Madras High Court
M/S. Dcw Limited vs M/S. South India Corporation Ltd on 28 June, 2012
Author: V.Periya Karuppiah
Bench: V.Periya Karuppiah
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED : 28.06.2012 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE V.PERIYA KARUPPIAH C.S.No.666 of 2001 1. M/s. DCW Limited represented by Subrogee/power agent M/s. National Insurance Company Ltd. 2. M/s. National Insurance Company Ltd. .. Plaintiffs Vs. M/s. South India Corporation Ltd .. Defendant Prayer:- This Suit has been filed under Order IV Rule 1 of the Original Side Rules R/W Order VII Rule 1 Section 26 of C.P.C. For Plaintiffs : Mr.N. Venkatraman for M/s. Nageswaran and Navichania For Defendant : Mr. Raghul Balaji JUDGMENT
This suit has been filed by the plaintiffs for a decree and judgment against the defendant directing them to pay the 2nd plaintiff herein a sum of Rs.23,97,290/- with interest at 18% p.a. from the date of the suit till the date of payment in full and to pay the costs of the suit.
2.The averment made in the plaint are as follows:
(a) The 1st plaintiff is a public limited company registered under the Indian Companies Act and having their Registered Office at Nirmal, III floor, Nariman point, Mumbai 400 021 and carrying on business among other places through their regional office at Sahupuram Post, Tuticorin District and herein represented by their Subrogee/Power agent M/s. National Insurance Company Ltd who are in turn represented by their Principal Officer/ Senior Divisional Manager.
(b) The 2nd plaintiff is a public limited company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, a subsidiary of the General Insurance Corporation of India and having their Registered office at 3, Middleton Street, Calcutta 700 071 and carrying on business among other places through their Divisional office at 40, Pereira Street, Tuticorin represented by its Principal Officer/ Senior Divisional Manager.
(c) The 1st plaintiff in the course of their business sought to export 10,000 M.Tons of upgraded Beneficiated Ilmenite (Synthetic Rutile) to M/s. Kerr McGee Corp., Oklahoma City OK 73125 as per their work order bearing No. Exp 8398 dated 3.7.98 issued to the defendant. The said cargo weighing in on 10060.15 M.Tons was entrusted to the defendant between 23.7.1998 and 4.08.1998 and the same was accepted by the defendant as the shipping, clearing and forwarding agents of the 1st plaintiff, to be stored, transported and shipped on board the vessel "M.V. NICOLE" for safe carriage by sea to M/s. Kerr McGee Corp., Oklahoma.
(d) The abovesaid cargo was loaded on "M.V.NICOLE" from 5.8.1998 and completed on 18.8.1998. To ascertain the quantum of cargo shipped by the defendant, a draft survey was conducted at the port of loading at Tuticorin on 15.8.1998 as per which the cargo available on board the vessel for carriage was only 9850.830 M.tons resulting in a short shipment of 149.170 M.tons. The defendant could obtain three Bills of Lading only for 9850.830 M.tons., for which alone the plaintiffs could raise their invoices upon the foreign buyer. A second survey was conducted by Capt. Krishnan and Co., which assessed the available cargo on board to be 9850.83 M.tons. On a draft survey conducted by M/s. EWIG International Marine Corp., at Mobile, Alabama from 12.10.1998 to 14.10.1998 and as per their final survey report dated 14.10.1998 the cargo was found to weigh 9899.126 M.Tons as against the proposed shipment of which the defendant took charge as per the trip sheets resulting in a short shipment of 100.874 M.Tons to the consignee. The plaintiffs submit that though the defendant admitted the short shipment of 149.170 M.Tons in their short shipment Notice addressed to the Assistant Collector of Customs, Export Department dated 17.8.1998, they are liable to account for 100.874 M.Tons short delivered 100.874 M.Tons short delivered at the port of discharge. Upon such short shipment, the 1st plaintiff sent a notice of loss dated 1.12.1998 which was duly delivered which was denied by the defendant vide reply letter dated 14.12.1998.
(e) The defendant as per the work order issued by the 1st plaintiffs are under a contractual and statutory obligation to take maximum care and precaution in transportation, storing and loading the 10000 M.Tons of the cargo entrusted to them by the 1st plaintiff for shipment. The plaintiffs submit that the short shipment and consequential short delivery of the said upgraded Beneficiated Illmenite is only as a result of the failure on the part of the defendant to take proper care and caution in transporting and loading the cargo on board the vessel for carriage by sea and failure to discharge their contractual and statuory obligation as the Shipping, Clearing and forwarding agents of the 1st plaintiff's. Though the defendant is liable to account for 149.170 M.Tons admittedly short shipped by them, the claim against them is restricted to 100.874 M.Tons reckoned from the figures furnished by the surveyors at the port of discharge. The defendant is liable to make good the loss.
(f) As a result of negligence and failure on the part of the defendant to take proper care and caution in transporting and delivering the above said cargo, the 1st plaintiff suffered a loss of Rs.23,97,290/-. The suit consignment was insured with the 2nd plaintiff's under their policy bearing No.501200/4400007/97 and as per the terms and conditions of the said policy of Insurance, the 1st plaintiff's claim was settled for Rs.20,31,602/- towards value of cargo short shipped on 24.2.1999 and for Rs.3,65,688/- towards the excise duty on 5.11.1999 by the 2nd plaintiff in favour of the 1st plaintiff. On receipt of such indemnity, the 1st plaintiff executed two Letters of Subrogation & Special Powers of Attorney dated 26.2.1999 for a sum of Rs.20,31,602/- towards the cargo short shipped and on 10.11.1999 for a sum of Rs.3,65,688/- towards payment of Excise Duty respectively. Thus by virtue of such execution of Letters of Subrogation & Special Powers of Attorney for an aggregate sum of Rs.23,97,290/- by virtue of Section 79 of the Marine Insurance Act, the 2nd plaintiffs are entitled to file and maintain this suit in their own name.
(g) After the settlement of the claim of the 1st plaintiff by the 2nd plaintiff, the 2nd plaintiff through their advocates lodged a claim with the defendants vide their registered letter dated 19.05.2000 which was duly acknowledged, calling upon the defendant to pay the 2nd plaintiffs, the value of the cargo short shipped by them, which notice was served on the defendants under clear postal acknowledgment. The defendant through their advocates vide their reply dated 25.5.200 denied their liability on illegal and untenable grounds. The plaintiffs counsel sent a rejoinder to defendant's counsel vide letter dated 1.8.2000 claiming a sum of Rs.23,97,290/- being the value of the cargo short shipped and the excise duty paid by the plaintiffs for which notice the defendant's counsel sent a reply dated 7.8.2000, where the liability of the defendant's was denied on untenable grounds. Hence the suit.
3. The defendant has filed a written statement contending as follows:-
(a) The defendant had been issued a work order dated 3.7.1998. Pursuant thereto, the defendant acting in its capacity as a handling contractor carried out the work set out in the work order. The transaction, subject matter of the present proceedings, pertain to shipment of upgraded ilmenite from the 1st plaintiff's factory at Sahupuram to be loaded on to a vessel at Tuticorin port. The cargo had to be packed and the mouths of the bags had to be properly sealed by M/s. DCW Limited and the defendant was only responsible for the tasks set out in the work order. As per the weighment carried out at the DCW Ltd premises at Sahupuram, there was a net weight of 10,000.15 M.T. However, in terms of the weighment carried out at the Port Trust Weigh Bridge, the figure was 10,098.420 M.T. At the time of the draft survey conducted at the Port of loading at Tuticorin on 15.8.1998, the defendant as the handling contractor was responsible for loading the consignment at the factory premises by loading on the packed ilmenite ore that was to be provided in bags with closed mouths and transporting the same to the Shankagiri Godown of the defendant at Tuticorin for storage prior to shipment and thereafter loading the consignment from the transit godown and transporting the same to the berth in Tuticorin Port Trust and loading on board the vessel. Thereafter, on the directions of M/s. DCW Ltd, the defendant was directed to load the cargo on the vessel M.V. Nicole and the entire loading operations were conducted by following all the precautions. Due to inherent defect in the bags provided by the plaintiff whereby there were holes in the bags and also because the mouths were not properly sealed and had not been tied properly with wires during the operations, there was constant leakage and during the loading operations and further some of the mouths of the bags also opened leading to spillage. However, the defendant took due care by leading to spillage and took due care by ensuring that the floors of the trucks were covered with Tarpaulin and ensured that there were net slings placed at the floor of each truck and ensured that the siling were directly hooked on to the cargo hooks attached to the vessels derricks. The defendant ensured that during the entire period that due care was taken and the spillage which occurred due to the holes in the bags were all swept and filled into other bags. After the loading operations on to the vessel, a draft survey was conducted. However, there was heavy rolling and pitching, due to which admittedly the survey could not be properly conducted. The defendant states that it had taken of due care and during the entire course of operations, the representatives of M/s. DCW Ltd supervised the entire operation and there was no complaint of any loss or spillage. The surveys could not be correct for the reason that during the survey at the Port of loading there was heavy rolling and pitching of the vessel due to the conditions at sea whereby accurate readings could not be obtained. The plaintiff is put to strict proof of its claim in respect of the survey conducted at the Port of discharge and the defendant denies the claim in respect of the survey done and in any event the survey cannot be correct and no claim can be made based on the survey in view of the inherent vice of the goods which would make the survey inaccurate and the cargo which were stored in the bottom hold of the ship and due to the hot and humid condition at the ship's bottom hold cannot be properly assessed. The survey would also be unreliable due to the fact that out of 5 latches only 3 were loaded. There is always the possibility that any cargo such as in the present case of a bulk cargo, the weighment will not be correct. M/s. DCW Ltd. did not raise a whisper of protest nor was any complaint made during the entire loading process as would be evident from the correspondence and the 1st plaintiff's own letter dated 15.8.1988 specifically admits no fault on the part of the defendant and sets out the fact that the port weigh bridge reflects the quantity loaded and the draft survey is incorrect. Thereafter to the surprise of the defendant, claim of short delivery was sought to be made based on the weighment conducted at the port of discharge. The defendant further states that the statement of facts of the vessel M.V. Nicole clearly shows that the weather conditions were adverse and that the weighment is incorrect. It is pertinent to state that physical weighment and draught weighment will not always be the same and in fact no issue in this regard blaming the defendant was raised during the operations. The defendant denies all the allegation made against them and further submits that in respect of contract between the 1st plaintiff and M/s. Kerr McGEE Corp., Oklahoma City, OK 73125 is not known to the defendant. As far as the claim of the cargo weighment of 10060.15 MT is false since the 1st plaintiff did not in any manner or at any stage conduct a proper weighment and the plaintiff is put to strict proof of its claim in this regard. The defendant further submits that the cargo on the vessel was completed between 5.8.1998 and 15.8.1998 and insofar as quantum of cargo in the vessel is concerned, no correct weighment could be conducted due to the condition at sea and the weather condition and in fact a clean bill of lading could not be issued. The alleged short shipment only arose out of the fact that a proper weighment could not be conducted and for that purpose of customs authorities only the amount that could be ascertained could be filled in the bills of lading.
(b) The plaintiff's claim that the second survey was conducted by Capt. Krishnan and Company but the defendant is not aware of the survey or the results therein, except for the document filed together with the plaint in this regard and the plaintiff is put to strict proof of its claim. The contents of the survey itself indicate that there was no shortfall or lack of due care by the defendant and in fact there is an admission in the survey itself that the loss or short shipment could be due to the inherent defects in the bags of the 1st plaintiff and the improper manner of packing the same by the 1st plaintiff. As far as the draught survey by M/s. EWIG International Marine Corp., at Mobile, Alabama is concerned, the defendant is not aware of the same and denies the contents thereto and the plaintiff is put to strict proof of the same contained therein. The correctness or otherwise of the survey has to be proved by the plaintiffs. It is denied that the defendant admitted to any short shipment and the short shipment notice was addressed to the Assistant Collector of Customs only in view of the fact that proper weighment could not be done by the survey and only a shipment that reflected the said quantity could be intimated to customs. The defendant states that the differences in the various weighments cannot fasten any liability on the defendant. The defendant denies that it has ever admitted to short shipment and in any event such short shipment even if assumed to be correct can never be attributed to the defendant and the defendant is not liable for any loss. The defendant further states that the survey reports filed by the plaintiffs themselves clearly show that without prejudice to the averments made herein, the defendant cannot be held liable for loss beyond its control and arising out of force majeure conditions such as rough sea, strong winds, the heavy rolling and pitching of the vessel and the weather conditions as set out in the survey report thereby absolving the defendant of all liability.
(c) The alleged short shipment and alleged short delivery is not due to any failure on the part of the defendant to take proper care of the cargo or due to any failure on their part to complete their contractual obligations. There was no short shipment and in any event the defendant herein is not liable for any loss as claimed and defendant therefore states that it is not liable in law or in facts to make good alleged loss. Without admitting any negligence on its part or any lack of care, the defendant states that the 1st plaintiff is, even if loss is proved, liable for contributory negligence and the defendant is not liable for the damages. The valuation in support of the alleged loss is also denied and the claim in that respect and in respect of the alleged excess duty is denied and in any event no proof as a basis of such claim has been furnished. The defendant states that the 2nd plaintiff cannot sue the defendant and the plaintiffs are put to strict proof of their claims that loss of subrogation. In any event the suit is liable to be dismissed as the 2nd plaintiff in its capacity as an insurer and as the alleged subrogee to M/s. DCW Ltd cannot maintain the suit against the defendant.
(d) The claim made by the plaintiff was wholly untenable and was therefore rightly rejected. The plaintiff also made inconsistent claims by making claims in respect of different amounts in different occasions. Since the entire transaction, subject matter of the present suit, took place outside the jurisdiction of this court and insofar as the Corporate entity such as the defendant is concerned, when it carries on business through a subordinate office and when the cause of action has arisen only within the jurisdiction of the court, where that subordinate office is situate, the suit can be initiated only in such place and no other place and for the purpose of Section 12 of the Letters Patent and Section 20 of the CPC, the carrying on of business is deemed to have taken place only at subordinate office for the purpose of jurisdiction.
(e) The suit is liable to be dismissed as wholly devoid of merits and therefore the suit may be dismissed with costs.
4. On the above pleadings, this Court has framed the following issues for trial.
"1. Whether the Court is not having jurisdiction to try the suit?
2. Whether the defendants committed breach of work order No.EXP8398 dated 3.7.1998?
3. Whether there was short shipment of suit cargo against quantity cleared by defendant form the first plaintiffs works?
4. What is the loss sustained by the first plaintiff and indemnified by the second plaintiff?
5. To what relief the plaintiffs are entitled to?
5. In the course of trial, the plaintiffs examined the Assistant Manager of the second plaintiff as P.W.1 and had produced Exs. P1 to P21 in order to substantiate the case of the plaintiffs. The defendant examined its Manager one Mr.G.Manikam as D.W.1 and no documentary evidence has been produced on the side of the defendant.
6. I have heard Mr.N.Venkatraman learned counsel appearing for M/s. Nageswaran and Narichania, counsel for the plaintiffs and Mr.Raghul Balaji , learned counsel appearing for Mr.Sathish Parasaran, counsel for the defendant.
7. The Learned counsel for the plaintiffs would submit in his arguments that the first plaintiff, in the course of its business sought to export 10000 M.Tons, Upgraded Beneficiated Ilmenite (Synthetic Rutile) to one M/s.Kerr McGee Corp., Oklahoma City, OK73125 as per the work order bearing No.8398 dated 3.7.98 issued to the defendant. He would further submit that the said cargo was weighing at 10060.15 M.Tons, when it was entrusted with the defendant who being a Shipping, Clearing and Forwarding Agent of the first plaintiff and the said Cargo were stored for transportation and shipment on board vessel 'M.V.Nicole' for safe carriage through sea. He would also submit that the said cargo was loaded on 'M.V.Nicole' for a period of 11 days commencing from 5.8.1998 which was completed on 15.8.1998. At the time of shipment, a draught survey was conducted at the Port of Origin at Tuticorin. It was argued further that as per the cargo available on Board, weighment was done in the ship and it was was only 9850.830 M.Tons and the said measurement of weight was incorporated in the 3 Bills of Lading issued for the purpose of export. He would further submit that apart from the drought survey, a second survey was conducted by one Mr.Captain Krishnan and Co. who assessed the available cargo on the board and he had also reported that the said cargo was weighing 9850.83 M.Tons only. He would also submit that the drought survey was conducted by M/s. EWIG International Marine Corporation at Alabama from 12.10.198 to 14.10.1998 after the goods have reached the port of destination. He would further submit that as per the final survey report dated 14.10.1998 by the draught survey conducted at the Port of Destination, short shipment of 100.874 M.Tons was reported as not reached the consignee. He would further submit that the said short shipment was admitted by the defendant in the short shipment notice addressed to Assistant Collector of Customs, Export Department on 17.8.1998. However, the draught survey conducted at the Port of destination would disclose only 100.874 M.Tonnes as short supply. He would also accepting for the said short supply at 100.874 M.Tonnes. He would further submit that the plaintiff sent a notice of loss on 1.12.1998 to which the defendant denied its liability. He would therefore submit that there would not be any denial towards the short shipment of the cargo at the Port of loading, namely, Tuticorin.
8. The Learned counsel for the plaintiff would further submit in his argument that the short shipment should have been caused in between the weighment of the cargo on 4.8.1998 when it was entrusted with the defendant for transportation and the completion of transportation of cargo for boarding the ship. He would also submit that there is no failure on the part of the plaintiff in supplying the short weighed cargo. H would also submit that the negligence of the defendant's men and the failure on the part of the defendant to take proper care and action in transporting and delivering the said cargo in a safer manner, the first plaintiff sustained a loss to the tune of Rs.23,97,290/- which includes the excise duty paid by the Insurance company, the second defendant on behalf of the first defendant. He would also submit that the said loss could be ascertained as Rs.23,97,290/-. He would further submit that out of the said sum, a sum of Rs.20,31,602/- was sustained towards the shortage of the said cargo and excise duty paid at Rs.3,65,688/- which attached with the goods and therefore on the shortage of the cargo, the Central excise payable for the remaining cargo is at Rs.3,65,688/- respectively. He would also submit that the bill of lading prepared for the transportation of the cargo was also a solemn document and the contents of the said document may be perused and on such perusal, it could be found that there is a shortage of the goods, sought to be transported and therefore, the defendant is liable to compensate the said shortage. He would also submit that the said shortage in weighment as per the draught survey, has been recorded in the bill of lading and the said documents are squarely attracted under the provisions of the Commercial Documents Evidence Act 1939. He would further submit that in the schedule Part-I and Part-II, the documents which are mentioned therein would be sufficient to presume its truth and genuineness. He would also submit that when such solemn documents are produced into court, the court has to take the truth and genuineness of the document as proved and the rebuttal evidence likely to be produced by the other side for disproving the said document, provided such evidence is acceptable. He would further submit that the documents namely, the bill of lading have been mentioned in the schedule and therefore, the bills of lading used for the transportation of the cargo in this case could be presumed to be true document and the contents mentioned therein are also true and genuine according to the provisions of the Commercial Documents Evidence Act, 1939. Therefore, he would submit in his arguments that the draught survey done at the port of destination would show there was a short fall of 100.874 M.tonnes in the supply and that too, was happened during the transit and therefore, the defendant is liable to pay the said sum to the first plaintiff. He would further submit in his arguments that the second plaintiff was the insurer of the first plaintiff and on verifying the genuineness of the short shipments, the second plaintiff as a insurer of the first plaintiff has paid the said sum of Rs.23,97,290/- and the first plaintiff was made good the loss by the second plaintiff. The first plaintiff had already executed necessary document of subrogation to claim the suit amount as short shipment and also on the foot of the said document on subrogation, the second plaintiff is entitled to proceed against the defendant for the recovery of the said damages caused due to the short shipment of cargo.
9. The learned counsel for the plaintiff would further submit in his argument that the clean Bill of Lading issued by the carrier containing the weighment of the cargo would be a conclusive proof regarding the shipped cargo and the difference in between the cargo entrusted to the defendant by the 1st plaintiff and the cargo shipped would amply show the shortage of shipment of cargo. Similarly, he would also submit that the draught survey report done at the port of destination produced in Ex.P10 coupled with the covering letter would show that the discharged cargo was only 9899.126 M.Tonnes and the said documents are attracted by the provisions of the Commercial Documents Evidence Act, 1939. He would further submit that those documents need not be proved by any other evidence unless it is disproved by rebuttal evidence by the other side. He would also cite a judgment of Kerala High Court reported in AIR 1979 Kerala 187 for the proposition that the weighment of the cargo as referred in Bill of Lading, in good condition would indicate the actual weight of the said cargo and it would be relevant for proving the short delivery. He would also cite a judgment of this Court in support of his argument reported in 1974 (1) MLJ (1) for the principle that a certificate given by an international body showing the weight of the cargo as certified would be coming under the Commercial Documents Evidence Act 1939. He would also cite another judgment of this Court reported in 1977 (1) MLJ (32) for the principle of drawing presumption regarding the accuracy of the protest note and the clean Bill of Lading. He would further submit in his argument that the defendant had not only responsible for short shipment and delivery of the cargo entrusted to him but also for the breach of the conditions of work order dated 03.07.1998 produced in Ex.P2. He would also submit that the condition imposed regarding the transport of cargo was that after loading of cargo at the factory outlets of the 1st plaintiff at Sahupuram, the defendant ought to have taken the lorries directly to the vessel at the port and to board the cargos and to return the empty bags to the factory stores duly counted and bundled. He would further submit that the defendant did not verify as per the condition, per contra, he was transporting the cargo from the outlet of the 1st plaintiff at Sahupuram to the warehouse of the defendant and from there he took the cargo for transportation to the vessel and thereafter boarded the cargo. He would also submit that even the defendant admitted in the written statement that the net weight of the entire cargo at the 1st plaintiff's premises was at 10000.15 M.T and the said cargo after transportation to the vessel it was found in the survey report that it was weighing only 9850.83 M.Tonnes. He would also submit that the 2nd survey conducted by Captain Krishnan & Co. assessed the available cargo on board and had confirmed that the net weight of the cargo shipped was at 9850.83 M.Tonnes and those documents were produced before Court in Exs.P6 and P8, respectively. Those documents would also be attracted by the Commercial Documents Evidence Act, 1939 and there is no requirement of proof by examining the authors of the said report. He would further submit that the admission made by the defendant in the written statement about the net weight of the cargo at the premises of the 1st plaintiff and the cargo shipped in the vessel would enable those documents to be proved as per the case of the plaintiff.
10. He would also submit that the objection raised regarding the jurisdiction of this Court cannot be sustained. No doubt, the cause of action was arising at Tuticorin port whereas the defendant is doing its business at Chennai and its sub ordinate is only having office at Turicorin and where the defendant having worked for gain within the jurisdiction of this Court. As per the clause 12 of the letters patent, this Court has got jurisdiction to entertain the suit. He would therefore, submit that this Court has got jurisdiction and the evidence adduced by the plaintiff would categorically approve the short shipment of cargo and short delivery also and therefore, the defendant is liable to pay the cost of short shipment of cargo as per the cost admitted by the defendant for paying customs duty through Ex.P7 paying at Rs.20,140/M.T. The suit claim prayed by the plaintiff has to be paid. He would also submit that the 2nd plaintiff as insurer of the 1st plaintiff had paid the said money and therefore, under the agreement of subrogation produced in Ex.P2, the 2nd plaintiff is entitled to recover the money from the defendant solely or joining with the 1st plaintiff. Therefore, he would request the Court to decree the suit as prayed for.
11. The learned counsel for the defendant Mr.Raghul Balaji would submit in his argument that the suit filed by the plaintiffs were affected by three elements namely lack of jurisdiction, want of breach and no evidence as to quantum. He would further submit that there is no cause of action alleged to have taken place within the original jurisdiction of this Court in order to bring it to the jurisdiction of this Court. He would further submit that the defendant's address is shown to have been at Madras even though the address of the defendant was at Tuticorin. He would further submit that in the plaint, it has been stated that the defendant is also having an office at Chennai and therefore, it is quite clear that everything has taken place outside the jurisdiction of this Court. He would refer to Section 20 CPC for the principle and would argue that cause of action within the jurisdiction of Tuticorin courts and if the jurisdiction of this Court has to be considered clause-12 of the letters patent should have been complied with. The defendant who dealt with the suit transactions is having its office at Tuticorin and therefore, this Court has no jurisdiction at all. He would cite a judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in 2004 (4) SCC 677 (New Moga Transport Co v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd and others), in support of his arguments. Placing reliance upon the said judgment and the three limbs of clause-12 of letters patent, he would submit that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and on that score itself, the suit claim has to be rejected.
12. He would also submit in his argument that the defendant was entrusted with the cargo by the 1st plaintiff and the provisions of Section 151 of Contract Act governing the rights and duties of bailor and bailee would apply. He would further submit in his argument that under Section 152 of the Contract Act, the bailee who was entrusted with the goods should exercise care in keeping the goods and there is no case on the part of the plaintiff that the defendant was lacking in handling the cargo. The defendant was so careful in handling the goods. He would further submit that the plaint was short of such pleading and also a specific pleading towards the liability of the defendant towards the suit claim. He would also submit that there is no evidence adduced on the side of the plaintiff in respect of negligence in handling the cargo by the defendant and therefore the defendant was not liable for short shipment of any. The plaintiff failed to prove his case. He would further submit that the draught reports relied upon by the plaintiffs cannot be a correct weighment as done in the land since it depends upon the condition of the sea, vessel and the weather and therefore, the difference in the weighment in the land and the ship by way of draught survey report cannot be considered as proved for short shipment. He would further submit in his argument that the draught survey reports said to have been taken in the ship at the port of origin as well as a survey reports taken at the port of destination cannot depict the correct weighment of the cargo and it depends upon various factors like weather, spillage and other conditions prevailed in the ship. He would further submit that the Bill of Lading and its contents cannot be considered as correct but considered as having correct particulars regarding weighment of cargo and other things since such Bill of Lading were prepared on the basis of other documents in which the defendant was not connected. He would also submit that the survey reports were prepared and submitted by the plaintiff's men and those survey reports were also not produced in original but the copies alone were produced without any supporting evidence. He would also submit in his argument that those survey reports were not proved by the plaintiffs by examining the persons who prepared and unless those persons have been examined those survey reports cannot be relied upon. He would also submit that the mere marking of any document will not suffice the proof of such document. He would cite a judgment of this Court reported in 1997 (II) CTC 517 (Kousalya Ammal v. Valliammai Ammal and another) in support of his argument. He would also quote a judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in 1981 (1) SCC 80 for the principle that the contents of the documents have to be proved by admissible evidence even though the author of the document need not be examined. Yet another judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in 2006 (10) SCC 631 (Subhash Maruti Avasare v. State of Maharashtra) brought to the notice of this Court for the same principle. Relying upon the judgments referred above, he would insist in his argument that the draught survey report prepared at the port of origin as well as port of destination cannot be relied upon for the reasons stated in the aforesaid judgment. He would further submit in his argument that the weighment which was recognised would be the weighment at the land and there is no evidence to show that a report was prepared after weighing the cargo at the land of port of destination. Therefore, the quantum as claimed by the plaintiff cannot be considered as proved. He would also submit in his argument that the evidence of PW1 would not be sufficient to prove the case of the plaintiff and in the absence of the proof over the suit claim, the defendant cannot be expected to disprove the case of the plaintiff. There is no evidence as to the proof of documents by the examination of witnesses connected to those documents. He would also submit in his argument that the evidence of DW1 as explained beyond the doubt keeping the cargo godown of the defendant for the purpose of boarding the cargo to the vessel which was at the request of the 1st plaintiff. He would also submit in his argument that there is no evidence on the side of the plaintiff that the said boarding has been supervised by the plaintiff's men and the short shipment was noted by them. He would also cite a judgment of Kerala High Court reported in AIR 1983 Kerala 154 in respect of duties and responsibilities of a bailee, regarding care to be exercised on the entrustment of goods. He would insist in his argument that if the negligence on the part of the defendant was not proved by the plaintiff, there would not be any liability fastened on the defendant regarding short shipment. He would also submit even if the draught survey report are found to be true and those shortage in the cargo would have been caused due to spillage due to the loose packing of the neck of every bag with the iron wires. Even such spilled cargo have been collected and packed in the empty bag and handed over to the 1st plaintiff and therefore, there is no cause of action against the defendant and therefore, the suit has been dismissed as not sustainable. When there is no liability for the defendant to pay any damages for the short shipment to the 1st plaintiff and in consequence, the 2nd plaintiff cannot lay any claim against the defendant. Therefore, he would request the Court to dismiss the suit with costs.
13. I have given anxious thoughts to arguments advanced on either side.
14. It is very much convenient to apply the arguments of both sides on issue wise:-
Issue No.1: The suit has been filed by the plaintiffs seeking for the recovery of a sum of Rs.23,97,290.30 with subsequent interest and cost towards the short shipment of cargo as entered into between the 1st plaintiff and the defendant. The contract entered into between the 1st plaintiff and the defendant through the work order dated 03.07.1998 in Ex.P2 was admitted by both parties. According to the said work order, the cargo namely upgraded Beneficiated Illiminite (Synthetic Rutile) has to be transported through carriage by sea from the port of Tuticorin to the port of Oklahoma and for which, the defendants were approached by the 1st plaintiff to transport the said stocks of cargo from Sahupuram godown belonging to the 1st plaintiff to the Port. The said shipment was stated to be for 10000 M.Tonnes., and there is no dispute of entering into a work order as mentioned in Ex.P2. On the basis of the work order, the 1st plaintiff claimed that the disputed cargo at the godown of the 1st plaintiff at Sahupuram was 10419 M.Tonnes but the shipment at the vessel in the Port of Tuticorin was only 9850.83 M.T., for which, the suit has been laid at the original jurisdiction of this Court. According to the plaintiff, the defendants are carrying of business through their registered office at Chennai within the jurisdiction of this Court. However, it has been submitted by the learned counsel for the defendant that the work order dated 03.07.1998 produced in Ex.P2 would go to show that the defendant was having an address at Tuticorin and not at Chennai. The said fact that the work order was entered into between the 1st plaintiff and the defendant was not denied by the plaintiff. Similarly, the defendant is having a registered office at Chennai was also not denied by the defendant. When the notice was issued by the plaintiff's counsel, laying a claim for the short shipment which was addressed to the Chennai registered office, it was received by the defendant and the reply was sent in Ex.P19 and the location of registered office at Chennai as well as a branch office at Tuticorin have been admitted in the said reply notice Ex.P19. Therefore, the defendant is working and he was doing business through his registered office at the plaint address and was doing business through its branch office at Tuticorin is not a distinct legal entity but it is part and parcel of the defendant at Chennai and therefore, I could see that the defendant is carrying on business within the limits of this Court having the original jurisdiction. According to Section 20 CPC where the defendant is residing, or doing business or works for gain the cause of action would arise at that place for launching a suit. However, as per Section 120 CPC, the provisions of Sections 16, 17 and 20 are not applicable to any High Court having original civil jurisdiction when we apply the said principle and approached the judgment cited by the learned counsel for the defendant reported in 2004 (4) SCC 677 (New Moga Transport Co v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd and others), I could see that the following principle as laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court which would run as follows:-
"10. On a plain reading of the Explanation to Section 20 CPC it is clear that the Explanation consists of two parts:(i) before the word "or" appearing between the words "office in India" and the words "in respect of ", and (ii) the other thereafter. The Explanation applies to a defendant which is a corporation, which term would include even a company. The first part of the Explanation applies only to such corporation which has its sole or principal office at a particular place. In that event, the court within whose jurisdiction the sole or principal office of the company is situate will also have jurisdiction inasmuch as even if the defendant may not actually be carrying on business at that place, it will be deemed to carry on business at that place because of the fiction created by the Explanation. The latter part of the Explanation takes care of a case where the defendant does not have a sole office but has a principal office at one place and has also a subordinate office at another place. The expression "at such place" appearing in the Explanation and the word "or" which is disjunctive clearly suggest that if the case falls within the latter part of the Explanation it is not the court within whose jurisdiction the principal office of the defendant is situate but the court within whose jurisdiction it has a subordinate office which alone has the jurisdiction "in respect of any cause of action arising at any place where it has also a subordinate office".
15. In the said judgment it has been categorically mentioned that the suit should have been filed at the place where the cause of action arose whether it was at principal office or at sub-ordinate office. The learned counsel for the defendant was insisting that the cause of action was arising only in Tuticorin as per the work order and as per the principles of the Hon'ble Apex Court under Section 20 CPC, the suit ought to have been filed within the jurisdiction of Tuticorin and the present suit is not in accordance with Section 20 CPC.
16. However, a judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in 2006 (4) CTC 573 (Jindal Vijayanagar Stee. v. Jindal Praxair Oxygen Company Ltd.) would also deal with the jurisdiction. In the said judgment it has been held as follows:-
"48. The appellant loses sight of the fact that the judgement in the Patel Roadways case is clearly distinguishable on facts since in that case this Court was dealing with the jurisdiction of the 3rd Assistant City Civil Judge, Chennai who was governed by the C.P.C. And the Section 20, therefore and not by the Letters Patent. It is for this reason that in the Patel Roadways case the Court was only concerned with Section 20, C.P.C. And the was in no way concerned with the Letters Patent jurisdiction. In fact, nowhere in the Patel Roadways judgment is there a whisper on the scope of either the Letters Patent jurisdiction of the High Court or Section 120, C.P.C. Which will clearly distinguish the Patel Roadways case both on facts and law from the instant case or the Food Corporation case decided by this court.
51. The principles of Section 20 cannot be made applicable to Clause 12 of the Letters Patent since the C.P.C itself by Section 120 specifically excludes the applicability of Section 20 of the C.P.C. To Chartered High Courts. It is submitted that when the C.P.C. Itself provides that Section 20 is specifically excluded, the principles, of Section 20 cannot be made applicable or attracted when a Corporation is being sued under the Letters Patent. The judgment of this Court in Sarguja transport Service vs State Transport Appellate Tribunal, M.P Gwalior & Ors., 1987 (1) SCC 5 cannot apply for the following reasons:
(i) the principles of C.P.C were made applicable to Writ Petitions on the premise that these would not be contrary to the provisions of Articles 226.
(ii) If the appellant's argument is accepted it would render Section 120 of the C.P.C. Nugatory and otiose since Section 120 expressly refers to three Sections (i.e. Sections 16, 17 and 20) and makes them inapplicable.
(iii) The Letters Patent, is a special charter conferring jurisdiction on Chartered High Courts. When there is a special enactment such as the Letters Patent. Which expressly lays down the criteria on the jurisdiction of the Chartered High Court, it is totally unnecessary and in fact futile to refer to another legislation such as the C.P.C (which is not applicable) to determine the jurisdiction of he Chartered High Court.
(iv) The facts in the Sarguja Transport Case (supra) were entirely different since there was no corresponding legislation which laid down the territorial of the Court exercising Writ Jurisdiction.
54. Thus neither of the C.P.C. Nor its principles can be made applicable to the Letters Patent qua Sections 16, 17 and 20 of C.P.C. It is therefore not only impermissible but also unnecessary to apply the C.P.C. Or import the principles of Section 20 of the C.P.C into the Letters Patent more so when the Court has already held in the FCI case that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court under Section 20 C.P.C. is different from the jurisdiction of the High Court under Clause 12 of Letters Patent."
17. According to the said judgment, when ever the principles of clause-12 of letters patent is applied for a suit filed before Chartered High Courts including this Court, the principles laid down under Section 20 CPC would not apply to such cases since application of Section 20 CPC is excluded to the original side proceedings before the High Courts under Section 120 CPC. In the said judgment itself, it has been pointed out that the High Courts would get jurisdiction, when the principal was not within the jurisdiction at the time of filing the suit but subsequently, its principal office has been shifted to the said jurisdiction. Even then, the Chartered High Court would get jurisdiction under clause-12 of letters patent. In yet another judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in 1999 (2) SCC 446(Food Corporation of India v. Evdomen Corporation), it was emphasised that Section 20 CPC was not applicable to High Courts. The relevant passage would run thus:-
"8. However, under Section 120 of the Civil Procedure Code, section16, 17 and 20 of the civil Procedure Code do not apply to a High Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. Jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court to entertain a suit under its ordinary civil jurisdiction is determined by clause 12 of the Letters Patent, a place where the defendant, or each of the defendants where there are more than one, at the commencement of the suit, carry on business would be a place where the court would have jurisdiction. Therefore, under clause 12 of the Letters Patent of the Bombay High Court, the Bombay High Court would have jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the dispute in the present case because the appellant does carry on business in Bombay."
18. When the principles laid down in the aforesaid judgment has been read along with the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in 2006 (4) CTC 573 (SC). I could understand that the defendant who is having a principal office within the jurisdiction of this Court and was doing business on the date of filing of the suit would comply with the requisite of clause-12 of the letters patent since the principles laid down under Section 20 CPC cannot be applied to the High Courts having jurisdiction to try any suit, and therefore, the principles laid down in the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court cited by the learned counsel for the defendant reported in 2004 (4) SCC 677 (New Moga Transport Co v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd and others), would not apply. Therefore, I could see that as per the ingredients in the third limb of of clause-12 of letters patent, the defendant who is having his business place at Chennai within the original jurisdiction of this Court is also liable to be proceeded with the suit claim and this Court has got territorial jurisdiction to try the suit against the defendant. Accordingly, this issue is decided in favour of the plaintiffs.
Issue Nos.2 and 3:
19. The works contract was produced in Ex.P2 dated 3.07.21998 entered into between the 1st plaintiff and the defendant and as per the works order, the cargo was entrusted with the defendant at the godown of the 1st plaintiff, weighing in all 10060.15 M.Tonnes which was admitted by both sides. The said cargo was taken possession in between 23.07.1998 and 04.08.1998 for shipping them on board in the vessel "M.V. NICOLE" for safe carriage by sea to M/s. Kerr McGee Corp., Oklahoma. It is also an admitted fact that the said cargo, entrusted with the defendant was loaded at the said ship from 05.08.1998 till 15.08.1998. It was also an admitted fact that there was a draught survey taken by the plaintiff as well as the defendant separately. According to the plaintiff, the draught survey was taken and it showed that the shipped cargo was only to the tune of 9850.830 M.Tonnes and on that basis, invoices were also raised to the foreign buyer and Bill of Lading was prepared. The Bill of Lading was produced as Ex.P5. The said invoices prepared by the plaintiff was produced as Ex.P4.
20. Now, whether the weighment as mentioned in Bill of Lading could be true or not is the question. According to the plaintiff, the defendant had also conducted a draught survey through M/s.Celebrity Seascans (P) Ltd., and the defendant did not furnish or file the said report before the Court. It was admitted by the defendants' witness that the defendant, 1st plaintiff, the Captain and Chief Officer of the ship participated during the survey. In the said circumstances, whether the draught survey produced by the plaintiff to show that the shipped cargo weighing only 9850.830 M.Tonnes would be a correct one. No doubt, the plaintiff has also produced yet another draught survey report conducted by the Captain, the 2nd survey report, which would also go to show that the loaded cargo at the ship "M.V. NICOLE" as done by the defendant was only to the weighment of 9850.830 M.Tonnes. The contentions raised by the learned counsel for the defendant was that the survey reports were filed in as xerox or photo copies and they could not be relied upon by the Court so as to ascertain the correct weighment of the cargo shipped on the basis of such survey reports. Catena of judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court were relied upon by the learned counsel for the defendant. According to the judgment of this Court reported in 1997 (II) CTC 517 (Kousalya Ammal v. Valliammai Ammal and another), it has been laid down as follows:-
"16.No prejudice should be caused to the respondent by marking the document. Mere marking the document does not prove any of the recitals of the document itself. The truth of the document has to be independently proved."
21. The said view was also approved in a judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in 1981 (1) SCC 80 (Ramji Dayawala and sons (p) Ltd., Invest Import). The relevant passage would run as follows:-
"Undoubtedly, mere proof of the handwriting of a document would not tantamount to proof of all the contents or the facts stated in the document. If the truth of the facts stated in the document. If the truth of the facts stated in a document is in issue mere proof of the hand writing and execution of the document would not furnish evidence of the truth of the facts or contents of the document. The truth or otherwise of the facts or contents so stated would have to be proved by admissible evidence, i.e., by the evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue. But in this case Bhikhubhai Gourishankar Joshi who filed an affidavit on behalf of the appellant has referred to the averments in the letter and the cable."
22. The proof of contents of a document can be done only by examining the author, as laid down in a judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in 2006 (10) SCC 631 (Subhash Maruti Avasare v. State of Maharashtra). The relevant passage would run as follows:-
"17. ..... By mere filing of a document, its contents are not proved. A certificate issued by an expert should be brought on record by examining him."
23. It has been categorically laid down by this Court as well as the Hon'ble Apex Court that the mere production of document as exhibits would not be sufficient for proving a case. No doubt, the draught survey report produced by the plaintiff in Exs.P6, P8, P10 and P11 are the copies. No surveyor has been examined on the side of the plaintiff. However, it has been argued that those documents, Bill of Lading produced in Ex.P5 and Ex.P7, the short shipment notice issued by the defendant itself would show that the weighment mentioned in Bill of Lading was perfectly tallied with the weighment mentioned with draught survey report. According to the plaintiff, the said Bill of Lading is a solemn document and it is protected by Commercial Documents Evidence Act and its genuineness can be presumed under Section 3 of the said Act. The certificate of survey, declaration of survey have been enumerated in item 7 of Part of the schedule which are listed under the category of sale are covered under Section 3(A) of the said Act. Unless and otherwise those documents produced into Court are shown to be otherwise presumed to be genuine documents and their proof is not required by the producer, those documents, even though admitted as copies in evidence, it was not objected by the defendant while marking the copies of survey reports in evidence. Whether such presumption can be sustainable is another question. It has been categorically admitted by DW1 that the short shipment notice produced in Ex.P7 was prepared by the defendant and was sent to Assistant Commissioner of Customs for information. According to the said document, three shipping bills were sent for different quantities and amendment was sought to be carried out in respect of one shipping bill to be amended as 6170 M.T., instead of 6169 M.T. The evidence of DW1, would further show that the amendment of Bill of Lading produced in Ex.P5 was made as per their letter in Ex.P7. Therefore, I could see that the Bill of Lading prepared and produced in Ex.P5 contained the weight of the boarded cargo, after the entrustment of the cargo with the defendant by the 1st plaintiff. On verification of Ex.P5 Bill of Lading, it was a clean Bill of Lading in which the weighment of the boarded cargo was referred as 1730 + 2100 + 6020.830 M.Tonnes. The total boarded cargo was 9850.830 M.Tonnes. The said Bill of Lading were not disputed by the defendant. Even if it is disputed, those Bills of Lading are solemn documents having the protection under Section 3(A) of the Commercial Documents Evidence Act, 1939. The short shipment notice produced in Ex.P7 is the document prepared and sent to Assistant Commissioner of Customs by the defendant which would confirm the Bills of Lading, apart from the evidence given by the defendant as DW1, regarding genuineness of Bill of Lading in Ex.P5. Therefore, I could find that the production of the copies of the Bill of Lading could not be said as not proved before this Court, for merely its author was not examined. Similarly, the survey reports submitted in Exs.P6, P8, P9 to P11 both at the port of origin and at the port of destination are also protected by the provisions of Section 3 of Commercial Documents Evidence Act and therefore, the principle laid down by the judgment of this Court as well as the Hon'ble Apex Court as to the examination of the author of those documents for their proof is not applicable to the facts of the present case. According to the admission given by DW1, the entrusted cargo was weighing 10089 M.Tonnes when weighed at the ware house belonging to 1st plaintiff. It is proved that the shipped cargo was weighing only at 9850.830 M.Tonnes, and therefore, there would be a short shipment of cargo.
24. As regards the work order in Ex.P20 there is a clause II (v) that loading of cargo in the vessel should be done directly from lorry received from the factory and to return the empty bags after duly counted and bundled to the 1st plaintiff and the said condition was admittedly present in the work order. Therefore, the entrusted cargo at the Sahupuram factory stores should have been transported directly from the said godown to the port for boarding them, the ship. According to the evidence of DW1 the cargo was transported by the trucks and were unloaded from the trucks and were kept in their godown for some time and reloaded into the trucks for transporting the same to the port of Tuticorin. DW1 further admitted that he instructed their supervisor to store the cargo in the godown. The said admission of DW1 would go to show that it was a patent violation of the said clause, in the work order produced in Ex.P2. The suggestion made by the learned counsel for the 1st plaintiff was that during the said storage at the godown, shortage of cargo should have been taken place, cannot be ruled out.
25. It was also pleaded that there was a spillage in the trucks belonging to the defendant as well as such spillage also happened at the godowns belonging to the defendant. If it is so, it is for the defendant to show that the spillage was equivalent to that of the short shipment. There was no proof produced by the defendant. Furthermore, it has been categorically admitted by DW1 that there were no defects found in the bags provided by the 1st plaintiff containing the cargo and iron wire fastened at the neck of the bag was also in order. When the evidence of DW1 was such, how the spillage to an extent of 149.170 M.Tonnes would happened was not explained. As per the case of the 1st plaintiff, the short shipment was categorically shown in the draught survey reports produced by him in Exs.P6 to P8 and the admission of DW1 in the written statement was that the cargo entrusted to the defendant was 10060.15 M.Tonnes on 23.07.1998. As already discussed, the said admission made by the defendant in the short shipment notice in Ex.P7 coupled with the Bill of Lading produced in Ex.P5 series and the invoice attached to them, would go to show that the shipped cargo was only 9850.830 M.Tonnes and it was not the actual quantity of the cargo entrusted with the plaintiff at 10060.15 M.Tonnes. The survey report at the Port of destination obtained by the 1st plaintiff and produced in Exs.P10 and P11, which are also having the benefit of Section 3(A) of the Commercial Documents Evidence Act, would go to show that the discharged cargo was not the actual quantity of the entrusted cargo by the 1st plaintiff to the defendant.
26. In the said circumstances, it was argued by the learned counsel for the defendant that there was no negligence pleaded nor found on the part of the defendant in handling the cargo to board them the ship "M.V. NICOLE" after it was entrusted by the 1st plaintiff. However, the admitted evidence would show that there was a breach of condition by storing the entrusted cargo at the godowns of the defendant, contrary to clause-II(b) of Ex. P2. Therefore, the negligence on the part of the defendant is patent. In the said circumstances, it is for the defendant to show that nothing has happened at the godown of the defendant and no pilferage or loss happened to the cargo at the time of removing the cargo from the godown belonging to the defendant to the Port. Such burden of proof was not discharged by the defendant to avoid its liability. In the said circumstances, the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the defendant that the absence of pleadings of negligence would disentitle the plaintiff to claim the suit claim, cannot be accepted. The short shipment as pleaded by the 1st plaintiff was categorically proved at 149.170 M.Tonnes, while the plaintiff had entrusted 10060.15 M.Tonnes.
27. As regards the value of the cargo, the plaintiff relied upon the value as admitted by the defendant in the letter written by him to the Assistant Collector in Ex.P7. According to the said Ex.P7, the value as referred to in the short shipment notice for 149.170 M.Tonnes was Rs.30,04,283/-. However, the value as claimed by the plaintiff was on the basis of the discharge survey report held at Port of Destination which shows the shortage at 100.874 M.Tonnes. The proportionate value calculated for 100.87 M.Tonnes was Rs.20,140/- per M.Tonnes. and the total would be Rs.20,31,602.30ps. The plaintiff further claims the corresponding Excise Duty at Rs.3,65,688/- and the total value for the short shipment at Rs.23,97,290/-. Since the 1st plaintiff himself had reduced the claim towards short shipment at 100.874 M.Tonnes instead of 149.170 M.Tonnes as stated in Ex.P7, this Court is inclined to find that the plaintiff is entitled only to the value of 100.874 M.Tonnes. Accordingly, I am of the considered view that the plaintiff is entitled to the suit claim at Rs.23,97,290/- as asked for by him. Accordingly, both the issues are decided in favour of the plaintiffs.
Issue No.4:
28. It has been categorically submitted that the 2nd plaintiff had indemnified the 1st plaintiff from any loss and there was a valid insurance contract had in between them. Ex.P1 is the contract of insurance and it is also no doubt, the 1st plaintiff has received the money from the 2nd plaintiff and he had also admitted that a letter of subrogation was issued to the 2nd plaintiff. On the basis of Ex.P1, I could see that the letter of subrogation and the special Power of Attorney executed by the 1st plaintiff in favour of the 2nd plaintiff was produced in Exs.P16 and 17, would give a right to the 2nd plaintiff to step into the shoes of 1st plaintiff and ask for the damages sustained by the 1st plaintiff, which was indemnified by the 2nd plaintiff through the settlement voucher produced in Exs.P14 and P15. Therefore, the 2nd plaintiff is entitled to claim the said settled payment of the actual damage sustained by the 1st plaintiff due to short shipment of the cargo in the work order entered into between the 1st plaintiff and the defendant. Therefore, this issue is also ordered in favour of the plaintiffs and the defendant is found liable to pay the said sum of Rs.23,97,290/-. Therefore, the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief as sought for in the plaint. Accordingly, this issue is also decided in favour of the plaintiffs.
Issue No.5:
29. As discussed in the previous issues, this Court has come to a conclusion that the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief as sought for in the plaint against the defendant over the claim of Rs.23,97,290/- with interest. The plaintiffs have asked for 18% interest on the said amount of Rs.23,97,290/- from the date of filing of the plaint till the date of payment since the transaction being a commercial one. It is no doubt true, the said contract was a commercial one and the subject matter of the contract being the cargo shipped to foreign countries which is admittedly a commercial substance, the claim of the plaintiffs seeking for 18% per annum is allowable. Therefore, the suit is liable to be decreed as prayed for with costs.
30. In the result, the suit is decreed as prayed for with costs.
.06.2012 Index : Yes / No Internet : Yes / No ssn Plaintiff side Exhibits Ex. P.1 ... Policy Ex. P.2 03.07.1998 Copy of Work order Ex. P.3 (series) ... Trip sheet Ex. P.4(series) 30.07.1998 Invoices Ex. P.5(series) ... Bills Ex. P.6 17.08.1998 Certified copy of survey report Ex. P.7 ... Short shipment notice Ex. P.8 ... survey report Ex P.9 ... survey report Ex. P.10 ... survey report Ex. P.11 ... survey report Ex. P.12 ... notice Ex. P.13 ... Reply Ex. P.14 ... Receipt Ex. P.15 ... Receipt Ex. P.16 ... Letter Ex. P.17 ... Letter Ex. P.18 ... Copy of Legal notice Ex. P.19 ... Reply Ex. P.20 ... Legal Notice Ex. P.21 ... Reply Plaintiff side witness:
P.W.1 Mr.K.Nagarajan Defendant side exhibits:
Nil Defendant side witness:
D.W.1 Mr.G.Manickam V.PERIYA KARUPPIAH, J., ssn Pre-Delivery Judgment in C.S.No.666 of 2001 28.06.2012