Delhi High Court
New Bharat Overseas vs Kian Agro Processing Private Limited & ... on 23 December, 2022
Author: Navin Chawla
Bench: Navin Chawla
Neutral Citation Number: 2022/DHC/005810
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Reserved on: 14.12.2022
Date of decision: 23.12.2022
+ CS(COMM) 280/2020 & I.A. 6169/2020
NEW BHARAT OVERSEAS ..... Plaintiff
Through: Ms.Swathi Sukumar, Mr.Santanam
Swaminadhan, Mr.Rahul Sharma,
Mr.Kartik Malhotra & Mr.Naveen
Nagarjuna, Advs.
versus
KIAN AGRO PROCESSING PRIVATE LIMITED & ORS.
..... Defendants
Through: Mr.Ashish Aggarwal & Mr.Nalin
Dhingra, Advs. for D-1.
Mr.S.K. Bansal & Mr.Amitabh
Suman, Advs. for D-4.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAVIN CHAWLA
I.A. 9604/2020 [U/Or. XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908]
1. The present application has been filed by the plaintiff praying for an
order of ad-interim injunction restraining the defendant nos.1 and 4
from using, selling, exporting, advertising or in any other mode or
manner dealing in or using the mark 'TAJ MAHAL/ '
(word or device) (hereinafter referred to as 'TAJ MAHAL').
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed By:RENUKA
NEGI
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FACTUAL BACKGROUND
I) CASE OF THE PLAINTIFF
2. It is the case of the plaintiff that the plaintiff is engaged in the
business of processing, marketing and exporting rice of various
kinds, including basmati rice and non-basmati rice. It adopted and
has used the mark 'TAJ MAHAL' in relation to rice since the year
1978 and has been selling the same all over India, as also exporting
to Europe, U.S.A., Canada and the Middle East since the year 1978.
The said mark is also registered in Class 30 under the provisions of
the Trade Marks Act, 1999 (in short, 'the Act') read with the Trade
Marks Rules, 2002, as under:-
S. NO. Trade Mark Class Registration Date of
No. Application
1. Taj Mahal (Word) 30 338004 30/06/1978
2. 30 387177 03/03/1982
3. The said registrations were applied for by the predecessor-
partnership firm of the plaintiff, which assigned the said trade marks
to the plaintiff vide Assignment Deed dated 23.03.2018. The
plaintiff has also applied to seek international registrations of the
said marks in various countries, the details whereof are given in
paragraph no. 8 of the amended Plaint. The plaintiff claims that its
goods, that is, rice, is available across the world.
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4. The plaintiff gives its sales figures from the years 1982-83 to 2019-
20 in paragraph no. 9 of the amended Plaint. The plaintiff claims
that it has also been extensively advertising the said mark by
expending large amounts of money, thereby gaining goodwill and
reputation in the mark.
5. The plaintiff had earlier filed the present suit impleading the
defendant no.1 and its directors as the defendant nos. 2 and 3
respectively; the 'Principal Commissioner of Customs, Custom
House, Mundra' as the defendant no.4; and 'Master Cert LLP' as the
defendant no.5.
6. In the original Plaint, it was pleaded that the defendant nos. 1 to 3
have adopted the same mark 'TAJ MAHAL' for the manufacture
and export of rice and a complaint regarding the same was made to
the defendant no.4 as the consignment of rice bearing the said mark
was being exported to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (in short,
'Saudi Arabia') via Mundra Port at Gujarat. It was pleaded that as
the erstwhile-defendant no.4 failed to act on the complaint, the
present Suit was filed. It was further pleaded by the plaintiff that the
erstwhile-defendant no.4 was impleaded for the proper
implementation of any order passed by this Court.
7. The plaintiff impleaded 'Master Cert LLP' as the defendant no.5-
stating that it is the investigating agency that issues the Certificate of
Conformity for goods to be exported to Saudi Arabia and has issued
the same in favour of the defendant no.1. It was pleaded that as the
defendant no.5 would be in possession of the photographs of the
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infringing materials, its presence in the Suit as a necessary party is
imperative.
8. As far as 'Abdul Aziz Hamad Alfares & Sons Company', which is
the present defendant no.4 per the Amended Memo of Parties, in the
original Plaint, it was alleged that the defendant no.4 was the
distributor of the plaintiff for more than ten years, and that the
plaintiff was continuously from the years 1999 to 2009 supplying
rice under the mark 'TAJ MAHAL' to the defendant no.4 for sale
in Saudi Arabia. The defendant nos. 1 to 3, despite knowledge of the
fact that the said buyer is a former distributor of the plaintiff, started
supplying rice to the defendant no. 4 under the trade mark of the
plaintiff, that is, 'TAJ MAHAL'.
9. Most importantly, in the original Plaint, the defendant no.4 was not
impleaded as a party.
10. The Suit was first listed before this Court on 27.07.2020. On hearing
the parties, the erstwhile-defendant nos. 2 and 3, who were the
directors of the defendant no.1-company, were deleted from the
array of parties. As far as the plaintiff and the defendant no. 1 and
present-defendant no.4 are concerned, it was further
observed/directed by the Court as under:-
"8. Therefore, what has emerged from the
aforesaid is that there are, presently, two
registered trademarks. While the plaintiff has
obtained registration of the trademark and trade
device TAJ MAHAL, albeit in India, the
aforementioned Saudi Arabian entity has also
obtained registration of the trademark and trade
device TAJ MAHAL which is similar to the
plaintiff‟s trademark, under the laws prevalent in
that country.
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8.1 To my mind, the matter requires further
examination.
xxxxxx
10. Mr. Aggarwal, however, offers to undertake
on behalf of defendant no. 1 that the said
defendant will not sell or distribute rice under the
impugned mark either in India or in any other
country [except Saudi Arabia] where the plaintiff
has obtained registration of the trade mark and
trade device TAJ MAHAL.
10.1 The statement of Mr. Aggarwal is taken on
record.
xxxxxx
11. Defendant no. 1 shall maintain accounts of
exports made to the aforementioned Saudi
Arabian entity. Defendant no. 1 shall produce the
same as and when required to do so by the Court.
xxxxx
14. In addition to the above, plaintiff will take
steps to array the aforementioned Saudi Arabian
entity as a party to the instant proceedings."
(Emphasis Supplied)
11. Aggrieved of the above order of this Court directing the plaintiff to
take steps to implead the defendant no.4 as a party to the present
suit, the plaintiff filed an application being I.A. No. 7288/2020,
praying for recall of the said direction. The said application,
however, was withdrawn by the plaintiff, as noted in the order of
this Court dated 24.08.2020.
12. The plaintiff thereafter filed I.A. No. 8189/2020 under Order I Rule
10 read with Section 151 of the CPC, seeking the impleadment of
the present-defendant no.4, which application was allowed by this
Court vide order dated 16.09.2020.
13. The plaintiff then filed I.A. No. 8433/2020 under Order VI Rule 17
read with Section 151 of the CPC, praying for amendments to its
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Plaint. The same was allowed by this Court vide order dated
22.09.2020.
14. In the amended Plaint, as far as the defendant no.4 is concerned, the
plaintiff asserted that the defendant no.4 was aware of the statutory
as also the common law rights of the plaintiff in the trade mark
'TAJ MAHAL'. In the year 1989, a consignment of rice bearing the
infringing mark 'TAJ MAHAL' meant to be exported to the
defendant no.4 was seized at the Kandla Port, Gujarat. Subsequent
thereto, the defendant no.4 approached the plaintiff for buying rice
under plaintiff's trade mark 'TAJ MAHAL'. A consignment of rice
was exported by the plaintiff to the defendant no.4 as its distributor
in Saudi Arabia, and, thereafter, the defendant no.4 continued to buy
rice as per its requirements from the plaintiff till the year 2017. Per
the case of the plaintiff, the defendant no.4 clandestinely obtained
the registration of the impugned mark 'TAJ MAHAL' in Saudi
Arabia, while continuing to import rice from the plaintiff.
15. As far as the defendant no.1 is concerned, the plaintiff further
pleaded that in the year 2017 it had acted against one 'M/s. Bhagwati
Lacto Vegetarian Foods Pvt. Ltd.', when goods bearing the mark of
the plaintiff were found in the local market of Batala, Punjab. The
said entity was also exporting a consignment of rice to Poland and
New Zealand bearing the plaintiff's trade mark 'TAJ MAHAL'.
The same were seized by the Police. The promoters and directors of
'M/s. Bhagwati Lacto Vegetarian Foods Pvt. Ltd.' thereafter
incorporated the defendant no.1-Company by setting up their
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employees as the promoters/directors thereof to continue their illegal
trade activities.
II) CASE OF THE DEFENDANT NO. 1:
16. The defendant no.1 has asserted that it is not independently claiming
any rights over the trade mark 'TAJ MAHAL' for rice; it is merely
affixing the mark belonging to the defendant no. 4 for the export of
rice made to the defendant no.4. It asserts that the plaintiff has filed
the present Suit merely to defeat any competition for export of rice
to the defendant no.4 and, therefore, the present Suit has been filed
with mala fide intent.
17. Placing reliance on the judgments of the High Court of Madras in
Crompton Greaves Limited v. Salzer Electronics Limited, 2011
SCC OnLine Mad 199 and Crompton Greaves Limited v. Salzer
Electronics Limited, 2011 SCC OnLine Mad 882, the learned
counsel for the defendant no.1 submits that the affixation of the
trade mark 'TAJ MAHAL' by the defendant no.1 for the ultimate
importer of rice in Saudi Arabia, that is, the defendant no.4, where
the defendant no.4 is the registered proprietor of the said mark,
would not constitute infringement of the plaintiff's trade mark 'TAJ
MAHAL'.
18. The defendant no.1 further asserts that a comparison of the trade
mark of the plaintiff and the defendant no.4 shows that the same are
different. The learned counsel for the defendant no.1 asserts that the
mark of the defendant no.4 is in Arabic, which as per the 'Census of
India 2011' is the mother tongue of merely 0.0045% of the Indian
population. He submits that, therefore, there is no possibility of
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confusion or deception being caused by the affixation of the
impugned mark.
III) CASE OF THE DEFENDANT NO. 4:
19. The defendant no.4 asserts that the plaintiff cannot claim any
exclusive right over the trade mark 'TAJ MAHAL'. Extensively
placing reliance on various litigations between the plaintiff and 'M/s.
KRBL' and its successors, the learned counsel for the defendant no.4
contended that the right of the plaintiff in the trade mark 'TAJ
MAHAL' is seriously doubtful and in challenge before not only this
Court but also before the learned erstwhile-Intellectual Property
Appellate Tribunal (in short, 'IPAB'). He submits that the plaintiff,
apart from making a vague assertion on the series of litigations it has
with 'M/s KRBL', has suppressed the details thereof from this Court.
He submits that the plaintiff is disentitled to claim any discretionary
relief from this Court on account of suppression alone.
20. As far as its own right to use of the mark 'TAJ MAHAL', the
defendant no.4 states that it honestly and in a bona fide manner
adopted the said mark in Arabic letters with drawing of the Taj
Mahal Palace inside a frame, demarcated by red and blue color, for
its goods and business in the year 1983, and started importing rice of
various kind under the said trade mark into Saudi Arabia. The said
mark is depicted hereinbelow:-
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21. In the year 1989, the defendant no.4 obtained the recommendation
of prominent business personalities who acknowledged the priority
of the right of the defendant no.4 to get its trade mark registered,
and the same was duly registered on 10.07.1999 for the period
27.08.1989 to 11.05.1999; thereafter the registration has been
renewed from time to time and is now valid up to 25.01.2029.
22. In the year 2008-09, the defendant no.4 created and adopted a new
and original artistic label for the trade mark 'TAJ MAHAL'
represented as under:-
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23. The defendant no.4 has been continuously using the said packaging,
except for a slight variation in the colour scheme of blue and red, as
is represented hereinbelow:-
24. The same has also been registered in Saudi Arabia vide no.
1439028602 on 04.02.2019, effective from 13.09.2018 and
subsisting until 26.05.2028.
25. It is the case of the defendant no. 4 that the plaintiff has been well-
aware of the above registrations and the right of the defendant no.4
in the said trade mark/label, however, intentionally concealed the
same from this Court.
26. It is further asserted that the defendant no.4 imports rice from India
from various rice vendors/millers/processors under the said trade
mark/label 'TAJ MAHAL', as per the specifications provided by
the defendant no.4, for sales and distribution in Saudi Arabia,
including from „M/s KRBL‟, „Amirchand Jagdish Kumar‟ and „R.T.
Agro Pvt. Ltd', to name a few entities. It started importing rice from
the defendant no.1 since the year 2010 only. It asserts that it is
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importing and selling rice under the said trade mark only for Saudi
Arabia.
27. It further asserts that it had business dealings with the plaintiff for
the supply of rice under the said trade mark/label sporadically
somewhere from the year 2003, and on being dissatisfied with the
quality of the rice supplied in the year 2009, it stopped dealing with
the plaintiff. Thereafter, at the insistence of the plaintiff, the
defendant no.4 imported one shipment of 240MT of rice from the
plaintiff under the said trade mark/label 'TAJ MAHAL' in the year
2017.
28. The learned counsel for the defendant no.4 drew my attention to
various documents exchanged between the plaintiff and the
defendant no.4, as also to the copies of invoices raised by third-party
suppliers on the defendant no.4 for the export of rice to the
defendant no.4 with the mark 'TAJ MAHAL'. He submits that all
these documents were intentionally concealed by the plaintiff from
this Court, thereby disentitling the plaintiff to any relief on account
of suppression alone.
29. He further submits that the defendant no.4, being the registered
proprietor of the mark 'TAJ MAHAL' in Saudi Arabia and having
been using the said mark since the year 1983, would otherwise also
be entitled to the use of the said mark for its import from India. In
support of this assertion, he places reliance on the following
judgments:-
(i) QRG Enterprises & Anr. v. Surendra Electricals & Ors.
2005 SCC OnLine Del 480;
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(ii) Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc. & Anr. v. Harinder
Kohli & Ors., 2008 (38) PTC 185 (Del);
(iii) Amritdhara Pharmacy v. Satya Deo Gupta, (1963) 2 SCR
484;
(iv) Vrajlal Manilal & Co. v. Bansal Tobacco Co., 2001 SCC
OnLine Del 40;
(v) KRBL Ltd. v. Lal Mahal Ltd. And Anr., 2015 SCC OnLine
Del 13793; and
(vi) Vikas Makhija v. The Bengal Phenyle & Allied Products
(P), 2001 SCC OnLine Del 643.
30. He submits that even otherwise, it is the plaintiff who has copied the
packaging of the defendant no.4 and is, therefore, not entitled to any
relief. In support of the same, he places reliance on Glaxo
Orthopedic U.K. Ltd. v. Samrat Pharmaceuticals, AIR 1984 Del
265.
31. The learned counsel for the defendant no.4 further submits that the
plaintiff applied for registration of its mark 'TAJ MAHAL' for the
purposes of export of rice under Class 30, however, the same has
still not been registered. The plaintiff, therefore, cannot claim to be
the registered proprietor of the mark for purposes of export of rice.
III) SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE
PLAINTIFF
32. The learned counsel for the plaintiff, while reiterating the averments
made in the plaint, submits that the plaintiff is admittedly the
registered proprietor of the mark 'TAJ MAHAL' in word as also in
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device form. The defendant no.1 and/or the defendant no.4 are not
the registered proprietor(s) of the mark 'TAJ MAHAL' in India.
She submits that the use of the registered mark by the defendant
no.1 and/or the defendant no.4 would, therefore, amount to
infringement of the said mark in terms of Section 29(2)(c) read with
Section 29(3) of the Act.
33. She submits that as the trade mark used by the defendant nos.1 and 4
is identical to the registered mark of the plaintiff; and applied to the
same goods, that is, rice, an injunction must follow. In support of
this submission, she places reliance on the following judgments:-
(i) Renaissance Hotel Holdings Inc. v. B. Vijaya Sai and
others., (2022) 5 SCC 1;
(ii) Kaviraj Pandit Durga Dutt Sharma v. Navratna
Pharmaceutical Laboratories, AIR 1965 SC 680;
(iii) KEI Industries Limited v. Raman Kwatra and another.,
2022 SCC OnLine Del 1459; and
(iv) Century Traders v. Roshan Lal Duggar & Co., 1977 SCC
OnLine Del 50.
34. She submits that affixation of the mark even for the purposes of
export would amount to its 'user' and in support, she places reliance
on Section 56 of the Act and on the following judgments:-
(i) M/s. Friends Overseas v. Swadi Product U.K. Ltd. & Ors.,
2012 SCC OnLine Del 3353;
(ii) UFO Contemporary, INC v. Creative Kids Wear (India)
Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., CS(COMM) 375/2020;
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(iii) TIL Healthcare v. Bioconic Remedies,
MANU/TN/2611/2022;
(iv) The Coca-Cola Company v. Bisleri International Pvt. Ltd.
& Ors., 2009 SCC OnLine Del 3275; and
(v) Kirorimal Kashiram Marketing and Agencies Pvt. Ltd. v.
Sachdeva & Sons Industries Pvt. Ltd., 2008 SCC OnLine
Del 1328.
35. As far as 'M/s KRBL' is concerned, she submits that even as per the
assertions of the defendant no.4, the right of the plaintiff to the mark
'TAJ MAHAL' has not been cancelled. At best, the plaintiff does
not have any order of injunction against 'M/s KRBL' as of today,
however, the same cannot inure to the benefit of the defendant no.1
and/or defendant no.4. The litigation between the plaintiff and 'M/s
KRBL' is, therefore, not relevant to the present suit and, in any case,
the defendant no.4 cannot claim any benefit therefrom. She submits
that third-party infringement is not a defence for infringement or
passing off. She places reliance on the following judgments:-
(i) Pankaj Goel v. Dabur India Ltd., 2008 SCC OnLine Del
1744;
(ii) Prakash Roadline Ltd. v. Prakash Parcel Service (P) Ltd.,
1992 SCC OnLine Del 138;
36. She further submits that the adoption of the infringing mark by the
defendant no.4 is mala fide . She submits that this is evident from
the letter dated 21.08.1989 addressed by the defendant no.4 to 'M/s
KRBL', stating that the plaintiff is asserting its right as a proprietor
of the mark 'TAJ MAHAL'. Immediately thereafter, the defendant
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no.4 filed its application seeking registration of the said mark in
Saudi Arabia on 27.08.1989. Placing reliance on the following
judgments, she submits that no amount of use thereafter can purge
dishonest adoption:-
(i) Hindustan Pencils Private Limited v. India Stationary
Products Co. & Another, 1989 SCC OnLine Del 34;
(ii) Midas Hygiene Industries P. Ltd. And another v. Sudhir
Bhatia and others, (2004) 3 SCC 90;
(iii) Dr. Reddy's Laboratories Ltd. v. Reddy Pharmaceuticals
Limited, 2004 SCC OnLine Del 668; and
(iv) MAC Personal Care Pvt. Ltd. & Anr v. Laverna GMBH &
Co. KG & Anr., 2016 SCC OnLine Del 530.
37. She submits that the plea of the defendant no.4 that the defendant
no.4 was importing rice from other third-parties can also not come
to the aid of the defendant no.4, inasmuch as the plaintiff cannot be
held to have acquiesced their right as the import which was made
behind its back. In support, she places reliance on the judgments of
this Court in Dr. Reddy's Laboratories Ltd. v. Reddy
Pharmaceuticals, 2004 SCC OnLine Del 668 and Ansul Industries
v. Shiva Tobacco Company, 2007 SCC OnLine Del 74.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
38. I have considered the submissions made by the learned counsels for
the parties.
39. It is not denied by either the defendant nos.1 and/or 4 that they have
a prior use to that of the plaintiff or have any statutory rights in the
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mark 'TAJ MAHAL' in India. The defendant no. 1, in fact, does
not claim any right in the said mark, and claims to be affixing the
same only for the defendant no. 4; while the defendant no. 4 claims
such right only in Saudi Arabia. It is also not denied that the plaintiff
is a registered proprietor of the mark 'TAJ MAHAL' in India and is
using the same in India.
40. Though the learned counsel for the defendant no.4 spent a
substantial time in explaining the various litigations that have been
initiated and are pending between the plaintiff and 'M/s KRBL', the
same are not relevant to the present suit inasmuch as the defendant
nos.1 and/or 4 are not claiming any right under or through 'M/s
KRBL' for the use of the mark 'TAJ MAHAL' for rice. Whether
the plaintiff has a superior right to the use of the mark 'TAJ
MAHAL' for rice against 'M/s KRBL' or not, is not to be
determined in this Suit.
41. Section 29(2)(c), Section 29(3), Section 29(6) and Section 56 of the
Act are relevant to be considered for appreciating the submissions
made by the learned counsels for the parties, and are reproduced
hereinbelow:-
"Section 29. Infringement of registered trade
marks.--
xxxx
(2) A registered trade mark is infringed by a
person who, not being a registered proprietor or a
person using by way of permitted use, uses in the
course of trade, a mark which because of--
xxxx
(c) its identity with the registered trade
mark and the identity of the goods or services
covered by such registered trade mark, is likely to
cause confusion on the part of the public, or which
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is likely to have an association with the registered
trade mark.
(3) In any case falling under clause (c) of sub-
section (2), the court shall presume that it is likely
to cause confusion on the part of the public.
xxxx
(6) For the purposes of this section, a person uses
a registered mark, if, in particular, he--
(a) affixes it to goods or the packaging
thereof;
(b) offers or exposes goods for sale, puts
them on the market, or stocks them for those
purposes under the registered trade mark, or
offers or supplies services under the registered
trade mark;
(c) imports or exports goods under the
mark; or
(d) uses the registered trade mark on
business papers or in advertising.
xxxx
Section 56. Use of trade mark for export trade
and use when form of trade connection
changes.-- (1) The application in India of trade
mark to goods to be exported from India or in
relation to services for use outside India and any
other act done in India in relation to goods to be
so exported or services so rendered outside India
which, if done in relation to goods to be sold or
services provided or otherwise traded in within
India would constitute use of a trade mark therein,
shall be deemed to constitute use of the trade
mark in relation to those goods or services for any
purpose for which such use is material under this
Act or any other law.
(2) The use of a registered trade mark in relation
to goods or services between which and the
person using the mark any form of connection in
the course of trade subsists shall not be deemed to
be likely to cause deception or confusion on the
ground only that the mark has been or is used in
relation to goods or services between which and
the said person or a predecessor in title of that
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person a different form of connection in the course
of trade subsisted or subsists."
(Emphasis Supplied)
42. From a comprehensive reading of the above provisions, it is clear
that the mark in which export is being made by the defendant no.1 to
the defendant no.4 is identical to the registered trade mark of the
plaintiff; and the goods for which it is used, that is, rice, is also
identical. In terms of Section 29(2)(c) read with Section 29(3) of the
Act, such use would amount to infringement of the registered trade
mark of the plaintiff.
43. The submission of the learned counsel for the defendant no.1 that as
the mark is being affixed in Arabic language, there shall be no
infringement, cannot be accepted. Section 29(9) of the Act states
that where the distinctive element of a registered trade mark consists
of or include words, the trade mark may be infringed by the spoken
use of those words. It is also now well settled that the use of the
infringing mark in the form of a translation (same trade mark but in
a different language) or its transliteration amounts to infringement.
Reference in that regard is drawn to The Indian Express Ltd. &
Anr. v. Chandra Prakash Shivahare, 2015 SCC OnLine Bom
5541; the order of this Court dated 06.05.2022 in Pepsico Inc. &
Anr. v. Jagpin Breweries Limited & Anr., CS(COMM) 288/2022
and M/s Bhatia Plastics v. Peacock Industries Ltd., 1994 SCC
OnLine Del 1387.
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44. The only question, therefore, to be determined is whether affixation
of the mark for the purposes of export would amount to 'use in the
course of trade' under Section 56 of the Act.
45. Section 29(6)(c) of the Act states that for purposes of Section 29 of
the Act, a person uses a registered trade mark if he 'imports or
exports goods under the mark‟. Section 56 of the Act further states
that the application in India of a trade mark to goods to be exported
from India would deem to constitute use of the trade mark. Section
56(2) of the Act, however, states that the use of a registered trade
mark in relation to goods or services between which and the person
using the mark any form of connection in the course of trade
subsists, shall not be deemed to be likely to cause deception or
confusion on the ground only that the mark has been or is used in
relation to goods or services between which and the said person or a
predecessor in title of that person a different form of connection in
the course of trade subsisted or subsists.
46. In Kirorimal Kashiram Marketing and Agencies Pvt. Ltd. (supra),
the Court held that affixation of a mark for export would amount to
use of the trade mark under Section 56 of the Act. Following the
above judgment, in M/s. Friends Overseas (supra), this Court
reiterated that merely because goods bearing an impugned mark are
only exported, it does not follow either as a question of law or even
a fact that the proprietor of the mark is not likely to suffer
substantial damage to his property in the goodwill.
47. In The Coca-Cola Company (supra), this Court again held that
exporting goods from a country is to be considered as sale within the
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country from where the goods are exported, and the same amounts
to infringement of a trade mark.
48. In UFO Contemporary, INC (supra), the Court repelled the
challenge of the defendant on the ground of non-use of the trade
mark by the plaintiff in India, relying upon Section 56 of the Act
and observing that although goods are to be exported from India, it
is deemed to constitute the use of the trade mark in relation to those
goods.
49. In TIL Healthcare (supra), the High Court of Madras also relied
upon Section 56 of the Act to hold that as the mark was being
applied in India, it would amount to infringement of the mark.
50. As far as the judgment of the learned Single Judge of the High Court
of Madras in Crompton Greaves Limited (supra), relied upon by the
learned counsel for the defendant no.1 is concerned, the learned
Court framed the following questions for consideration:-
"25. In the light of the above pleadings and the
documents, the questions that arise for
consideration are: (i) whether the use of the mark
MCG by the First Defendant in the products
intended for export to the Second Defendant
would constitute an infringement in terms of the
Act, and (ii) whether the use of the mark in the
inner casing of the switchgear, in a manner not
visible to the end users, but visible only after the
opening of the outer casing by removing the
screws, would constitute an infringement."
51. The Court answered the above questions observing as under:-
"27. A plain reading of Section 56(1) makes it
clear that if a trademark is applied in India, upon
goods to be exported from India, it shall be
deemed to be the use of the trademark in relation
to those goods, for any purpose for which such use
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is material under this Act or any other law. But
the condition for such a deeming fiction to come
into play is that such an Application of the
trademark, if done in relation to goods to be sold
within India, should constitute use of a trademark.
In other words, the Court must first test whether
the application in India, of the trademark, upon
goods or services traded within India, constitutes
the use of the mark or not. If it does, then the
application of the trademark upon goods exported
from India would also constitute the use of the
mark.
xxxx
29. As a matter of fact, Section 29(6)(c) itself
stipulates that for the purposes of Section 29, a
person will be said to be using a registered mark,
if he exports goods under the mark. Interestingly,
the whole of Section 29 deals with infringement
and sub-section (6) of Section 29 gives an
indication of what constitutes the use of a
registered mark, for the purposes of Section 29
viz., infringement. Section 56(1) speaks of the "use
of a trade mark", but does not speak either of "the
use of a registered mark" or about "infringement",
though Section 29(6) speaks of "the use of a
registered mark" for the purpose of determining
whether there was "infringement" or not.
Curiously, sub-section (2) of Section 56 speaks of
the use of a registered trademark, though sub-
section (1) of Section 56 does not speak of the use
of a registered trademark, but speaks only of the
"use of a trade mark".
xxxx
31. The expression "use of the mark" in the Act, is
intended to serve two
purposes, viz., (i) to see if such use by third
parties, constitutes infringement, and (ii) to see if
there is bona fide usage of the mark by the
proprietor of the mark himself, to enable him
either to obtain registration or to continue to have
the benefit of registration under Chapter VI. To
put it differently, the expression "use of the mark"
is used in the Act, (i) in some places with
reference to the use by the proprietor of the mark
himself, and (ii) in other places with reference to
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the use by persons other than the proprietor of the
mark. Therefore, the meaning to be assigned to
the expression, depends solely upon the context.
This is why, a distinction is maintained between
the use of the same expression in Chapter IV
including Section 29(6)(c) and the use of the same
expression in Chapter VI including Section 56(1).
In Chapter IV, the expression "use of the mark" is
used predominantly in connection with the use by
third parties, tantamounting to infringement and
the limitations upon the registered proprietor for
prohibiting the others from using his mark. On the
other hand, in Chapter VJ, the same expression is
used in connection with the use of the mark by the
proprietor himself, either for the purpose of
entitling him to the registration of the mark or for
the purpose of retention of the already registered
mark in the Register."
(Emphasis supplied)
52. Having observed the above, the Court, on facts found that the
application of the trade mark 'MCG' on the goods supplied by the
first defendant to the second defendant therein as not intended to
either cause confusion in the minds of the public or to create an
impression that the goods are that of the plaintiffs. It was in that
light and based on the said finding that the Court further observed as
under:-
"34.... Even if the First Defendant makes exports
without affixing any trademark on the goods, the
supplier for whom they are intended, viz., CEF,
would affix and would be entitled to affix their
registered trademark MCG before tapping the
market. At that stage, the Plaintiff would have no
cause to complain, since the use of a registered
trademark by the proprietor, would not
tantamount to infringement of the registered
trademark of another. This is clear from Section
30(2)(e) of the Act.
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35. Though to claim protection under Section
30(2)(e), both the registered trademark as well as
the infringing mark should have been registered
under this Act, a similar protection would be
available to the Defendants herein, for two
reasons:
(i) While the application of the mark MCG
by the First Defendant takes place in India,
the infringement, if at all there is any, takes
place outside India, due to the fact that the
supply is to a specific customer outside
India, who himself has registration for the
said trademark at the place of supply viz. ,
UK.
(ii) In the European market, the Plaintiff
has obtained registration of the CG logo as
a Community Trade Mark (CTM) and the
ultimate supplier viz., CEF has also
obtained registration of the trademark
MCG in UK. Therefore, if the Plaintiff
initiates action in UK against CEF, they
would have protection under the European
Council Directives, under provisions
similar to Section 30(2)(e) of our Act. As a
matter of fact, under Section 11(1) of the
U.K. Trade Marks Act, 1994, a registered
trademark is not infringed by the use of
another registered trademark in relation to
goods or services for which the latter is
registered.
36. Therefore, I am of the view that the
application by the first Defendant, of the
registered trademark of the ultimate importer in
UK, on the goods intended for export to such
importer in UK, would not constitute an infringing
use of the registered trademark of the Plaintiff,
either under Section 29(6)(c) or under Section
56(1) of the Act."
53. The above judgment, while acknowledging that in view of Section
29(6) of the Act, affixation of a trade mark on the goods for
purposes of export would amount to „use of the trade mark' for
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purpose of an action for infringement; and under Section 56(1) of
the Act for purpose of showing the use of the mark, on the facts of
that case declined the relief of injunction.
54. In appeal, the Division Bench of the High Court of Madras in
Crompton Greaves Limited (supra), observed as under:-
"15. Section 29 of the Trade Marks Act deals with
infringement of trade marks and explicitly states
as to the various acts which constitutes
infringement. The ingredients of Section 29(1) are
as follows:
1. The Plaintiff's mark is registered.
2. The Defendant's mark is identical with,
or deceptively similar to the Plaintiff's
registered mark.
3. The Defendant's use of the mark is in the
course of trade in respect of Goods/services
covered by the registered trade mark.
4. The use by the Defendant is in such
manner as to render the use of the mark
likely to be taken as being used as a trade
mark.
5. The Defendant's use of the mark is not by
way of "permitted user" and accordingly
unauthorized infringing use.
16. Section 29(6) of the Act states the
circumstances when a person is considered to use
a registered trade mark for the purpose of Section
29. Section 29(6) inter alia states that a person
uses a registered trade mark if he imports or
exports goods under the mark. Thus, under
Section 29(6)(c) there is a deeming provision of
infringement of registered trade mark even if the
goods are imported or exported infringing the
registered trade mark. Section 2(2) states that the
reference to the use of a mark shall be construed
as use upon or in any physical or in any other
relation what so ever to such goods. In view of
this provision, any use of the registered trade
mark in any manner without the consent of the
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registered proprietor will fall within Section
29(6)."
(Emphasis Supplied)
55. Having observed the above, the Division Bench, again on facts,
found that the infringing mark 'MCG' appearing in the outer casing
of the switch gear as not similar to the mark of the plaintiff 'CG'.
The appeal was accordingly dismissed.
56. The judgments in Crompton Greaves Limited, both of the learned
Single Judge as also of the learned Division Bench of the High
Court of Madras, therefore, acknowledged that the affixation of a
trade mark for purpose of export of goods would amount to its user
in terms of Section 29(6) of the Act and, therefore, may even attract
an action of infringement. The said judgments, therefore, cannot
come to any aid of either the defendant no.1 or the defendant no.4.
57. The learned counsel for the defendant no.4 submitted that Section
29(6) of the Act would not apply as the defendant no.4 is neither
importing goods into India nor exporting the same from India. The
said submission is flawed inasmuch as the present ad-interim
injunction is to operate against the defendant no.1, who is seeking to
export rice with the impugned trade mark- which is registered in the
name of the plaintiff. Merely because the defendant no.4 is the
recipient of the said rice, said fact cannot come to the aid of the
defendant no.1 unless an exception in favour of the defendant no.4
for the use of the said trade mark is made out.
58. The plea of the defendant no.4 that the application of the plaintiff
seeking registration of its mark for the purposes of export is still
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pending, cannot also come to the aid of the defendant no.4 as the
plaintiff would be entitled to seek relief on its already existing
registrations in terms of Section 29(6) read with Section 56(1) of the
Act.
59. The plea of the defendant no.4 being an honest concurrent user of
the trade mark and thereby being entitled to protection under Section
30(1)(a) and/or under Section 30(2)(c)(i) of the Act, again does not
prima facie impress me. Sections 30(1)(a) and 30(2)(c)(i) of the Act
are reproduced hereinbelow:-
"Section 30. Limits on effect of registered trade
mark.--- (1) Nothing in section 29 shall be construed as
preventing the use of a registered trade mark by any
person for the purposes of identifying goods or services
as those of the proprietor provided the use--
(a) is in accordance with honest practices in industrial
or commercial matters, and
xxxx
(2) A registered trade mark is not infringed where--
xxxx
(c) the use by a person of a trade mark--
(i) in relation to goods connected in the course of
trade with the proprietor or a registered user of the
trade mark if, as to those goods or a bulk of which they
form part, the registered proprietor or the registered
user conforming to the permitted use has applied the
trade mark and has not subsequently removed or
obliterated it, or has at any time expressly or impliedly
consented to the use of the trade mark;"
60. For invoking Section 30(1)(a) of the Act, the defendant has to show
that its use of the mark of the plaintiff is in accordance with honest
practices. For determining the same, the defendant no.4 has placed
reliance on the registration of the trade mark obtained by it in the
Saudi Arabia. While at first blush, the same comes out to be an
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impressive defence, on a deeper scrutiny not much merit is found
therein. As noted hereinabove, the defendant no.4 itself has relied
heavily on the inter se dispute between the plaintiff and 'M/s KRBL'
not to assert its own right in the trade mark but to dispute the right
of the plaintiff to the trade mark 'TAJ MAHAL'. As far as
defendant no. 4's own right in the mark is concerned, the learned
counsel for the plaintiff has drawn my attention to the letter dated
21.08.1989, written by the defendant no. 4 and addressed to 'M/s
KRBL'. The same reads as under:-
"As you are aware that we are regularly
importing Basmati Rice under Taj Mahal Brand
from you since 1985. Originally we were given to
understand by your goodself that you are the
exclusively users of this. Brand for export with
your maintain good quality of rice and our
continues efforts in these five years Taj Mahal
brand has become popular in whole of Saudi
Arabia.
Recently we understand that one Mr. Khosla of
New Bharat Rice Mill, Batala is claiming to be the
legal owner of using this Taj Mahal Brand. He
also tried to contact me while I was in India.
Kindly clarify the whole situation by return telex
or fax about the facts of whole case.
We would also like to immediately register the
brand Taj Mahal with the trade mark authorities
so that their may not be any confusion for the
future. Take this matter as serious.
Rest we are awaiting for your arrival in Damman
for discussing __."
(Emphasis Supplied)
61. A reading of the above letter would show that the defendant no.4
was seeking confirmation from 'M/s KRBL' of it being the exclusive
user of the mark 'TAJ MAHAL' for export. It also sought this
confirmation so as to register the impugned trade mark in Saudi
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Arabia. It is only thereafter that it went ahead and got its first
registration in the impugned trade mark on 27.08.1989. It, therefore,
prima facie appears that while applying for the registration of the
mark in Saudi Arabia, the defendant no.4 was well-aware of the
claim of the right in the said trade mark by the plaintiff. The
defendant no. 4 was also banking on the alleged claim of the right of
'M/s KRBL‟ on the said mark, rather than asserting its own right
over the same.
62. The plaintiff has further pleaded in its amended Plaint that in the
year 1989, it made a complaint to the Police regarding the
unauthorized export of rice with the trade mark 'TAJ MAHAL', on
which complaint the goods were seized by the Police. The plaintiff
further claims that on seizure of the consignment, the defendant no.4
approached the plaintiff for purchasing rice under the trade mark
'TAJ MAHAL', and that the same were exported by the plaintiff to
the defendant no.4 right till the year 2017. At this moment, I must
note that the learned counsel for the defendant no.4 has submitted
that the complaint filed by the plaintiff against 'M/s KRBL' failed,
however, in my prima facie opinion, the same is not relevant to
judge the subsequent conduct of the defendant no.4. A perusal of
the order would show that the said complaint was dismissed because
of the inter se claims and counter-claims of the plaintiff and 'M/s
KRBL' to the impugned mark, and not for any purported claim of
the defendant no.4 over the said mark.
63. The defendant no.4 has also asserted that it started importing rice
from the plaintiff under the trade mark 'TAJ MAHAL' from the
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year 2003, although the same being done in an irregular manner. It
has also asserted that at the same time, it was importing rice under
the said trade mark from other suppliers and in this regard, has
placed on record certain shipping bills. However, from these
shipping bills, it is not evident that the plaintiff was in knowledge of
such imports being made by the defendant no.4.
64. On the other hand, the plaintiff has placed on record an e-mail dated
29.05.2017 from the defendant no.4 to the plaintiff, which reads as
under:-
"Thanks for your greetings and wishes, this is the
holy month of Ramadan people extend their
maximum cooperation and favour by doing
righteous deeds that can be done by rich and
poor, old and young, male and female, depending
on each person‟s circumstances, ambition and
energy, after the help of Allah.
We do expect you will stand on your commitment
to Mr. Abdul Aziz by withdrawing legal case you
had submitted to the exporter's (Amar Singh/ JP
Sortex etc...) instead of feeding to lawyer's. Which
shall result our business relation will become
more stronger and stable by the mutual aid.
Refer to your email dated 25.05.2017 request to
extending the shipment date, You must understand
we made the contract to meet our customers
demand / commitment during the Ramadan
season, and the delay you made resulted in losing
scheduled plan-
1. Our commitment with our customer particularly
Ramadan season, we lost many orders, customers
of this Flag Ship Brand and switched over to other
competitors. We reduce the sales team target due
to the unavailability of this brand
2. Now the Indian market situation has changed
from the Contract Price, therefore the local
selling price already reduced by our competitors
all Saudi market.
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We shall accept your request as a goodwill
business gesture and your commitment for
withdrawing the case against the exporter's.
Waiting your immediate confirmation with action
on above commitment."
(Emphasis Supplied)
65. A reading of the above email would show that the plaintiff was, in
fact, taking legal action against all suppliers who were trying to
export rice with the impugned trade mark 'TAJ MAHAL' to the
defendant no.4, although at the same time it was requesting the
defendant no.4 to accept supplies from it. The plaintiff cannot,
therefore, be said to have acquiesced their right in the export of the
rice with the impugned trade mark 'TAJ MAHAL' to the defendant
no.4.
66. The learned counsel for the defendant no.4 has also placed reliance
on exchange of certain e-mails between the defendant no.4 and the
plaintiff to contend that the said e-mails would show that the manner
of packaging of rice was a call of the defendant no.4. He has
submitted that the plaintiff never asserted that the defendant no.4
cannot use the mark 'TAJ MAHAL', but in fact went on to make
supplies to the defendant no.4 under the impugned packaging. In my
prima facie opinion, the said submission has no merit. Merely
because the packaging of rice is in a manner approved by the
defendant no.4, it does not mean that the plaintiff also accedes to the
right of the defendant no.4 in the mark 'TAJ MAHAL', specially
where what is being complained of is the infringement of a
registered trade mark. Any sale made by the defendant no. 4 with
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the impugned mark would have been a sale inuring to the goodwill
of the plaintiff, and in any case, with the consent of the plaintiff. For
the said reason, the judgment of Glaxo Orthopedic (supra) relied
upon by the learned counsel for the defendant no.4, will not also be
applicable.
67. The concept of the acquiescence and the pre-conditions for its
application were explained by the Supreme Court in M/s Power
Control Appliances and Ors. v. Sumeet Machines Pvt. Ltd. (1994)
2 SCC 448 as under:
"26. Acquiescence is sitting by, when another is
invading the rights and spending money on it. It is
a course of conduct inconsistent with the claim for
exclusive rights in a trade mark, trade name etc. It
implies positive acts; not merely silence or
inaction such as is involved in laches. In Harcourt
v. White [(1860) 28 Beav 303 : 54 ER 382] Sr.
John Romilly said: "It is important to distinguish
mere negligence and acquiescence." Therefore,
acquiescence is one facet of delay. If the plaintiff
stood by knowingly and let the defendants build up
an important trade until it had become necessary
to crush it, then the plaintiffs would be stopped by
their acquiescence. If the acquiescence in the
infringement amounts to consent, it will be a
complete defence as was laid down in Mouson
(J.G.) & Co. v. Boehm [(1884) 26 Ch D 406] . The
acquiescence must be such as to lead to the
inference of a licence sufficient to create a new
right in the defendant as was laid down in
Rodgers v. Nowill [(1847) 2 De GM&G 614 : 22
LJ KCH 404] ."
68. In Glaxo Smithkline Pharmaceuticals Ltd. & Anr. v. Naval
Kishore Goyal and Others, 2019 SCC OnLine Del 10340, the
learned Single Judge of this Court has again reiterated that in order
to claim the defence of acquiescence, there should be a tacit or an
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express assent by the plaintiff to the defendant's using the mark and
in a way encouraging the defendants to continue with the business.
I may quote from the judgment as under:
"25. It has been held in numerous decisions that
mere inaction on the part of Plaintiff in a
trademark infringement suit does not exclude the
right owner Plaintiff from suing for infringement.
In Hindustan Pencils Private Limited v. India
Stationary Products Co., AIR 1990 Del 19, this
Court dealt extensively with the question of delay
and acquiescence. It was held that in order to
claim the defence of acquiescence, there should be
a tacit or an express assent by the plaintiff to the
defendant's using the mark and in a way
encouraging the defendants to continue with the
business. It is as if the plaintiff wants the
defendant to be under the belief that the plaintiff
does not regard the action of the defendant as
being violative of the plaintiff's rights. In
Dr.Reddy Laboratories Pvt. Ltd. v. Reddy
Pharmaceuticals, 2013 SCC OnLine Del 3626, the
question of acquiescence and laches was
discussed elaborately and the Court took note of
the fact that the owners of trademarks or
copyrights cannot be expected to run after every
infringer and thereby remain involved in litigation
at the cost of their business time, but can wait till
the time the user of their name starts harming
their business interests and starts misleading and
confusing their customers. In Emcure
Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Corona Remedies Pvt.
Ltd., 2014 SCC OnLine Bom 1064, the Bombay
High Court extensively discussed the defence of
acquiescence as available to an alleged infringer
of trademark. It was held that a mere failure to
sue without a positive act of encouragement is no
defence and is no acquiescence. Further,
examining the concept of "acquiescence", it was
observed that acquiescence is a species of
estoppel, a rule in equity and a rule of evidence
and it is essential to the acquiescence doctrine
that it is accompanied by an encouragement or an
inducement: he who possesses a legal right must
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have encouraged the alleged violator of that right
in acting to the latter's detriment, confident in the
knowledge that the former is not asserting his
rights against the violator. Acquiescence is sitting
by when another invades your rights and spends
money in the doing of it. It is conduct
incompatible with claims of exclusivity, but it
requires positive acts, not mere silence or inaction
(of the stripe involved in the concept of laches).
Acquiescence is not mere negligence or oversight.
There must be the abandonment of the right to
exclusivity. In Midas Hygiene Industries v. Sudhir
Bhatia, 2004 (28) PTC 121 (SC) the Apex Court
held that mere delay in bringing action is not
sufficient to defeat grant of injunction in
infringement cases. Even otherwise, the act of
infringement is a separate cause of action as held
by the Supreme Court in Bengal Waterproof
Limited v. Bombay Waterproof Manufacturing
Company, 1997 (17) PTC 98 SC. In view of the
facts on record and law on the subject, the Issue
No. 4 is decided against the Defendants and in
favour of the Plaintiffs."
69. In the present case, as it is evident, the plaintiff has been taking
regular action against all suppliers of rice using the impugned trade
mark, therefore, it cannot be said that the plaintiff acquiesced in the
use of the impugned mark by the defendant no.4.
70. In ORG Enterprises and Anr. (supra), the claim was between the
plaintiff therein and the original proprietor of the mark who had
later assigned the said mark to the plaintiff. In the peculiar facts of
that case, the Court observed that a defence under Section
30(2)(c)(i) of the Act is open where the proprietor of a registered
trade mark has expressly or impliedly consented to the use of the
said mark by the defendant. In the present case, as prima facie
appears, the plaintiff has been acting against the third-parties who
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were trying to export rice to the defendant no.4 with the impugned
trade mark. The said judgment, therefore, cannot come to the aid of
the defendant no.4. The same also applies to the other judgments
relied upon by the learned counsel for the defendant no.4 on this
proposition.
71. Similarly, the judgments in Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc.
(supra); Amritdhara Pharmacy (supra), Vrajlal Manilal & Co.
(supra); KRBL Ltd. (supra); Vikas Makhija (supra) and Glaxo
Orthopedic U.K. Ltd. (supra) were of their own facts and will not be
applicable to the facts of the present suit.
72. To summarize the above, it is not disputed that the plaintiff is the
registered proprietor of the mark 'TAJ MAHAL' in India, though
such registration is in challenge by a third party to this suit, 'M/s
KRBL'. As far the plaintiff and the defendant nos. 1 and 4, such
registration, therefore, must operate unless cancelled on the action
of 'M/s KRBL'. It is also not disputed that the defendant nos. 1 or 4
do not have any registration in the impugned mark in India. It is also
not in dispute that the plaintiff is a prior adopter of the mark in
India. Section 29(6) and Section 56(1) of the Act, would therefore,
inure to the benefit of the plaintiff and against the defendant nos. 1
and 4. The mark being identical and the use of the same by the
defendant no. 1 even for export of rice to the defendant no. 4, would
amount to infringement of the mark.
73. As far as the plea of suppression is concerned, it is not the case of
the defendant no.4 that the defendant no.4 had asserted its right in
the trade mark 'TAJ MAHAL' against the plaintiff in any previous
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litigation or proceedings. As noted hereinabove, it is also evident
that the plaintiff has being from time to time taking action against
the third parties who were trying to export rice with the impugned
trade mark to the defendant no.4.
74. In the present Suit also, the primary grievance of the plaintiff was
against the defendant no.1 making export of rice with the impugned
mark to the defendant no.4. Therefore, in my opinion, the plaintiff
cannot be said to be guilty of concealment or mis-statement only on
account of it not fully disclosing its relationship with the defendant
no.4 at the initial stage of the Suit, or various litigations that have
been undertaken between the plaintiff and 'M/s KRBL'. As stated
hereinabove, they are of no relevance to the present Suit.
75. In that light, the submission of the learned counsel for the defendant
that the ad-interim injunction should be refused to the plaintiff on
account of concealment, is to be rejected.
76. In view of the above, the plaintiff has been able to make out a good
prima facie case against the defendant nos.1 and 4. The balance of
convenience is also in favour of the plaintiff and against the said
defendants. The plaintiff is likely to suffer grave irreparable injury
in case the ad-interim protection is not granted in its favour.
RELIEF
77. Accordingly, the defendant no.1 and/or the defendant no. 4 are by
way of an ad-interim injunction, restrained from affixing the mark
'TAJ MAHAL' or any other mark deceptively similar to the
registered marks of the plaintiff reproduced hereinabove, for the
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Neutral Citation Number: 2022/DHC/005810
purposes of selling or marketing rice in India or for export to the
defendant no. 4 or to any other entity, during the pendency of the
present suit.
78. It is however made clear that this order shall not, in any manner,
affect the right, if any, of the defendant no. 4 to use its impugned
mark in Saudi Arabia, as the same is not a subject-matter of this
judgment.
79. It is further made clear that any and all observations made herein
above are only prima facie in nature and shall not influence this
Court at the time of the adjudication of the Suit.
CS(COMM) 280/2020 & I.A. 6169/2020
80. List before the learned Joint Registrar (Judicial) for completion of
pleadings and further proceedings on 27th February, 2023.
NAVIN CHAWLA, J.
DECEMBER 23, 2022/rv/AB Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:RENUKA NEGI Signing Date:23.12.2022CS(COMM) 280/2020 Page 36 of 36 18:53:11