he has again gone back to Dubai. Date of marriage was fixed for 22.02.2016 and he has returned back to India on 7-8 February, 2016, but prosecutrix and her family members have refused for marriage and instead they have asked for court marriage. When accused-respondent has refused for court marriage, the date of marriage was fixed for 02.04.2016, but family members of prosecutrix have refused for marriage and accordingly, on 12.04.2016, he has gone back to Dubai. After that he and prosecutrix have taken a premises on rent at Hardev Nagar, Kanpur and there his cousin Shubham used to visit continuously. Prosecutrix has developed intimacy with said Shubham and she has gone for tour with him. She also used to visit her earlier boy friends Saurabh and one Parvin Awasthi. He as well as his parents were also called at said house at Hardev Nagar, Kanpur. He has further stated that in May, 2016, prosecutrix has gone for tour with her friend and when accused-respondent objected, an altercation took place between them and she asked for Rs. 15 lacs, which were lying in his bank account. On 02.07.2016, he has sent Rs. 10,000/- to her through express money and when demand of Rs. 15 lacs was not fulfilled, she has lodged this false case.
21. It is apparent from the record that accused-respondent Amit Sachan and prosecutrix Alpana were in touch with each other and that talk of marriage between them has also taken place and even the date of marriage was fixed. However, the marriage could not take place between them. The case of accused-respondent is that prosecutrix has developed intimacy with his cousin Shubham Sachan and that she also used to visit her other boy friends and she has also gone a tour with said Shubham. Prosecutrix has not mentioned any time, date and place of alleged incident of rape. Her version is that on 13.03.2016, she came at rented house of accused-respondent Amit Sachan in Kanpur and she remained there till 12.04.2016 along with accused-respondent and his family members and that during that period, one day accused-respondent has committed rape upon her. However, she has not lodged any complaint at that time. Her version that she has told this incident to his mother and sister-in-law (bhabhi) does not appear reliable. Here, it has to be kept in mind that prosecutrix is a major and educated lady and as per her own version, she is a M.C.A. and has done job at several companies. It would also be relevant to mention here that in her statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C., she has alleged that on one night, accused-respondent has committed rape upon her, while she was sleeping, whereas as per statement in court, alleged incident took place during day time. In her statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C, she alleged that after that incident also, accused-respondent has subjected her to rape for several times, but in court statement, she has not made any such cogent statement. It has been found by learned trial court that after alleged incident, she remained in touch with accused-respondent regarding expenses. Learned trial court has also found that prosecutrix has refused to undergo any medical examination. It was also found from record of alleged chatting between them that the allegation of prosecutrix that accused-respondent and his family members have harassed her, is not established. So far as purchase of alleged car is concerned, learned trial court has found that on 09.11.2015, accused-respondent has withdrawn Rs. 7 lacs by way of cheque and on the same day, delivery of car was taken, thus, version of accused-respondent, that he has purchased the alleged car by withdrawing amount from his account, appears to be cogent. Here, it may be relevant to mention that in FIR, it was alleged that she and accused-respondent remained together and they have maintained physical relationship. In later part of FIR, she has alleged that accused-respondent has subjected her to rape on the pretext of marriage, whereas in her statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C., she developed an entirely new version that on one night, accused-respondent has committed rape, while she was sleeping. During her statement in court, she again changed her version and stated that on one day, accused-respondent has committed rape upon her, while she was sleeping in her room. In her statement in court, she has alleged that she was subjected to forcible sexual intercourse by accused-respondent during day time, but this version contradicts her earlier version made in FIR and statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C.
22. In the case of Anurag Soni v State of Chhattisgarh reported in (2019) SCC Online SC 509 SC 509, it has been held by Honb'le Apex Court as under:
"37. The sum and substance of the aforesaid decisions would be that if it is established and proved that from the inception the accused who gave the promise to the prosecutrix to marry, did not have any intention to marry and the prosecutrix gave the consent for sexual intercourse on such an assurance by the accused that he would marry her, such a consent can be said to be a consent obtained on a misconception of fact as per Section 90 of the IPC and, in such a case, such a consent would not excuse the offender and such an offender can be said to have committed the rape as defined under Sections 375 of the IPC and can be convicted for the offence under Section 376 of the IPC."
Similar observations were made by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Deepak Gulati v State of Haryana reported in (2013) 7 SCC 675 as under:-
"21. ... There is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must examine whether there was made, at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused..."
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dr. Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State of Maharashtra and others, 2019(1) RCR (Criminal) 674, has observed as under:-
"20. Thus, there is a clear distinction between rape and consensual sex. The court, in such cases, must very carefully examine whether the complainant had actually wanted to marry the victim or had mala fide motives and had made a false promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the later falls within the ambit of cheating or deception. There is also a distinction between mere breach of a promise and not fulfilling a false promise. If the accused has not made the promise with the sole intention to seduce the prosecutrix to indulge in sexual acts, such an act would not amount to rape. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused and not solely on account of the misconception created by accused, or where an accused, on account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her despite having every intention to do. Such cases must be treated differently. If the complainant had any mala fide intention and if he had clandestine motives, it is a clear case of rape. The acknowledged consensual physical relationship between the parties would not constitute an offence under Section 376 of the IPC.
In the case of Deepak Gulati vs. State of Haryana reported in (2013) 7 SCC 675, it has been observed as under:-
"21. Consent may be express or implied, coerced or misguided, obtained willingly or through deceit. Consent is an act of reason, accompanied by deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance, the good and evil on each side. There is a clear distinction between rape and consensual sex and in a case like this, the court must very carefully examine whether the accused had actually wanted to marry the victim, or had mala fide motives, and had made a false promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls within the ambit of cheating or deception. There is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must examine whether there was made, at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused; and whether the consent involved was given after wholly understanding the nature and consequences of sexual indulgence. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused, and not solely on account of misrepresentation made to her by the accused, or where an accused on account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen, or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her, despite having every intention to do so. Such cases must be treated differently. An accused can be convicted for rape only if the court reaches a conclusion that the intention of the accused was mala fide, and that he had clandestine motives.
23. Averting to the facts of present case, it appears that statement of prosecutrix does not inspires confidence and is not worthy of credence. It is true that in a rape case, accused could be convicted on the sole testimony of prosecutrix, but for that her evidence must be capable of inspiring confidence in the mind of the court. If version given by prosecutrix is not supported by medical evidence and whole surrounding circumstances are highly improbable and belie the case set up by the prosecutrix, accused cannot be convicted on the sole testimony of prosecutrix. In the instant case as stated earlier, the prosecutrix has nowhere stated the exact date and time of alleged incident of rape and she stated that alleged incident took place between 13.03.2016 to 12.04.2016, whereas in FIR her version is that after their marriage was fixed, they have established physical relation, which implies that it was consensual. Further, in her statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C., she stated that alleged incident took place in night, whereas in her statement in court that alleged incident took place in day time. As noted earlier, her version is not supported by any medical evidence, as she refused to undergo medical examination. It is apparent from record that prosecutrix has not come up with a clear and cogent case that her consent was obtained on promise of marriage, rather in evidence her case is that she was subjected to forcible sexual intercourse. But this version is not consistent with FIR and her statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. Considering whole evidence, it cannot be ruled out that it was a case of mere breach of promise to marry.
Recently, Hon'ble Apex Court, in Criminal Appeal No. 1165 of 2019, Pramod Suryabhan Pawar vs. The State of Maharashtra & Anr., decided on 21.08.2019, held as under:
16. Where the promise to marry is false and the intention of the maker at the time of making the promise itself was not to abide by it but to deceive the woman to convince her to engage in sexual relations, there is a "misconception of fact" that vitiates the woman's "consent". On the other hand, a breach of a promise cannot be said to be a false promise. To establish a false promise, the maker of the promise should have had no intention of upholding his word at the time of giving it. The "consent" of a woman under Section 375 is vitiated on the ground of a "misconception of fact" where such misconception was the basis for her choosing to engage in the said act. In Deepak Gulati this Court observed:
"21. ... There is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must examine whether there was made, at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused; and whether the consent involved was given after wholly understanding the nature and consequences of sexual indulgence. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused, and not solely on account of misrepresentation made to her by the accused, or where an accused on account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen, or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her, despite having every intention to do so. Such cases must be treated differently.
24. In view of the aforesaid, the view taken by the learned trial court cannot be said to be perverse or against the provisions of law. Learned State Counsel has failed to point out any patent illegality or perversity in the findings so recorded in the impugned order and thus, no case for interference is made out. It is an established position of law that if the court below has taken a view, which is a possible view in a reasonable manner, then the same shall not be interfered with. After considering the entire evidence, it cannot be said that the view taken by the trial court is not a possible view or a feasible view that could be taken on the facts and evidence of the case. Moreover, no illegality or perversity has been pointed out in the impugned judgment.
25. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstance of the case, the application seeking leave to appeal is declined and, accordingly, the government appeal is dismissed.
Dated: 29.11.2019
Anand
(Raj Beer Singh) (Pritinker Diwaker)