Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur
Jaswant Singh @ Jassu Suthar vs Narendra Kumar on 28 September, 2020
Equivalent citations: AIR 2021 RAJASTHAN 108, AIRONLINE 2020 RAJ 674
Author: Arun Bhansali
Bench: Arun Bhansali
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
S.B. Civil Second Appeal No. 150/2020
Jaswant Singh @ Jassu Suthar S/o Shri Hari Ram Suthar, Aged
About 62 Years, R/o Mankad Jewellers, Near Smb Hotel, Main
Market, Opposite Purana Bas Stand, Anupgarh, District Sri
Ganganagar (Raj.)
----Appellant
Versus
Narendra Kumar S/o Shri Bansidhar Sharma, R/o Industrial
Area, Rani Bazaar, Bikaner (Raj.)
----Respondent
For Appellant(s) : Mr. Sanjeet Purohit.
Mr. Rajesh Parihar.
Mr. Surendra Thanvi.
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Rajesh Joshi, Sr. Advocate
assisted by Mr. Devesh Purohit.
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN BHANSALI
REPORTABLE Judgment 28/09/2020 This second appeal is directed against the judgment & decree dated 30.01.2019 passed by the Civil Judge, Anoopgarh and the judgment & decree dated 05.03.2020 passed by the Additional District Judge, Anoopgarh, whereby the suit for eviction and arrears of rent filed by the respondent has been decreed and the first appeal filed by the appellant has been dismissed, respectively.
The respondent-plaintiff Narendra Kumar Sharma filed a suit for eviction and arrears of rent against the appellant, inter-alia, with the submissions that at main market opposite old Bus Stand, Anoopgarh, plaintiff's immovable property is situated wherein shops exist. From the said shops, two shops whose joint size is 10' x 20' were let out by the plaintiff's father Shri Banshidhar to (Downloaded on 28/09/2020 at 08:32:11 PM) (2 of 17) [CSA-150/2020] the defendant @ Rs.14,600/- p.a. by oral agreement with the delivery of possession.
During life time of Banshidhar, he received the rent of the premises, after his death, rent upto the month of december, 2014 was paid to the plaintiff. Whereafter, neither the rent was paid, nor tendered nor sent by money order.
For the period January, 2015 to June, 2015, six months rent of Rs.7,300/- remained in arrears. It was alleged that the material alteration has taken place in the rented premises, as at the back of the rented premises there is open land, for which there is no ingress or egress, the plaintiff wants to demolish the shop and create way for the premises at the back of the shop. Further allegations were made regarding trespass having been committed on Government land for setting up generator and creating nuisance. It was indicated that by registered notice dated 27.06.2015, the tenancy has been terminated w.e.f. 30.06.2015, which notice has been received by the defendant. However, despite receipt of notice neither the arrears of rent have been paid nor the vacant possession has been handed-over. It was prayed that the possession of the suit premises be delivered and arrears amounting to Rs.7,300/- till June, 2015 and thereafter, @ 1217/- p.m. be decreed.
A written statement was filed by the appellant-defendant, inter-alia, indicating that no immovable property belonging to the plaintiff is situated in front of old Bus Stand and there are no shops. It was denied that the shop in question was taken on rent by way of oral agreement with delivery of possession from the plaintiff's father Shri Banshidhar. It was claimed that the patta by the Municipal Board, Anoopgarh was issued in the name of Smt. (Downloaded on 28/09/2020 at 08:32:11 PM) (3 of 17) [CSA-150/2020] Bharpai in the year 1958-59, there is no record regarding Smt. Bharpai having transferred the said property. Shri Bheemraj illegally transferred the land by way of sale deed dated 20.06.1960 to Shyamsunder S/o Banshidhar, how Bheemraj got right qua the plot is not available on record. Shyamsunder is brother of the plaintiff and he has executed the sale deed dated 06.08.1976 in favour of the plaintiff and Smt. Kanta. Shyamsunder had no right; the plaintiff has no right and title in the suit property; the defendant never paid rent to Banshidhar or to the plaintiff till December, 2014; the plaintiff has no right in the property; rest of the averments pertaining to the bonafide necessity etc. were denied. The validity of notice was also questioned, inter-alia, on the ground that a manufacturing unit is situated in the shop for making jewellery and a minimum notice of six months was required to be given, whereas, a notice of only three days has been issued. It was prayed that the suit be dismissed.
The trial court framed four issues. On behalf of plaintiff, plaintiff himself was examined as PW-1 and he produced 24 documents. On behalf of the defendant, defendant himself was examined and he produced 04 documents.
After hearing the parties, the trial court came to the conclusion that the plea raised during the course of evidence by the defendant that the shop in question was taken on rent from Ghanshyam and till the death of Shivpratap, the rent was being paid to him, could not be countenanced and no such plea was taken in the written statement. It was admitted by the defendant that the electricity connection in the shop is in the name of (Downloaded on 28/09/2020 at 08:32:11 PM) (4 of 17) [CSA-150/2020] Narendra Kumar S/o Banshidhar and the water connection is in the name of Shyamsunder.
The trial court further relying on the documents produced in relation to S.B. Cr. Misc. Petition No.1663/2015 by tenant Jaswant Singh alongwith Bajranglal and one Bhanwar Lal, wherein the defendant admitted his signatures on Vakalatnama (Exhibit-7) and also admitted the contents of the petition filed before the High Court (Exhibit-5), were correct and Exhibit-19 a cheque dated 07.11.1991 issued by Jaswant Singh with return memos Exhibits- 20 & 21, found that there was no material contradiction of the documentary evidence produced by the plaintiff.
The trial court also noticed that the defendant accepted that he was doing the business in the shop since 1976 when a cloth shop in the name of Shankar Cloth Centre was there and in the year 1990-91, the business was changed and ultimately, came to the conclusion that there exists relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and that rent was received by the defendant Jaswant Singh till December, 2015, the notice given was valid and sufficient and ultimately based on its findings decreed the suit.
Feeling aggrieved, the appellant filed first appeal, the first appellate court, after hearing the parties, reiterated the findings recorded by the trial court and dismissed the appeal.
It is submitted by learned counsel for the appellant that the two courts below were not justified in coming to the conclusion that there exists landlord-tenant relationship between the parties and consequently, neither the notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 ('the Act') was valid nor the suit at the instance of the plaintiff was maintainable and therefore, the judgment impugned deserves to be quashed and set-aside. (Downloaded on 28/09/2020 at 08:32:11 PM)
(5 of 17) [CSA-150/2020] Without prejudice, further submission was made that as the premises were being used for manufacturing purpose, the notice of three days issued by the plaintiff terminating the tenancy and filing the suit before expiry of six months from the receipt of notice, the notice under Section 106 of the Act stands vitiated and on that count also, the judgment impugned deserves to be quashed and set-aside.
Learned counsel emphasized that there is no material available on record to sustain the findings of the two courts below regarding existence of landlord-tenant relationship between the parties.
Submissions were made that there is no evidence to indicate any payment of rent by the appellant to either Banshidhar, father of the plaintiff or to the plaintiff and therefore, as the entire basis of the suit i.e. existence of landlord-tenant relationship is missing, the suit was liable to be dismissed.
Submissions were made that the heavy reliance was placed on the proceedings before the High Court in a Criminal Misc. Petition, which it was clearly explained by the appellant that the same was filed by one Bhanwar Lal and only Vakalatnama was given, as FIR was wrongly lodged against Bhanwar Lal and appellant alongwith Bajranglal and therefore, no reliance could be placed on the said document for establishing the landlord-tenant relationship.
Submissions were made that merely because the electricity connection stood in the name of Narendra Kumar and the water connection stood in the name of Shyamsunder, the same could not prove the landlord-tenant relationship between the parties and (Downloaded on 28/09/2020 at 08:32:11 PM) (6 of 17) [CSA-150/2020] therefore, the entire basis on which the two courts below came to the conclusion on the said issue is wholly perverse.
Submissions were made that the appellant had explained even the cheque (Ex.19) of the year 1991 purportedly issued in the name of the plaintiff, however, the two courts below fell in error in not accepting the explanation. Further submissions were made that the conclusion arrived at regarding rate of rent being Rs.14,600/- p.a., is belied from the material produced by the plaintiff and therefore also, the two courts below were not justified in coming to the conclusion about existence of the landlord-tenant relationship.
It was submitted that admittedly, the appellant was having business of dye cutting for manufacturing jewellery and as the shop in question was let out for manufacturing purposes, issuance of notice is contrary to the requirement of a six months' notice under Section 106 of the Act and therefore also, the judgments impugned deserves to be quashed and set-aside.
Further submissions were made that at the time of letting out in the year 1976, the appellant was doing cloth business is of no consequence as it is only on the date when notice is issued, has to be seen whether premises was being used for manufacturing purpose and therefore, the notice issued is not valid.
It was prayed that appeal be admitted as the same involve substantial questions of law.
Reliance was placed on Idandas v. Anant Ramchandra Phadke : AIR 1982 SC 127, John Augustine Peter Mirande v. N. Datha Naik : 1971 AIR (Kar.) 365, Kishore Kumar v. Smt. Daya : (Downloaded on 28/09/2020 at 08:32:11 PM)
(7 of 17) [CSA-150/2020] 2017(3) CCC 397, Sharda Alika v. Harji Lal Alika : 2017(4) RLW 3457, P.C. Cheriyan v. Mst. Barfi Devi : (1980) 2 SCC 461.
Learned counsel for the respondent appearing on caveat vehemently opposed the submissions.
It was submitted that the appellant was seeking to mischievously deny the landlord-tenant relationship and in fact, had indulged in denying the title of the respondent-plaintiff and therefore, the plea raised in this regard deserves to be rejected.
Submissions were made that both the courts, based on evidence available on record, have rightly come to the conclusion on the issue of landlord-tenant relationship and the validity of the notice issued, which do not call for any interference in a second appeal under Section 100 CPC as the concurrent findings recorded by the two courts below do not give rise to any substantial question of law.
Submissions were made that the attempted denial made by the appellant regarding the various documents placed on record to establish the landlord-tenant relationship and to claim the ownership in someone else, has no basis and therefore, the judgments impugned passed by the two courts below do not call for any interference.
It was submitted that the petition filed before the High Court, wherein the appellant has admitted his signatures on Vakalatnama, specific admission has been made regarding the landlord-tenant relationship and even in the statement before the trial court during course of evidence, the contents of Exhibit-5 were clearly admitted.
Submissions were made that the appellant was seeking to take advantage of the fact that on the patta of the property issued (Downloaded on 28/09/2020 at 08:32:11 PM) (8 of 17) [CSA-150/2020] by the Municipal Board, Anoopgarh, it was indicated that while the application was filed by Smt. Bharpai, who was wife of Bheemraj, the patta was issued in the name of Bheemraj and said Bheemraj had transferred the property to plaintiff's brother Shyamsunder, who, in-turn, transferred the same to the plaintiff and therefore, the objections sought to be raised in this regard are absolutely baseless.
It was submitted that the appellant has admitted that the electricity connection is in the name of Narendra Kumar, which electricity bills he was paying since long. However, denied that he did not know who Narendra Kumar was, who is the plaintiff himself and that the water connection was in the name of Shyamsunder, the predecessor in title and brother of the plaintiff and therefore, the attempt made in this regard being absolutely baseless, the two courts below have rightly come to the conclusion that there exists landlord-tenant relationship between the parties.
Submissions were made that the appellant, attempted to some how protect his possession of the shop in question by getting a power of attorney from Ghanshyam S/o Shivpratap, after the present suit was filed, in the name of his sons and got filed a suit seeking to question the title of the plaintiff, which action clearly brings out the malafides on part of the appellant and on that count also, the appeal deserves to be dismissed.
Further submissions were made that admittedly, the shop in question was let out for cloth business in the year 1976 and merely because the appellant during course of tenancy changed the user from cloth shop to manufacturing / dye cutting of jewellery, the same cannot entitle him to get a notice for the purpose by treating the tenancy for manufacturing purpose under (Downloaded on 28/09/2020 at 08:32:11 PM) (9 of 17) [CSA-150/2020] Section 106 of the Act and therefore, the plea raised in this regard also has no basis.
It was also pointed out that in execution of the impugned decree, the respondent has already taken possession of the shop in question. It was further submitted that the issue of relationship of landlord and tenant is a question of fact and the same cannot be assailed in the second appeal. It was prayed that the appeal be dismissed.
Reliance was placed on LRs of Mool Chand v. Chhitarmal & Ors. : 2004(2) DNJ (Raj.) 848; Dharmichand v. Parasmal & Anr. :
S.B. Civil Second Appeal No.77/2008, decided on 19.09.2008;
Shree Ram Urban Infrastructure Limited v. Court Receiver, High Court of Bombay : (2015) 5 SCC 539; Vipin Jain & Anr. v.
Bhagwandas & Ors. : S.B. Civil First Appeal No.41/2010, decided on 07.09.2012; Seth Murlidhar Mansinghka Chairity Trust v.
Rajendra Kumar : 2017 SCC OnLine Raj 3248; Harcharan Singh v. Smt. Shivrani & Ors. :(1981) 2 SCC 535; Ruprao Nagarao Mahulkar v. Murlidhar Dagduseth Dalshade : 1982 Mah LJ 104;
Samir Mukherjee v. Davinder K Bajaj & Ors. : (2001) 5 SCC 259;
Kishan Chand v. Sayeeda Khatoon : AIR 1983 253; Manzoor Ali Usmani v. Lal Devi & Anr. : AIR 1951 All 396; Sati Prasanna Mukherjee & Ors. v. Md. Fazel : AIR 1952 Cal 320.
I have considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and have perused the material available on record and made available by learned counsel for the parties during course of submissions.
The suit was filed by the plaintiff seeking eviction of the shop in question based on termination of tenancy by issuance of notice under Section 106 of the Act. Though, grounds pertaining to (Downloaded on 28/09/2020 at 08:32:11 PM) (10 of 17) [CSA-150/2020] bonafide necessity etc. were also indicated, however, as the Rent Control Act is not applicable to the area in question, the said grounds had no relevance.
The suit was resisted by the appellant while denying the landlord-tenant relationship between the plaintiff and himself and additionally, it was claimed that the notice issued was not in consonance with the provisions of Section 106 of the Act as the lease was for manufacturing purposes and a notice of six months was required.
As already noticed herein-before, the two courts below based on the pleadings, oral & documentary evidence came to the concurrent findings that the landlord-tenant relationship exists between the parties and that the notice issued was in consonance with the provisions of Section 106 of the Act. The appellant has questioned the findings by seeking to discredit the material relied on by the two courts below for reaching the conclusion regarding existence of landlord-tenant relationship.
On behalf of the plaintiff, evidence was led to indicate the chain of title to the property wherein the patta was issued in the name of Bheemraj, who transferred the property to Shyamsunder, who in-turn, transferred the same to Narendra Kumar - plaintiff in 1976. It is not in dispute that the electricity connection of the shop even now stands in the name of Narendra Kumar and water connection in the name of Shyamsunder. The said aspects are prima-facie sufficient to come to the conclusion pertaining to the aspect that the plaintiff has the ownership of the suit property.
The title was sought to be questioned based on the fact that in the patta (Ex.-1) issued by the Municipal Board, Anoopgarh at (Downloaded on 28/09/2020 at 08:32:11 PM) (11 of 17) [CSA-150/2020] the beginning name of Smt. Bharpai has been indicated. The patta (Ex.-1) in the beginning indicates as under :-
^^uke nj- eqΠHkjikbZ iq=h Jh nsbZjke ckcr [kjhn tehu iwjk irk fdyk uEcj 26&27 rknknh 2400 njxt** The patta, thereafter has been issue qua the area in the name of Bheemraj, husband of Smt. Bharpai. The indication at the beginning, as quoted herein-before, starts with ' nj :' which necessarily means that the application was filed by Smt. Bharpai, however, the patta has been issued to her husband Bheemraj. Bheemraj in-turn, as already noticed herein-before, transferred the property to Shyamsunder and Shyamsunder transferred it to the plaintiff and therefore, the confusion sought to be created in this regard by the appellant has apparently no basis.
The plaintiff placed on record the certified copy of Criminal Misc. Petition (Exhibit-5) filed before this Court, wherein, inter- alia, the following was indicated :-
"2. That in addition to this one another plot measuring 20x60 feet is in the name of Narendra Kumar complainant is in the possession of Jaswant Singh as tenant of the shop.
Jaswant Singh is paying the rent regularly." The appellant admitted his signatures on the Vakalatnama (Exhibit-7) filed alongwith the Misc. Petition, but for the contents of the petition lay the burden on Bhanwar Lal. However, on further cross-examination, admitted filing of criminal proceedings by the plaintiff against the appellant and Bajranglal and clearly admitted qua the contents of the Misc. Petition as under :-
";g lgh gS fd izn'kZ 5 esa vafdr ckrs lgh gSA "
The said admission regarding the contents of the petition as quoted herein-before, and the contents essentially concludes the issue and the plea sought to be raised seeking to deny the landlord-tenant relationship, cannot apparently be countenanced. (Downloaded on 28/09/2020 at 08:32:11 PM)
(12 of 17) [CSA-150/2020] Besides the above, the plaintiff has placed a cheque (Ex.19) way-back of the year 1991, which was dishonoured alongwith the memo, which cheque also was sought to be explained by indicating that the same was given to someone else, which has been misused for the purpose at the relevant time i.e. almost 25 years prior to filing of the suit in the year 1991. The explanation sought to be given apparently is merely an eyewash for attempts to deny the landlord-tenant relationship, which, as noticed herein- before, cannot be countenanced.
The fact that proceedings have been initiated by the children of the appellant based on power of attorney given by the children of Bharpai / Bheemraj by claiming ownership in Smt. Bharpai, after the present suit was filed, is also reflective of the desperation on part of the appellant in some how continue to retain the possession of the shop in question.
In view of the above, the plea sought to be raised seeking to deny the landlord-tenant relationship cannot be countenanced.
So far as the reliance placed on the judgment in the case of Kishore Kumar (supra) and Sharda Alika (supra) are concerned, in the said cases there was no admission on part of the defendants, as in the present case and the said cases were decided based on the facts obtaining in those cases and have no application to the facts of the present case.
Coming to the issue regarding validity of notice issued under Section 106 of the Act, it would be noticed that the notice issued was dated 27.06.2015 and the tenancy was terminated w.e.f. 30.06.2015 i.e. within three days, however, the suit was filed on 04.08.2015 i.e. after about one month of giving of the notice. (Downloaded on 28/09/2020 at 08:32:11 PM)
(13 of 17) [CSA-150/2020] The provisions of Section 106 of the Act, inter-alia, provides that a lease of immovable property is terminable on part of either lessor or lessee by 15 days' notice and in case of lease of immovable property for agriculture or manufacturing purposes by six months' notice. However, sub-section (3) of Section 106 of the Act provides that a notice shall not be deemed to be invalid merely because the period mentioned therein falls short of the period specified under sub-section (1), where a suit or proceeding is filed after the expiry of the period mentioned in that sub-section and therefore, if it is found that the lease is for the purpose other than manufacturing purpose merely giving a three days' notice would not invalidate the proceedings.
The appellant himself in his statement has clearly admitted that he was a tenant in the shop since 1976, in the year 1976, his shop was that of cloth in the name of Shankar Cloth Store, he changed his business in the year 1990-91 and started work of dye cutting of jewellery in the name of Mankad Jewellers.
From the above statement, it is apparent that when the shop was let out in the year 1976, the same was neither for agriculture purpose nor for manufacturing purpose as the appellant was selling cloth only, however, in the year 1991, the use of shop was changed to manufacturing purpose. Whether in these circumstances, the issuance of notice by treating the lease for purpose other than manufacturing purpose i.e. notice for less than six months / filing the suit before expiry of six months from the date of notice would be in compliance of provisions of Section 106 of the Act?
The various Courts have dealt with the said aspect and have come to the conclusion that the relevant purpose of lease under (Downloaded on 28/09/2020 at 08:32:11 PM) (14 of 17) [CSA-150/2020] Section 106 of the Act is the purpose for which the lease was initially granted and subsequent change would not effect duration of the notice.
Bombay High Court in the case of Ruprao Nagorao Mahulkar (supra), inter-alia, observed as under :-
"16. I, however, think that for the purposes of section 106 what is relevant is the purpose for which the lease was obtained at the time when the lease was obtained. A subsequent change of use and subsequent employment of the premises taken on lease for a manufacturing purpose where they were not at the commencement taken for that purpose would not entitle a lessee to take advantage of section 106. The purpose of the lease must be found arid ascertained with reference to the time when the lease was brought into existence. This seems to me also consistent and in accordance with the other provisions of the Transfer of Property Act and law in that behalf. Section 108 (a) of the Transfer of Property Act speaks of rights and liabilities of the lessees. In the absence of a contract of local usage to the contrary, a lessee is under an obligation by virtue of section 108 (a) of the Transfer of Property Act to use the leased premises for the purpose for which they were let and is obliged not to use them "for the purpose other than for which it was leased." To do so therefore, would be a, breach of the terms and conditions of the lease which are implied in the absence of the contract to the contrary. Section 111 (g) of the Transfer of Property Act provides that where a lease permits a re-entry on breach of a condition, then the lessor would be entitled to determine the lease and re- enter. Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act also provides for termination of leases. A breach of terms and conditions of the lease would entitle a lessor to terminate the lease and to re-enter. In Devji's case (supra) Justice P.B. Mukherjee also observed that "the lease for manufacturing purpose must be a lease which at its inception is for that purpose. The lease at the time of the grant by the landlord must be impressed with the purpose of manufacture." Per contra-where it is not so impressed and where that was not the purpose at the time when the lease was commenced, the lessee would not be entitled to take advantage of section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act."
In the case of Kishan Chand (supra), Andhra Pradesh High Court, inter-alia, observed as under :-
"12. ..........Even if that be so, I am unable to comprehend as to how this would go to the aid of the (Downloaded on 28/09/2020 at 08:32:11 PM) (15 of 17) [CSA-150/2020] tenants' case it is now well settled that in order to gather as to for what purpose the lease was brought about in respect of certain premises, reference must be made to the time on which the lease is brought into being. In this case it is evidence that initially when the premises was leased out it was for residential purpose if that be so it is the original intention that has to be taken into recokoning for the purpose of determining the nature of lease and not how the said premises is subjected to treatment later. ............"
Allahabad High Court in the case of Manzoor Ali Usmani (supra),inter-alia, observed as under :-
"7. .........In considering whether a lease is for manufacturing purpose we must look to the original intention of the parties which can be gathered from the deed itself and not to the subsequent conduct of the lessee. If after taking a lease for a show-room the lessee began to carry on any manufacturing operation upon the premises the lease is not converted into one for manufacturing purposes. The second ground also fails."
Calcutta High Court in the case of Sati Prasanna Mukherjee & Ors. (supra), inter-alia, observed as under :-
"17. ..............I need only add that in my view a lease for manufacturing purpose must be a lease which at its inception is for that purpose.. The lease at the time of the grant by the landlord must be impressed with the purpose of manufacture. The tact that the premises after being taken is actually being uses by the tenant for manufacture does not make the lease for manufacturing purpose within the meaning of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. It is necessary to emphasise that a lease or a tenancy must be by agreement, between the landlord & the tenant & both the parties must know that the lease is for manufacturing purpose at the time of the grant. If that not so then the nature of subsequent user of the premises by the tenant without agreement of the landlord will not convert such a lease into one for manufacturing purpose. .............."
In fact, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Samir Mukherjee (supra), has gone to the extent of observing that unless a lease is registered in terms of Section 107 of the Act, the same cannot even be claimed as a lease for manufacturing purpose, inasmuch as, the lease for manufacturing purpose is (Downloaded on 28/09/2020 at 08:32:11 PM) (16 of 17) [CSA-150/2020] from year to year and in terms of Sections 106 and 107 of the Act, a lease of immovable property from year to year or for any term exceeding one year can only by a registered instrument, it was, inter-alia, observed as under :-
"10. In the present case though the appellant has claimed that it was a lease for manufacturing purpose, admittedly there was no registered written lease. Therefore, rule of construction as envisaged in Section 106 would not be applicable as the statutory requirement of Section 107 of the Act has not been satisfied. The plea of the appellant that 15 days' notice terminating the present tendency is bad in law would not be sustainable."
From the above law laid down by the various High Courts and Hon'ble Supreme Court, the legal position is well established that for the purpose of Section 106 of the Act only the purpose for which the property was let out has to be seen and subsequent change in user would not change the nature of lease so as to require compliance of provisions of Section 106 of the Act by treating the lease for manufacturing purposes.
So far as reliance placed by learned counsel for the appellant on judgment in the case of John Augustine Peter Mirande (supra) is concerned, a bare look at the said judgment would reveal that the Court in the said case had come to the conclusion that the change of purpose for which the property was let out for manufacturing purpose was with the consent of the landlord and as such, the said judgment has no application to the present case.
So far as the judgment in the case of Idandas (supra) cited by learned counsel for the appellant is concerned, the same insofar as, the manufacturing purpose is concerned, the work of dye cutting for jewellery would fall within manufacturing purpose, however, in view of the fact that initially the property was let out (Downloaded on 28/09/2020 at 08:32:11 PM) (17 of 17) [CSA-150/2020] for the purpose of cloth shop only, no advantage can be taken of the said aspect.
In view thereof, the second issue raised by learned counsel for the appellant also apparently has no substance.
In view of the above discussion, there is no substance in the appeal, the same is, therefore, dismissed.
(ARUN BHANSALI),J 37-Rmathur/-
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