Delhi District Court
Ashok Gupta vs M/S Modi Rubber Limited on 17 November, 2021
IN THE COURT OF SHRI NARESH KUMAR LAKA
ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE - 03, SOUTH EAST,
SAKET COURTS, NEW DELHI
In the matter of:
RCA No. 25/2020
Ashok Gupta
...........Appellant
vs.
M/s Modi Rubber Limited
...........Respondent
RCA No. 20/2020
M/s Modi Rubber Limited
...........Appellant
vs.
Ashok Gupta
...........Respondent
Date of Institution of appeal : 11.03.2020 & 26.02.2020
Final arguments concluded on: 08.11.2021
Date of decision : 17.11.2021
Result : Disposed of
APPEAL UNDER SECTION 96 CPC
JUDGEMENT
Aggrieved by the decision in the judgment/decree dated 20.01.2020 passed by Shri Vinod Joshi, Ld. Civil Judge-05, Central RCAs No.25/2020 and 20/2020 No. 1 of 20 District, Tis Hazari Court in Suit No. 91/18, both the parties preferred separate appeals under Section 96 CPC. I have heard arguments on the said appeals from Sh. Siddharth Aggarwal, Ld. Counsel for Shri Ashok Gupta and Sh. Siddharth Dias, Ld. Counsel for M/s. Modi Rubber Ltd. For the sake of convenience, Shri Ashok Gupta is referred to as plaintiff and M/s. Modi Rubber Ltd as defendant hereinafter.
Brief background of the case
2. The plaintiff was appointed by the defendant as Law Officer (Taxation) in its Department of Accounts vide appointment letter dated 24.01.1980. The plaintiff was initially posted at Modi Puram, Meerut, UP at a salary of Rs. 1200 per months along with other allowances. The services of the plaintiff were confirmed by the defendant on 24.10.1981 vide letter dated 09.11.1981. It is alleged that on 08.09.1997, the defendant company did not allow the plaintiff to enter into the premises of the defendant company and the plaintiff was informed that the defendant company has terminated his services with immediate effect.
3. Aggrieved by the alleged illegal dismissal, the plaintiff approached the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi by filing a Writ Petition titled as 'Ashok Gupta vs. Union of India & Ors.' but later on he withdrew the aforesaid writ petition and filed civil suit on 29.09.2003.
4. The plaintiff claimed various reliefs in the said civil suit, including a declaration to that effect that the termination of services of RCAs No.25/2020 and 20/2020 No. 2 of 20 plaintiff on 08.09.1997 was mala fide, arbitrary, punitive and illegal; relief of mandatory injunction for a direction to defendant to reinstate him with full back wages and all consequential benefits. Ld. Trial Court decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff on 04.01.2012 declaring that the termination of services of plaintiff was illegal and arbitrary and plaintiff was held entitled for recovery of Rs. 11560 (2187 towards salary for seven days for the month of September, 1997 and Rs. 9373 towards salary of one month).
5. The plaintiff filed an appeal bearing RCA No. 117 of 2013 against the said judgment. The Appellate Court of Ld. ADJ remanded the matter back to the Ld. Trial Court with a direction to calculate the compensation as per law. Thereafter, the Ld. Trial Court vide its judgment dated 12.07.2016 again decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff by enhancing the compensation which includes granting salary for 06 months along with interest @12%. The decretal amount, this time was calculated as Rs. 56,238 along with interest @ 12% from the date of termination till the date of realization.
6. Aggrieved by the aforesaid decision, the plaintiff again filed an appeal bearing RCA No. 35/17 on 07.04.2017 and the Appellate Court of Ld. ADJ vide judgment dated 13.11.2017 remanded the matter back to the Trial Court to calculate the compensation as per law.
7. Aggrieved by the judgment dated 13.11.2017, the defendant filed an appeal under Section 100 CPC before the Hon'ble High Court. The RCAs No.25/2020 and 20/2020 No. 3 of 20 Hon'ble High Court dismissed the said appeal and upheld the remand order dated 13.11.2017. Third time, the suit of the plaintiff was decreed by enhancing the compensation to Rs.3 lakhs and the said judgment/decree is under challenge in the present appeal.
8. The respondent also challenged the said decision by filing an appeal by raising rival contentions. By this common judgement, I shall decide both the said appeals together.
Reasons for Decision
9. From the aforesaid sequences of events and various decisions of the Ld. Trial Court as well as their appeals, it is clear that the finding of the Ld. Trial Court on the point that the termination of the services of the plaintiff was illegal has attained finality. In the present appeals, mainly the issue of quantum of compensation and other service benefits have been raised and challneged.
10. In the previous three separate judgments of the Ld. Trial Court, none of the courts granted any relief of full back wages to the plaintiff. In the present appeal, the main contention of the plaintiff is on the said point that the plaintiff was not granted full back wages from the date of his termination (i.e. 08.09.1997) till the date of his superannuation (i.e. 23.04.2009) and he has also claimed other service benefits in commensuration with the said date of superannuation. From the prayer RCAs No.25/2020 and 20/2020 No. 4 of 20 clause, it is seen that the plaintiff has claimed the relief of reinstatement with full back wages.
11. In this regard, the plaintiff heavily relief on the observations of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Gammon India Ltd. Vs. Niranjan Das (1984) 1 SCC 509 as under:
"4. In the course of hearing of this appeal, it was stated that the respondent has reached the age of superannuation therefore physical reinstatement in service is not possible. Appellant will have to establish that fact but in the event, the appellant shows that under a valid rule, respondent has reached the age of superannuation and therefore physical reinstatement is not possible, it is hereby declared that the respondent shall continue to be in service uninterruptedly from the date of the attempted termination of service till the date of superannuation. Respondent would be entitled to all back wages including the benefit of revised wages or salary if during the period there is revision of pay-scales with yearly increment, revised dearness allowance or variable dearness allowance and all terminal benefits if he has reached the age of superannuation such as Provident Fund, Gratuity etc. Back wages should be calculated as if the respondent continued in service uninterrupted. He is also entitled to leave encashment and bonus if other workmen in the same category were paid the same. It appears that the respondent has been unlawfully kept out of service, therefore it is but just that the appellant company shall pay all the arrears as calculated according to the directions herein given with 12 per cent interest from the date the amount became due and payable till realisation. Appellant shall also pay costs to the respondent quantified at Rs 5000. The appellant is directed to pay the amount as herein directed to be paid within 3 months from today."
12. From the perusal of the aforesaid judgment and the other RCAs No.25/2020 and 20/2020 No. 5 of 20 judgments/case-laws as relied by the plaintiff, this court finds that the aforesaid observations and the judgment apply to the cases which are applicable to the 'workman', as defined in the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 and only when such workman is terminated or dismissed illegally as a punishment or stigma. The said judgments do not apply to the present case firstly because the plaintiff was not a workman and it has been admitted specifically in his cross-examination by the plaintiff himself by saying that his salary was beyond the amount of wages which is covered in the said Act. Secondly, the aforesaid judgments mainly apply when the workman is dismissed or terminated with a stigma or punishment and not to the cases of retrenchment. In the instant case, the termination letter provides that the services of the plaintiff were terminated due to business exigencies and administrative reasons and, therefore, it cannot be said that the termination of the plaintiff was infliction of a punishment.
13. The Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 takes a wider view of termination of employee as 'retrenchment'. Section 2(oo) of the said Act defines 'retrenchment' as under:
"Section 2(oo) of ID Act. Retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include -
(a) voluntary retirement of the workman or
(b) retirement of the workmen on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between RCAs No.25/2020 and 20/2020 No. 6 of 20 the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf; or (bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein;
(c) termination of the service of a workman on the ground of continued ill-health."
14. It may be noted that the termination by way of retrenchment can be for any reason whatsoever. Apart from the issue of definition, what is critical is that an employer must carry out retrenchment (other than dismissal on grounds of misconduct), as per the requirements of section 25F of the ID Act. The Section 25F provides for the employer to fulfill certain conditions before retrenching any employee. The said Section is reproduced as under:
Section 25F of ID Act No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until-
a. the workman has been given one month' s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice;
b. the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six months; and RCAs No.25/2020 and 20/2020 No. 7 of 20 c. notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.
15. In the instant case, there is a finding of the Ld. Trial Court that the notice of termination was not served upon the plaintiff. Therefore, it can be said that the plaintiff was not properly retrenched as per the procedure provided in the ID Act. Although the ID Act does not apply to the plaintiff, yet an analogy can be drawn about the course of action to be followed in that eventuality from the following observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India:
16. In the case of BSNL v. Man Singh, (2012) 1 SCC 558, Ho'ble Supreme Court held that when the termination is set aside because of violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, it is not necessary that relief of reinstatement be also given as a matter of right.
17. In the case of Telecom District Manager v. Keshab Deb [(2008) 8 SCC 402] the Hon'ble Supreme Court emphasized that automatic direction for reinstatement of the workman with full back wages is not contemplated. He was at best entitled to one months' pay in lieu of one month's notice and wages of 15 days of each completed year of service as envisaged under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. He could not have been directed to be regularized in service or granted/given a temporary status. Such a scheme has been held to be unconstitutional in A. RCAs No.25/2020 and 20/2020 No. 8 of 20 Umarani v. Registrar, Coop. Societies [(2004) 7 SCC 112] and Secy, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi [(2006) 4 SCC 1].
18. In the case of Coal India Ltd. v. Ananta Saha [(2011) 5 SCC 142] and Metropolitan Transport Corporation v. V. Venkatesan [(2009) 9 SCC 601], it was held that even when reinstatement was ordered, it does not automatically follow full back wages should be directed to be paid to the workman.
19. In the landmark case of BSNL v. Bhuramal, (2014) 7 SCC 177 : AIR 2014 SC 1188, Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under:
"It is clear from the reading of the aforesaid judgments that the ordinary principle of grant of reinstatement with full back wages, when the termination is found to be illegal is not applied mechanically in all cases. While that may be a position where services of a regular/permanent workman are terminated illegally and/or mala fide and/or by way of victimization, unfair labour practice etc. However, when it comes to the case of termination of a daily wage worker and where the termination is found illegal because of procedural defect, namely in violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, this Court is consistent in taking the view in such cases reinstatement with back wages is not automatic and instead the workman should be given monetary compensation which will meet the ends of justice. Rationale for shifting in this direction is obvious.
Reasons for denying the relief of reinstatement in such cases are obvious. It is trite law that when the termination is found to be illegal because of non-payment of retrenchment compensation and notice pay as mandatorily required under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, even after RCAs No.25/2020 and 20/2020 No. 9 of 20 reinstatement, it is always open to the management to terminate the services of that employee by paying him the retrenchment compensation."
20. In the case of St. John's School v. Asha Bhan, 2012 SCC OnLine Del 3769, Hon'ble High Court of Delhi referred to following landmark observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court which lay down the guiding principles as under:
In Allahabad Jal Sansthan v. Daya Shankar Rai, (2005) II LLJ 847 SC, the Supreme Court inter alia observed as under:
"We have referred to certain decisions of this Court to highlight that earlier in the event of an order of dismissal being set aside, reinstatement with full back-wages was the usual result. But now with the passage of time, it has come to be realized that industry is being compelled to pay the workman for a period during which he apparently contributed little or nothing at all, for a period that was spent unproductively, while the workman is being compelled to go back to a situation which prevailed many years ago when he was dismissed. It is necessary for us to develop a pragmatic approach to problems dogging industrial relations. However, no just solution can be offered but the golden mean may he arrived at."
In Kendriya Vadvalaya Sangathan v. S.C. Sharma, (2005) II LJ 153 SC, the Supreme Court granted only 25% of total back-wages to the respondent. In Hindustan Motors Ltd. v. Tapan Kumar Bhattacharva. (2002) II LLJ 1156 SC, the Supreme Court awarded 50% of the back-wages till the RCAs No.25/2020 and 20/2020 No. 10 of 20 date of reinstatement of the respondent. In U.P. State Electricity Board v. Laxmi Kant Gupta, 2009 LLR 1, the Supreme Court referring to its decision in U.P. State Brassware Corporation Ltd. (supra) and Haryana State Electronics Development Corporation v. Mamni, (2006) 9 SCC 434 : AIR 2006 SC 2427 inter alia observed as under:
"Thus it is evident that there has been a shift in the legal position which has been modified by this Court and now there is no hard and fast principle now that on the termination of service being found to be illegal, the normal rule is re- instatement with back wages. Compensation can be awarded instead, at the discretion of the Labour Court, depending on the facts and circumstances of the case."
The proposition of law, which emerges from these judgments, is that even if the dismissal or termination of an employee from service is illegal, he is not entitled to whole of the back- wages as a matter of right, and the Court needs to award a suitable compensation after considering all the facts and circumstances of the case before it.
21. On the point of mitigating circumstances, the Hon'ble High Court finally held in the aforesaid case of St. John's School (supra) as under:
"This also cannot be disputed that the plaintiff/respondent should have tried to mitigate her loss either by taking alternative employment or generating alternative sources of income. As regards the plaintiff/respondent taking up another employment as a teacher, this is appellants, own case that the defendant/respondent was overage for being employed as a teacher in a school. Therefore, she could not have got RCAs No.25/2020 and 20/2020 No. 11 of 20 appointment as a teacher. It is, however, difficult to dispute that being a qualified teacher, the plaintiff/respondent could have taken up assignment such as home tuitions to earn her livelihood. There is no evidence of any such attempt having been made by the plaintiff to mitigate her damages either by exploring alternative avenues of employment or by trying to take home tuitions. She could also have sought appointment in a private coaching centre. There is no evidence of that option having been explored by her."
22. From the aforesaid judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India as well as our own High Court, it is clear that even if the case of the plaintiff is presumed to be covered within the ambit of Industrial Dispute Act, 1947, in that case also the plaintiff is not entitled for automatic reinstatement or full back wages, as claimed by him.
23. In the case of retrenchment under the ID Act, he can be said to be entitled for 15 days of salary for one year of service for the total number of years rendered in past along with one month's salary as notice period. However, in the instant case, the plaintiff is not covered under the said ID Act, therefore, he cannot be said to be entitled for the compensation as per the aforesaid provision of Section 25F of the ID Act.
24. Now, a question arises as to how the compensation of the plaintiff can be assessed. The plaintiff claimed compensation by filing the civil suit and in the absence of applicability of any special statute, the compensation can be assessed as per the contract of a master and servant RCAs No.25/2020 and 20/2020 No. 12 of 20 read with Section 73 and 74 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872.
25. The appointment letter of the plaintiff provided a clause of severing of the contract by either side upon serving one month's notice or on payment of one month's salary in lieu of notice period.
26. The Ld. Counsel for the defendant heavily relied on the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of S.S. Shetty v. Bharat Nidhi Ltd., (1958) SCR 442 where it was observed as under:
"The position as it obtains in the ordinary law of master and servant is quite clear. The master who wrongfully dismisses his servant is bound to pay him such damages as will compensate him for the wrong that he has sustained. They are to be assessed by reference to the amount earned in the service wrongfully terminated and the time likely to elapse before the servant obtains another post for which he is fitted. If the contract expressly provides that it is terminable upon, e.g., a month's notice, the damages will ordinarily be a month's wages.
No compensation can be claimed in respect of the injury done to the servant's feeling by the circumstances of his dismissal, nor in respect of extra difficulty of finding work resulting from those circumstances. A servant who has been wrongfully dismissed must use diligence to seek another employment and the fact that he has been offered a suitable post may be taken into account in assessing the damages. (Chitty on Contracts, 21st Ed., Vol. (2), p. 559 para. 1040).
If the contract of employment is for a specific term, the servant would, in that event, be entitled to damages the amount of RCAs No.25/2020 and 20/2020 No. 13 of 20 which would be measured prima facie and subject to the rule of mitigation in the salary of which the master had deprived him (Vide Collier v. Sunday Referee Publishing Co., Ltd.). The servant would then be entitled to the whole of the salary, benefits etc. which he would have earned had he continued in the employment of the master for the full term of the contract, subject of course to mitigation of damages by way of seeking alternative employment.
Such damages would be recoverable by the servant for his wrongful dismissal by the master only on the basis of the master having committed a breach of the contract of employment. If, however, the contract is treated as subsisting and a claim is made by the servant for a declaration that he continues in the employment of the master and should be awarded his salary, benefits, etc., on the basis of the continuation of the contract, the servant would be entitled to a declaration that he continues in the employment of the master and would only be entitled to the payment of salary, benefits, etc., which accrued due to him up to the date of the institution of the suit."
27. The counsel for the plaintiff vehemently argued that the defendant has admitted liability of Rs.5,46,737 in the proceedings before the Board for Industrial & Financial Reconstruction (BIFR) and this admission is binding being upheld/endorsed by Ld. ADJ in his judgement dated 13.11.2017 as well as Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in the Order dated 23.07.2019. On the other hand, the counsel for the defendant argued that the said amount of Rs.5,46,737 was shown as a contingent liability in said proceedings and it is not an admission.
RCAs No.25/2020 and 20/2020 No. 14 of 2028. From the perusal of the aforesaid orders of Ld. ADJ and the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi, it is seen that although a reference was made of the amount of Rs.5,46,737 in the concluding observations but it is noted that the said Orders were not in the form of final finding or decision on the said particular amount when the matter was remanded back to the Ld. Trial Court to calculate the compensation as per law. The words "as per law" are of great significance and the Ld. Trial Court was duty bound to consider the legal admissibility and the evidentiary value of the said statement of the defendant on the point of disclosure of said amount, on merits. It is a settled position of law that this court being the first Appellant Court is empowered to evaluate the entire facts and the findings of the present suit including question of law and fact.
29. The word "Contingent" shows that there was no admission of the liability of the defendant and the said amount of Rs.5,46,737 was shown as an estimated or guessed or contingent liability which may or may not arise. Further, the said amount of Rs.5,46,737 could not be said to be estimated towards making payment of the plaintiff only and rather it would include the expenses for litigation, court fees, advocate's fees etc. for contesting the claim of the plaintiff in different courts of law. From the record of the defendant company filed before the BIFR, it is also seen that the defendant was obliged to indicate the statement of estimated credit and loss amount in respect of the assets of the said company for the purpose of examination of the issue whether the defendant company can be declared as a sick industry or not. Therefore, this court holds that mere mentioning RCAs No.25/2020 and 20/2020 No. 15 of 20 of the said amount before a third party/agency cannot be treated as an admission against the defendant. As such, the finding of the Ld. Trial Court treating the said amount as an admission is illegal and not as per the established principles of law of evidence.
30. The Ld. Trial Court also relied on the statement of the plaintiff dated 24.03.2015 where the plaintiff had restricted its claim to the tune of Rs.3 lakh only. In the present appeal, the plaintiff also questioned the said finding of the Ld. Trial Court on the interpretation of the said statement. The pecuniary jurisdiction of the Civil Court in Delhi is upto Rs.3 lakh and if the plaintiff had any intention to claim any amount greater than Rs.3 lakh or for claiming the so called admitted amount of Rs.5,46,737, he ought to have sought the said relief by seeking necessary amendment in the plaint as well as relief clause. In that eventuality, the plaintiff would be required to pay requisite court fee and the plaint was to be returned as per law. Anyway, this court is of the considered opinion that when no specific amount has been claimed by the plaintiff greater than Rs.3 lakh, the said situation does not arise and the suit was otherwise maintainable because the claim of the plaintiff was towards reinstatement with full back wages which were not ascertainable at that time. Therefore, this court is of the considered opinion that when the suit was maintainable on the pecuniary aspect keeping in mind the prayer clauses which were not connected with the alleged amount of Rs. 5,46,737, the recording of statement on 24.03.2015 lost its significance.
RCAs No.25/2020 and 20/2020 No. 16 of 2031. The defendant also raised an issue that the impugned judgement/decree not only awarded the amount of Rs.3 lakh, but also awarded the amount of the previous decree dated 04.01.2012 and total decretal amount of the said two decrees crossed the amount of Rs.3 lakh which was beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Civil Court. In the opinion of this court, the Trial Court committed illegality on that account by passing such order.
Conclusion
32. From the perusal of the entire record and the above cited case laws/judgements of the Hon'ble Apex Court as well as our own High Court, this court holds as under:
1) The termination of the plaintiff comes within the meaning of retrenchment and in that eventuality as per Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, the plaintiff would be entitled for 15 days of salary of each year of his service for the total number of years rendered in the past along with one month's notice period which can be assessed as Rs. 9373 X1/2 X 18 = 84,357 as 15 days salary of a month for total 17 years and 8 months of past service plus one month's notice period i.e. Rs.9373, totaling to Rs.93,730. (This is only an analogy and the said Section 25F does not apply to the plaintiff because he was not a workman). But in that case also, the plaintiff cannot be said to be entitled for entire full back wages.
2) From the aforesaid authorities, it is clear that while considering the back wages, the situation of the management is also required to be kept in mind (Ref: Thankur Singh Rawat v. Jagjit Industries Ltd., Division Bench of Hon'ble High Court of Delhi, 2004 SCC OnLine Del 772). In the RCAs No.25/2020 and 20/2020 No. 17 of 20 instant case, the plaintiff admitted in his cross examination that some of the plants of the plaintiff company were closed down. When a question was asked in his cross-examination about the financial crises of the defendant company, he did not deny it and simply replied that he does not know about it, which indirectly amounts to be an admission.
3) The record of BIFR itself shows that the defendant was facing proceedings for declaring it as a sick industry and the said situation occasions when a company is not either doing well or facing financial debt or liability. The termination letter of the plaintiff also specifically finds mentioned that his services were terminated on account of business exigency and administrative reasons. Accordingly, this court is of the considered view that in such circumstances, the plaintiff does not deserve award of full back wages which is generally given in a case where the termination is punitive in nature which is not the case herein.
4) The appointment letter of the plaintiff also specifically provides a clause that the services of the plaintiff can be severed by one month's notice from either side or on payment of one month's salary in lieu of notice period.
5) The case of the plaintiff is also distinguishable from the ordinary cases of workmen under the ID Act because he is not a workman who is entitled to take the benefit of welfare legislation i.e. The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
6) The plaintiff also did not bring on record any circumstances to show that he ever tried to find alternative avenues of employment and the entire financial burden of his indifferent approach cannot be put on the defendant which was already facing financial crisis. The position of the plaintiff was that of a Manager/Supervisor of the defendant company and in that capacity the general law of Indian Contract Act, 1872 applies especially Section 73 of the said Act.RCAs No.25/2020 and 20/2020 No. 18 of 20
33. In the light of the aforesaid facts, this court holds that the plaintiff is entitled only for one month's salary of Rs.9373 as per the original employment contract for one month's notice period besides the other service dues which has been decided by Ld. Trial Court in its first judgement dated 04.01.2012 i.e. Rs.2187, totaling to Rs.11,560 along with interest @ 12% from the date of termination of service i.e. 09.09.1997 till the date of realization along with the costs of the suit.
34. In the present appeal, the plaintiff has also claimed provident fund, DA, HRA, Bonus, LTA and Gratuity. The said reliefs were not the part of the original prayers of the suit, therefore, they cannot be considered and allowed. Further, when it has already been held that the plaintiff is not entitled for full back wages, he cannot be said to be entitled for the aforesaid reliefs. Secondly, HRA and LTA is permissible only when a person is into service which is not the case herein. The Bonus and Gratuity can be claimed from the competent authority as prescribed in the Bonus Act and Gratuity Act as per law. The amount already received by the plaintiff is deductible and excess, if any, to be refunded to the defendant within 30 days.
35. Both the aforesaid appeals are disposed of accordingly by modifying the impugned judgement/decree dated 20.01.2020 of the Ld. Trial Court. Decree sheet be prepared accordingly. Copy of the judgment RCAs No.25/2020 and 20/2020 No. 19 of 20 be sent to the parties on their What's App, if desired. File be consigned to record room.
Digitally signed by NARESH NARESH KUMAR
LAKA
Announced & dictated in the KUMAR LAKA Date: 2021.11.18
11:57:06 +05'30'
open court on 17.11.2021 (Through VC)
(Naresh Kumar Laka)
Additional District Judge-03
South East District,
Saket Courts, New Delhi.
RCAs No.25/2020 and 20/2020 No. 20 of 20