Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
N.R. Patel And Co., Rep. By Its Partner ... vs Smt. T. Aparna And Ors. on 27 April, 2006
Equivalent citations: IV(2006)ACC488, 2006ACJ2719, 2006(4)ALD130, 2006(3)ALT657
JUDGMENT D. Appa Rao, J.
1. This appeal is filed by the Insurance Company against the award passed by the Motor Vehicles Accidents Claims Tribunal-cum-District Judge, Saroornagar, Ranga Reddy District, in M.V.O.P. No. 310 of 1992, dated 9-2-1994 awarding a compensation of Rs. 17,10,000/-. The claimants, widow and children of T. Ravi, the deceased, filed cross-objections against the order disallowing the balance of compensation of Rs. 7,90,000/-
2. Briefly, the facts are that T. Ravi, was an industrialist. He was aged 30 years, earning about Rs. 10,000/- per month. While so, on 11-4-1990, when he was going in a jeep AAJ 4004 along with others and by the time they reached Mandinaguda, the driver of the car TSR 2745 belonging to M/s. M.R. Patel & Company, drove it in a rash and negligent manner, in a high speed, rashly and negligently, and dashed against the jeep, when it was coming in opposite direction, due to which the jeep went off the road, turned turtle and fell down due to which the petitioner-Ravi and others, who were occupants of jeep, sustained multiple grievous injuries on various parts of the body. Immediately, the injured-Ravi was shifted to Appolo Hospital, Hyderabad, in an unconscious state, went into coma and could not regain consciousness. He was treated in various hospitals, initially, at Appolo Hospitals, Hyderabad. From thereafter, he was shifted to St. Theresa Hospital on 26-8-1990 and treated till 26-5-1991 and later shifted to Nizam's Institute of Medical Sciences (NIMS), Hyderabad, from 26-5-1991 to 17-10-1991 and finally to his house in the month of June, 1993. He became completely disabled and a total wreck and died in coma. The father, representing him as guardian, filed the petition claiming Rs. 10,00,000/- under various heads, and later by way of amendment, enhanced the claim to Rs. 25,00,000/-. After the death of the deceased, the wife and children impleaded themselves as Legal Representatives.
3. In the trial Court, R-1 and R-3, the owners of the Car and jeep, respectively, did not contest the matter. Therefore, they were set exparte.
4. Oriental Insurance Company, the appellant, is the insurer for both the vehicles. It resisted the claim alleging that the accident was due to rash and negligent driving of the driver of the jeep. The police, after investigation, filed a final report before the Judicial First Class Magistrate to the effect that there was no rash or negligent driving on the part of the driver of the car and that the accident was vis major occurred due to the burst of tyre. The insurance policy in respect of the jeep was not comprehensive, and its driver was not covered by the policy and as there was no negligence on the part of the driver it need not pay any compensation. It put the petitioners to prove various claims made by them in the application, at any rate, the compensation of claim was highly excessive.
5. After enhancement of the claim made by the claimants, the appellant filed additional counter stating that the claims were highly excessive and exhorbitant and out of proportion. The Legal Representatives cannot succeed to the claims nor entitled to the amounts claimed by the deceased.
6. Upon the pleadings, the Court framed the following issues:
(1) Whether the accident occurred on 11-4-1990 at 12.30 noon at Madinaguda was due to the rash and negligent driving of the driver of jeep bearing No. AAJ 4004 or of the car bearing No. TSR 2745 or both resulting injuries to the petitioner.
(2) Whether the petitioner is entitled to any compensation? If so, to what amount and against whom?
(3) To what relief?
7. The petitioners-claimants in proof of their claim, examined P.Ws. 1 to 12 and filed Exs.A-1 to A-48, bills. The Insurance Company did not examine any witness. Exs.B-1 to B-7 and C-1 and C-2 were marked on its side.
8. The learned Judge after considering the oral evidence of P.W.3, an eye-witness, who travelled in the vehicle and in the light of documents, opined that the accident was due to rash and negligent driving of the driver of the car. In view of the evidence placed on record in regard to the treatment, expenses and earnings, the learned Judge, granted Rs. 5,93,689/- towards medical expenses, Rs. 1,00,000/- towards pain and suffering, Rs. 10,14,000/- towards loss of income, awarded Rs. 17,07,689/-, rounded it to Rs. 17,10,000/-.
9. Aggrieved by the said order, the insurer preferred this appeal contending that the learned Judge erred in finding that the driver of the car was negligent. He did not consider the First Information Report (F.I.R.) and other connected documents. There was negligence on the part of the driver of the jeep. In fact, the very deceased was driving the jeep and due to his rashness and negligence the accident took place. The compensation awarded under medical expenses, treatment etc., was exhorbitant, equally under the head of pain and suffering. The Tribunal ought not have granted Rs. 10,14,000/- under loss of income. The liability could not have been more than 50% as both the drivers are liable. Therefore, it prayed that the appeal be allowed setting aside the award.
10. The claimant filed cross objections contending that the trial Court erred in refusing to grant entire claim of Rs. 25,00,000/-. It could have awarded Rs. 6,00,000/- towards medical expenses. They have appointed three nurses and spent about Rs. 6,00,000/-. They prayed that the remaining amount of Rs. 7,90,000/- be granted.
11. The points that arise for consideration are:
(1) Whether the respondents-claimants can claim the amounts on the death of the deceased-Ravi and entitled to the amounts awarded by the Tribunal?
(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to further claim?
12. It is not in dispute that on 11-4-1990 while the deceased and P.W.3 and others were going in a jeep, it met with an accident, involving car bearing Regn. No. TSR 2795 and wherein Ravi had sustained injuries, went into coma and admitted in various hospitals and died on 26-6-1995. From the date of accident till his death, he did not regain his consciousness and died undoubtedly due to the injuries sustained by him in the motor vehicle accident. The insurer, the appellant herein, admits that it had insured both the vehicles evidenced under policies Exs.B-1 and B-2 respectively.
13. P.W.3, B. Narayana, an eyewitness, swore on oath and stated that while he along with Ravi and another were returning to Ramachandra puram after attending the marriage and by the time they reached Miyapur, the driver of the car coming in opposite direction overtook the lorry came to the opposite direction and dashed against the jeep. All of them have sustained injuries, while one Sarmadied while undergoing treatment. It may be stated herein that when P.W.3 was giving evidence, the original claimant Ravi was alive. P.W.3 stated that the injured was still unconscious.
14. At the out set, I may state that the Insurance Company did not seek any permission from the Tribunal to contest the claim on all grounds re-coursing to Section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act. It is settled law that where the owner remained ex parte, Insurance Company does not get an automatic right to defend the claim on the grounds not covered by Section 149 (2) of the Act.
15. I reiterate that the Insurance Company cannot assail the finding of the question of negligence. Even otherwise, in the light of the evidence of P.W.3, an eyewitness, it cannot be said that there was no rashness or negligence on the part of the driver of the car. It was not a case of head on collision. P.W.3 had clearly narrated the incident by stating that the driver of the car came on wrong side of the road by overtaking the lorry and dashed against their jeep. I reiterate there is no proof that deceased was negligent and caused the accident, on the other hand, the evidence shows that the driver of the Car was negligent.
16. The learned Counsel for the Insurance Company contended that the lower Court failed to consider F.I.R.-Ex.B-3, Case Diary-Ex.B-4 and Final Report-Ex.B-6 that show that the accident was due to the tyre burst. The trial Court did consider this aspect of the matter and observed that the report was given by the father of the owner of the car. The case was registered against the jeep driver. It was closed on the ground that there was no . negligence on the part of the jeep driver. It was observed that no report was taken from any of the occupants of jeep. It was not known as to what happened to the final report submitted by the police.
17. The Insurance Company did not choose to examine any of the witnesses to prove that there was negligence on the part of the driver of the jeep. Except taking contentions that there was head on collision, and that the liability to be restricted to 50% as the accident was due to vis major, no effort was made to establish these facts. It did not file even M.V.A. Report. The trial Court having considered all aspects of the matter came to the right conclusion that the accident was due to rash and negligent driving of the driver of car, and accordingly found this issue in favour of claimant. I am fully in agreement with this finding of the fact.
18. The injured being in coma, undergoing treatment, his father filed the petition claiming an amount of Rs. 10,00,000/- under various heads and later amended to Rs. 25,00,000/-. After the death of the injured, the wife, and children, did not seek any more compensation, except pursuing the very same claim.
19. Coming to the present case, it is not in dispute that the injured had been admitted in various hospitals, took treatment for about five years and succumbed to the injuries. All through he was under coma and 100% disabled.
20. P. W. 1, the wife, P. W.5, her father, and P.W.12, the father of the deceased, have reiterated as to the treatment underwent by the deceased in various hospitals and the amounts spent under various heads.
21. It is in their evidence that an amount of Rs. 1,15,129/- was spent when the deceased underwent treatment at Appolo Hospitals, Rs. 54,767/- at St. Theresa Hospital, Rs. 63,894/- at NIMS, and Rs. 48,606/- towards medicines, Rs. 2,00,000/-towards nursing etc., Rs. 49,000/- towards conveyance charges and salary of the driver and Rs. 24,000/- towards attendant charges and fee paid to the Acupuncturist. All these expenses are borne out by oral as well as documentary evidence.
22. In order to prove that the deceased had taken treatment in Appolo Hospitals, P. W.6, a consultant, Neuro Surgeon was examined. He deposed that "the patient was unconscious and is bleeding. C.T. Scan of the brain revealed injuries- (1) left temporal area and edema (2) diffused brain edema (3) fracture of left frontal bone". He categorically stated that "the patient did not regain consciousness and was in vegetative stage at the time of discharge". He also said that "he was paralysed on all four limbs with reduced movements and no control over urination and defecation." P.W.11, the Medical Officer, in-charge of administration in the Appolo Hospitals, proved the bills, Exs.A-1 to A-41, totalling Rs. 1,15,129/-.
23. P. W.8, Assistant, working in St. Theresa Hospital filed Ex.A-1(a) to A-1(i), bills, amounting to Rs. 54,767/-. He further stated that during the entire treatment, the injured was in unconscious state and was treated by Neurologist Dr. Balaparameswar Rao.
24. An amount of Rs. 63,894/- was spent during treatment at NIMS. The claimants examined P.W.8, the office assistant-cum-receptionist, who produced case sheet Ex.X-9. P.W.9, the Medical Officer of NIMS filed case sheet Ex.X-10. He categorically stated that the deceased was attended by a Neuro Surgeon. The deceased was provided with staff nurses in addition to the nursing care, and was unconscious at the time of discharge, Ex. A-5 is the discharge card, P. W. 1 filed a bunch of medical bills 294 in number, marked as Ex.A-1 series. All these come to Rs. 2,82,397/-. The claimants have paid Rs. 4,000/- per month to P.W.2, a qualified nurse throughout. According to her, an amount of Rs. 2,00,000/- was incurred towards the expenditure on nursing to attend on the deceased.
25. The trial Court opined that the amount claimed under this head was exaggerated. However, he came to the conclusion that the deceased was bed-ridden and P.W.2 was engaged for four years two months. P.W.7 Dr. Hanumantha Rao, an Acupuncturist, deposed that he had charged Rs. 5,000/- per month and filed Ex.A-4, a bunch often receipts showing that he received Rs. 5,000/- per month.
26. Evidently, the deceased was owning a car, employed P. W.4 as driver. The trial Court, having found that an amount of Rs. 49,000/-was spent towards conveyance charges etc., awarded the said amount as they were based on authenticated record. In this regard, it cannot be said that the amount that was granted was either excessive or exhorbitant. All these were covered by documentary evidence, vouch-safed by the hospital authorities concerned.
27. The compensation can be awarded if the claimant had proved that he sustained injury in accident which was result of rash and negligent driving on the part of the driver of the vehicle and on account of that injury or injuries he sustained loss which can be calculated in terms of money. It may include pain, sufferings, agony and loss of income, etc. In view of provisions of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant would get the compensation on account of the death of a person, who has been killed in an accident in which vehicle has been involved, if they represent the deceased or his legal representatives,
28. When one carefully looks to the contexts of Sections 163-A, 165 and 166 of the Act, one finds that the claimant has to prove, with reference to cogent, plausible and reasonable evidence that the injury was sustained by him in the course of and because of an accident occurring due to a motor vehicle and that he suffered because of such injury, and that he is entitled to compensation, hence, his application under Section 166 of the Act. If at all, these three sections cumulatively fortify the principle that without evidence and proof; of the injury and its resultant effects, the amount of compensation cannot be determined at all: Union of India v. Cheman Lal AIR 1996 J & K 27.
29. The learned Counsel for the appellant contended that the maxim 'actio personalis moritur cum persona' is applicable to the instant case. The petition was filed by the deceased when he had sustained injuries. On his death, his wife and children continued the proceedings which they could not have done. In view of the fact that the cause of action does not survive, the petitioners were not entitled to the amount.
30. It is not in dispute that the injured died due to the injuries sustained in the accident. The voluminous medical record would unerringly point out that the death was due to the injuries. In fact, he did not regain consciousness having sustained injuries in the motor vehicle accident. Consequently, the injured would be entitled to both pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages.
31. It is not in dispute that the action for personal injury not causing the death of injured does not survive and does not pass over to his legal representatives in view of Section 306 of the Succession Act, 1925. However, the claim under the Act also relates to the estate of the deceased, the action survives on the death of claimant and passes over to his legal representatives.
32. At the earliest, our own High Court in Kongara Narayanamma and Ors. v. Uppala China Simhachalam and Ors. 1975 (2) An.W.R. 130 considering the provisions of Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act (for brevity 'the Act') opined that:
When a person sues for compensation in respect of the injuries sustained by him under Section 110-A (1)(a) of the Act, compensation may be claimed in respect of not only the physical injury but also the mental suffering including any experience (sic. expenditure) he might have incurred for treatment etc. He may also claim damages towards loss to the property consequent upon the accident, if the compensation awardable in respect of some of the items can be said to have resulted in loss to the property of the injured person, there is nothing in law or Section 110-A(1)(a) of the Act which prohibits a claim for compensation being made in that behalf. In such cases the maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona cannot be invoked, if the accident instead of resulting in an injury resulted in the death of a person, under the law the legal representatives can claim compensation for loss of the estate of the deceased. If an action is initiated by an injured person for compensation in respect of items which involve loss to his property why should it not survive to the legal representatives when he dies during the pendency of an action?
Finally, His Lordship has opined that it was no bar to the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased being allowed to prosecute the cause of action of their predecessor under Clause (a) of Section 110-A of the Act when the same was permissible under law on the footing that the cause of action survived to them.
33. The trial Court has awarded loss of earnings as a loss to the estate. Had the deceased survived, he had been living a life of total wreck with 100% disability, the loss of earnings would have been fixed taking his age and appropriate multiplier at the time of trial. I reiterate that the injured, as he was in coma, his father filed the petition representing as natural guardian. On his death, his wife and children were impleaded and continued the proceedings. His Lordship in the above decision, relying on Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 28, page 100, observed:
If after the death of a person injured, the legal representatives could claim for pain and suffering loss of earnings as loss to the estate. I fail to see on what principle if a claim was made by an injured person and he dies thereafter the cause of action in respect of the aforementioned things would not survive to the legal representatives.
(emphasis mine)
34. The learned Judge has concluded that under Section 110-A(1)(a), the cause of action survives to the heirs or legal representatives on the death of the claimant and the pending proceeding could be continued by them in respect of compensation claimed for physical injuries even where the physical injuries had later resulted in the death of the deceased after his making a claim.
35. Subsequently, the said decision was followed in Nurani Jamal and Ors. v. Naram Srinivasarao and Ors. by reiterating the right to sue in such cases survives and the legal representatives of the original petitioner are entitled to come on record to prosecute the original petition filed by the deceased.
36. The learned Counsel relying on Kannamma v. Deputy General Manager, Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation contended that legal representatives cannot claim compensation for personal injuries and also compensation towards expenses, loss of income etc., i.e., loss to the estate, as claim application will be abated. I may state that their Lordships have made a categorical observation that:
... But, if the death of the person, undoubtedly, occurs as a result of bodily injuries sustained by him/her legal representatives to claim compensation under various heads, such as, expenses incurred for obtaining medical treatment for him/her, loss of his/her earnings between the date of accident and the date of death, paid and suffering undergone by him/her due to bodily injuries sustained. If claim for compensation under such heads made by the person injured or his/her authorized agent is pending adjudication either before the Claims Tribunal or an appellate Court, there can be no valid reason as to why on such person's death such claim for compensation shall not survive to his/her authorized agent is pending adjudication either before the Claims Tribunal or an appellate court, there can be no valid reason as to why on such person's death such claim for compensation shall not survive to his/ her legal representatives and they be permitted to prosecute the claim as loss suffered by the estate of the deceased. Claim for such compensation made by the persons injured as loss to his/her estate on his/her death must be regarded as surviving, for even otherwise they would be entitled to make a claim in that behalf on the death of the person injured as a consequence; of bodily injuries sustained in the motor accident as provided for under Clauses (b) and (c) of Sub-section (1) of Section 110-A of the Act. This would be the correct legal position, which becomes evidence when seen from yet another angle, to wit, the cause of action for claim for compensation for personal injuries by the person injured and the cause of action for the claim for compensation for the death of the person injured as a consequence of such injuries, by his legal representatives, is common, the motor accident caused by the tortfeasor....
37. As we could see though the words were couched in the negative form, it was observed that the decision in Kongara Narayanamma's case 1975 (2) An.W.R. 130 : 1975 ACJ 448 (A.P.), was dissented since His Lordship was considering a question where the death was unrelated to the injuries sustained by the claimant in the accident.
38. However, coming to the facts, it is not in dispute that the deceased died as a consequence of the bodily injuries sustained by him in the accident. In fact, their Lordships considering the above said context, observed:
A claim petition presented under Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, by the person sustaining bodily injuries in a motor accident, claiming compensation for personal injuries as also for compensation to wards expenses, loss of income, etc., (loss to the estate) can, on such person's death occurring as a result or consequence of bodily injuries sustained in the motor accident, be prosecuted by his/her legal representatives only in so far as the claim for compensation in that claim petition relates to loss to the estate of the deceased person due to bodily injuries sustained in the motor accident.
(emphasis supplied)
39. The learned Counsel for the appellant also relied on M. Veerappa v. Evelyn Sequeira and Ors. on the contention that cause of action does not survive on the death of the person. It was a case where damages were claimed in a suit against a counsel. It was held that the claim abated consequent on the death of the plaintiff. I may state that a suit for damages cannot be equated with the compensation claimed under Motor Vehicles Act. This is made clear in the above decision, which I do not intend to repeat.
40. In Adapaka Eswaramma and Ors. v. N. Chandra Sekhar this Court reiterated that the Maxim "actio personalis moritur cum persona" has no application where there is loss to the estate of the deceased to the claims under the Motor Vehicles Act. In the said decision, however, His Lordship while following the decisions relied above, opined that the death of the deceased was not due to the injuries sustained by him in the accident. In view of the said finding, His Lordship has granted compensation, spent to wards medical expenses apart from general damages to a tune of Rs. 5,000/-.
41. The Supreme Court recently in New India Assurance Company Limited v. Charlile and Anr. held that in a case where the injured has suffered 100 per cent, the logic applicable to a deceased can, in appropriate cases, taking note of all relevant factors be reasonably applied.
42. Coming to the facts, since the evidence discloses that the death has occurred as a result or consequence of bodily injuries sustained in the motor accident, his wife and children can prosecute the claim, they are entitled towards expenses, personal injuries, loss of income (loss to estate) as laid in the above said decisions.
43. The trial Court applied multiplier table since the very same multiplier table is to be adopted both for fatal accidents as well as injuries. In this regard, it is necessary to refer to a decision A.P. State Road Transport Corporation, rep. by its G.M. Musheerabad v. G. Ramanaiah 1987 (2) ALT 526. It was observed that:
It is logically and mathematically unthinkable (nay, impossible) to have separate multiplier tables for fatal cases because for each age (at death or at trial in accident case) the basic material, namely, the mortality rates and the conversion rates will be the same. There is no change in basic data so far as the period from which the 'estimate' for future is to be made.
It is clear that the multiplier in cases of death are to be chosen, from the same table, with reference to the age of the deceased at his death or with reference to the age of the injured at the trial, (the loss up to trial being computed on actuals without the need to take future uncertainities into account because, the injured is alive till the trial in flesh and blood and there is no uncertainty about it till the trial).
The age with reference to which a multiplier is chosen may vary from one situation to another. It may be (a) the age at death in fatal cases; (b) age at the time of trial in injury cases; (c) age of a person at his superannuation for computing pensions, (d) age of a person at the time of voluntary retirement for commuting pensions; (e) age of parents, at the time of death of a child because the dependency will last only for the remaining period of life of the parents etc.,
44. Coming to the facts of the present case, the deceased was a businessman, aged 35 years (Ex. A-3-the Secondary School Certificate showing date of birth 16-7-1979). Ex.A-7isthe Certificate issued by the Registry in the name of the deceased, P. W.1, the wife, filed Ex. A-13 return showing the statement of profit and loss account for three years 1992 to 1994. Ex,A-10 are assessments, of income tax. His assessments of income tax for years 1987-88, 1988-89 and 1989-90 are progressive indication in profits.
45. He was running an ancillary industry to BHEL situated at Ramachandrapuram. Ex.A-13 shows the deceased had earned a net profit of Rs. 30,000/- in the year 1991-92, Rs. 35,000/- in the year 1993 and Rs. 55,000/-in the year 1994. The assessment orders for the year 1987-88, 1988-89 and 1989-90 show the income at Rs. 18,900/-, Rs. 41,430/- and Rs. 53,240/-, respectively. He was paying advance taxes for the financial year 1987-88. He paid Rs. 12,703/- and in the year of accident, he paid Rs. 11,073/-. The trial Court had taken the annual income for 1988-89 at Rs. 53,240/-as mentioned in Ex.A-10. Since this computation of income arrived basing on un-rebutted documentary evidence, there cannot be any difficulty in relying the same. The trial Court has estimated the past earnings after the date of trial forfour years three months at Rs. 2,29,677/-. In regard to future loss of earnings, the very same multiplier suitable to his age was taken at '14.8'. The trial Court observed about future loss of earnings. No increase was made in regard to future loss of earning. The income remained stand still. It would reasonably come to Rs. 7,84,400/-.
46. In the light of the above decisions, the computation cannot be said to be high. The learned Counsel for the claimants contended that the trial Court ought to have awarded some more compensation on the head of loss of estate. The deceased was running a small scale industry and it was not known as to the profits that could be derived later. In fact, P.W.1 has let out the premises to another entrepreneuron a rent of Rs. 2,000/-. However, this suggestion was made to prove that she was getting income more than Rs. 10,000/- per month. Her admission was considered mistakenly by the trial Court, at any rate, the trial Court having taken all the criteria, rightly arrived at the relevant compensation. I do not see any flaw which requires modification.
47. The trial Court has awarded an amount of Rs. 1,00,000/- under the head of non-pecuniary loss by relying on the judgment of Gujarat High Court in 1982 ACJ (Suppl.) 1, wherein a compensation of Rs. 75,000/- was granted towards person who became total wreck.
48. In Ward v. James, Lord Denning observed that:
award of damages in personal injury cases is basically a conventional figure derived from experience and from awards in comparable cases. Thus, in a case involving loss of limb, or its permanent inability; or impairment, it is difficult to say with precise certainty as to what compensation would be adequate to the sufferer. The reason is that the loss of a human limb, or its permanent impairment cannot be measured, or converted in terms of money.
49. By relying on a decision in Satyanarayana v. Babu Rajendraprasad 1988 ACJ 88 His Lordship held that the compensation under this head consists mainly in standardizing amounts and upgrading past awards in keeping with the earnings to meet the current values of money.
50. Considering the above said decisions, the trial Court had taken the wholesale price index in 1979 as 206. It would be 334, after five years, and in 1986, it was 372. By 1990, it was observed that it would be more than 100% increase. In such a case, the most conservative amount that one can award would be Rs. 1,00,000/- towards pain and suffering, as he was confined to bed and forced to live purposeless existence.
51. To sum up, the original petitioner, died during the pendency of the trial, continued by the Legal Representatives. He sustained injuries to the brain and other parts of the body, fell in coma, from which he never recovered. H is death was directly attributable to the injuries sustained in the motor vehicle accident. He was a businessman, aged 36 years by the date of filing of the petition. The family spent around Rs. 6,00,000/- towards medical and other expenses, supported by the evidence of medical officers. It was proved that there was loss of income to a tune of Rs. 10,14,000/-. It was considered as loss to the estate. An amount of Rs. 1,00,000/- was awarded towards pain and suffering as non-pecuniary loss. In awarding Rs. 17,10,000/-, I do not see any flaw either in appreciation of fact or Law in this regard.
52. The learned Counsel for the appellants contended that the interest awarded at 12% was excessive. In fact, the Supreme Court in Kaushnuma Begum v. New India Assurance Company Limited while considering the component of interest, opined that awarding interest at 9% would be adequate and reasonable. Therefore, the component of interest is reduced to 9% instead of 12%.
53. In the result, the appeal as well as Cross-Objections are dismissed except the above modification of interest. The insurer is directed to pay interest at 9% instead of 12% awarded. The award is confirmed in regard to the rest of the claim. No costs.