Madras High Court
T.Krishnaraj vs The Land Commissioner on 18 March, 2010
Bench: D.Murugesan, M.Sathyanarayanan
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
DATED: 18.03.2010
CORAM
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE D.MURUGESAN
AND
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE M.SATHYANARAYANAN
W.P.No.18959 of 2000
and W.M.P.No.27475 of 2000
T.Krishnaraj .. Petitioner
Versus
1. The Land Commissioner,
(Land Reforms), Chennai.
2. The Assistant Commissioner
(Land Reforms), Villupuram.
3. Ramamurthy
4. P.Balu
5. P.Dayalan
6. The Tamilnadu Land Reforms
Appellate Tribunal, Santhome,
Chennai. .. Respondents
Petitions filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for issue of Writ of Certiorari to call for the records made in M.P.No.105 of 1998 and T.R.P.No.575 of 1991 dated 08.01.98 on the file of the Tamilnadu Land Reforms Special Appellate Tribunal, Chennai, and the orders made in M.P.Nos.21 and 22 of 1998 in T.R.P.No.575 of 1991 dated 13.03.1998 confirming the amendment to the final statement under Section 12(1) of the Act 1970 made in Notification issued by the second respondent in A2/MR-1/79.K., Cuddalore-17/70, published in Tamilnadu Govt. Gazette No.39-A dated 4.10.1989 and the final statement under Section 18(1) of the Act 1970 published in Notification in G.O.Ms.No.121, Revenue, dated 24.01.90 by the first respondent and published in Tamilnadu Government Gazette No.5E dated 7.2.1990 and quash the same.
For Petitioner : Mr.R.Krishnamoorthy,
Sr. Counsel, for
Mr.V.Ayyadurai.
For Respondents : Mrs.Malarvizhi Udayakumar
Spl. G.P. For RR1 & 2
* * * * *
O R D E R
(Made by D.Murugesan, J.) An extent of 19.26 acres of land in Ranganathapuram Village was purchased in the name of the petitioner by the mother, when he was minor, on 27.06.1973. That land was purchased from one Kondappa Naidu, who owned 49.61 acres of land and at the time when the lands were purchased, there were proceedings initiated and pending against the said Kondappa Naidu under the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Reduction & Ceiling) of Land Act (hereinafter called as 'the Act'), which came into force with effect from 15.02.1970. A draft notification was also issued under Section 10(1) on 05.03.1975, of course, against the erstwhile vendor. A final statement dated 13.08.1975 was also made under Section 12 of the Act.
2.Subsequently, one Kamalammal, who has also purchased certain extent of land from the very same Kondappa Naidu, filed a revision petition before the Commissioner and ultimately, the said revision petition was allowed. As far as the petitioner is concerned, a final statement under Section 18(1) was published on 04.10.1989, wherein 28 items out of 40 purchased by the petitioner, were included and declared as surplus.
3.On attaining majority, the petitioner had preferred a revision petition on 18.07.1990 in R.P.No.49 of 1990 before the Commissioner, which was dismissed. Thereafter, he filed a writ petition in W.P.No.15843 of 1990 questioning that order in the revision. While the writ petition was pending, the Land Reforms Special Appellate Tribunal was established and as a consequence, the writ petition was transferred to the said Tribunal and the same was re-numbered in T.R.P.No.575 of 1991.
4.For the completion of facts that followed after the revision petition was filed, we may also refer that the Chairman and the Member called for a report from the Assistant Commissioner in respect of the claim of the petitioner and such a report was filed on 19.05.1995, wherein it was stated that 9.60 acres were exemptible under Section 73 of the Act, 4 acres of the land were referred as 'Thope' and some of the lands sold even during the year 1969 were wrongly included in the holdings and that apart, lands not owned by the land holder had also been taken into account. With the said report, it was concluded that only 0.48 std. acres were alone surplus. Before the said report could be considered by the Special Tribunal and orders were to be passed, the Chairman retired and therefore, a further report was called for from the Assistant Commissioner concerned, who submitted his report dated 21.8.1997 giving a go-by to the earlier report and suggested the surplus of the land from the petitioner. Thereafter, the single Administrative Member of the Special Tribunal rejected the revision petition by order dated 08.01.1998 on the ground that the petitioner cannot claim exemption and the final order under Section 18(1) cannot be reopened as the petitioner did not file any objection to Section 18(1). A review application was also filed seeking for review of the said order and the same was also rejected. Questioning that order, the petitioner has also filed a Civil Revision Petition, which was disposed of on 31.08.2000 observing that the revision petition will not lie under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and the petitioner has to agitate the matter in the proper forum. That is how, the present writ petition came to be filed.
5.The petitioner questions the impugned order on very many grounds including the challenge to the reports, which formed the basis for rejection of the claim. Nevertheless, as the petitioner has questioned the impugned order passed by a single Administrative Member on the ground of want of jurisdiction, we only refer to the said submission.
6.The question, therefore, is whether a Single Administrative Member of the Special Tribunal would be entitled or competent to consider a revision petition and pass orders thereon and such orders could be sustained in the eye of law. To decide the said question, we may refer to some of the provisions of the Act. The Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act, 1961, was amended by a subsequent Amendment Act, which came into force with effect from 15.02.1970. Chapter X-A of the said Act relates to the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms Special Appellate Tribunal. Section 77-C relates to the Constitution of Special Appellate Tribunal, which consists of a Chairman, Vice-Chairman, a Judicial Member and an Administrative Member. It may be relevant to notice that the Chairman of the Tribunal must be a person who is or has been a Judge of a High Court and has, for at least two years, held the office of Vice-Chairman. Similarly, for the post of Vice-Chairman, the person is or has been or is qualified to be a Judge of a High Court or has been an officer of the Government not below the rank of Special Commissioner and Secretary to the State Government for a period of not less than two years and so on. As far as Judicial Member is concerned, again he must be or has been or is qualified to be a Judge of a High Court or has been the Secretary to Government, Law Department of the State Government for a period of not less than two years. The Chairman, Vice-Chairman as well as the Judicial Member have been purposely included in the said provision with obvious reason that the constitution of the Tribunal should have the representation of Chairman, Vice-Chairman and the Judicial Members having the judicial background. In addition to the above, an Administrative Member is also included, who has been an officer of the State Government not below the rank of Commissioner and Secretary to the State Government, who had put in service in the said capacity for a period not less than one year in the aggregate. Section 77-F of the Act relates to the procedure of the Special Appellate Tribunal. That provision enables the Tribunal to entertain an appeal or revision, as the case may be and pass orders. Sub-section (4) of Section 77-F reads thus:-
"(4) The function of the Special Appellate Tribunal may be exercised -
(i) by a Bench consisting of Chairman, Vice-Chairman and the other Member; or
(ii) by a Bench consisting of the Vice-Chairman and the other member constituted by the Chairman; or
(iii)by a single Member of the Special Appellate Tribunal nominated in this behalf by the Chairman in such cases as he deems fit."
7.In this context, we may also refer to the proviso to the said section, which contemplates that if any case which comes up before a single Member (who is not the Chairman) or a Bench (of which the Chairman is not a Member) involves a question of law, such single Member or Bench may, in his or its discretion reserve such case for decision by a Bench of which the Chairman shall be a Member. A careful reading of the said provision shows that the appeal or the revision could be heard by the Chairman, Vice-Chairman and the Members and in some cases, the Chairman and the Members or the Vice-Chairman and the Members. However, the question of consideration of any appeal or revision by a single Member, that too an Administrative Member is possible only when nomination is made by the Chairman in this regard. This view is further strengthened in view of the proviso, where when a matter involves question of law, then the matter could be heard only by the Bench of which Chairman shall be a Member. There is a purpose in this restriction for a single Member to hear the matter, as the single Member is only an Administrative Member of the Special Appellate Tribunal, who has functioned as Commissioner and Secretary for a period not less than one year in aggregate.
8.For an effective disposal of a revision petition or an appeal, as the case may be, the constitution of Full Member of the Tribunal is always advisable; but only in cases where it is not possible, then the other mode of nomination of a single Member may be available to the Chairman. The very purpose of the constitution of Special Appellate Tribunal consisting of the persons, who are either serving as a Judge of the High Court or had been a Judge or a person be entitled to be appointed as a Judge, would be for dealing with matters like this, particularly relating to the property of individuals.
9.In this context, we may refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Shri Amulya Chandra Kalita v. Union of India & Others (JT 1990 (1) S.C. 558). In that case, the Supreme Court was considering the provision of Sections 4, 5(1) and 5(2) of the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985. Section 5 also contemplates in sub-section (4) authorising the Chairman or the Vice-Chairman, as the case may be, to discharge the function of an Administrative Member. While considering the said provision, the Apex Court had referred to its earlier judgment rendered in S.P.Sampath Kumar & Others v. Union of India, 1987 (1) SCC 125 and in paragraph 5 of the said judgment, it has been observed as follows:-
"It is necessary to bear in mind that service matters which are removed from the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution and entrusted to the Administrative Tribunal set up under the impugned set of adjudication involves questions of interpretation and applicability of Articles 14, 15, 16 and 311 in quite a large number of cases. These questions required for their determination not only judicial approach but also knowledge and expertise in this particular branch of constitutional law. It is necessary that those who adjudicate upon these questions should have some modicum of legal training and judicial experience because we find that some of those questions are so difficult and complex that they baffle the minds of even trained judges in the High Courts and the Supreme Court. That is why at the time of the preliminary hearing of these writ petitions we insisted that every bench of the Administrative Tribunal should consist of the judicial member and one administrative member and there should be no preponderance of administrative members on any bench. Of course, the presence of the administrative member would provide input of practical experience in the functioning of the services and add to the efficiency of the Administrative Tribunal but the legal input would undeniably be more important and sacrificing the legal input or not giving in sufficient weightage would definitely impair the efficacy and effectiveness of the Administrative Tribunal as compared to the High Court."
Of course, the Supreme Court had also observed that if any provision under the act contemplates for a single Administrative Member also to hear and dispose of matters even without reference to the nomination of the Chairman, that could be possible and not otherwise. Insofar as the present provision in question is concerned, it is similar to Section 5 of the Central Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985. In fact, the said judgment in Shri Amulya Chandra Kalita's case (JT 1990 (1) S.C. 558), referred supra, was again quoted with approval by the Supreme Court subsequently in Government of Tamil Nadu and others v. S. Balasubramaniam and others, (1995) 6 SCC 642. In paragraph 14 of the said judgment, the Apex Court had observed as follows:-
"14.Before we conclude, we would like to mention that all these matters have been heard by the Vice-Chairman of the Tribunal sitting singly. The Vice-Chairman of the Tribunal was an Administrative Member. In Amulya Chandra Kalita v. Union of India, (1991) 1 SCC 181, a two-Judge Bench of this Court, having regard to Section 5(2) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, has held that an Administrative Member alone cannot decide a case and the Bench must also have a Judicial Mamber. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Mahabal Ram (Director) v. Indian Council of Agricultural Research, (1994) 2 SCC 401 keeping in view the provisions of Sections 5(2) and 5(6) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 has held that the expression "Single Member" in Section 5(6) means Judicial as well as Administrative Member. The Court has directed that the Chairman should keep in view the nature of the litigation and where questions of law and/or interpretation of constitutional provisions are involved, they should not be assigned to a Single Member. The Court has, however, pointed out that the vires of Section 5(6) was not under challenge before the Court. In Union of India v. Tushare Ranjan Mohanty, (1994) 5 SCC 450 the Court has taken note of both these decisions and has referred the matter to be heard by a Bench of three Judges since the validity of sub-section (6) of Section 5 was challenged in the said case. It is not clear as to what directions had been given by the Chairman of the Tribunal in the matter of listing the cases before a Single Member. Since the question as to the validity of a statutory rule made under Article 309 of the Constitution was raised in the present case, we are of the view that it should have been heard by a Bench having two Members."
From the above paragraphs, it would be very clear that wherever there is a power for the Single Administrative Member to discharge the function of considering and disposing of appeals and revisions and such power could be exercised only after the nomination or assignment from the Chairman, he could not exercise such power as he would not have any jurisdiction.
10.In the above backdrop of the law laid down by the Apex Court, the facts of the present case must be considered. There is no dispute that after the constitution of the Special Appellate Tribunal, it consisted of Chairman as well as the Administrative Member. However, the Chairman had retired on 30.01.1996. After his retirement, there was no appointment of a Chairman or a Vice-Chairman, as the case may be and only the Administrative Member was available. It is not brought to our notice that even before the retirement, the Chairman had nominated the Single Administrative Member to discharge the function and the files which are produced before this Court also do not reveal such a nomination by the Chairman. Further, it is brought to our notice that after the retirement of the Chairman on 30.01.1996, there was no appointment of a Chairman till the Single Administrative Member passed the impugned order on 08.01.1998, thereby indicating that there was no nomination subsequently as well. In those circumstances, the impugned order passed by the Single Administrative Member, who has not been authorised to entertain and dispose of the revision, cannot be sustained in the eye of law, as he lacks jurisdiction on the date when he passed the order. On the above legal ground, the petitioner must succeed. In view of the said conclusion, we are not inclined to go into the merits of the case and we do not express any opinion on the same.
11.Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. No costs. Consequently, connected W.M.P. is closed.
sra
1. The Land Commissioner, (Land Reforms), Chennai.
2. The Assistant Commissioner (Land Reforms), Villupuram