Delhi District Court
Rakesh Sehgal vs Meenakshi Gupta on 30 November, 2023
IN THE COURT OF SH. VIMAL KUMAR YADAV
PRINCIPAL DISTRICT & SESSIONS JUDGE
NORTH-WEST DISTRICT: ROHINI COURTS: DELHI
CNR No. DLNW01-002322-2022
RCT No. 1/22
Rakesh Sehgal
S/o late Sh. K.L. Sehgal
R/o Flat No. 9,
Apna Ghar Cooperative Group Housing Society,
Opposite Chanderlok Enclave,
Rani Bagh, Delhi ...Appellant
Versus
Meenakshi Gupta
W/o Sh. Adesh Gupta
R/o D-701, Jhulelal Apartment,
Pitampura, Delhi-110034
Permanent Address:
A-653, Shastri Nagar,
Delhi-110052 ...Respondent
Date of institution : 22.03.2022
Arguments heard on : 07.11.2023
Date of pronouncement : 30.11.2023
Appearance:
Sh. C.P. Vig, Adv. Ld. Counsel for appellant.
Sh. Sanjeev Mehta, Adv. Ld. Counsel for respondent.
JUDGMENT:
Appeal filed on behalf of Rakesh Sehgal u/s.38 of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 assailing the judgment dated 04.03.2022, through which the eviction petition filed on behalf of respondent was allowed, is hereby disposed off through this judgment.
RCT 01/22 Rakesh Sehgal v. Meenakshi Gupta Page 1 of 152. The indispensable facts, in brief, are that the eviction petition was filed by the respondent/landlord on 25.04.1992 against the father of the present appellant i.e. late Sh. Kishori Lal Sehgal on the ground of bonafide requirement u/s.14(i)(e) of Delhi Rent Control Act. Leave to contest the petition was granted and thereafter the petition was contested upon by the father of the appellant herein K.L. Sehgal.
3. The plea taken on behalf of the father of the appellant was that he was not the tenant rather Naresh Kumar Sehgal was the tenant in respect of the suit premises i.e. Flat No.9, Apna Ghar Cooperative Group Housing Society, Opposite Chander Lok Enclave, Rani Bagh, New Delhi. Since the petition was filed on bonafide requirement, therefore, no notice was served in respect of the said petition, although in the civil suit filed on behalf of the respondent claiming the arrears of rent had a notice served upon the father of the appellant dated 18.04.1992.
4. K.L. Sehgal was held to be the tenant in the suit premises in the civil suit bearing no. 564/95 titled as Meenakshi Gupta v. Kishori Lal Sehgal & Anr. in the suit for recovery of Rs.62,100/- decided on 27.01.1996 by the court of Sh. D.K. Malhotra, Ld. Civil Judge, Delhi, which was upheld by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in RSA No. 195/2001 case titled as Swaran Sehgal & Ors. v. Meenakshi Gupta vide order dated 29.11.2010 as well as by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 8896/2011 case titled as Swaran Sehgal (D) through LRs v. Meenakshi Gupta vide order dated 15.07.2013, cementing the status of the father of the appellant as RCT 01/22 Rakesh Sehgal v. Meenakshi Gupta Page 2 of 15 tenant in the suit property.
5. During the pendency of the eviction petition, K.L. Sehgal died on 25.10.1997 leaving behind his widow, five sons and two daughters as his LRs who were all impleaded as parties in the Eviction Petition. The original eviction petition was amended time and again due to various circumstances on 18.01.2021, 08.08.2023 and 19.08.2008.
6. The widow of K.L. Sehgal also died on 03.08.2009 and the remaining LRs continued to be on record and in contest. In the intervening period, however, the other legal heirs left the suit premise permanently leaving behind only the present appellant Rakesh Sehgal in occupation of the property. In the application u/o.I Rule 10 CPC, the other legal heirs were deleted from the eviction petition qua which the counsel for appellant gave statement dated 18.02.2016 that the legal heirs have no objection qua the deletion of their names. Eviction petition once again went through a series of amendments and was amended on 28.08.2014, 21.02.2015, 17.09.2015, 26.02.2016 and 26.09.2016 but ultimately only Rakesh Sehgal remained as the contesting respondent in the Eviction Petition.
7. At the stage of final arguments, the petitioner/respondent dropped the ground of bonafide requirement against the tenant and the only ground which remained was u/s.14(i) DRC Act which was not accepted by Ld. Trial Court, who dismissed the same through the impugned order dated 14.03.2022 as it was not pressed.
RCT 01/22 Rakesh Sehgal v. Meenakshi Gupta Page 3 of 158. However, an eviction order still came to be passed u/s.2(1)(iii) of DRC Act treating the tenant(s) as unauthorized occupants, whereas it is contended on behalf of the appellant that Ld. Trial Court has failed to appreciate the fact that once the main eviction petition was dismissed, all pending applications also stood dismissed as there remains no justifiable ground to allow any pending application. Ld. Trial Court has also, it is asserted, failed to appreciate that there is no other provision in the Delhi Rent Control Act except Section 14 DRC Act through which an eviction order can be passed. It is, thus, submitted further that in the absence of any valid legal notice and proof of its service on the tenants, the presumption regarding UPC having been served upon the tenants, is not tenable. As all the legal heirs of Kishori Lal were treated as tenants by virtue of application u/o.XXII Rule 4 CPC in the amended petitions, the appellant could not have been thrown out of the tenanted premises in terms of Section 2(l) of the DRC Act. Even if it is presumed that notice was issued and was served upon the appellant or his father late K.L. Sehgal, still this amounts to waiver of the showcause notice dated 18.04.1992.
9. It is stated on behalf of the appellant that in all such petitions, all the legal heirs of K.L. Sehgal were impleaded as parties as LRs of deceased K.L. Sehgal and were treated as tenants as well. Nowhere it was mentioned or clarified that after the death of the statutory tenant Kishori Lal Sehgal, his wife has become tenant for a limited period of one year or upto her death, whichever is earlier, rather all the legal heirs of K.L. Sehgal were treated as tenants by the respondent. Thus, by implication the so-
RCT 01/22 Rakesh Sehgal v. Meenakshi Gupta Page 4 of 15called notice dated 18.04.1992 stood waived for all purposes and this position, where all the legal heirs of K.L. Sehgal as tenants, cannot be altered or amended under any circumstances.
10. No relief, contrary to what has been given by the Ld. Trial Court, could have been there in favour of the respondent u/s.2(l) of the DRC Act as it was not pleaded anywhere in the petition and that there was no provision of eviction except those mentioned u/s.14 of the DRC Act.
11. Respondent, while contesting the petition, submitted that K.L. Sehgal was the tenant in the premises in question on whose death on 25.04.1997, his widow Swarn Sehgal becomes entitled to acquire the property for a period of one year or her death, whichever is earlier. It is submitted that the tenancy of K.L. Sehgal already stood terminated through the legal notice dated 18.04.1992 but after the death of K.L. Sehgal, tenancy devolved upon his wife and as an abundant precaution the respondent has impleaded all the LRs of Kishori Lal Sehgal as it was for the court to decide who is to remain a party and who are not to be impleaded. So the case of the respondent cannot be treated defective on this ground alone that all the LRs were impleaded.
12. The notice of termination of tenancy dated 18.04.1992 was duly served and has been proved with its receipt, AD and UPC through Ex. PW1/A to PW1/D. The said notice and the ancilliary documents stood proved in the civil proceedings and certified copies of the same were already obtained by the RCT 01/22 Rakesh Sehgal v. Meenakshi Gupta Page 5 of 15 respondent. By the time the evidence came to be recorded in the eviction petition, the record of the civil suit was already weeded out, therefore, certified copies are admissible and should be considered for all purposes. It is finally concluded that the eviction petition filed against a statutory tenant, who died during the pendency then the wife of the deceased, who was dependent upon him can claim the tenancy for a period of one year or her death whichever is earlier and none else. In these circumstances, if anybody else is found to be in occupation of tenanted premises, then eviction order can be passed u/s.2(l) of the DRC Act as those occupants become unauthorised occupants. In order to supplement the arguments on behalf of the respondent, the counsel for the respondent has placed reliance on the following judgments:
i) Kishori Lal v. Sri Kishan 63 (1996) DLT 577
ii) Vijay Kumar Khambate v. Vinay Kumar Aggarwal 2006 (130) DLT 474
iii) P. Jayantilal Shah (deceased) v. Ramakant Sanoriya (deceased) 2006 (131) DLT 388
iv) Calcutta Credit Corporation v. Happy Homes Pvt. Ltd. 1967 Legal Eagle SC 287
v) Mohan Lal Goela 7 Ors. v. Siri Krishan & Ors. Law AIR 1978 Delhi 92
vi) M/s Madan & Co. v. Wazir Jaivir Chand AIR 1989 SC 630
vii) Jindal Dyechem Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. Pahwa International Pvt. Ltd. 2009(8) AD (Delhi) 535
13. I have considered the submissions raised by the contesting sides.
RCT 01/22 Rakesh Sehgal v. Meenakshi Gupta Page 6 of 1514. The issues which have cropped up for decision are about the status and position of the tenants/tenancy after the demise of K.L. Sehgal, whether any legal notice was served upon the appellant/his father or not. Whether an eviction order can be passed while dismissing the eviction petition u/s.14 of the DRC Act and by upholding or allowing the petition with the aid of Section 2(l) of the DRC Act and whether by impleading all the LRs of the deceased/tenant, the landlord foregoes his rights, which may or has accrued to him to have the suit premises vacated.
15. So far as the status of tenant is concerned, it was held that deceased father of the present appellant i.e. K.L. Sehgal was tenant and this finding was upheld upto the Hon'ble Supreme Court, thus, this issue no longer remains in contention. Notice was served upon K.L. Sehgal through UPC and regd. AD post, as can be seen from documents Ex. PW1/A to D. It is also a matter of record that during the pendency of the petition K.L. Sehgal died on 25.04.1997, thereby his wife Smt. Swarn Sehgal stepped into his shoes and became the statutory tenant, who also incidentally died during the pendency of the petition on 03.08.2009. In such circumstances, the appellant has no further right to continue in occupation of the tenanted premises.
16. K.L. Sehgal was a statutory tenant and after the death of a statutory tenant, his wife Swarn Sehgal stepped into the tenancy and was permitted to continue for a limited period and in any case after her death, the property was to revert back to the landlord. It has not happened so, although all the LRs of K.L. RCT 01/22 Rakesh Sehgal v. Meenakshi Gupta Page 7 of 15 Sehgal vacated the premises and were taken off the record from the petition/appeal in terms of an application u/o. I Rule 10 CPC and the statement of the counsel for appellant dated 18.02.2016 leaving behind only one person i.e. the present appellant Rakesh Kumar in contest but in view of the aforesaid developments and discussion he becomes unauthorised occupant and was bound to hand over the property.
17. Out of the three vital issues, raised in the appeal, the aspect of legal notice stands at rest in view of the fact that notice was served and has been proved to be served upon K.L. Sehgal in the civil suit filed. Incidentally, the record of the civil suit was weeded out but the notice dated 18.04.1992, which became part of the SLP before the Hon'ble Supreme Court can be looked into especially when the same has been proved in the evidence and the same are Ex. PW1/A to D, as can be seen on page no. 2831 of the trial court record. It is not the case that the legal notice was not served upon late K.L. Sehgal. A presumption too stands in favour of the respondent that it was sent at the correct address and delivered too, in terms of Section 27 of the General Clauses Act. Reference in this context may be made to the judgments in M/s Madan & Co. v. Wazir Jaivir Chand AIR 1989 SC 630; Jindal Dyechem Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. Pahwa International Pvt. Ltd. 2009(8) AD (Delhi) 535.
18. The status of K.L. Sehgal was ultimately approved to be of a tenant by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the civil suit filed by the respondent in which notice dt. 18.04.1992 was served. However, Courts have gone to the extent of saying that once a RCT 01/22 Rakesh Sehgal v. Meenakshi Gupta Page 8 of 15 valid notice of termination is given in any previous suit, the tenancy stands terminated irrespective of the outcome of the proceeding in that previous suit. Reference can be made to the judgment in Mohan Lal Goel & Ors. v. Shri Krishan & Ors. AIR 1978 Delhi 92. As such, the legal notice of termination of tenancy dt. 18.04.1992 was effective in all senses and aspects to terminate the tenancy of K.L. Sehgal.
19. The other aspect which came up for adjudication is whether after the death of the statutory tenant, if the wife of the statutory tenant alongwith other LRs are impleaded, would mean that the landlord has foregone his right which accrued to the landlord after the death of the statutory tenant which permits the wife, who was living with the statutory tenant and was financially dependent upon the tenant to remain in occupation of the tenanted premises for a period of six months or so. It has been contended on behalf of the appellant that the respondent has foregone right once the respondent has impleaded the LRs of the deceased statutory tenant K.L. Sehgal. Incidentally, all the LRs have already vacated the tenanted premises leaving behind only the present appellant. In this context, reference can be made to the judgment in J.C. Chatterjee & Ors. v. Sri Kishan Tandon & Anr. AIR 1972 SC 2526 (1), wherein it has been observed as under:
"On the death of a statutory tenant pending eviction suit or appeal his heirs and legal representatives brought on record cannot claim the status of tenant within S.3(vii) of the Act as no rent is payable by them. If the rent was paid by them during the course of the proceedings it was not because they were recognised as tenants by the landlord but because the amount was received by him without prejudice to his rights under the orders of the court.RCT 01/22 Rakesh Sehgal v. Meenakshi Gupta Page 9 of 15
Therefore, the only contentions that they could put forward in the second appeal by the landlord were the contentions appropriate to their representative character and not one which was personal to the deceased. The defence of want of bona fide requirement by the landlord was personal to the statutory tenant and on his death the same is not open to his legal representatives."
20. In this context, Ld. Counsel for the respondent has placed reliance on the judgment in A.R. Singh v. Sant Lal (dead) 1998 RLR (Note) 56 and emphasised that the respondent, in the capacity of petitioner, was under obligation to implead all the LRs leaving the ARC to decide the objection with regard to the widow alone being entitled to be substituted. In view of this fact, respondent herein has impleaded all the LRs but that does not mean that the respondent has foregone any of his rights, which accrued to the respondent.
21. Finally, it was contended on behalf of the appellant that there is no provision in the DRC Act except Section 14 through which eviction can be secured. It is contended that the Ld. Trial Curt has dismissed the claim of the respondent u/s.14(1)(e) of the DRC Act but still proceeded to pass on an eviction decree in terms of Section 2(l) of the DRC Act, which is not permissible. When the main petition has been dismissed then all the applications etc. part of the petition should be deemed to have been dismissed as well.
22. The respondent, on the other hand, contended that the tenancy was a statutory tenancy, after the legal notice for eviction was served upon the statutory tenant and after his death, the tenancy passed on to his widow, who was living with him in the RCT 01/22 Rakesh Sehgal v. Meenakshi Gupta Page 10 of 15 tenanted premises. She could have continued as the widow of the statutory tenant as long as she was paying the rent and the increase or enhancement but then the right was confined to her as individual right and she could not have passed on the right to any of the other LRs of deceased statutory tenant. It is contended that the right being a personal right, therefore, even if Section 14(1)
(e) of DRC Act, the petition was declined by the Ld. Trial Court but then the eviction order was still passed. This is in consonance with the legal provision as the appellant becomes an unauthorised occupant and should have been ordered to vacate the premises and has been rightly done so. Incidentally, the premises stands vacated and that the appellant has lost all claims over the same and he is not even an occupant of the premises in question unauthorised, authorised or otherwise. Section 2(l) of the DRC Act is reproduced herein for ready reference so as to see and assess under what circumstances, it can be invoked:
(l) "tenant" means any person by whom or on whose account or behalf the rent of any premises is, or, but.for a special contract, would be, payable, and includes -
(i) a sub-tenant;
(ii) any person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy; and
(iii) in the event of the death of the person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy, subject to the order of succession and conditions specified, respectively, in Explanation I and Explanation II to this clause, such of the aforesaid person's --
(a) ...
(b) ...
(c) ...
(d) daughter-in-law, being the widow of his pre-
deceased son, as had been ordinarily living in the premises with such person as a member or members RCT 01/22 Rakesh Sehgal v. Meenakshi Gupta Page 11 of 15 of his family up to the date of his death, but does not include, (A) ...
(B) ...
Explanation I. - The order of succession in the event of the death of the person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy shall be as follows: -
(a) firstly, his surviving spouse;
(b) secondly, his son or daughter, or both, if there is no surviving spouse, or if the surviving spouse did not ordinarily live with the deceased person as a member of his family up to the date of his death;
(c) thirdly, his parents, if there is no surviving spouse, son or daughter of the deceased person, or if such surviving spouse, son or daughter or any of them, did not ordinarily live in the premises as a member of the family of the deceased person up to the date of his death; and
(d) fourthly, his daughter-in-law, being the widow of his pre- deceased son, if there is no surviving spouse, son, daughter or parents of the deceased person, or if such surviving spouse, son, daughter or parents, or any of them, did not ordinarily live in the premises as a member of the family of the deceased person up to the date of his death.
Explanation II. - If the person, who acquires, by succession, the right to continue in possession after the termination of the tenancy, was not financially dependent on the deceased person on the date of his death, such successor shall acquire such right for a limited period of one year; and, on the expiry of that period, or on his death, whichever is earlier, the right of such successor to continue in possession after the termination of the tenancy shall become extinguished.
......"
23. Application u/s.2(l) of DRC Act was moved on 21.11.2009 after death of the mother of the applicant and wife of the deceased statutory tenant on 03.08.2009. The application was pressed several times and ultimately the court observed that it RCT 01/22 Rakesh Sehgal v. Meenakshi Gupta Page 12 of 15 would be decided at the time of final order as can be seen in the order sheet dated 30.05.2012. The respondent again sought relief by moving application u/o. XII Rule 6 CPC on the basis of Section 2 (e) DRC Act. Thus, it cannot be contended by the appellant that there was nothing left after the dismissal of the eviction petition u/s.14 DRC Act. The application u/s.2(l) of DRC Act was alive and was disposed off.
24. It can be seen that the status of the present appellant is not that of a tenant and in terms of the Explanation II, he cannot continue in possession of the tenanted premises, and so far as other successors are concerned, they are already deleted from the array of the parties in terms of the application u/o.I Rule 10 CPC and the statement dated 18.02.2016 of both the appellant herein and the counsel representing other siblings of appellant. In any case, the right, if any, accrued to the widow of the statutory tenant, was for a limited purpose and stands extinguished and is not available to any of the legal heirs or successors.
25. In this context, reference can be made to the judgment in Kishori Lal v. Sri Kishan & Ors. 63 (1996) DLT 577, wherein it was observed as under:
"The plea may now be examined with reference to the facts of the present case. The landlords brought their petition for eviction against the tenants. There was valid termination of statutory tenancy and the legal heirs of the deceased statutory tenants had not inherited any right or rights within the meaning of Section 2(1) of Delhi Rent Control Act as amended by Act No. 18 of 1976. In this background it was held to be unnecessary to go into the question, whether any ground of eviction was available to the landlord or not and whether an order of eviction could be passed straightway against the legal representatives. The position of law is not in dispute as the definition of RCT 01/22 Rakesh Sehgal v. Meenakshi Gupta Page 13 of 15 'tenant', as contained in Section 2(1) of the Act will indicate that in the event of the death of the person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy, subject to the order of succession and conditions specified etc. the spouse alone was entitled to inherit the tenancy rights of the deceased tenant and that too for the own life time."
26. It was further observed finally in the aforesaid judgment itself that the provisions of Section 2(l)(iii) of the DRC Act cannot in any manner accordingly be held in conflict with the provisions of Section 14(l) of the DRC Act and eviction order can always be passed in a case where there is no inheritance of tenancy in respect of residential premises except to the extent as provided in law and while reaching this conclusion, the dictum of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gauri Shankar v. Union of India 1994 (2) RCR 474 was taken into consideration and relied upon. A reference in this context can also be made to the judgment in Vijay Kumar Khambate v. Vinay Kumar Aggarwal 2006 (130) DLT 474.
27. In P. Jayantilal Shah (deceased through LRs) v. Ramakant Sanoriya (deceased through LRs) 2006 (131) DLT 388, it was observed as under:
"The question which thus arises in the aforesaid circumstances is whether the respondent/landlord should be relegated to a civil sit or whether an eviction order can be passed in these proceedings. In this behalf, it may be noticed that the legal heirs who have been impleaded really have no defence as they have not right to continue to occupy the premises after the expiry of one year. This question has formed subject matter of adjudication in Gian Devi v. Jiwan Kumar, 17 (1980) DLT 197 where it was held that the Rent Controller does not lose jurisdiction on the death of a statutory tenant since the obligations of the deceased tenant has to be considered and not that of his heirs. Thus an order for recovery of premises made against the legal representatives can be duly executed and the relief granted against such legal RCT 01/22 Rakesh Sehgal v. Meenakshi Gupta Page 14 of 15 representatives will not become nugatory. The extent of liability of such legal representatives was held to be ultimately decided by the extent of the assets or the estate of the deceased and thus the liability would extend to their putting the landlord back into possession. It was further held that legal representatives may put forward such contentions as are appropriate to their representative character but not the contentions which were personal to the deceased tenant. In the end it was observed that if the legal representatives have no defence to raise in law the landlord cannot be driven to file an suit against them for their eviction."
28. Therefore, in the circumstances, the impugned judgment came to be passed in which, apparently, there is no illegality or impropriety, which may require any interference. As a result, in view of the foregoing discussion, the Appeal stands dismissed.
29. Trial Court Record be sent back with copy of this judgment. Appeal file be consigned to Record Room.
Announced in the open court VIMAL Digitally by VIMAL signed KUMAR YADAV today i.e. 30th November, 2023 KUMAR Date:
YADAV 2023.12.01 14:25:12 +0530 (Vimal Kumar Yadav) Principal District & Sessions Judge (NW) Rohini Courts, Delhi/sb RCT 01/22 Rakesh Sehgal v. Meenakshi Gupta Page 15 of 15