Allahabad High Court
Pankaj Rastogi And 2 Others vs State Of U.P. And 3 Others on 15 April, 2019
Equivalent citations: AIRONLINE 2019 ALL 666
Bench: Vipin Sinha, Ajit Singh
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD Reserved AFR Court No. - 51 Case :- CRIMINAL MISC. WRIT PETITION No. - 31343 of 2018 Petitioner :- Pankaj Rastogi And 2 Others Respondent :- State Of U.P. And 3 Others Counsel for Petitioner :- Shishir Tandon,G.S. Chaturvedi (Sr. Advocate) Counsel for Respondent :- G.A.,Manish Tiwary,Syed Imran Ibrahim And Case :- CRIMINAL MISC. WRIT PETITION No. - 31370 of 2018 Petitioner :- Tanya Rastogi And Another Respondent :- State Of U.P. And 2 Others Counsel for Petitioner :- Dileep Kumar,Rajrshi Gupta Counsel for Respondent :- G.A.,Manish Tiwary,Syed Imran Ibrahim Hon'ble Vipin Sinha,J.
Hon'ble Ajit Singh,J.
(Delivered by Hon'ble Vipin Sinha, J) These are two writ petitions being Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 31343 of 2018 and Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 31370 of 2018. The writ petitioners in the first writ petition are Pankaj Rastogi, Mohit Rastogi and Ketan Kumar Shah whereas the writ petitioners in the second writ petition are Smt. Tanya Rastogi and Ambuj Rastogi. The record shows that both the writ petitions have been filed being aggrieved against the lodging of the FIR dated 22.10.2018 by one Ruchir Rastogi (respondent no.4 in the first writ petition and respondent no.3 in the second writ petition). The FIR was registered as Case Crime No.0128 of 2018 under Sections 457, 380 and 506 IPC PS Pheelkhana District Kanpur Nagar. As the relief sought in both the writ petitions is absolutely identical i.e. quashing of the aforesaid FIR dated 22.10.2018 registered as Case Crime No.0128 of 2018 and in both the writ petitions the FIR has been annexed as Annexure-1 to the writ petition, therefore with the consent of all the parties concerned, both the writ petitions were taken up for hearing together and both the writ petitions are being decided by means of the present common order while treating Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No.31343 of 2018 as the leading case.
We have heard Shri G.S. Chaturvedi, learned senior counsel assisted by Shri Shishir Tandon, learned counsel for the petitioners in the first writ petition i.e. Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 31343 of 2018, Shri Dileep Kumar and Shri Rajrshi Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioners in the second writ petition i.e. Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 31370 of 2018, Shri Manish Tiwary, learned counsel for the complainant Ruchir Rastogi in both the writ petitions and Shri Rajesh Mishra, learned AGA appearing for the State in both the writ petitions.
After hearing the learned counsel for the petitioners and the contentions as have been raised at the Bar of this Court, the factual position as it emerges can be crystallized herein as under:-
The impugned FIR has been lodged by Ruchir Rastogi in his capacity as a partner of H.U.F. M/s Lala Jugal Kishore & Sons having a business showroom at 26/59 Birhana Road, Kanpur Nagar. The relevant extract of the said FIR is being quoted herein below:-
lsok esa Jheku Fkkuk/;{k egksn;] Fkkuk Qhy[kkuk] tuin dkuiqj uxj egksn; fuosnu gS fd eS #fpj jLrksxh iq= Jh jkt fd'kksj jLrksxh fuoklh 7@ 123 ,] Lo#i uxj] dkuiqj uxj] m0 iz0 eSllZ #fpj jLrksxh ,p0 ;w0 ,Q0 dk drkZ gSA #fpj jLrksxh ,p0 ;w0 ,Q0 eSllZ tqxy fd'kksj ,UM lUl esa ikVZUkj gSA ftldk dkjksckjh 'kks#e 25@ 59 fcjgkuk jksM] dkuiqj esa fLFkr gSA QeZ esa cjkcj ds ikVZUkj eSllZ iadt jLrksxh ,p0 ;w0 ,Q0 gS] ftlds drkZ iadt jLrksxh gSA iadt jLrksxh ds lkFk fookn gksus ij fnukad 30-05-2013 dsk 'kks#e ij rkys iM x;s rFkk dksVZ ls vkns'k gqvk fd nksuks i{kksa dh ekStwnxh esa gh nqdku ds rkys [kqysaxsA ml oDr nqdku es t#jh dkxtkr rFkk fuEufyf[kr LVkd miyC/k FkkA lksuk & 100 fdyksxzke] pkanh 500 fdyksxzke] ghjk 10 gtkj dSjsV tokgjkr 5 gtkj dSjsV fnukad 17-10-2018 dks geus ns[kk fd nqdku esa u;s rkys iMs gS rFkk lq"kek dkUlVªD'ku dk cksMZ yxk gqvk gSA fo'oLr lw=ksa ls irk pyk gS fd iadt jLrksxh us vius LVkQ eksfgr jLrksxh] dsru 'kkg us ,oa vU; rFkk lq"kek dkUlVªD'ku ds yksxks ds lkFk feydj rkyk rksM fy;k gSA vkSj lEiw.kZ lkeku vkSj dherh dkxtkr xk;c dj fn;s gSA tc eSus iadt jLrksxh ls iwNk rks mUgksus dgk fd pqi jgks ojuk viuh tku ls gkFk /kks cSBksxsA bl lUnHkZ esa izFke lwpuk fjiksVZ ntZ dj vko';d dk;ZOkkgh djus dh d`ik djsaA Keeping in view the aforesaid allegations as have been made in the FIR and factual position as is revealed as per the contentions as made at the Bar of this Court and as per the averments made in the writ petition, the facts, in brief, are that petitioner no.1 is the uncle (Chacha) of respondent no.4 and petitioner nos.2 and 3 are the employees of petitioner no.1. The partnership between petitioner no.1 and respondent no.4 has come into existence on 1.4.2012 in pursuance of a partnership deed dated 1.4.2012. It has been contended that thereafter some dispute had arisen between the partners and both the parties i.e. petitioner no.1 and respondent no.4 agreed to settle their dispute through Arbitrator, due to which five persons were nominated on 3.8.2014 to settle their dispute. However, it appears that subsequently a petition was filed before the District Judge, Kanpur Nagar with the prayer that a receiver be appointed to take possession, custody and management of the partnership business and on the said petition, the District Judge, Kanpur Nagar vide order dated 11.11.2013 had directed herein as under:- (copy of which has been annexed as Annexure-5) "The Application 4Kha is decided accordingly. The entire assets, belongings of the firm M/s Lala Jugal Kishore & Sons at Premises No.26/59, Birhana Road, Kanpur Nagar shall be preserved till the making of the arbitral award before it is enforced in accordance with Section 26 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act."
At this stage, it may be noted that in the present case the FIR has not been lodged either by any officer of the court or by the receiver. In fact, it has been lodged by Ruchir Rastogi in his capacity as a partner of the firm. The writ petition also shows that a number of dates were fixed to resolve the dispute between petitioner no.1 and respondent no.4 before the Arbitrator but nothing fruitful resulted and thus, the Arbitrator resigned from the post of Arbitrator vide order dated 17.4.2017. It has been further contended that the shop of petitioner no.1 was a rented shop, which was owned by Smt. Urmila Gupta and she sold the said shop to M/s Sushma Construction Pvt. Ltd. in the year 2014. It has been contended that the shop in question situated at 26/59 Birhana Road, Kanpur Nagar was only a part of a larger property and M/s Sushma Construction after purchasing the shop from Smt. Urmila Gupta filed a suit for eviction which was initially rejected vide order dated 15.7.2015 passed by Addl. District Judge, Court No.16, Kanpur Nagar. However, the said order was challenged by M/s Sushma Construction Pvt. Ltd. before this Hon'ble Court in S.C.C. Revision No.279 of 2015 in which this Court vide order dated 19.7.2018 had directed that "the defendant-respondent is directed to hand over the peaceful possession of the shop in question within a period of thirty days from today. In case such possession is handed over within 30 days, the plaintiff-revisionist shall not press for any recovery of the rent. It is also made clear that any delay or deliberate avoidance on the part of the plaintiff in taking possession when handed over by the defendant would be taken against the spirit of the present order". This order has been annexed as Annexure-8 to the writ petition. In pursuance of the said direction of this Court, petitioner no.1 has handed over the possession of the shop to M/s Sushma Construction Pvt. Ltd. on 11.10.2018 and this act culminated in the lodging of the impugned FIR, contents of which have already been extracted above.
Shri G.S. Chaturvedi, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners contends that the impugned FIR has been lodged and proceedings have been initiated by way of a malicious prosecution as no offence as alleged in the FIR is made out against the petitioners. Contention is that essential ingredients to make out an offence under Sections 457, 380 and 506 IPC are missing and thus, the FIR itself is liable to be quashed as the petitioners seek protection from unnecessary harassment of any investigation whatsoever in pursuance of the FIR which does not show commission of any cognizable offence. Further contention is that initially petitioner no.1 was the proprietor of M/s Lala Jugal Kishore & Sons and the same was registered on 27.5.1985 and it was only on the recommendation of his elder brother Raj Kishore Rastogi that the proprietorship firm was converted into a partnership firm by introducing his son Ruchir Rastogi as one of the partner. Further contention is that as per the partnership deed itself all the disputes among the partners shall be referred to arbitration under the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Contention is that it is not in dispute that it was a partnership firm between him and respondent Ruchir Rastogi, the first informant and thus, even if the allegations as contained in the FIR itself are believed to be true, no offence would be made out because it cannot be said that a person can steal his own property especially property of which he is the rightful owner. It is also not in dispute that the shop was closed on 30.5.2013. The basic contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the petitioners were the partners of the said partnership firm, the business of which was discontinued as far back in 2013 and no business was being transacted in the said firm since 30.5.2013 and thus, even if the allegations as made in the FIR are believed to be true, the petitioners cannot be made accused for offence under Sections 457, 380 and 506 IPC. The specific contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that no offence under Sections 457, 380 and 506 IPC is made out against the petitioners and thus, they cannot be put to harassment under the garb of fair investigation by the police authorities. Learned counsel for the petitioners has further submitted that shop remained closed since the year 2013; no business was conducted since 2013 and the partnership firm is in the nature of 'joint ownership' and thus, the person who is the owner of the property cannot be an accused of committing theft of his own property. Learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance upon the judgment of this Court rendered in the case of Board of Revenue U.P. vs. Auto Sales, Allahabad, AIR 1979 All 312, Indian Oil Corporation vs NEPC India Ltd. & ors, AIR 2006 SC 2780. Hamid Ali Bepari vs. Emperor, (1925) ILR 52 Cal 1015 vs. Addanki Narayanappa & Anr vs Bhaskara Krishtappa and others, reported in AIR 1966 SC 1300.
Contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that conversion of joint possession of property into exclusive possession does not constitute the offence of theft. For theft it is necessary that property should be in the exclusive possession of a person other than the thief. If thereafter a joint owner takes some property from the joint possession (in which his possession is included) with a view to make a separate property he commits no theft. Further contention is that partnership firms do not hold the property for trust for each, however in case of partnership every person has dominion over property by reason of the fact that he is a partner. This is a kind of dominion which every owner of property has over his property.
It may be further appreciated that a partnership firm is not a legal entity but a legal mode of doing business by all the partners until a firm is dissolved as per law and account is settled.
In the case of Board of Revenue UP (supra), it has been observed as under:-
"At this place, it would be appropriate to notice the law on the nature of the rights of a partner qua partnership property. A partner of a firm is in the same position as a co-owner of the joint property in relation to other co-owners. The concept of partnership is to embark upon a joint venture and for that purpose to bring in a capital money or even property, including immovable property. Once a partner brings his properties to the common hotch-potch of a partnership, whatever is brought in would cease to be the exclusive property of that partner. It would be the trading asset of the partnership in which all the partners would have their shares. As a practical matter, now the partnership, rather the partners, owns the firm's property. A partner, subject to any agreement between the partners, has an equal right with his partners to possess specific partnership property for partnership purposes, but has no right to possess such property for any other purpose. Hence, in the absence of a special agreement, neither a partner separately owns or has the exclusive right of possession of, any particular article of partnership property, nor does either partner own any proportional part of any partnership property, but each has dominion over the whole article and over the entire partnership property."
Much reliance has been placed on a full Bench judgment of Calcutta High Court rendered in the case of Bhuban Mohan Das vs Surendra Mohan Das, AIR 1951 Cal 69, wherein the Court has held as under:-
"From these observations, it is clear that the share of a partner in the partnership assets cannot be predicated until an account has been taken & all the debts have been discharged. Until that has been done, it cannot be said that a partnership asset belongs to any particular partner or that any particular share of it belongs to any particular partner That being so, if one partner retains a partnership asset can it be said that property belonging to somebody else has been entrusted to him, or at least the share of his co-partner has been entrusted to him? It may be that two persons each own a half share in a partnership & at first sight it might appear as if each would own a half of every asset of the partnership. However, that by no means follows, because if at any given moment the partnership account was taken & the debts discharged, it might be that the assets belonged wholly to one of the partners, or indeed after payment of debts there might be no assets at all for any of them. It is, therefore, impossible to say at any given moment before accounts have been taken, what share, if any, a partner has in the property. Until dissolution & accounts each partner must be regarded as having a right to the property & he does not hold it in a fiduciary capacity."
The aforesaid judgment has been subsequently affirmed by the Supreme Court in the case of Velji Raghavji Patel vs State of Maharashtra, AIR 1965 SC 1433. The relevant paragraph nos.7 and 9 are being extracted herein as under:-
"7. It seems to us that the view taken in Bhuban Mohan Rana's case(1) by the later Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court is the right one. Upon the plain reading of s. 405, I.P.C. it is obvious that before a person can be said to have committed criminal breach of trust it must be established that he was either entrusted with or entrusted with dominion over propery which he is said to have converted to his own use or disposed of in violation of any direction of law etc. Every partner has dominion over property by reason of the fact that he is a partner. This is a kind of dominion which every owner of property has over his property. But it is not dominion of this kind which satisfies the requirements of s. 405. In order to establish "entrustment of dominion" over property to an accused person the mere existence of that person's dominion over property is not enough. It must be further shown that his dominion was the result of entrustment. Therefore, as rightly pointed out by Harris C.J., the prosecution must establish that dominion over the assets or a particular asset of the partnership was, by a special agreement between the parties, entrusted to the accused person. If in the absence of such a special agreement a partner receives money belonging to the partnership he cannot be said to have received it in a fidu- ciary capacity or in other words cannot be hold to have been "entrusted" with dominion over partnership properties."
9. Mr. Chatterjee finally contends that the act of the appellant will at least amount to dishonest misappropriation of property even though it may not amount to criminal breach of trust and, therefore, his conviction could be altered from one under s. 409 to that under s. 403. Section 403 runs thus :
"Whoever dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use any moveable property, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both."
It is obvious that an owner of property, in whichever way he uses his property and with whatever intention will not be liable for misappropriaion and that would be so even if he is not the exclusive owner thereof. As already stated, a partner has, undefined ownership along with the other partners over all the assets of the, partnership. If he chooses to use any of them for his own purposes he may be accountable civilly to the other partners. But he does not thereby commit any misappropriation. Mr. Chatterjee's alternative contention must be rejected."
The aforesaid judgment (Velji Raghavji Patel vs State of Maharashtra) has been subsequently followed and affirmed by the Supreme Court in the cases rendered in AIR 1967 SC 1342 Prem Ballabh Khulbe vs Mathura Datt Bhatt, AIR 1968 SC 700, State of Gujarat v. Jaswantlal Nathalal AIR 1985 SC 628 and AIR 1996 SC 2452 Central Bureau of Investigation, SPE, SIU(X), New Delhi vs Duncans Agro Industries Ltd. Calcutta.
To the aforesaid consistent legal position, nothing to the contrary has been shown by the counsel for the respondents. It has not been shown that the law as laid down by the full Bench of Calcutta High Court in the case of Bhuban Mohan Das (supra) and the judgement of the Apex Court passed in the case of Velji Raghavji Patel (supra) have either been overruled or distinguished till date, on the other hand we find that it is still good law.
Shri Manish Tiwary, learned counsel appearing for the complainant Ruchir Rastogi in the present case has argued with vehemence that there is a 'dishonest intention' on the part of petitioner no.1 in as much as without making the first informant Ruchir Rastogi a party in the suit for eviction, a collusive suit was filed which ultimately culminated in passing of the order in pursuance of which possession was handed over to M/s Sushma Construction Pvt. Ltd. and this act itself would constitute an offence.
However, it may be reiterated that learned counsels for the respondents do not dispute the law as laid down by the Apex Court as well as by the Full Bench of Calcutta High Court with regard to the ownership of the property of the partnership firm. It has not been brought to the knowledge of the Court that the aforesaid case law has either been overruled or distinguished till date. On the other hand, learned counsel for the petitioners contends that the same still holds the field till date.
Learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that in pursuance of the order dated 11.11.2013 by means of which the District Judge had allowed Application 4Kha, the property could not have been taken away. Learned counsel for the respondents, however, has not been able to dispute the fact and the contentions as raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that possession has been handed over in compliance of the direction of a court of competent jurisdiction and thus, no illegality or ulterior motive can be attributed to the petitioners in this regard.
As far as Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 31370 of 2018 is concerned, we have heard Shri Rajrshi Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioners at great length. Contention is that it is correct to say that petitioner no.2 is the real brother of Pankaj Rastogi and real uncle of informant Ruchir Rastogi and that petitioner no.1 Tanya Rastogi happens to be the daughter-in-law of petitioner no.1. However, the petitioners have been falsely implicated in the present case as they have nothing to do whatsoever in the controversy in issue. They have nothing to do with the partnership or property of the partnership. Shri Rajrshi Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioners has very vehemently contended that the petitioners are the Directors of M/s Sushma Construction Pvt. Ltd. which is a Private Limited Company and registered with the Registrar of Companies at Calcutta (West Bengal). Pankaj Rastogi has nothing to do with M/s Sushma Construction Pvt. Ltd. and that the present petitioners who are the directors of M/s Sushma Construction have nothing to do as far as business activities of Pankaj Rastogi are concerned apart from the family relationship. The company M/s Sushma Construction Pvt. Ltd. had purchased the property in dispute by means of sale deed dated 12.12.2013 from Mrs. Urmila Gupta. Pankaj Gupta was already a tenant in the aforesaid property since the year 1986 and was doing his business therein. Learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the shop in question was only a 'minuscule part' of the larger property which was purchased by M/s Sushma Construction Pvt. Ltd. Learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that as per the admitted position on record in the connected writ petition itself, no business was conducted in the said partnership firm after 2013. Shri Rajrshi Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioners has argued that if there was any dishonest intention then they would have purchased this particular property alone and not the entire property by investing such a huge amount. He has further argued that after M/s Sushma Construction Pvt. Ltd. had purchased the property from the erstwhile owner Mrs. Urmila Gupta vide sale deed dated 12.12.2013, they filed a suit for eviction against the existing tenant i.e. Pankaj Rastogi being Original Suit No.309 of 2014 M/s Sushma Construction Pvt. Ltd. vs Pankaj Rastogi in the court of District Judge, Kanpur Nagar. The aforesaid suit was dismissed by the court of Judge Small Causes/Addl. District Judge, Court No.16, Kanpur Nagar vide order dated 15.7.2015 and aggrieved against the order dated 15.7.2015 M/s Sushma Construction Pvt. Ltd. has filed a SCC Revision No.279 of 2015 M/s Sushma Construction Pvt. Ltd. vs Pankaj Rastogi before this Court and in the aforesaid matter, a compromise was effected between the parties which resulted in the Revision being allowed vide order dated 19.7.2018 with a direction that the possession of the aforesaid property be handed over to the petitioners company by Pankaj Rastogi within 30 days. Copy of the order dated 19.7.2018 has been annexed as Annexure-5 to the writ petition. It was in compliance of the said direction that the possession over the property in question was handed over by Pankaj Rastogi in presence of the witnesses on 11.10.2018. It has been further contended that the petitioners merely inherited Pankaj Rastogi as a tenant on the purchase of the aforesaid property done in the year 2013 and they have absolutely no concern with the business of Pankaj Rastogi or his partnership with Ruchir Rastogi nor in any way Ruchir Rastogi was party to the civil dispute between the petitioner's company and Pankaj Rastogi. Further contention is that Ruchir Rastogi was not a necessary party in the suit for eviction filed by M/s Sushma Construction Pvt. Ltd. against Pankaj Rastogi who was the tenant since 1986, that is, even much before coming into existence of the aforesaid partnership firm. Further contention is that even if the allegations as made in the FIR are believed to be true, there is no specific allegation against the petitioners company or any person belonging to the same. However, there is bald allegation that the informant had came to the knowledge from some reliable sources that the alleged stocks and documents have been removed by Pankaj Rastogi and his employees in connivance with the petitioners' company. The petitioners are the owners of the property in question and they have taken possession in pursuance of the order of a court of competent jurisdiction and at the time of possession an affidavit was duly entered between the petitioners' company and Pankaj Rastogi which categorically mentions that the property in question was handed over with only some furnitures and other fittings like Air-conditioner, Generator Set for which the petitioners company paid an amount of Rs.5 lakhs to Pankaj Rastogi. Contention is that no offence as mentioned in the FIR under Sections 457, 380 and 506 IPC is made out against the petitioners.
It has been further informed to the Court that keeping in view the contentions as raised by the learned counsel for the complainant that the suit was filed with dishonest intention that a recall application was filed in the revision and the same is pending, however that is not the subject matter of the present writ petition and the recall application will be considered and decided by the appropriate court. The recall application was filed only after filing of the present writ petition. It was only Pankaj Rastogi who was the sole tenant in the shop in question since 1986. The said suit was filed against only Pankaj Rastogi. The suit was not filed against the partnership firm.
Further contention is that the petitioners are the owners of the property in question and they took over the possession of the aforesaid property pursuant to the order dated 19.7.2018 passed by this Court in SCC Revision No.279 of 2015 M/s Sushma Construction Pvt. Ltd. vs. Pankaj Rastogi and at the time of possession an affidavit was duly entered between the petitioners company and Pankaj Rastogi, which categorically mentions that the property in question was handed over with only some furnitures and other fittings like Air-conditioner, Generator Set for which the petitioners' company paid an amount of Rs.5 lakhs to Pankaj Rastogi and they are absolutely oblivious to any dispute between Pankaj Rastogi and Ruchir Rastogi or have any stocks or documents belonging to the Firm of Pankaj Rastogi or Ruchir Rastogi, were present before the handing over of the shop and clearly the petitioners have been falsely implicated in the present case with a malicious intent to harass them and thus, as the impugned FIR does not show the commission of any offence in the present case, the same is liable to be quashed.
Shri Manish Tiwary, learned counsel appearing for the complainant has once again raised strong opposition saying that the suit for eviction was filed with dishonest intention in as much as Ruchir Rastogi was never arrayed as defendant in the said suit. This dishonest intention itself shows the commission of an offence.
Shri Rajesh Mishra, learned AGA appearing for the State has adopted the same argument as those of Shri Manish Tiwary, learend counsel for the complainant.
Once again Shri Rajrshi Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that they have taken possession over the property in dispute from the erstwhile tenant Pankaj Rastogi. The partnership firm was not a tenant in the said shop. The said shop under the tenancy of Pankaj Rastogi since the year 1986 and thus, it was only Pankaj Rastogi who was a necessary party in the suit for eviction and thus, no ulterior motive can be attributed to the petitioners in this regard. Learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Apex Court rendered in the case of Kasturi vs Iyyamperumal and others, reported in (2005) 6 SCC 733 to illustrate as to who would be a necessary party. Once again nothing has been said to the contrary by the learned counsel for the respondents.
We have examined the allegations as contained in the impugned FIR and we are clearly of the opinion that no offence under various Sections mentioned therein has been made out, since in our view the allegations contained in the impugned FIR taking on its face value do not satisfy the offences under Sections 457, 380 and 506 IPC, continuance to proceedings in furtherance thereof will be an apparent misuse of the Court and same cannot be allowed.
Thus, in view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances and the consistent legal position, a case for grant of indulgence has been made out.
Accordingly, the impugned FIR dated 22.10.2018 registered as Case Crime No.0128 of 2018 under Sections 457, 380 and 506 IPC PS Pheelkhana District Kanpur Nagar is quashed.
Accordingly, both the writ petitions being Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 31343 of 2018 and Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 31370 of 2018 are allowed.
A certified copy of this order be placed on the file of Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 31370 of 2018.
Order Date :- 15.4.2019 SP