Allahabad High Court
Kaisar Jahan And 11 Others vs Pashupati Colonizer Private Limited on 30 May, 2022
Author: Neeraj Tiwari
Bench: Neeraj Tiwari
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD A.F.R. Reserved On 06.05.2022 Delivered On 30.05.2022 Case :- S.C.C. REVISION No. - 23 of 2022 Revisionist :- Kaisar Jahan And 11 Others Opposite Party :- Pashupati Colonizer Private Limited Counsel for Revisionist :- Amit Krishna,Tejasvi Misra Counsel for Opposite Party :- Hanuman Kinkar,Shashi Kumar Dwivedi Hon'ble Neeraj Tiwari,J.
Heard Sri Tejasvi Misra, learned counsel for the revisionists-defendants and Sri Atul Dayal, learned senior counsel assisted by Sri Hanuman Kinkar, learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiff.
Present revision has been filed challenging the impugned judgment and order dated 18.12.2021 passed by Additional District and Sessions Judge, (Anti-Corruption), Court No. 5, Gorakhpur in SCC Suit No. 15/2011 (Pashupati Colonizer Private Limited Vs. Smt. Kaisar Jahan and 11 others).
Learned counsel for the revisionists-defendants has challenged the judgment and decree basically on four grounds i.e. maintainability of suit, rate of rent, no proper notice and communication of sale deed.
So far as maintainability of suit is concerned, he submitted that respondent-plaintiff is a Private Limited Company, therefore, to initiate any legal proceeding, resolution of Board of Director of Company is necessarily required. In the cross examination, Director of the Company, namely, Sri Awadhesh Kumar Srivastava, who has filed SCC Suit has accepted that he has not filed any resolution of Company as it was not required. There is no meeting of Board of Directors before filing the case. He next submitted that once there is no resolution, an individual Director cannot file SCC Suit for eviction against the revisionists-defendants. In support of his contention, he has placed reliance upon the judgement of Apex Court in the matter of M/s. Dale & Carrington Invt. (P) Ltd. & Another Vs. P.K. Prathapan & others; 2005 0 AIR (SC), in which Apex Court has observed that individual Director has no power to act on behalf of the Company.
Learned counsel for the revisionists-defendants submitted that it is a question of law, which goes to the root of the case, therefore, it can be raised at any stage of proceeding. In support of his contention, he placed reliance upon the judgement of Apex Court in the matter of Shri Saurav Jain & Another Vs. M/s A.B.P. Design & Another passed in Civil Appeal No. 4448 of 2021 arising out of SLP (C) No. 29868 of 2018.
He next submitted that respondent-plaintiff is claiming the rent at the rate of Rs. 6600/- per month, but at no point of time, it has been proved and according to the revisionists-defendants, rent was Rs. 32/- per month, which has been deposited till the decision of suit under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act , 1972 (hereinafter referred to as U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972). He next submitted that there is no specific finding as to how, amount of rent is Rs. 6600/- per month.
He further submitted that no proper notice has been given to them as notices are returned back with endorsement of postman as "ckj ckj tkus ij Hkh edku ij rkyk can jgrk gS" (Baar Baar Jaane Par Bhi Makaan Par Taala Band Rehta Hai). He next submitted that it is required on the part of plaintiff-respondent to examine the postman in Court to prove the service of notice for which no application had ever been filed by the plaintiff-respondent. Under such facts of the case, notice may not be treated to be sufficient and further postman has to be examined.
Lastly, he submitted that information of sale deed has never been provided to them, therefore, impugned order is bad and liable to be set aside.
Learned counsel for respondent-plaintiff submitted that so far as first contention with regard to maintainability of suit is concerned, it is necessarily required to raise this issue in plaint and should have been part of pleading, which has never been raised. Further, there is only vague assertion based upon the cross examinations not supported by any documentary evidence, therefore, cannot be accepted. He next submitted that it is required on the part of revisionists-defendants to have specific pleading to this effect and in lack of pleading, Court may not travel beyond that. In support of his contention, he placed reliance upon the judgement of Apex Court in the matter of Shivaji Balaram Haibatti Vs. Avinash Maruthi Pawar; (2018) 11 SCC 652.
So far as rate of rent is concerned, he submitted that admitted rent by the revisionists-defendants was Rs. 32/- per month and they deposited the same under Section 30 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 before the Court till the conclusion of this proceeding whereas as per Order XV Rule 5 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as "CPC, 1908"), after first appearance, it is required on the part of revisionists-defendants to deposit the amount before the Court concerned, where the suit is pending. Not only this, they have admitted the tenancy in a written statement with effect from 2011, but even though they have never deposited any amount of rent before SCC Court and they continuously deposited the amount of rent under Section 30 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 before another Court. This fact is never disputed by the revisionists-defendants. Therefore, in all eventuality, they are defaulter of payment of rent either it is at the rate of Rs. 32/- per month or Rs. 6600/- per month. In support of his contention, he placed reliance upon the judgement of this Court in the matter of Smt. Kalawati Vs. Deen Dayal Sharma; 2018 (1) ARC 464.
About the service of notice upon the revisionists-defendants is concerned, he submitted that there is no dispute on the point that notice has been sent to the revisionists-defendants on the correct address, which was returned back with remark "ckj ckj tkus ij Hkh edku ij rkyk can jgrk gS" (Baar Baar Jaane Par Bhi Makaan Par Taala Band Rehta Hai). He next submitted that once notice has been sent on the correct address and returned back with endorsement of postman with aforesaid remark, same shall be treated to be sufficient. In support of his contention, he placed reliance upon the judgement of Apex Court in the matters of Dharam Pal Vs. Harbans Singh; (2006) 9 SCC 216.
Further, he also placed reliance upon the judgement of Apex Court in the matters of Ajeet Seeds Limited Vs. K. Gopala Krishnaiah; (2014) 12 SCC 685.
The issue of examination of postman in Court is having no force. He submitted that once notice has been sent upon the correct address, there is no requirement to examine the postman. In support of his contention, he placed reliance upon the judgement of Apex Court in the matters of P.T. Thomas Vs. Thomas Job; (2005) 6 SCC 478.
So far as communication of sale deed is concerned, once notice has been served, which is mentioned in plaint and also accepted by revisionists-defendants in their written statement that they are having knowledge of change of landlordship of respondent- plaintiff and paid rent at the rate of Rs. 32/- per month. It would be deemed that they are having knowledge of sale deed. Lastly, he submitted that once, they have never deposited any amount before SCC Court, admitted or not admitted, they are defaulter and liable to be vacate the house in question. Under such facts and circumstances, there is no illegality in the impugned judgment and order and same is liable to be set aside.
I have considered the rival submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record as well as judgments placed by the learned counsel for the parties.
The first issue which was raised by the learned counsel for the revisionists-defendants about the maintainability of the suit in lack of resolution or authorization from the Board of Director and whether this question can be raised for the first time before this Court or not.
Learned counsel for the revisionists-defendants has placed reliance upon the judgement of the Apex Court in the matter of M/s Dale & Carrington Invt. (P) Ltd. (supra), which says that individual Director has no power to act on behalf of the Company. Relevant paragraph is quoted hereinbelow;
"At this stage it may be appropriate to consider the legal position of Directors of companies registered under the Companies Act. A company is a juristic person and it acts though its Directors who are collectively referred to as the Board of Directors. An individual Director has no power to act on behalf of a company of which he is a Director unless by some resolution of the Board of Directors of the Company specific power is given to him/her. Whatever decisions are taken regarding running the affairs of the company, they are taken by the Board of Directors. The Directors of companies have been variously described as agents, trustees or representatives, but one thing is certain that the Directors act on behalf of a company in a fiduciary capacity and their acts and deeds have to be exercised for the benefit of the company. They are agents of the company to the extent they have been authorized to perform certain acts on behalf of the company. In a limited sense they are also trustees for the shareholders of the company. To the extent the power of the Directors are delineated in the Memorandum and Articles of Association of the company, the Directors are bound to act accordingly. As agents of the company they must act within the scope of their authority and must disclose that they are acting on behalf of the company. The fiduciary capacity within which the Directors have to act enjoins upon them a duty to act on behalf of a company with utmost good faith, utmost care and skill and due diligence and in the interest of the company they represent. They have a duty to make full and honest disclosure to the shareholders regarding all important matters relating to the company. It follows that in the matter of issue of additional shares, the directors owe a fiduciary duty to issue shares for a proper purpose. This duty is owed by them to the shareholders of the company. Therefore, even though Section 81 of the Companies Act which contains certain requirements in the matter of issue of further share capital by a company does not apply to private limited companies, the directors in a private limited company are expected to make a disclosure to the shareholders of such a company when further shares are being issued. This requirement flows their duty to act in good faith and make full disclosure to the shareholders regarding affairs of a company. The acts of directors in a private limited company are required to be tested on a much finer scale in order to rule out any misuse of power for personal gains or ulterior motives. Non-applicability of Section 81 of the Companies Act in case of private limited companies casts a heavier burden on its directors. Private limited companies are normally closely held i.e. the share capital is held within members of a family or within a close knit group of friends. This brings in considerations akin to those applied in cases of partnership where the partners owe a duty to act with utmost good faith towards each other. Non-applicability of Section 81 of the Act to private companies does not mean that the directors have absolute freedom in the matter of management of affairs of the company."
Further in light of judgment of Apex Court in the matter of Shri Saurav Jain (supra), he submitted that it is a question of law, which can be raised at any stage as it goes to the root of the case. Relevant paragraph of the aforesaid judgment is quoted hereinbelow;-
"Based on the position of law, we find it just to allow the appellant to raise the ground of jurisdiction before us. Allowing the ground to be raised would not require the submission of additional evidence since it is a pure question of law and strikes at the heart of the matter. We shall now turn to the merits of this argument."
There is no dispute on the point that Director may not proceed alone on behalf of the Company. It is also undisputed that it is required on the part of revisionists-defendants to have specific pleading to this effect to provide opportunity to other side to rebut the same. In present case, undisputedly this issue has never been pleaded or raised before the Court below. The Apex Court in the matter of Shivaji Balaram Haibatti (supra) has considered this fact and clearly held that Court has to record the findings only on the issues which are part of the pleadings on which parties are contesting the case. Resolution of Board of Director has been passed or not, is the question of fact and can only be replied if it is raised in the pleadings. In the present case, this issue is based upon the cross examination of the plaintiff-respondent not supported by any documentary evidence, therefore, without pleadings revisionists-defendants cannot take benefit of maintainability of the SCC suit. Apex Court in the matter of Shivaji Balaram Haibatti (supra) has also taken the same view. Relevant paragraph of the said judgment is quoted hereinbelow;
"It is these issues, which were gone into by the two Courts and were concurrently decided by them against the respondent. These issues, in our opinion, should have been examined by the High Court with a view to find out as to whether these findings contain any legal error so as to call for any interference in second appeal. The High Court, however, did not undertake this exercise and rather affirmed these findings when it did not consider it proper to frame any substantial question of law. It is a settled principle of law that the parties to the suit cannot travel beyond the pleadings so also the Court cannot record any finding on the issues which are not part of pleadings. In other words, the Court has to record the findings only on the issues which are part of the pleadings on which parties are contesting the case. Any finding recorded on an issue de hors the pleadings is without jurisdiction. Such is the case here."
So far as judgment of Shri Saurav Jain (supra) is concerned, same is not applicable in the present case for the reason that revisionists-defendants have not raised any legal issue, but factual issue based upon the cross examination of plaintiff-respondent, which cannot be accepted without pleading in written statements as it was held by the Apex Court in the matter of Shivaji Balaram Haibatti (supra).
The second issue is about the rate of rent. The case of revisionists-defendants are that rent was Rs. 32/- per month, which they have deposited till the decision of the suit under Section 30 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. If it is treated to be correct even though as provided under Order XV Rule 5 CPC after first appearance before the Court concerned or SCC Court, it is required on the part of revisionists-defendants to deposit the amount before this Court where the suit is pending, but it is admitted position that revisionists-defendants have never deposited any amount before the SCC Court, but continuously deposited the same before the Court provided under Section 30 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. Therefore, in light of judgment of Apex Court in the matter of Smt. Kalawati (supra), no advantage can be given to the revisionists-defendants for the very simple reason that in all eventuality after appearance in suit proceedings, current rent has to be deposited by the revisionists-defendants before the Court where the suit is pending. Relevant paragraphs of the aforesaid judgment is quoted hereinbelow;-
"Similar view has been expressed by a Bench of this Court in the case of Madhu Mittal (Smt.) Vs. Additional District Judge, Ghaziabad and others, 2004 (2) ARC 326 wherein following the law laid down by the full Bench, the court held as under;
"4. The tenant started depositing rent under Section 30 of U.P. Act N. 13 of 1972 with effect from 01.07.1993 and continued to deposit the rent under Section 30 till 30.06.1995. Defendant admitted that meanwhile he received two registered notices from the landlord dated 27/30 January 1994 demanding the rent. In spite of the said notices, defendant continued to deposit the rent under Section 30 of the Act. The defendant did not deposit any rent in the suit. The suit was ultimately decreed on 30.01.1996 by J.S.C.C. Tenant-respondent no. 2 filed a revision against the judgment and decree passed by the trial court under Section 25 P.S.C.C. Act being S.C.C. Revision No. 60 of 1996. Vth Addl. District Judge, Ghaziabad through judgment and decree dated 19.03.1997, allowed the revision, set aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial court and dismissed the suit. The Revisional Court placing reliance upon, 1986 All. C.J. 782 (Gyanendra Lal and another Vs. Vishnu Narain Mishra) held that even after filing of the suit for ejectment tenant had two options, one deposit of rent under Section 30 of the Act and second; deposit of rent in court where suit for ejectment was filed. The writ petition is directed against the aforesaid judgment and order of revisional court.
5. It has been held in Full Bench Authority of this Court reported in 2000 (1) ARC 653, that deposit of rent under Section 30 of Act, after receiving notice of demand, is not permissible and any such deposit, if made, will not be of any benefit of the tenant. The tenant will have to be treated defaulter in payment of rent for the period subsequent to the receipt of notice given by landlord intimating his intention to receive the rent directly.
6. Accordingly, I hold deposit of rent made by the tenant after receipt of notice dated 27/30 January 1994 was not permissible and the said deposit cannot be said to be payment to the landlord. The tenant was defaulter when the suit was filed and the trial court rightly decreed the suit. In view of the above, I hold that the judgment passed by the revisional court is patently erroneous in law."
(Emphasis supplied by me) Thus, the deposit of rent under Section 30 of the Act after receiving of notice of demand, is not permissible and any such deposit, if made will not be of any benefit to the tenant. The tenant will have to be treated as defaulter in payment of rent for the period subsequent to the receipt of notice given by the landlord intimating his intention to receive the rent directly.
A careful reading of Section 20(4) of the Act/ Rule 5 of Order XV shows that in any suit by a lessor for the eviction of a lessee after the determination of the lease and for recovery of rent or compensation for use and occupation, the defendant is required to deposit at or before the first hearing of suit, the entire amount admitted by him to be due together with interest thereon at the rate of 9% per annum and whether or not he admits any amount to be due, he shall throughout the continuation of the suit regularly, deposit the monthly amount due within a week from the date of its accrual, and in the event of any default in making the deposit of the entire amount admitted by him to be due or the monthly amount due as aforesaid, the Court may, subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2) strike off his defence. The expression "entire amount admitted to be due" means the entire gross amount, whether as rent or compensation for use and occupation, calculated at the admitted rate of rent for the admitted period of arrears after making no other deduction except the taxes, if any, paid to a local authority in respect of the building on lessor's account and the amount, if any, deposited in any Court under Section 30 of the U.P. Act No.13 of 1972. As per Explanation 3, the expression "monthly amount due" means the amount due every month, whether as rent or compensation for use and occupation at the admitted rate of rent, after making no other deduction except the taxes, if any, paid to a local authority, in respect of the building on lessor's account. The admitted rate of rent is Rs.200/- per month which was payable to the plaintiff-respondent. The petitioner-defendant was liable to deposit the entire amount at the first hearing and was also liable to continue to deposit the monthly rent in time from month to month. The aforesaid provision is a beneficial provision and if the petitioner defendant wanted to take its advantage then he must have strictly complied with the requirement of the aforesaid provision.
A clear cut statutory provisions of Section 20(4) of the Act leads to an inescapable and irresistible conclusion that the petitioner-defendant/ tenant was under statutory obligation to deposit the entire amount of rent and damages for use and occupation of the building due from him together with interest thereon @ 9% per annum and landlord's costs of the suit in respect thereof, at first date of hearing of the suit, after deducting there from any amount already deposited by him under Section 30(1) of the Act, if he desired to take benefit of the beneficial provisions of Section 20(4) of the Act. The tenant can deduct the amount deposited under Section 30 of the Act but the deposits of the monthly amount after the first hearing and throughout the continuation of the suit must be made in the court where the suit has been filed for eviction and recovery of rent or compensation for use and occupation. Amount, if any, deposited by petitioner-defendant/tenant under Section 30 of the after the first hearing of the suit cannot be deducted for the purposes of benefit of the provisions of Section 20(4) of the Act. If the defendant wishes to take advantage of the beneficial provisions of Section 20(4) of the Act, he must strictly comply with the requirements and if any condition precedent is to be fulfilled before the benefit can be claimed, he must comply with that condition, failing which, he cannot take advantage of the benefit conferred by the provisions of Section 20(4) of the Act.
If the tenant wishes to take advantage of the beneficial provisions of the Rent Control Act, he must strictly comply with the requirements and if any condition precedent is to be fulfilled before the benefit can be claimed, he must strictly comply with the condition failing which, he can not take advantage of the benefit conferred by such a provision. It has been further emphasized that the rent must be deposited in the court where it is required to be deposited under the Rent Control Act and if it is deposited somewhere else, it shall not be treated as a valid payment/tender of the rent and consequently, the tenant must be held to be in default."
It is undisputed that applicant is having full knowledge of change of landlordship and it cannot be believed that second purchaser (respondent-plaintiff) after a very long time shall maintain the same rent, which was earlier fixed by the previous landlord i.e. Rs. 32/- per month. The acceptance of change of landlordship and continuation of tenancy with new landlord impliedly said that applicant was also having full knowledge about the enhanced rent at the rate of Rs. 6600/- per month. It is nothing, but an attempt to any how continue the tenancy by getting the SCC suit prolonged or dismissed on a frivolous ground.
So far as issue with regard to service of notice and examination of postman in court are concerned, there is no dispute on the point that notice has been returned back with the remark as "ckj ckj tkus ij Hkh edku ij rkyk can jgrk gS" (Baar Baar Jaane Par Bhi Makaan Par Taala Band Rehta Hai). In light of judgment of Apex Court in the matter of Dharam Pal (supra) & Ajeet Seeds Limited (supra), it is settled proposition of law that in such circumstances notice has to be treated sufficient and this cannot be ground for which benefit may be given to the revisionists-defendants. In the matter of Dharam Pal (supra), Apex Court has taken the same view and relevant paragraph of the same is quoted hereinbelow;-
"Learned counsel for the appellant submits that none of the two recitals contained in the notice can fulfill the requirement of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. One recital in the notice terminates the tenancy from the date of issue of notice. The other one requires the tenant to vacate the premises within 15 days from the date of the receipt of the notice. Both are bad in the light of the requirements spelled out by the Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The learned counsel seems to be right in urging the pleas. However, still we feel that the appellant cannot be allowed relief. Law is well settled that an objection as to the invalidity or insufficiency of notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act should be specifically raised in the written statement failing which it will be deemed to have been waived. In the present case, the only objection taken in the written statement is that the notice issued by the plaintiff was "illegal, null and void and ineffective upon the right of the defendant". The thrust of the plea raised by the defendant-appellant in his written statement was that the notice was issued by the person who did not have the authority from the landlord to give the notice. The plea so taken has been found devoid of merit by the High Court and the courts below. The plea that the notice was insufficient in the sense and it did not give 15 clear days to the tenant to vacate or that the notice did not terminate the tenancy with the expiry of the month of the tenancy, has not been taken in the written statement."
Again, Apex Court in the matter of Ajeet Seeds Limited (supra), reiterated the same view and relevant paragraph of the same is quoted hereinbelow;-
"This Court then explained the nature of presumptions under Section 114 of the Evidence Act and under Section 27 of the GC Act and pointed out how these two presumptions are to be employed while considering the question of service of notice under Section 138 of the NI Act. The relevant paragraphs read as under:
"13. According to Section 114 of the Act, read with Illustration (f) thereunder, when it appears to the Court that the common course of business renders it probable that a thing would happen, the Court may draw presumption that the thing would have happened, unless there are circumstances in a particular case to show that the common course of business was not followed. Thus, Section 114 enables the Court to presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business in their relation to the facts of the particular case. Consequently, the court can presume that the common course of business has been followed in particular cases. When applied to communications sent by post, Section 114 enables the Court to presume that in the common course of natural events, the communication would have been delivered at the address of the addressee. But the presumption that is raised under Section 27 of the G.C. Act is a far stronger presumption. Further, while Section 114 of Evidence Act refers to a general presumption, Section 27 refers to a specific presumption. For the sake of ready reference, Section 27 of G.C. Act is extracted below:
"27. Meaning of service by post.- Where any Central Act or regulation made after the commencement of this Act authorizes or requires any document to be served by post, whether the expression ''serve' or either of the expressions ''give' or ''send' or any other expression is used, then, unless a different intention appears, the service shall be deemed to be effected by properly addressing, pre-paying and posting by registered post, a letter containing the document, and, unless the contrary is proved, to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post".
14. Section 27 gives rise to a presumption that service of notice has been effected when it is sent to the correct address by registered post. In view of the said presumption, when stating that a notice has been sent by registered post to the address of the drawer, it is unnecessary to further aver in the complaint that in spite of the return of the notice unserved, it is deemed to have been served or that the addressee is deemed to have knowledge of the notice. Unless and until the contrary is proved by the addressee, service of notice is deemed to have been effected at the time at which the letter would have been delivered in the ordinary course of business. This Court has already held that when a notice is sent by registered post and is returned with a postal endorsement ''refused' or ''not available in the house' or ''house locked' or ''shop closed' or ''addressee not in station', due service has to be presumed. [Vide Jagdish Singh Vs. Natthu Singh (1992) 1 SCC 647; State of M.P. Vs. Hiralal & Ors. (1996) 7 SCC 523 and V.Raja Kumari Vs. P.Subbarama Naidu & Anr. (2004) 8 SCC 74] It is, therefore, manifest that in view of the presumption available under Section 27 of the Act, it is not necessary to aver in the complaint under Section 138 of the Act that service of notice was evaded by the accused or that the accused had a role to play in the return of the notice unserved."
It is thus clear that Section 114 of the Evidence Act enables the Court to presume that in the common course of natural events, the communication would have been delivered at the address of the addressee. Section 27 of the GC Act gives rise to a presumption that service of notice has been effected when it is sent to the correct address by registered post. It is not necessary to aver in the complaint that in spite of the return of the notice unserved, it is deemed to have been served or that the addressee is deemed to have knowledge of the notice. Unless and until the contrary is proved by the addressee, service of notice is deemed to have been effected at the time at which the letter would have been delivered in the ordinary course of business."
Revisionists-defendants have raised issue about the examination of postman regarding the notice has been served at the correct address or not. This issue has also been considered by the Apex Court in the matter of P.T. Thomas (supra), which has held that under such circumstances once the requirement of Section 27 of the Post Office Act has been complied with and endorsement has been made by the postman with regard to service of notice, there is no requirement to examine the postman in Court. Relevant paragraph of the aforesaid judgment is quoted below;-
"The High Court, in our view, has also misinterpreted Section 27 of the Post Office Act. The requirement of Section has been complied with in this case. The reasoning of the High Court on this issue is not correct and not in accordance with factual position. In the notice issued, the Postman has made the endorsement. This presumption is correct in law. He had given notice and intimation. Nevertheless, the respondent did not receive the notice and it was returned unserved. Therefore, in our view, there is no obligation cast on the appellant to examine the Postman as assumed by the High Court. The presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act operates apart from that under the Post Office Act, 1898. "
The last issue raised by the revisionists-defendants is improper communication of sale deed. This cannot be accepted for the reason that notice has properly been served, revisionists-defendants have accepted the change of landlordship in their written statements and also payment of Rs. 32/- per month under Section 30 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. It clearly shows that they are having full knowledge of change of landlordship after receiving the notice and admitted the same in their written statements. Once they have knowledge of change of landlordship, that cannot be without having knowledge of sale deed, therefore, this cannot also be ground for interference by this Court.
Therefore, under such facts of the case and law laid down by the Courts, I found no good reason to interfere in the impugned judgment and order. Revision lacks merit and is accordingly, dismissed. No order as to costs.
Order Date :- 30.5.2022 Arvind