Custom, Excise & Service Tax Tribunal
Delta Logistics vs Acc, Mumbai on 1 September, 2015
IN THE CUSTOMS, EXCISE AND SERVICE TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL
WEST ZONAL BENCH AT MUMBAI
APPEAL NOS: C/205 & 490/2009
[Arising out of Order-in-Original No: CC/PMS/50/2008 ADJ.ACC dated 17/11/2008 passed by the Commissioner of Customs (Export), ACC, Mumbai.]
For approval and signature:
Honble Shri P.K. Jain, Member (Technical)
Honble Shri S. S. Garg, Member (Judicial)
Honble Shri C J Mathew, Member (Technical)
1.
Whether Press Reporters may be allowed to see the Order for publication as per Rule 27 of the CESTAT (Procedure) Rules, 1982?
:
No
2.
Whether it should be released under Rule 27 of CESTAT (Procedure) Rules, 1982 for publication in any authoritative report or not?
:
Yes
3.
Whether Their Lordships wish to see the fair copy of the Order?
:
Seen
4.
Whether Order is to be circulated to the Departmental authorities?
:
Yes
Rainbow Silks
Delta Logistics
Appellants
Vs
Commissioner of Customs (Export)
ACC, Mumbai
Respondent
Appearance:
Shri R.V.Shetty, Advocate for appellant No.1 Shri A.V. Naik, Advocate for appellant No.2 Shri A.K. Singh, Addl. Commissioner (AR) for the respondent CORAM:
Honble Shri P.K. Jain, Member (Technical) Honble Shri S. S. Garg, Member (Judicial) Honble Shri C J Mathew, Member (Technical) Date of hearing: 01/09/2015 Date of decision: 13/10/2015 ORDER NO: ____________________________ Per: C J Mathew:
The issue to be decided by this Larger Bench is whether the provisions of sections 113(d) and 114 of the Customs Act, 1962 are invocable in the case of export under Duty Entitlement Pass Book (DEPB) scheme or not.
2. Briefly stated the facts leading up to this reference are: the appellant, M/s Rainbow Silks, filed shipping bill no 7010127 dated 22nd October 2008 through their Customs House Agent, M/s Delta Logistics at Air Cargo Complex Mumbai for export of goods described as dyed fabrics made from 100% polyester filament yarn with embroidery. Export shed officers, noticing that the invoice declared the export goods to have dimensions of 6.3 metres x 1.12 metres, examined the packages and found them to contain embroidered sarees, hemmed and ready to use. The examination covered five other bills filed at the same time totally valued at Rs 3828937.78. For the purposes of DEPB, the goods as described in the shipping bills would be classified as fabric lengths at serial no 43A of the schedule with eligibility at 8.2%. Sarees, on the other hand, are entitled to only 6.6% being classifiable as made-ups at serial no 43B and thus entitled to DEPB credit of Rs 252209.89 against the claimed amount of Rs 313972.87. Consequent upon the detection of the misdeclaration purportedly to secure undue benefit of duty-free imports, proceedings were proposed to be initiated for confiscation of the goods and imposition of penalty. The appellant waived the right to be issued with show cause notice under section 124 of Customs Act, 1962 and the original authority, Commissioner of Customs (Export), Air Cargo Complex, Mumbai, adjudicated the matter after hearing the exporter and Customs House Agent. In the impugned order CC/PMS/50/2008 ADJACC dated 17th November 2008, the export was permitted subject to DEPB entitlement being restricted to 6.6%. The goods, held to be liable for confiscation under section 113(d)/(i) of Customs Act, 1962, were also confiscated under section 113(d) with option to redeem the same on payment of fine of Rs 75000. Penalties were imposed on the exporter and Customs House Agent. The goods were redeemed and penalty paid by the appellant-exporter before export of the goods. The appellant, thereafter, filed an appeal against the impugned order and another appeal was filed by M/s Delta Logistics against the personal penalty imposed on them; both these came up before the Single Member Bench of this Tribunal.
3. The Single Member Bench hearing the two appeals took note of the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant who, relying on the decision of this Tribunal in Kanhaiya Exports (P) Ltd v. Commissioner of Customs (Port), Kolkata [2006(204) ELT295 (Tri-Kol)], claimed that in matters relating to export under the DEPB scheme, Customs authorities are bereft of jurisdiction to order confiscation and penalty. Likewise the decision in Texport India v. Commissioner of Customs, Mumbai [2006 (199) ELT 97(Tri-Mum)] was also cited to bolster this claim. The Bench also noted the argument of the learned Authorized Representative that section 50 of the Customs Act, 1962 required declaration of description and that the exporter had attempted to misdeclare with intent to avail undue benefit under DEPB scheme. Citing the decision of the Tribunal in Asian Exports v. Commissioner of Customs (Export), Mumbai [2009 (238) ELT 85(Tri-Mum)], which accepted the argument of Revenue that proceedings under section 113 and 114 were valid when overvaluation had been admitted to by the exporter, and in Ramesh Jain v. Commissioner of Customs (G), Mumbai [2009 (238) ELT 783 (Tri-Mum)] it was contended that the impugned order was legal and proper. Owing to the contrary views of the Tribunal as reflected in the cited judgments, the Single Member Bench sought the intervention of a Larger Bench on the reference stated supra.
4. Learned counsel for appellant-exporter drew attention to decisions of the Tribunal in Mercantile India v Commissioner of Customs, Chennai [2007 (215) ELT 158 (Tri-Chennai)], Malboro Electronics Pvt Ltd v Commissioner of Customs, Jaipur [2005 (190) ELT 404(Tri-Del)], Ramayan Impex v Commissioner of Customs (Exports), Nhava Sheva [2005 (189) ELT 446 (Tri-Mum)], Commissioner of Customs (EP), Mumbai v Prayag Exporters (P) Ltd [2003 (155) ELT 4 (SC)], Suresh Enterprises v Commissioner of Customs, Mumbai [2005 (179) ELT 466 (Tri-Mum)], Suresh Jhunjhunwala v Commissioner of Central Excise & Customs, Hyderabad [2005 (183) ELT 60(Tri-Mum)], Trustworth Enterprises v Commissioner of Customs, Tuticorin [2008 (228) ELT 201(Tri-Chennai)], Vishwajyoti Impex v Commissioner of Customs (Adj), Mumbai [2009 (238) ELT 267(Tri-Mum)], Advance Exports v Commissioner of Customs, Kandla [2007 (218) ELT 39(Tri-Ahd)], Commissioner v Advance Export [2010 (256) ELT A20 (SC)], Kobian ECS India Pvt Ltd v. Commissioner of Customs, Mumbai [2003 (157) ELT 662 (Tri-Mumbai), Kanhaiya Exports (P) Ltd v. Commissioner of Customs (Port), Kolkata [2006 (204) ELT 295 (Tri-Kol)], Hewlett Packard India Sales (P) Ltd v Commissioner of Customs, Bangalore [2009 (241) ELT 545(Tri-Bang)], Commissioner v Hewlett Packard India Sales (P) Ltd [2005(316)ELT A32(Kar)], Laxman Overseas v Union of India [2010 (252) ELT 513(Del)], Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd v Commissioner of Customs, Bangalore [2010 (258) ELT 534(Tri-Bang)], Kanji Shavji Parekh (Cal) P Ltd v Appraiser Customs, Postal Appraising Deptt [2010 (262) ELT 83(Cal)], Yashraj Industries v Commissioner of Central Excise, Mumbai-IV [2013 (296) ELT 204 (Tri-Mum)], Kavia Carbons v Commissioner of Customs Tuticorin [2009 (243) ELT 547(Tri-Chennai)], Vrundavan Exports v Commissioner of Customs (Exp), Mumbai [2005 (191) ELT 1036(Tri-Mum)] and Commissioner v Vrundavan Export [2009 (240) ELT A42 (Bom)]. On behalf of the appellant-exporter learned Counsel averred before us that the dispute being specific to classification solely for availment of DEPB credit, the jurisdiction to initiate penal action vested exclusively with the authority under the Foreign Trade (Development & Regulation) Act, 1992 and that the invoking of section 113 of the Customs Act, 1962 was, for that very reason, improper.
5. Learned Authorized Representative placed reliance on Commissioner of Customs, Lucknow v GP Jaiswal [2015 (318) ELT 610 (SC)], GP Jaiswal v Commissioner of Customs Lucknow [2004 (167) ELT 206(Tri-Del)], Yash Exports Inc v Commissioner of Customs, Lucknow [2005 (179) ELT 238(Tri-Del)], Dimension Overseas Pvt Ltd v CC, ICD, Tughlakabad [2005(181) ELT 237(Tri-Del)], Om Prakash Bhatia v Commissioner of Customs, Delhi [2003 (155) ELT 423(SC)], Subhash Embroidery Works v Union of India and another [1988 (33) ELT 267(P&H)], Sravani Impex v Addl Dir Gen, DRI Chennai [2010 (252) ELT 19(AP)], Commissioner of Customs (EP), Mumbai v Prayag Exporters (P) Ltd [2003 (155) ELT (SC)], Commissioner of Central Excise & Customs, AP v Suresh Jhunjhunwala [2006 (203) ELT 353(SC)] and Gurcharan Singh v Directorate of Revenue Intelligence [2008 (224) ELT 497(SC)].
6. We feel that the task before this Bench will not be advanced any further by examination of most of these cited decisions of the Tribunal. The existence of what appears to be contrary decisions is the reason for constitution of this Larger Bench and mere enumeration of these for either side cannot be expected to throw light sufficient to resolve the dilemma. It would be more advantageous to examine the relevant statutory provisions as well as the decisions of the Honble Supreme Court which we observe have been the foundations of these decisions of the Tribunal.
6.1. Section 113(d) is as follows:
any goods attempted to be exported, or brought within the limits of any customs area for the purpose of being exported, contrary to any prohibition imposed by or under this Act or any other law for the time being in force. Section 11 of Customs Act, 1962 empowers the Central Government, by notification, to prohibit, absolutely or conditionally, the import or export of any goods. Section 2(33) of Customs Act, 1962 defines prohibited goods to be any goods the import or export of which is subject to any prohibition under this Act or any other law for the time being in force.
6.2. We also note that DEPB scrip is issued by the field offices of the Director General of Foreign Trade on the basis of value and description of export goods in accordance with the scheme envisaged in Chapter IV of the Foreign Trade Policy for the relevant period. The Foreign Trade Policy is notified in exercise of powers vested with the Director General of Foreign Trade under section 5 of the Foreign Trade (Development & Regulation) Act, 1992. We observe that, in relation to exports, a declaration under section 50 of Customs Act, 1962 in the form of shipping bill is filed before the goods are brought into the customs area for examination and clearance thereof as per section 51. Thereafter goods are loaded on the designated conveyance in accordance with its availability for taking out of India and, thus, completing the process of export. Generally, the verification of particulars filed in the shipping bill is exclusively in the hands of the proper officer of Customs whose reports are relied upon by other agencies and offices of the Government of India. We also observe that section 113 of Customs Act, 1962 which contains the provisions relating to confiscation of export goods was amended with effect from 14th May 2003 by deletion of the phrase dutiable or prohibited that qualified the word goods till then in clauses (c), (e), (f), (g) and (h). It is further observed that disputes relating to rate of duty rarely occurs in exports as these are, by and large, not subject to duty; consequently, valuation disputes or discrepancies in description are, primarily, related to various schemes under the Foreign Trade Policy.
6.3. Disputes relating to jurisdiction to confiscate export goods and to impose penalty thereon have travelled to this Tribunal on many occasions in the past and the decisions in these cases have relied upon relevant pronouncement of the Honble Supreme Court. Accordingly, the dismissal of the appeal of Revenue in re Prayag Exporters Pvt Ltd [2004 (163) ELT A113 (SC)] by the Honble Supreme Court in the absence of any justifiable reason to interfere with the decision of the Tribunal regarding the non-applicability of section 113(d) of Customs Act, 1962 in exports that were neither prohibited nor dutiable led to subsequent decisions of the Tribunal that were produced before us in support of the contention of the exporter-appellant. On the other hand, the decisions of the Tribunal cited in support of Revenue by the learned Authorized Representative are based on the decision of the Honble Supreme Court in Om Prakash Bhatia v. Commissioner [2003(155) ELT 423 (SC)]. Our attention was drawn by the learned Authorized Representative to the elaborate discussion in the judgment rendered by the Honble Supreme Court in re Om Prakash Bhatia in contrast with the limited direction in re Prayag Exporters Pvt Ltd.
6.4. It would appear that the short point considered by the Honble Supreme Court in re Prayag Exporters was whether the consistent position taken by the Tribunal in allowing the invoking of section 113(d) of the Customs Act, 1962 only when goods in question were prohibited or dutiable needed to be interfered with and it was held as not warranted. It is worth noting that till May 2003 many of the clauses in section 113 were liable to be invoked only when export goods were dutiable or prohibited; prohibited in this context was interpreted by the Tribunal with reference to section 2(33) of Customs Act, 1962 as being prohibited for import or export by the Foreign Trade Policy or by a specific notification under section 11 of the Customs Act, 1962. The use of the word prohibition in other clauses of section 113 was also assigned the same meaning as prohibited. This appears to have been the consistent stand of the Tribunal that the Honble Supreme Court did not find it necessary to interfere with. On behalf of the appellant-exporter, the learned Counsel would submit that reliance should not be placed on the decision of the Honble Supreme Court in re Om Prakash Bhatia and other Tribunal decisions, notwithstanding that it was chronologically more recent of the two, because the review petition of Revenue for reconsideration of Prayag Exporters did not succeed despite drawing attention to the decision in Om Prakash Bhatia.
6.5. There can be no two views that adjudicating authorities under the Customs Act, 1962 are empowered to confiscate goods in terms of section 113 and to impose penalty in terms of section 114. It is in this context that the Honble Supreme Court laid down in Principal Appraiser (Exports) v Esajee Tayabally Kapasi [1995 (80) ELT 3 (SC)], and followed by the Tribunal in Sripad Upadhyay v CC Chennai [2001(138) ELT 768 (Tri-Chennai), that mere filing of Shipping Bills will not suffice for initiating these proceedings but that goods must be presented for clearance as a pre-requisite for deciding whether these, being dutiable or prohibited, had contravened the provisions of section 113.
6.6. The consistent stand of the Tribunal in narrowly interpreting the scope of section 113(d) as stated supra, and endorsed by the Honble Supreme Court in re Prayag Exporters, further restricted the jurisdiction to confiscate. However, with the deletion of the phrase dutiable or prohibited with effect from 14th May 2003 in those clauses of sec 113 where it qualified the word goods, this view could no longer be sustained. Therefore, the corresponding restriction attached to prohibition in clause (d) would also be without a logical foundation. Accordingly, the conclusion arrived at by the Honble Supreme Court in re Om Prakash Bhatia could not be ignored any further solely on the ground that the dismissal of the review petition of Revenue in re Prayag Exporters virtually overruled the former. The observation of the Honble Supreme Court on the scope of the word prohibition in re Om Prakash Bhatia is:
6. Next as the order for confiscation of goods is passed by referring to Section 113(d) of the Act, we would refer to the same. It reads as under: "113. Confiscation of goods attempted to be improperly exported etc. The following export goods shall be liable to confiscation: xxxx
(d) any goods attempted to be exported or brought within the limits of any customs area for the purpose of being exported, contrary to any prohibition imposed by or under this Act or any other law for the time being in force."
7. The aforesaid Section empowers the authority to confiscate any goods attempted to be exported contrary to any 'prohibition' imposed by or under the Act or any other law for the time being in force. Hence, for application of the said provision, it is required to be established that attempt to export the goods was contrary to any prohibition imposed under any law for the time being in force.
8. Further, Section 2(33) of the Act defines "prohibited goods" as under: "prohibited goods" means any goods the import or export of which is subject to any prohibition under this Act or any other law for the time being in force but does not include any such goods in respect of which the conditions subject to which the goods are permitted to be imported or exported have been complied with."
9. From the aforesaid definition, it can be stated that (a) if there is any prohibition of import or export of goods under the Act or any other law for the time being in force, it would be considered to be prohibited goods; and (b) this would not include any such goods in respect of which the conditions, subject to which the goods are imported or exported, have been complied with. This would mean that if the conditions prescribed for import or export of goods are not complied with, it would be considered to be prohibited goods. This would also be clear from Section 11 which empowers the Central Government to prohibit either 'absolutely' or 'subject to such conditions' to be fulfilled before or after clearance, as may be specified in the notification, the import or export of the goods of any specified description. The notification can be issued for the purposes specified in sub-section (2). Hence, prohibition of importation or exportation could be subject to certain prescribed conditions to be fulfilled before or after clearance of goods. If conditions are not fulfilled, it may amount to prohibited goods. This is also made clear by this Court in Sheikh Mohd. Omer v. Collector of Customs, Calcutta and Others [(1970) 2 SCC 728] wherein it was contended that the expression 'prohibition' used in section 111 (d) must be considered as a total prohibition and that the expression does not bring within its fold the restrictions imposed by clause (3) of the Import Control Order, 1955. The Court negatived the said contention and held thus: " What clause (d) of Section 111 says is that any goods which are imported or attempted to be imported contrary to "any prohibition imposed by any law for the time being in force in this country" is liable to be confiscated. "Any prohibition" referred to in that section applies to every type of "prohibition". That prohibition may be complete or partial. Any restriction on import or export is to an extent a prohibition. The expression "any prohibition" in section 111 (d) of the Customs Act, 1962 includes restrictions. Merely because Section 3 of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947, uses three different expressions "prohibiting", "restricting" or "otherwise controlling", we cannot cut down the amplitude of the word "any prohibition" in Section 111(d) of the Act. "Any prohibition" means every prohibition. In other words all types of prohibitions. Restriction is one type of prohibition. From item (I) of Schedule I, Part IV to Import Control Order, 1955, it is clear that import of living animals of all sorts is prohibited. But certain exceptions are provided for. But nonetheless the prohibition continues."
Going on to discuss the contraventions that would be considered as prohibitions under any other law, the judgement observed:
The next question is Is there any prohibition imposed under other law which is for the time being in force? For this purpose, reliance is placed upon Section 18 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, relevant part of which reads thus: xxxxx
17. To the same effect, Rule 11 of the Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Rules, 1993 provides. This Rule is to be read along with Section 11(1) of the Foreign Trade (Development & Regulation) Act, 1992, which inter alia provides that no export or import shall be made by any person except in accordance with the provisions of this act, the rules and the orders made thereunder and the export and import policy for the time being in force. Rule 11 reads thus: "11. Declaration as to value and quality of imported goods.On the importation into, or exportation out of, any customs ports of any goods, whether liable to duty or not, the owner of such goods shall in the bill of entry or the shipping bill or any other documents prescribed under the Customs Act, 1962 (52 of 1962), state the value, quality and description of such goods to the best of his knowledge and belief and in case of exportation of goods, certify that the quality and specification of the goods as stated in those documents are in accordance with the terms of the export contract entered into with the buyer or consignee in pursuance of which the goods are being exported and shall subscribe to a declaration of the truth of such statement at the foot of such bill of entry or shipping bill or any other documents."
Hence, in cases where the export value is not correctly stated, but there is intentional over-invoicing for some other purpose, that is to say, not mentioning true sale consideration of the goods, then it would amount to violation of the conditions for import / export of the goods. The purpose may be money laundering or some other purpose, but it would certainly amount to illegal / unauthorised money transaction.
Concurring with the decision of the Tribunal in upholding confiscation and imposition of penalty, the Honble Supreme Court ruled thus:
Considering the aforesaid facts and also the fact that this was the second case belonging to the same exporter, the authorities arrived at the conclusion that it was an organized racket to claim fraudulent drawback or an act of deliberate over-invoicing the readymade garments. Hence, the authority imposed redemption fine as well as levied penalty. In our view, this finding arrived at by the authorities below cannot be said to be, in any way, unreasonable which would call for interference by this Court in this appeal. In view of the above, the dichotomous impact of the two decisions has no further ground to subsist.
6.7. In our opinion, three aspects require to be considered in the above context:
a) that the decision of the Honble Supreme Court in re Om Prakash Bhatia was subsequent to the decision in re Prayag Exporters;
b) that of the two issues dealt with by the Honble Supreme Court in re Om Prakash Bhatia, one was the scope of the usage of the word prohibited used in relation to export goods in section 113 of Customs Act, 1962;
c) the endorsement by the Honble Supreme Court of its decision in re Om Prakash Bhatia in later judgments.
6.8. The decisions of the Tribunal cited by the learned Counsel to canvass the contention of the exporter-appellant place reliance on the decision of the Honble Supreme Court in re Prayag Exporters which was prior to the decision of the Honble Supreme Court in re Om Prakash Bhatia. The Tribunal, however, held that the former would prevail owing to subsequent dismissal of the review petition filed by the Revenue in which the latter decision was brought on record as a ground for reconsideration. The review re-examined the original decision within a limited context and without a discussion of or express repudiation of Om Prakash Bhatia; mere dismissal of the review petition filed in re Prayag Exporters would not nullify applicability of Om Prakash Bhatia. The chronological juxtaposition of the two decisions in the respective civil appeals would accord a primacy to Om Prakash Bhatia.
6.9. Even without the benefit of chronological primacy, it is also seen that the decision in re Om Prakash Bhatia was arrived at after detailed consideration of the word prohibition in section 113(d) of Customs Act, 1962. Having discussed the mandates prescribed in the Foreign Exchange Management Act and the rules framed under the Foreign Trade (Development & Regulation) Act, 1992, it was held that these mandates and rules, if not complied with, amounted to goods being exported in contravention of prohibition under other laws and hence crystallizing the liability to confiscation under section 113(d) of Customs Act, 1962. We would note that section 113(d) used the word prohibition whereas in clauses (c), (e), (f), (g) and (h) of section 113 the word prohibited qualified the goods liable for confiscation. The deletion of this qualifying phrase by Finance Act, 2003 without any changes in clause (d) would indicate that the word prohibition was not intended to be read as related only to prohibited goods. It is, thus, amply clear that prohibition referred to in other sections of the Customs Act, 1962 are not limited to those notified under section 11 of the same Act. Prohibition has a much wider connotation that traverses beyond Prayag Exporters. Accordingly, in re Gurcharan Singh, the Honble Supreme Court observed It not only takes within its sweep the goods which are prohibited under the Customs Act but also under other Acts. It is, therefore, impossible to ignore the binding effect of the decision in re Om Prakash Bhatia particularly after May 2003 when the words dutiable or prohibited ceased to be a requirement for invoking section 113 of Customs Act, 1962 while retaining prohibition in clause (d).
6.10. To reinforce that binding effect, the Honble Supreme Court has relied upon the same decision in disposing Gurcharan Das v Directorate of Revenue Intelligence[2008 (224) ELT 497 (SC)] and Commissioner of Customs Lucknow v GP Jaiswal [2015 (318) ELT 610 (SC)]. In the latter, the appeal of the Revenue against the decision of the Tribunal was allowed holding that contravention of Rule 11 of Foreign Trade (Development & Regulation) Rules, 2003, which required the exporter to declare, inter alia, the value, quality description of the goods, would render the export goods liable to confiscation for having been exported contrary to any prohibition. While the Tribunal had relied upon the decision in re Prayag Exporters to give benefit to the exporter, the Honble Supreme Court relied upon its own decision in re Om Prakash Bhatia to confirm the jurisdiction of customs authorities under section 113 (d) even if the contravention was with intent to claim undue benefits under the Foreign Trade Policy schemes. In re GP Jaiswal, the Honble Supreme Court observed:
6. A perusal of the judgement of this Court in Om Prakash Bhatia would reveal that under identical circumstances the Court held that the provisions of clause (d) of section 113 of the Act would get attracted and the goods may be liable for confiscation when the value of the goods in the invoices is exaggerated. Our purpose would be served by referring to and reproducing paras 18, 19 and 20 of the said judgement which read as under:
xxx
7. In view of the above, the impugned order passed by CESTAT is clearly wrong in law and, therefore, the same has to be set aside. Hence, the decision in re Om Prakash Bhatia had certainly never been nullified.
6.11. This would appear to set the issue to rest; that misdeclaration of quantity, description or value with intent to claim benefits under schemes in the Foreign Trade Policy would bring such goods within the prohibition envisaged in the Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Rules, 2003 which allows section 113(d) and section 114 to be invoked for confiscation of export goods that breach these Rules.
7. We, therefore, decide the reference placed before us as under:
Customs officers are empowered to invoke section 113(d) and 114 of Customs Act, 1962 in cases relating to export under claim for DEPB
8. The appeals are returned to the original bench for deciding on merits.
(Pronounced in Court on 13/10/2015) (S S Garg) Member (Judicial) (P K Jain) Member (Technical) (C J Mathew) Member (Technical) */as 20